

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

JULY 22, 23, 24 AND 29, 1986

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SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Kassebaum, Pressler, Evans, Pell, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Cranston, and Kerry.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today, the Committee on Foreign Relations commences the first of three hearings to review the situation in South Africa, to take stock of American attitudes toward the evolving situation in that country, and to hear from the administration its proposals for addressing the larger issues of United States-South African relations.

Since the Foreign Relations Committee deliberated last year on South Africa, there has been a tragic increase of violence in that troubled country. The government has responded to the growing internal turmoil with harsh security measures, accompanied by some selected reforms of governmental policies aimed primarily at urban blacks.

During this period, and particularly since the imposition of the so-called state of emergency, racial polarization has deepened. The prospects for continued and increasingly strident forms of violence have grown.

Last year, both the House and the Senate passed legislation imposing sanctions upon South Africa. Last September, prior to Senate passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act conference report, President Reagan issued 12 Executive orders with respect to South Africa, imposing certain sanctions which incorporated much of the legislation contained in the conference report.

The Executive orders issued by the President did not go quite so far as the actions recommended by the conference report. Some members believed that the stronger actions contained in the legislation would have constituted clearer signals to the authorities in South Africa. Other members—and I am one of them—believed that the President's willingness to join with the Congress in exerting pressure on South Africa deserved a supportive, rather than a critical, acceptance by the Congress. We argued that a premium should be placed on the American Government speaking with one voice.

The President's Executive orders contained certain prohibitions on United States bank loans to South Africa, on the sale of computers to South African governmental agencies, and on any nuclear trade with South Africa. Moreover, these Executive orders barred the importation to the United States of weapons and Krugerrands from South Africa, and required most United States firms in South Africa to adhere to certain fair labor standards or face export sanctions here in the United States.

Those orders also required increased funding for scholarship programs involving blacks in South Africa and additional resources for the Human Rights Grant Program initiated by Senator Kassebaum.

Presently, there are several bills before Senate committees that propose increased sanctions on South Africa as a means of demonstrating American intent to promote positive economic, political, and social change in South Africa.

This committee must consider some of the fundamental realities bearing on the issue of sanctions. The first reality is that the United States does not possess unlimited influence and leverage over events in South Africa. This is not to argue that the United States has no influence, but rather, that our influence and leverage are limited and must be applied with wisdom and in the service of well-defined goals and objectives.

In this country today, some citizens speak of sanctions without clearly identifying the objectives which are to be furthered by their imposition; some speak of exerting leverage and influence over developments in South Africa while simultaneously urging total of disinvestment, a form of disengagement, rather than involvement, in the affairs of South Africa. If one of our challenges is to devise better and more effective ways of talking to and influencing the millions of South Africans who would be citizens of the future South Africa, then we must establish and maintain multiple opportunities for communication and involvement with all parties. We must be creative in sponsoring talks and insistent that all potential conferees be free and able to talk.

Americans have been a force for positive change in our relations with South Africa. It was an American group, led by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, that established the first code of corporate conduct in South Africa. It was an American corporation, Kellogg, that was the first company in South Africa to recognize a black trade union.

It was an American organization that was the first educational charity to operate in South Africa with a nonracial board of directors. Throughout our history of relations with South Africa, it has been the United States that has sought to act at the cutting edge of social, economic, and educational reform in South Africa.

These actions have not been sufficient by themselves to bring about the changes necessary for the well-being of the South African people. But they have been sufficiently instructive so as to cause us to question whether the withdrawal of American influence from this situation helps or hinders the promotion of a democratic and just society in that country.

The debate over an appropriate U.S. policy must be broader than the issue of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are a tool, a means of policy, not ends in and of themselves. Economic sanctions,

to be effective, must be carefully targeted, but equally important, they must address how fundamental governmental and societal reforms might be assisted without so destabilizing the country as to lead to worse alternatives.

Whatever steps might be adopted with respect to South Africa, they will have to be taken with both a sense of tragedy and reality. There is no unemployment compensation system in South Africa for black workers, and no welfare system for their families. One looks in vain for concrete signs that the welfare and interests of black South Africans would be served by the departure of American corporations and the sale of American-owned firms to white South Africans.

By the same token, in assessing the potential impact of economic sanctions in South Africa, we must not overlook the effects that such sanctions would have on the neighboring states which remain heavily dependent upon South Africa for transportation, utilities, and overall trade. These countries would, no doubt, suffer increased hardships and strains upon their economies as the impact of sanctions takes effect.

But, despite these potential hardships, seven of the nine neighboring states have declared themselves in favor of international sanctions against South Africa.

Moreover, actions taken by the United States and other Western countries have not led to an appreciable increase in the number of South Africans able to enjoy basic human rights.

Repression and violence are increasing. Large segments of South Africa's black community have come to believe that international sanctions may be the only way to force change.

Our moral outrage at the system of apartheid in South Africa must be accompanied by the moral determination to urge the South African regime to reduce the violence and repression and to accelerate the process of political, economic, and social reform. At the same time, our actions cannot be divorced from the economic, political, and strategic interests of the United States and its allies.

An appropriate United States policy toward South Africa must contain multiple elements—carrots and sticks—and not simply punitive measures. Political polarization and economic decline would likely hurt the prospects for a peaceful solution in South Africa.

The question is whether the United States is going to be a vigorous and active participant in the movement to promote a truly dynamic and democratic system in South Africa, or will seek to withdraw itself from the inevitable process of change in that country.

In the face of a seemingly intractable problem, the American people have always rolled up their sleeves and not washed their hands of it. The situation in South Africa is far too serious for acts of desperation or resignation on our part.

Any American effort to serve as a trusted and reliable friend of both black and white South Africans, encouraging their progress and reforms because they benefit us as well, will always risk the anger of elements in both the United States and South Africa whose interests would be furthered by worsening conditions.

We want to prevent a bloody civil war and the destruction of a nation. In my judgment, the United States must work to encourage

the writing of a peace treaty in South Africa now, by all South Africans, before and not after such a war.

I will turn now to Senator Cranston for opening comments which he may have.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to commend you and Senator Kassebaum for your leadership in pressing the President for strong action against apartheid and against the administration in South Africa that perpetrates apartheid.

I also want to thank Senator Kennedy and Senator Weicker for their magnificent leadership on this issue.

This issue plainly has gone beyond party politics. The President has been wrong on this issue. I think that you know it and I know it.

The United States has been on the wrong side of history on this issue. Tonight, I presume we will hear the death knell of constructive engagement. I trust the President will not seek to resurrect that failed policy.

It is time for Congress to act in the face of the monstrous evil of apartheid.

This committee should act this week. I am glad that hearings have now commenced.

We should proceed after this hearing to mark up and to report out the strongest possible anti-apartheid measure this week.

As Senate sponsor of the House passed bill, the principal, strongest, anti-apartheid measure, I will push my bill on the Senate floor in the next 10 days unless the Foreign Relations Committee starts and concludes action on this issue.

We know the issues that are involved in this. We must act and we must act now.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston.

Senator Kassebaum, do you have an opening comment this morning?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no opening comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes, do you have an opening comment?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that these hearings are now underway. The gravity of the situation in South Africa and the urgency of an appropriate United States response is underscored by the presence here today of a number of our distinguished colleagues as witnesses.

Last year, the Senate approved sanctions legislation 80 to 12. Sanctions legislation earlier had been voted by the House. The conference agreement was subsequently approved overwhelmingly in the House and was on its way to approval by a very large margin in the Senate. It was in anticipation of decisive congressional action that the administration, by Executive decree, imposed very limited sanctions.

The Congress then did not proceed to enact legislation.

I regret that that was the case. I think it would have been better had the Congress clearly gone on record and placed legislation in the statute books.

With respect to South Africa, the situation today is far more serious than it was a year ago. The fundamental intransigence of the South African Government remains unchanged. Apartheid remains in place. South Africa's black political leadership remains in prison.

At the same time, the daily incidence of violence and oppression is worse. Thousands of persons are estimated to have been detained under the state's sweeping emergency powers.

South African military force continue to engage in acts of aggression against neighboring states.

The Government has imposed a subtle and vicious form of press censorship, which makes full and accurate reporting impossible.

The outrage in South Africa demands our response. The policy of constructive engagement is not merely a failure. It was clearly a failure long ago. It is now a tragedy and a disgrace.

The Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group, whose chairmen appeared yesterday at a forum organized by our colleagues, Senators Kennedy and Weicker—and I want to commend them for their very strong leadership on this issue—the Eminent Persons Group concluded as follows:

The question is not whether sanctions will compel change. It is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared defer change.

Nearly 100 presidents of major American colleges and universities have written to us and concluded, and I quote:

Sanctions legislation offers a critical opportunity for the United States to make a forceful, bipartisan, statement against apartheid. Legislation will convey more effectively than anything else the breadth and depth of national feeling against apartheid. Such action at this time offers the best prospect of inducing other nations to follow suit, thus placing strong pressure on the South African Government to pursue a different course.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that in very short order this committee will report out strong and meaningful sanctions legislation and then proceed to carry it through to enactment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Pressler, do you have an opening comment?

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, very briefly I have an opening statement for the record, which I will submit.

Let me just say that I am somewhat in disagreement with the direction I see this morning. Basically this has become equated to a domestic civil rights issue as opposed to analysis of foreign policy and economic policy.

I certainly want to see apartheid ended. I supported the sanctions bill of last year. But since that time, I made a visit to South Africa and Zimbabwe, and I am fearful that we may well be destroying the most forceful tool for ending apartheid if we go to some of the extreme sanctions such as are in the House bill.

I say this with the strongest belief that the strongest force for ending apartheid is the business community, and, as the chairman has pointed out in his opening statement, the American business community.

Also, it is true that some of the neighboring states have taken official stances in support of sanctions. But in informal talks that I had in Zimbabwe, I learned that its trade could be damaged severe-

ly because 90 percent of its imports and exports go through South Africa.

The point I am making is that the destruction of the industrial and business sectors may well force the Botha government further to the right and have the exact opposite effect that everybody is talking about. There is a sort of fever that if we impose more severe sanctions, all of a sudden, apartheid will end. Indeed, just the opposite may occur.

I think Margaret Thatcher has made some very eloquent statements to that effect.

So I hope we analyze this as a foreign policy issue, as an economic issue. Certainly, the domestic civil rights political weight that it has come to have is important. But our business here in the Foreign Relations Committee is to carefully analyze what is going on in South Africa and to try to find a solution.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator Kerry, do you have an opening comment this morning?

Senator KERRY. No, I don't, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask unanimous consent that my written statement be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator KERRY. I would merely comment that I share the views of my colleagues and particularly welcome Senators Weicker and Kennedy here.

Needless to say, I want to thank them for their leadership on this issue. Particularly, I think my colleague's, Senator Kennedy's, trip last year was the beginning point of the heightening of consciousness in this country, and I think their leadership has been very important on the issue.

[The opening statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KERRY

Mr. Chairman, I welcome these hearings on the situation in South Africa. The subject of these hearings could not be more timely, or more important. I hope that these hearings will lead to greater public awareness of the issues and the problems of South Africa, and to a change in U.S. policy with regard to South Africa. That change is long overdue.

Today, South Africa is a nation in crisis. The state of emergency imposed last month by State President P.W. Botha is a testimony to the moral bankruptcy of the apartheid system, and to the illegitimacy of the South African government. The press restrictions imposed by the Botha government, which are designed to keep its brutality and repression from the eyes of the world, are a further admission of its own failure, and of its contempt for democratic values.

But the situation in South Africa today should not come as a surprise to us. It is a direct outgrowth of this Administration's policy of "constructive engagement"—a policy which has already failed. The policy of the new "active constructive engagement", announced by the President last fall, has only given us more of the same—more violence, and retrenchment and repression on the part of the South African regime.

The illegitimacy of the South African political system has finally caught up with it. A system that denies 80 percent of the people all political rights, because of the color of their skin, has never rested on the consent of the governed. Such a system makes a mockery of the Botha government's claims to be a democracy. Today, the Botha regime governs only by an army of occupation in the black townships.

The time has long since passed for empty political rhetoric and empty promises in South Africa. Government promises of "reforms"—reforms which never touch the essentials of apartheid—make it clear that the only path to change is violence, unless the white regime takes immediate steps to enter into negotiations with the

black leadership for a swift transition to majority rule. And the Botha government seems incapable of understanding this.

The Botha regime claims that apartheid is an outdated concept, that apartheid no longer exists in South Africa. As one black South African put it, it is true that the regime has begun to dismantle some of the scaffolding of apartheid. But that is only because the structure of apartheid is now firmly in place.

The history of humankind has been plagued by injustice carried out in the name of racial or ethnic prejudice. The Holocaust engineered by the Nazis was carried out in the name of creating a pure Aryan race by ridding the world of the Jews. And in the 1930's, while the Nazi regime passed anti-Jewish laws and economic decrees, and laid the foundation of hatred for the Holocaust, much of the world sat by and watched, and did nothing.

Today, South Africa is in many ways comparable to the Germany of the 1930's. And we have a choice. We can sit by and watch, or we can do everything in our power now to use our influence for change, before it is too late. It has often been said that all that is required for the triumph of evil is for men of good will to do nothing. And that is the choice which faces us today.

That is what this debate is all about. It is about making moral choices. We will hear much talk in these hearings about economic, political, and strategic interests in South Africa. We will hear debates about the wisdom and the effectiveness of sanctions, of divestiture, of disinvestment. And those issues are important.

But the bottom line is that this is a moral issue. It is an issue of right and wrong, and of which side we choose to be on. And let us never lose sight of that moral choice.

This debate is not over which system is more repressive—the Soviet Union or South Africa. The debate is about race, about repressions based solely upon race. The color of one's skin has been the most persistent and most devastating form of prejudice with which humanity has had to struggle to overcome. In our own country, we have struggled with those issues. And we have made significant strides in erasing prejudices which still linger in our society.

But, because of our alliance with the regime in Pretoria, the United States is seen around the world as being on the side of racism. This has been one of the great hidden costs of this Administration's policy of "constructive engagement". To people around the world, and especially to people of color in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America, the United States today is seen as being on the wrong side, on the side of racism and repression in South Africa.

We need to change that. We need to be on the right side of history. Because there is no question that, whether it takes 5 years, or 10 years, or 20 years, or longer, eventually the black majority will take power in South Africa. And when that happens, they will remember who their friends were, and who their enemies were. And if we are on the wrong side of history, then we will lose all of our influence in the region of southern Africa. We will lose our economic interests, and we will lose our strategic interests. And where we lose, the Soviet Union will gain.

The white minority regime in South Africa professes to uphold Western values, and claims membership in the Western community of nations based on those professed values. But it is our obligation to impress on that government that there is a price for admission into our system if they want to claim the benefits of that system.

I believe that the sanctions legislation passed by the House, and now before the Senate, sends the right signal and the right message. That message is: "P.W. Botha, you are going to be denied membership if you don't dismantle apartheid." That is a far better message, and a message more consistent with our values, than the one which has been sent by this Administration for the past six years.

It appears to many of us that the Botha government no longer cares about world opinion. That is the message conveyed by the imposition of the state of emergency, by the arrests of thousands of black political and trade union organizers, by the new press restrictions, and by the rejection of the recommendations of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group.

The report of the Eminent Persons Group outlines the gravity of the situation in South Africa, and makes it clear that much stronger measures must be taken by Western governments to influence the outcome of events in South Africa. While the South African government may no longer care about world opinion, it is concerned, as the report points out, about "the adoption of effective economic measures against it . . . If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum, and the descent into violence would be accelerated. In these circumstances, the cost in lives may have to be counted in the millions."

In order to be effective, such economic measures will have to include strong and meaningful sanctions by the United States and other Western nations. As the Eminent Persons Group stated in their report, "Such measures may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst blood bath since World War II". Those are words not to be taken lightly.

The time has come for negotiations in South Africa between the white minority government and representatives of the black majority. The South African government must release Nelson Mandela, who is the one black leader universally accepted throughout South Africa. I am somewhat encouraged by the fact that, after six years, President Botha has finally seen fit to meet with Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The fact that they met last month, and again yesterday, is a positive sign.

However, to be truly meaningful, these meetings must be followed up by the prompt release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners, by the dropping of all charges against Rev. Allan Boesak, by the "un-banning" of Winnie Mandela and other "banned" persons, and by the lifting of the state of emergency and of all restrictions on press freedom in South Africa. And the South African government must then enter into meaningful negotiations with Mr. Mandela, with Archbishop Tutu and Rev. Boesak, and other representatives of the black leadership in South Africa, for a transition to democracy and majority rule in South Africa.

At this moment, the South African government does not appear to be ready to take those steps. Tragically, the Botha regime seems to be headed in the other direction, towards greater intransigence, greater repression, and greater bloodshed. But it is not too late for South Africa to change course, before it arrives at the "blood bath" envisioned by the Eminent Persons Group.

Just as the United States and other Western nations took on the moral obligation of combatting the evil of Nazi Germany in the 1940's, so do we have an obligation to do all that we can today to combat the evil of apartheid, and to prevent the occurrence of another Holocaust. If we have no leverage other than economic sanctions, then we must use those sanctions now to bring about change in South Africa, before it is too late.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Evans, do you have an opening comment?

Senator EVANS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just a few opening comments.

I think it is most appropriate and important that the Foreign Relations Committee has initiated this series of hearings.

I cannot think of any example more applicable to the old adage that the Senate ought to be a place where the coffee cools in the saucer than in this emotional and difficult issue regarding South Africa.

I would be most disappointed if, before we have had a chance to conclude our actions and to make recommendations to the Senate as a whole, action were to be taken on the Senate floor, bypassing this committee, which has as its responsibility the analysis and the determination of appropriate measures to bring to the Senate floor.

I have real concern about sanctions, economic sanctions, not because I think they are an inappropriate tool, but because we have used them so badly as a country over the past decade or more. I don't think anyone has pointed or can point to a single case where we have really used sanctions effectively.

They have rebounded against us. We have literally shot ourselves in the foot more often than not in imposing sanctions, and we seldom, if ever, have been able to impose economic sanctions in concert with allies, friends, and others from the Western world.

It seems to me that it is terribly important, as we deal with the whole question of sanctions to try to do it in a way that will gain the broadest possible acceptance and participation by friends, allies, and other nations. Otherwise, sanctions will end up making

us feel good politically, but will not really accomplish very much economically.

I think it is important for us to make broader contacts with those groups representing black interests in South Africa, whether it is the ANC or other groups. We, through our Government, ought to be making such contacts. It is important and I think under the unusual circumstances which exist in South Africa, it is appropriate for us to make those kinds of contacts; recognizing that some share—I don't know how much, but certainly some share—of the leadership and the membership in the ANC is Communist oriented and even supported financially by the Soviet Union.

This does not mean that we should ignore or turn away from contacts with a group which does represent a large share of black hopes and black ambitions.

Finally, I would call to the attention of my chairman and my colleagues that if we are serious and if we believe that radical action is necessary to cure what is happening in South Africa, I would just pose for my colleagues the potential of a solution suggested in an editorial in the *Economist* on July 19, the current issue. It is radical. It very likely would work and work rapidly, but to the great consternation of banks and governments and others in the Western world.

They say in the key part of their editorial,

If Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission to Pretoria draws its expected blank, governments in North America, the EEC, and the Commonwealth would be wise to stop shouting at each other and consider whether to issue some communique like "Unless Mr. Nelson Mandela is released by September 30, the central banks signing this statement will start to sell gold from their vaults with the object of slashing gold's market price." This would make a large cut in South Africa's earnings within an hour because private hoarders from Bombay to Britany would be rushing to sell their gold at crashing prices before the central market selling began. And diamonds could be the anti-apartheid second-best friend,

With suggestions of a similar action being taken there.

There are radical steps which can be taken, steps which would probably be very effective.

But, steps to be effective are likely to be ones which cause some pain outside of South Africa as well as inside South Africa. The real test is whether we are willing to take action that hurts outside, that pains us or that costs us in order to achieve the goals we seek in South Africa.

If we are unwilling to do that, if we are willing only to take painless steps for ourselves, I suspect they will not do much good inside South Africa either.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Evans.

To assist the committee in its deliberations over our policy, we have invited Secretary George Shultz to offer testimony tomorrow morning, and on Thursday, the committee will hear from a number of distinguished private citizens.

This morning, we are pleased to welcome distinguished colleagues from the U.S. Senate.

I would ask the first panel to take their seats. It consists of Senator William Roth, of Delaware, Senator Orrin Hatch, of Utah, Senator Lowell Weicker, of Connecticut, and Senator Ted Kennedy, of Massachusetts.

Gentlemen, I thank you for your patience. As members of our committee have expressed their opening comments, we now look forward to your remarks.

I would like to recognize, first of all, Senator William Roth, of Delaware, for his testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., A U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE**

Senator ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is sad to observe that it was just 1 year ago that I was sitting before this very committee talking about the need to change administrative policy toward the Republic of South Africa.

At that time, we were discussing the formulation of a bill which would communicate our disquiet over South African development to both the administration and to the South African Government.

We succeeded in drawing up a bill with strong bipartisan support. Unfortunately, the signal went largely unheeded.

Since then, the South African situation has deteriorated even further, and we find ourselves again seeking to formulate a legislative position on a problem for which there may be no legislative solution.

Clearly, a moral imperative does impel the United States to act on the South African issue. The Reagan administration has launched on a forceful, and in my opinion laudable, policy promoting democracy in developing countries. South Africa can be no exception to such a policy. Currently, the vast majority of South Africans are denied any voice in their central government solely on the basis of the color of their skin.

Such illegitimate procedures are an affront to any concept of human dignity, and, inevitably, they are the cause of major economic distress.

As all of the most eloquent opponents of apartheid have asserted, there can be no reform of apartheid, only its removal.

The South African Government repeatedly asserts that the prompt demolition of apartheid would give rise to mass confusion. That government would do well to pay some mind to the mass confusion and killing which the current maintenance of apartheid already is causing.

Under prevailing circumstances, it would be ridiculous, in my opinion, to argue that United States policy toward South Africa does not stand in need of considerable overhaul. The very state of affairs in that troubled country and the condition of United States-South African relations cry out for a change of policy.

Here in Congress, the focus of our frustration has been the administration's policy of constructive engagement.

I would like to strike a note of caution here. Constructive engagement, as theoretically formulated, represents little more than an academic restatement of traditional U.S. policy.

The Carter administration never fooled itself into believing that it could overthrow the South African minority government through political, economic, or military force. We could best hope to influence the situation for good by being engaged constructively with all

parties in South Africa, cajolling on some occasions, pressuring on others.

The problem lies not so much with constructive engagement as with the manner in which it has been practiced.

First, but most regrettably, we have not been constructively engaged with all parties in South Africa. Our contacts with the black majority have been meager, to say the least, and our policy seems to have presupposed that the black majority would be happy to sit as passive beneficiaries of limited, white sponsored reforms, meted out to them at a pace suitable to the white minority.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I would like to welcome the administration's initiative to appoint a black American as Ambassador to South Africa. Apparently, Mr. Brown is no longer being considered.

However, the principle remains strong and sound. The appointment of a black American to this vital post would indicate a new sensitivity to the South African majority and represent a laudable image of the United States as a multiracial democracy in which men and women can rise to the highest positions regardless of the color of their skin.

However, I would hasten to point out that we should not place unreasonable expectations upon any new ambassador. Simply a new ambassador there alone cannot inject new life into a failed policy.

Let it be quite clear: If we are to begin to redress our South African situation, we will require a change of policy and a change of faces throughout the senior levels of the African Bureau.

To return to my central theme, I do not believe that we have been even properly engaged with the minority government. All too often, our purpose seems to have been to appease that government, to apologize publicly for its failure to adopt necessary reforms, and for its lamentable habit of unnecessarily riding roughshod over its neighbors in an ongoing effort to subject them to its will.

This brings us to the inevitable and awkward question: What is to be done?

Clearly, the solution to the South African problem lies in South African and not American hands. However, that situation would not legitimate the absence of U.S. policy goals. We must, on all occasions, strive for a peaceful transition to truly multiracial democratic rule. I stress the word "democratic."

In securing a multiracial, democratic government, the majority must attain their due right. And if the process is to be peaceful, the minority must be assured the opportunity to participate effectively in government.

These ends can be achieved only through internal, multiracial dialog. At the moment, the key elements in the minority government seem utterly unaware of the need to commence negotiations with the legitimate representatives of the black majority and the colored and Asian minority.

Let me stress the word "legitimate." Puppet leaders of bogus homelands do not constitute legitimate representatives.

Who would constitute a legitimate group of majority representatives? I think it is important to remember that black South Africans, like white Americans, are not politically homogeneous. A whole variety of groups will have to be represented. The emergent

black trade unions constitute a potent political force. Clerical leadership has proven a catalytic force in mobilizing black opinion, while the United Democratic Front played a key role in opposing the latest constitutional plan.

Chief Buthelezi and his organization are striving to set up in Natal Province a multiracial model. Unquestionably, the banned African National Congress enjoys great popularity. It is, indeed, the oldest of the antiapartheid activist groups.

The South African Government has made a great deal of the need for the ANC to renounce violence prior to any negotiations. I do not object to such stipulations, but I would like to make two points.

First, the South African Government itself should make a corresponding renunciation of violence, both on its population as well as its neighbor.

Second, under the circumstances, the ANC's attitude toward violence is secondary to its attitude toward democracy. The purpose of any proposed multiracial negotiation in South Africa must be the establishment of a multiracial democracy. The one truly valid precondition for entry into talks by any group is a true commitment to democracy.

Such discussions of negotiations of course run into the unfelling wrath of the South African Government. Currently, the state president, P.W. Botha, seems more interested in empty bluster and posing besides medium grade weaponry than in playing the part of the statesman, at a time when his country is truly crying out for statesmen to carry it into a new and secure future.

Let me stress that I do not believe that the only viable future for South Africa lies through multiracial negotiations. No one can say whether the South Africa Government, as currently constituted, has the ability to hang on to power through violence through a prolonged period. However, we can say that any attempt to resolve the South African situation through violence will leave the nation in such a state that no successor government could hope to prosper.

Moreover, any government which accedes to power through violence will, in all likelihood, be hostile to U.S. interests. The Soviet Union, as a great arms merchant, will be eager to further its interests by pouring weaponry into South Africa regardless of the cost in human suffering.

We simply cannot afford to contemplate this possibility. South Africa demands a vital strategic position and it is an indispensable supplier of crucial raw material. The peaceful resolution of the emerging conflict serves our closest national interest as well as answering a moral imperative.

Of course, these observations all lead us to the final question of how we, in the United States, can promote a peaceful, multiracial settlement in South Africa. Inevitably, the administration must take the lead role in implementing a South African policy. This country does not provide security assistance or economic aid to South Africa, and, consequently, the Congress does not enjoy the same ability to influence administrative policy as it does, for example, in Central America.

Last year, we legislated a variety of government-to-government measures designed largely to communicate our displeasure to

South Africa. Now, in the absence of either an acceptable South African reaction or major changes in administration policy, we seek to act again.

Unfortunately, our options are limited. We can terminate the landing rights of South African Airways in this country, a measure which I clearly favor since it was part of the original Roth-MacDonald-Dodd bill of 1985. Apart from this proposal, congressional options seem to be limited to economic sanctions.

I am not, by any means, automatically opposed to economic sanctions on South Africa in the absence of a changed administration policy. On the contrary, if it is simply a question of expressing our sense of moral outrage against the inequitable, apartheid system, then the arguments in favor of sanctions would be unassailable.

As it is, many of us will feel obligated to vote for sanctions in the absence of substantive changes in administration policy. However, I do think we need to understand that sanctions do raise serious questions. Any United States measures which have a deleterious effect on the South African economy must, by definition, have a negative impact on the majority of South Africans, who are black.

U.S. investment may, indeed, be concentrated on high technology. But any reverse there will ripple through what is, after all, an integrated economic structure.

The most serious of all would be the impact on United States sanctions on South Africa's neighbors. Pretoria makes little secret of its intention to retaliate against its neighbors if it is targeted for sanctions. While they may be too proud to admit it, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Zambia are dependent upon South Africa not for luxury goods but for the very basics of life.

What will happen to those countries economically and politically if the South African lifeline is cut?

In addition, we must note that South Africa is not only a source of imports, but the sole export route for Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The railroad systems of South Africa run from north to south. The great bulk of these countries' commodity exports have to be transported to South Africa for shipment.

There are no credible alternative routes. The lines from Zimbabwe to Mozambique's port of Beira is under constant attack, as is Angola's Benguela railroad, which leads to the already clogged port of Dar es Salaam.

If South Africa chooses to close its borders to its neighbors, which it can do, we risk a southern African scenario of political turbulence and massive distress which we will be physically unable to alleviate.

These considerations, Mr. Chairman, in and of themselves, should not necessarily hold us back from acting, or indeed from posing some form of economic sanctions on that nation.

However, we must be aware of the potential implications of our acts. The deteriorating situation in South Africa requires the close attention of the Congress and the immediate attention of the administration. In the absence of a concerted administrative attempt to reassess policy, I trust that this committee, under your leadership, will help us to chart a course through the dangerous waters ahead.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Roth. Senator Hatch, please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

Senator HATCH. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I am happy to be with you today, and I am pleased to make a presentation today about the labor union movement in South Africa because that issue is important in any consideration of our policy toward South Africa, and in my opinion it is being neglected.

In 1979, the South African Government permitted the formation of black trade unions after years of successful lobbying by the white business community and the chambers of commerce in South Africa.

As a member of the Board for the National Endowment for Democracy and, of course, as the chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee of the U.S. Senate, I have been interested in fostering the growth of black trade union leadership through public funds made available to the AFL-CIO for training of black trade union leaders in South Africa.

Senator Kennedy and I succeeded in authorizing a small sum for the AFL-CIO in 1982 from the Department of Labor, and many Senators supported the formation of the National Endowment for Democracy, both of which have been very effective in helping to create, foster, and engender the black trade union movement, which, in and of itself, has brought about many, many aspects of freedom and has given dignity to millions of black South Africans.

The problem we face today is that the leaders of the black trade unions, a number of them, have been arrested, in many cases without charges. The threat exists that the Government of South Africa will be tempted to destroy the important work of the last 7 years since the unions were legalized back in 1979.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my concern is that we are neglecting the black leaders who could become responsible negotiating partners from the black majority who could help lead South Africa to a future without apartheid and a future with one-man-one-vote in that country.

Instead, too many Americans are seemingly obsessed with proclaiming the African National Congress as the sole representative of the 23 million blacks of South Africa.

The cover of the Economist, mentioned by Senator Evans, this week, it seems to me, is interesting. It shows a gold ingot with "Free Nelson Mandela" engraved on the top of it [indicating].

Now, many observers want President Botha to begin a serious negotiation with the black leadership. But we harm the chances of that negotiation by demanding that Nelson Mandela and the ANC be the sole representatives of the black majority in South Africa.

The ANC is not only composed of at least a dozen members of the South African Communist Party, but some of those Communists are from the original trade union movement in South Africa that has now been supplanted by the new black trade unions.

What makes the ANC more objectionable is that its terrorist activities are run by a white man, an acknowledged Communist active in the ANC for over two decades, Mr. Joe Slovo.

I am here today to listen and to learn. My mind is not made up about the sanctions issue, and it really does bother me and concern me.

I am eager to hear the President's speech today. My only recommendation to the committee today is that whatever sanctions are considered, if any, they should be carefully designed to help the black trade unions and not to harm them.

At least 10 of the 100 executive committee members of the Confederation of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] are now under arrest. At least 250 union leaders are under arrest since the emergency was declared June 12. Lane Kirkland, one of our great trade union leaders, and an international delegation are in South Africa right now to help them.

Let us not rush to embrace the ANC with its white Communist terrorists. Let's consider all the good work that has been done by these black trade unions and the work that can be done by them to bring about freedom and I think the end of apartheid in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I have a meeting that started at 10 that I am missing. But I wanted to make this point today as chairman of the Senate Labor Committee and as a member of the National Endowment for Democracy, though we are not representing them in any way, because I think we ignore this issue far too much. It is important. It is crucial. It may be the way to solve these problems.

We have seen tremendous changes brought about by the black trade unions which were organized since 1979. We have seen a lot of changes that have brought freedom in the workplace. And, by the way, they could not have occurred without American companies and corporations. They could not have occurred.

If you read the article in the Economist—and I have to admit that I think anybody could have some questions about their suggestions about selling off gold reserves and so forth—that may be a good idea or it may not be. Be that as it may, the front part of that article really lays out how difficult it will be to enforce sanctions. We may look good in the process, but they are still going to continue to be able to do what they want to do unless there is a massive civil war with bloodshed.

There may be some intelligent ways to do this.

Mr. Chairman, I have confidence in you and in other members of this committee that you will find those, that you will search them out, and that we will do the best we can in the U.S. Senate to be responsible and to bring about effective change without some of the I think ineffective approaches that some would suggest all over our country today.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Senator Hatch one question before he departs?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. The black trade unionists to whom you refer took the position that Nelson Mandela should be freed from prison in order to participate or even lead the negotiations with the South African Government.

Would you be supportive of that?

Senator HATCH. Yes.

I take the position that Nelson Mandela should be freed.

On the other hand, I cannot blame the Government for requesting that he renounce terrorism and renounce criminal activity in the process. I cannot blame them for that.

But I would like to see him freed. I think it is stupid for them to keep him in prison. It is really an affront to the world community to do what they are doing to these trade union representatives.

They detained Lane Kirkland the other day over there in South Africa. That was an affront to us. That has to stop if these people are the people who can bring about the change, along with Chief Buthelezi and others, with whom we have met in the Congress.

Senator SARBANES. But is your confidence in the black trade unionist leaders such that if they took the position that the ANC either ought to lead or be a part of the black South African effort, would you be supportive of that?

Senator HATCH. I'd have to really look at that.

Let me just say this. I have confidence in what they are doing in the field of trade unionism. I am not sure I would have the same degree of confidence in the political field.

However, I am certainly going to keep an open mind, and if you can make out a good case for it, that would be fine.

I did sit for about 1½ hours with Chief Buthelezi in my office, one on one, and I do not think that he shared the same confidence that some Members of the U.S. Senate share that the African National Congress is the answer to all of our problems in this area.

Senator SARBANES. I am trying to find out whether your support for black trade union leaders extends to the position they may take with respect to the ANC—and I take it it does not.

Senator HATCH. Well, I don't know what their position may be.

All I can say is that I reserve my own right to make determinations on whether or not I will support that type of activity.

I suspect that it will play a great weight with me if they decide to do that, and I would be surprised if they are not as concerned as I am about some of the activities of the African National Congress.

Then, again, sometimes leaders do not speak for all of the masses that they represent.

All I can say is that the black trade union movement in South Africa has been one of the great hopes for ending apartheid and certainly bringing freedom to blacks all over South Africa, and we ought to be supporting that free trade union movement.

I, for one, have been doing so for a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I had one question along the lines that Senator Sarbanes asked.

I, certainly, agree and I think you made a very strong statement about the black labor union movement in South Africa.

Senator HATCH. Thank you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But several times you mentioned the ANC as the sole representative black political party or majority party.

Senator HATCH. There are those who would argue that they should be.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I don't know that I have heard that voiced here so much as that it should just be recognized as one of the political parties that could operate within South Africa.

Senator HATCH. Well, I have heard those who have argued that they should be the major representative.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But you would have no quarrel with it being recognized as one of the legitimate political parties within South Africa?

Senator HATCH. I think all legitimate citizens in South Africa ought to be recognized, and if they organize, they ought to have recognition, just like we would recognize various groups in our country.

On the other hand, I think it would be really a mistake for us to not recognize some of the leadership of that group and some of the terrorist activities that do go on. I would just call that to your attention.

I hope at the same time we will recognize—I know that you will and I know others on this committee will—Chief Buthelezi, who has a different approach, and a whole raft of others over there who do, as well.

I think the key is what can we do. The key question is what can we do to bring about the end of apartheid and to basically diminish and dilute the opportunity and the potential of the loss of millions of lives over there, and I think to create freedom and, of course, democracy in South Africa.

I, personally, believe that the black trade union movement is the key to that.

I believe they have done more to bring about equality in South Africa for blacks than any other group of people. I would place great weight in supporting them, and I have been doing that as a Member of the U.S. Senate and as the chairman of the Labor Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the observation that the Eminent Persons group cochairmen, Prime Minister Frazier and General Obasanjo, indicated yesterday that Buthelezi was prepared to further the leadership of Mandela in South Africa. I would simply ask to Senator Hatch the same question I asked about the trade unionists, that if that is the case, would you defer to that judgment?

Senator HATCH. Well, that may give great weight, as far as I am concerned, because Chief Buthelezi represents 6 million of the Krva-Zulu people, and you cannot ignore that. I think we have a tendency to ignore that in our debates here in this country.

On the other hand, I know a number of responsible people on both sides of this issue who does not have that tendency to ignore them, and I am glad to see that you would not. I would not either.

I would be glad to listen to anybody on this issue. I just hope we can resolve it, and I hope we would resolve it in a responsible way.

I would give some credibility to the first part of the Economist article, where it basically states that if you want to have economic sanctions and pull America out, and disinvest, you are going to find that it is not going to work. It would not even work against the weakest of African countries, and it certainly is not going to work against South Africa. I think they lay out a better than substantial case that that would be the dumbest thing we could do.

By the way, I really believe that one of the real reasons we have made strides in South Africa for blacks, especially in the workplace—and economics governs almost everything in every country—is because of American corporations who have adopted the principles enunciated by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, and which have basically incorporated those, pushed them in South Africa, and have brought about I think the cementing relationship with the black trade unionists.

I think all too often they do not get nearly the credit for what they have done in our zeal to disinvest.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one quick question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Are your concerns about the ANC sufficient that you would support or justify any kind of actions whatsoever by the U.S. Government to assist the Government of South Africa to guard itself against the ANC?

Senator HATCH. I think my concerns are clearly not to that degree.

Senator KERRY. Not to that degree.

So, you think any action but that would be appropriate?

Senator HATCH. I don't think anybody's concerns are to that degree. But you have to be concerned because we see a lot of the things that are being done. Let's be honest about it, there are some reprehensible things that that organization represents.

Senator KERRY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave, too, I'm afraid.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

We express to both distinguished committee chairmen our appreciation for giving this time to the Foreign Relations Committee.

I want to recognize now Senator Lowell Weicker and Senator Ted Kennedy.

They are major authors and cosponsors of two pieces of legislation, one before the Banking Committee and one before the Finance Committee. They have previously been before this committee and have participated vigorously in our hearing and in the floor debate a year ago.

We welcome them again today.

Senator Weicker, we look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator WEICKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I want to thank you for having these hearings and having them held in a prompt fashion.

Regardless of our points of view on the legislation, I think we all agree that the response of the Senate of the United States, if it is to be effective, has to be timely. By timely, I mean that we do something in terms of the entire constitutional process and that we do it before we pack up and go home.

This point was made very clearly yesterday afternoon, when the Eminent Persons Group testified before a group of U.S. Senators, chaired by Senator Kennedy.

The actions of the United States, through the Congress and the President, will be more closely watched in the next 30 days than they have been perhaps in the last 300 days. All peoples are closely following this debate. They want to see if the American constitutional process can fashion a response to apartheid that is consistent both with our ideals and with the way we do business or not do business with enemies of humanity around the world.

Our allies, under the aegis of the British Commonwealth, are especially watching. They will see if the United States, the virtual birthplace of modern democracy, will help lead the world in condemning South African repression, or will simply stand silent as that nation intensifies its brutality.

Most importantly, the people of South Africa will be watching. We can, by our actions in the Congress, stand with the decent peoples of South Africa, black and white, or we can abet a government in Pretoria that is a disgrace to the dignity of mankind.

The latest report from South Africa, that which we heard yesterday afternoon, is the most comprehensive yet to come from that nation. The British Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group, after 6 difficult months of consultations and discussions with individuals in South Africa and the region, reached a disturbing conclusion about the situation there. I quote:

After more than 18 months of persistent unrest, upheaval, and killings unprecedented in the country's history, the government believes that it can contain the situation indefinitely by use of force.

Put in the most simple way, the blacks have had enough of apartheid. The strength of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for those convictions.

They will, therefore, sustain their struggle, whatever the cost.

We are here today to offer responses to this crisis, and, as I said, they are varied. Only one response must be rejected out of hand, and that is the one that is fashioned for the United States—our so far indelible association with apartheid across southern Africa.

This response is the policy of constructive engagement under this administration, or noninvolvement under previous administrations. Any response that relies solely on a combination of diplomatic maneuvering and antiapartheid rhetoric is to the suffering a copout.

The call for economic sanctions is not a call to disengage from South Africa. It is a call to alliance with the majority of that country in a progression of U.S. policy from talk to action.

Whatever we hear in the next few hours and days from the administration, we should remember that talk has always been tough, and that has made years of inaction all the more inexplicable.

Less than 2 months ago, Secretary of State Shultz said, and I quote: "Apartheid must go, and it must yield to a non-racial system based on the consent of all the governed. It must go soon."

Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker last year called apartheid a doomed system. In 1983, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger said, and I quote:

The political system in South Africa is morally wrong. We stand against injustice, and, therefore, we must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid. Neither can we countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures, like banning and detention, without due process of law. By one means or another, South Africa's domestic racial system will be changed.

And yet, as the administration has intensified the rhetoric up the chain of command, the South African Government has intensified its repression.

As many as 5,000 black leaders have been taken from their homes, and union officers and churchmen imprisoned. The South African Government has made it clear most recently to the Commonwealth Group that it will not even discuss a one-man-one-vote rule, and that it will continue by force to herd the 84 percent of the population that is black in so-called group areas that comprise less than 14 percent of the land.

Yesterday, when the Eminent Persons Group testified, they made mention of the fact that there would be no discussion of one-man-one-vote, no discussion. This raised the question among themselves of really, then, is there any purpose to negotiation?

The reason why they continued their effort is that they hope that at least if there is discussion, maybe a miracle or something of that nature might occur.

No one argues that the removal of U.S. investment and loans, or even a complete halt to all trade and commerce will bring about peace and majority rule. There is no magic bullet to end apartheid.

Indeed, there is a very real concern that at this point the free world is virtually out of ammunition in this fight.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator WEICKER. Thank you.

There are some who continue to oppose sanctions on the grounds that the black community in South Africa will suffer. It is time that we agree to that point and move on, because the blacks in South Africa and throughout Africa have agreed to that point.

That is no longer an issue of debate, and indeed it is rather presumptuous of us to interpose that argument when that point or that particular rubicon has been crossed by all of black Africa.

Continued reliance on this argument is an excuse to do nothing. It is an outrage and an embarrassment now to this Nation.

Bishop Desmond Tutu writes last June 16 in the New York Times, and I quote:

I would be more impressed with those who made no bones about the reason they remain in South Africa and said honestly, we are concerned for our profits, instead of the baloney that the businesses are there for our benefit. We don't want you there. Please do us a favor—get out and come back when we have a democratic and a just South Africa.

Unfortunately, Bishop Tutu's call for cooperation from the West may be among the last from the black community for South Africa.

In recent days, the leadership of that community has refused to meet with Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, and there is no reason to believe any similar initiative from the United States would fare any better.

The meeting yesterday between Bishop Tutu and South African President Botha reportedly produced little more than the threat of estrangement between Bishop Tutu and other black leaders. We can only hope that the current debate over sanctions is not too little—too late.

Last January, in a meeting with business and political leaders in my State capital in Hartford, Bishop Tutu said that one of his greatest concerns as a man of moderation, as a man of peace, and as a man of God, was that if he were a young man in South Africa, he would no longer be listening to Bishop Tutu. This should be our greatest worry as well.

In conclusion, I make these remarks not just as a matter of my personal feeling but I think the thought to which I am going to give expression now was articulated yesterday on several occasions. Constructive engagement has, by its fruitless trafficking with white oppression, become the greatest pro-Communist force existent in black Africa. And this is a truth that this Nation will pay for many times over in the decades ahead, unless we exhaust ourselves traveling a road of peaceful change to justice on behalf of South Africa's blacks.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Weicker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WEICKER

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to commend you for convening these hearings in prompt fashion. No matter what the differing views in this room when it comes to our national response to the declining situation in South Africa, I think we all agree that the response must be timely to be effective at all.

The actions of the United States, through the Congress and the President, will be more closely watched in the next 30 days than they have been in perhaps the last 300.

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The report states and I quote, "After more than 18 months of persistent unrest, upheaval, and killings unprecedented in the country's history, the government believes that it can contain the situation indefinitely by use of force . . . put in the most simple way, the blacks have had enough of apartheid . . . the strength of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for those convictions. They will, therefore, sustain their struggle, whatever the cost."

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Less than two months ago Secretary of State Shultz said and I quote, "Apartheid must go, and it must yield to a nonracial system based on the consent of all the governed. It must go soon."

Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker last year called apartheid quote, "A doomed system."

In 1983, then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger said, and I quote, "The political system in South Africa is morally wrong. We stand against injustice and therefore, we must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid. Neither can we countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures like banning and detention without due process of law. By one means or another, South Africa's domestic racial system will be changed."

Yet as the administration has intensified the rhetoric up the chain of command, the South African Government has intensified its repression. As many as 5,000 black leaders have been taken from their homes, union offices and churches and imprisoned. The South African Government has made it clear—most recently to the Commonwealth group—that it will not even discuss one man-one vote rule and that it will continue by force to herd the 84 percent of the population that is black into so-called "group areas" that comprise less than 14 percent of the land.

No one argues that the removal of U.S. investment and loans or even a complete halt to all trade and commerce will bring about peace and majority rule. There is no magic bullet to end apartheid. Indeed, there is a very real concern that at this point the free world is virtually out of ammunition in this fight.

What can we accomplish is the levying of a certain price on the continuation of intransigence in South Africa. The benefits of trade, consular relations, airline travel and access to banking remain a tangible sign of U.S. acceptance of Pretoria's policy. South Africa is a nation where whites comprise 15 percent of the population yet control nearly 60 percent of the disposable personal income. Meanwhile, the disparities of South African life go almost unnoticed in the white community.

Richard Manning, the Johannesburg Bureau Chief for Newsweek magazine recently expelled from South Africa writes July 7 and I quote, "Most whites care little about how substandard nutrition and health care hamper the growth of Black children. Most know little of the miserable black school system or of the shabby living conditions in the townships and homelands. Most are ignorant of the atmosphere of repression—armored police vans and daily arrests on every block—that turns young blacks against the white authorities and anyone who supports them."

Mr. Chairman, this ignorance carries a very great price for the whites of South Africa. It is sustained in large measure by the absence of economic pressure by the free world. By refusing to carry the economic and political battle into the white community, the United States isolates that community from the rest of South Africa.

This veil of acceptance of the white community is setting the stage for even more tragic consequences. Every major black leader and organization in South Africa continues to call for non-racial and democratic solutions for the nation. Both tenets of the future will require a large measure of white participation and that participation must be encouraged, beginning now in the form of a white opposition to apartheid. This is an essential role of economic sanctions; the raising of a new era of white consciousness about apartheid.

There are some who continue to oppose sanctions on the grounds that the black community in South Africa will suffer. It is time that we agree to that point and move on. The continued reliance on this argument as an excuse to do nothing is an outrage and an embarrassment to this nation. Bishop Desmond Tutu writes last June 16 in the New York Times and I quote, "I would be more impressed with those who made no bones about the reason they remain in South Africa and said, honest-

ly, 'we are concerned for our profits,' instead of the baloney that the businesses are there for our benefit. We don't want you there. Please do us a favor: Get out and come back when we have a democratic and just South Africa."

Unfortunately, Bishop Tutu's call for cooperation from the West may be among the last from the black community of South Africa. In recent days, the leadership of that community has refused to meet with Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary. There is no reason to believe any similar initiative from the United States would fare any better. The meeting yesterday between Bishop Tutu and South African President Botha reportedly produced little more than a threat of estrangement between Bishop Tutu and other black leaders.

We can only hope that the current debate over sanctions is not too little too late. Last January, in a meeting with business and political leaders in my state capital in Hartford, Bishop Tutu said one of his greatest concerns as a man of moderation, as a man of peace, as a man of God, was that if he were a young man in South Africa, he would no longer be listening to Bishop Tutu. That should be our greatest worry as well.

Constructive engagement has by its fruitless trafficking with white oppression, become the greatest pro-communist force existent in black Africa. That is a truth that this nation will pay for many times over in the decades ahead unless we exhaust ourselves traveling a road of peaceful change to justice on behalf of South Africa's black.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Weicker.
Senator Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Those words certainly are very powerful. I think all of us who have had the opportunity of service in the U.S. Senate know that the Senator from Connecticut minces no words and speaks his mind. In his statement Senator Weicker has in a very summary way focused our attention on the bankruptcy of the administration's policy over the period of the last 6 years.

I think it is a matter of great conscience for him. I think that those who have spent the time on this issue, like the chairman of this committee, and Senator Kassebaum, Senator Sarbanes, my colleague, Senator Kerry, Senator Evans, and Senator Cranston, know the enormous frustration that many of us who are so concerned about American policy toward South Africa feel.

Time is running out in a very precipitous way. We have said that previously I share the very strong sense of urgency that my friend and colleague has manifested at the outset of his testimony.

The recent series of events, the deterioration into violence in South Africa, the meetings of the Commonwealth Group in early August in London, the actions that have been taken by the House of Representatives, the anticipated action by the Senate of the United States, all really make the month of August a key time, I think, in terms of what little hope there is left in South Africa to move toward an alternative to violence. The dark clouds of a long, protracted, and bloody civil war hang over South Africa, and it is in this climate and atmosphere, Mr. Chairman, that we have this meeting today. I join those who commend you and the committee for holding these hearings.

I think the Senate is fortunate that there are three committees holding hearings on South Africa—the Finance Committee, the Banking Committee, and your committee, given the nature of the legislation, which is not enormously complex or complicated. These

are issues which this membership in the Senate is familiar with. This committee has had extensive hearings on these issues in the past as have other committees.

The real, fundamental question is this: Will this institution, the Senate of the United States, be willing to address the issue and to permit the roll to be called.

Millions of Americans across this country have expressed their own individual views and their own individual opinions. Towns, villages, and cities have indicated their disapproval and violent disagreement with apartheid by separating their investments and pension funds. States have done likewise.

All across this country, individual Americans are taking action, and the real question before this committee and before the Senate is whether we, as the people's representatives, are going to follow the people's lead. It's like so many other issues: are we going to follow the people's their lead in a way that expresses the best values of our society and our country; are we prepared between now and the August recess to permit the roll to be called and to put this country on the right side of this issue.

So this hearing is important. Support a Federal law mandating disinvestment by United States corporations in South Africa and imposing an embargo on United States trade with that nation.

I hope that this committee will follow the lead of the House of Representatives to achieve this goal. Diplomatic pressure is not enough. Constructive engagement has failed. Strong economic pressure in the form of comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa is now imperative.

Bishop Tutu, as he mentioned last month, said, "There is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid. But it is the last nonviolent option that is left."

Many of us regret that the Congress did not act last year. We cannot let another year go by. The policy of the administration is a disgrace. It is an embarrassment. Congress must act to put the United States back on the right side of history and human rights.

There are several reasons, Mr. Chairman, why the Congress should move now to require U.S. companies to sever their ties. I would like to address that issue briefly.

Whether we like it or not, and whether they like it or not, American business is propping up apartheid and playing into the hands of the racist regime. American dollars invested in South Africa, American profits reinvested in that economy, contribute to the care and the feeding of the institutions of apartheid.

It is true that many American corporations in South Africa have worked to improve the lot of their employees, and it is also true tha they are attempting to use their influence to end apartheid. But their presence and their profits speak louder than their protests.

Lesser steps have failed, and the time for an immediate, comprehensive disinvestment has come. It is time for the United States Congress to say that American business has no business doing business in South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I would mention to the Chair and the other members of the committee the excellent statement of former President Wharton of Michigan State University. He is also a member of the

board of Ford Motor Co. and, in that capacity, he has an important perspective. He wrote:

Our continued involvement in the economy of South Africa only implicates us deeper in apartheid in the eyes of the black majority. So long as the American corporations prominently participate in the economy of apartheid, the United States will be held responsible for the continuation of apartheid. It is time for us to say that enough is enough, and we will no longer be a part of a system that systematically oppresses 26 million people. Without strong action from the United States, the Western nations will also delay.

Mr. Chairman, you are familiar that the United States has about 18 percent of the foreign investment there. The European Community and the community have some 55 percent. These two elements are key, along with the other EEC countries, primarily West Germany. They are the key participants in terms of foreign investment.

I would agree with the Eminent Persons Group, which feels that when the United States takes action, the other countries cannot fail but to take action.

I think we have heard, both in the report of the Eminent Persons Group and elsewhere, the very clear statement that should the countries of the United States and the United Kingdom take action, Japan will follow. Effectively, that is the foreign investment market. It is really the issue and the question around the world as to what this country is going to do. It is the strong belief, which I share, that the other free nations will follow.

The violence and brutality of the current regime in South Africa is unparalleled even for that brutal regime. Since the state of emergency was imposed on June 12, over 4,000 political leaders have been arrested and detained. The entire leadership of the black South African trade unions is in jail or in hiding.

Imagine what the impact would be in the United States if 4,000 of our leaders were suddenly arrested and imprisoned by the Government?

This is the policy of a government that is not interested in negotiation or reconciliation. It is the policy of a government that is interested only in maintaining power, whatever the cost in human life and suffering.

This observation and belief, which many of us have stated, has been reinforced by the Eminent Persons Group, about the real willingness of that government to enter into negotiations.

You are familiar with the background and the development of the Eminent Persons Group. They drew this conclusion:

We draw the conclusion that, while the South African Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is, in truth, not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change; not to countenance the creation of a democratic structure; nor to face the prospect at the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future.

In the face of such intractability by the South African Government, it is no surprise that the EPG reached the conclusion that concerted action by all Western nations in the form of stiff economic sanctions is necessary.

This is a quote:

The question, in our view, is clear. It is not whether economic sanctions will compel change. It is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared defers change. Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War.

Apartheid is the greatest moral challenge in the world today. But our response to that challenge has been shameful and unworthy.

If there were cause to hope that persuasion might work, if there were reason to think that the apostles of apartheid might change course voluntarily, if there were evidence to suggest that our pleas for justice might be answered, our current policy of constructive engagement might suffice. But there is no sign that constructive engagement is succeeding.

To the contrary. The constructive engagement has become synonymous with aid and comfort to racism in South Africa, and instead of the last best hope of Earth, the United States of America has become the last best friend of apartheid.

Last month, by declaring the broadest and most ruthless state of emergency yet, President Botha of South Africa delivered a final blow to the policy of constructive engagement. No matter what the South African Government does, no matter how many innocent people are killed, no matter how many neighboring nations are invaded, no matter how many children are tortured, how many peaceful demonstrators are arrested, how much censorship is imposed, how many journalists are expelled, how many deceptions are foisted on U.S. diplomats, the administration clings to a bankrupt policy that puts the United States on the side of apartheid and transforms our country into the second most detested government in the eyes of all Africa.

I think that is another point, Mr. Chairman, that should be understood by this committee and by the American people—the dramatic change in view by blacks in South Africa, that the United States, as a country which has in the past been as an expression of the most basic and fundamental ideals of our human condition, has effectively come down hard on the side of the forces of repression.

This view, quite frankly, has been expressed by Mr. Botha, when he has been asked about the countries which have given him the greatest source of support. He mentioned Margaret Thatcher and the United Kingdom and the United States under this administration's policy.

If the leaders of this administration are unwilling to change their policy, then the Congress must change it for them. To do less means that we, too, are implicated in their policy of racism and in the violence of apartheid.

Mr. Chairman, finally, there are those who say that sanctions will destroy the South African economy and leave that nation in a financial and economic morass. But if the South African Government continues on its present course, then with or without sanctions, the South African economy will be destroyed by the violence and bloodshed that are now threatening to explode into all consuming civil war.

Those of us who support the economic sanctions are asked: isn't this going to undermine the economy, to destroy the possibilities of blacks gaining jobs? We have addressed that issue. Senator Weicker and the Eminent Persons Group have addressed it, I think, eloquently.

But the fact remains that without taking any action, there is no question of those that have and know South Africa that the South

African economy is on the verge of absolute destruction through civil war.

Opponents of sanctions also claim that such steps will do economic harm to the Front Line States. It is clear that the nations of Southern Africa are vulnerable to economic retaliation as well as to military retaliation by the Government of South Africa. Yet, we heard the representatives of the SADCC group, the Front Line States, speak very eloquently and compellingly about their willingness to support economic sanctions as a measure to rid their Front Line States from the kind of costs not only in moral terms but in economic terms that result from the continuation of apartheid some \$10 billion over the last 5 years in the destruction of their economy, destruction of their railroads, destruction of their commerce by the South African regime.

I thought the Ambassador from Zambia delivered a powerful message when he said, "To those who oppose sanctions because they will damage the economies of the Front Line States, I say you are not protecting us; you are protecting apartheid."

I think that this case has been made very well by the Front Line States, although it is an argument that has been used by those who continue to support constructive engagement.

One final point, Mr. Chairman, on this issue.

I think those of us who have supported various pieces of legislation understand the importance of movement on this issue.

This is a compelling moral fact.

I believe in the institutional process of the Senate, and believe that the committees ought to have an opportunity to consider the proposals and to work their will. But we are also faced with other realities that are evident: the importance of time, given the deterioration in South Africa, and the Senate scheduling.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we would be able to gain from you and from the majority leader at least a commitment that this issue could be treated prior to the August recess as independent legislation, and to permit the Senate to do its will.

I think all of us are aware that neither the chairman of this committee nor the majority leader can give us anything more than that. The Senate has a number of rules and procedures which can be exercised by individual members. I would hope that we could gain that type of assurance. I think it is enormously important that we do, and then, to permit the Senate to work its will.

If we are not able to get that assurance, then I don't see how we have any other alternative than to try to attach this legislation to the debt ceiling bill.

I would vastly prefer that we have the assurances, the best assurance that we could gain, from you, Mr. Chairman, and from the chairmen of the other committees that are holding hearings on this legislation, and the majority leader, that we are going to have some legislation, clean legislation, which would permit the Senate to do its will.

I would hope that you might at least pursue that opportunity so that we can follow the orderly process of the Senate, respect the procedures of the institution, but also meet the moral imperative, which is that the Senate of the United States must, one way or the other, vote on this issue prior to the August recess.

I thank the Chair and the members of the committee for their attention this morning.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY

I am here—with Senator Weicker—to urge the members of this Committee to act quickly to approve legislation imposing strong economic sanctions against the Government of South Africa. I support a federal law mandating divestment by U.S. corporations in South Africa, and imposing an embargo on U.S. trade with that nation. I hope that this Committee will follow the lead of the House of Representatives and adopt the legislation we have proposed to achieve this goal. Diplomatic pressure is not enough. Constructive engagement has failed. Strong economic pressure—in the form of comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa—is now imperative.

As Bishop Desmond Tutu said last month: "There is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid, but it is the last nonviolent option left."

Many of us regret that Congress did not act last year. We cannot let another year go by. The policy of the Administration is a disgrace and an embarrassment. The Congress must act to put the United States back on the right side of history and human rights.

There are several reasons why Congress should move now to require U.S. companies to sever their ties with South Africa.

Whether we like it or not, whether they like it or not, American business is proping up apartheid and playing into the hands of the racist regime. American dollars invested in South Africa and American profits re-invested in that economy contribute to the care and feeding of the institutions of apartheid.

It is true that many American corporations in South Africa have worked to improve the conditions of their employees; it is true that they are attempting to use their influence to end apartheid. But their presence and their profits speak louder than their protests. Lesser steps have failed. The time for immediate comprehensive divestment has come. It is time for the United States Congress to say that American business has no business in South Africa.

Our continued involvement in the economy of South Africa only implicates us deeper in apartheid in the eyes of the Black majority. So long as American corporations prominently participate in the economy of apartheid, the United States will be held responsible for the continuation of apartheid. It is time for us to say, "enough is enough. We will no longer be part of a system that systematically oppresses twenty-six million people."

Without strong action from the United States, the other Western nations will also delay. The eyes of the world are on the United States. With Canada and Europe, we account for 96 percent of all direct foreign investment in South Africa. With the United Kingdom and West Germany, the United States accounts for 65 percent of that investment. Acting alone, we can make a significant difference; acting with other nations, we can make an even greater difference. But first we must lead the way.

The situation in South Africa over the past year has gone from very bad to much, much worse. Over two thousand people have died since September 1984; over one hundred have been killed in the last thirty days alone. Even as we speak, South Africa is descending into what could be the longest and bloodiest civil war in history.

The violence and brutality of the current repression in South Africa is unparalleled even for that brutal regime. Since the State of Emergency was imposed on June 12, over four thousand political leaders have been arrested and detained. The entire leadership of the black South African trade unions is in jail or in hiding.

Imagine what the impact would be in the United States if four thousand of our leaders were suddenly arrested and imprisoned by the government. This is the policy of a government that is not interested in negotiation or reconciliation. It is the policy of a government that is interested only in maintaining power whatever the cost in human life and suffering.

The experience of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group is instructive. The group was formed under the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa agreed to by the Heads of Government of 49 nations meeting in Nassau in October 1985. The group made a courageous effort to mediate between the South African government and its opponents. But the government was unyielding. According to the report of the EPG:

"We draw the conclusion that while the South African Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future."

In the face of such intractability by the South African government, it is no surprise that the EPG reached the conclusion that concerted action by all Western nations in the form of stiff economic sanctions is necessary.

"The question in our view is clear. It is not whether economic sanctions will compel change: it is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, deters change. . . . Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War."

Apartheid is the greatest moral challenge in the world today. But our response to that challenge has been shameful and unworthy.

If there were cause to hope that persuasion might work, if there were reason to think that the apostles of apartheid might change course voluntarily, if there were evidence to suggest that our pleas for justice might be answered, our current policy of constructive engagement might suffice. But there is no sign that constructive engagement is succeeding.

To the contrary, constructive engagement has become synonymous with aid and comfort to racism in South Africa. Instead of the last best hope of earth, the United States of America has become the last best friend of apartheid.

Last month, by declaring the broadest and most ruthless state of emergency yet, President Botha of South Africa delivered a final blow to the policy of constructive engagement. No matter what the South African government does—no matter how many innocent people are killed, no matter how many neighboring nations are invaded, no matter how many children are tortured, how many peaceful demonstrators are arrested, how much censorship is imposed, how many journalists are expelled, how many deceptions are foisted on U.S. diplomats—the Administration clings to a bankrupt policy that puts the United States on the side of apartheid and transforms our country into the second most detested government in the eyes of all Africa.

If the leaders of the Administration are unwilling to change their policy of constructive engagement, then Congress must change it for them. To do less means that we too are implicated in their policy of racism and in the violence of apartheid.

The opponents of economic sanctions say that sanctions will not work. But Bishop Tutu responded to this argument in his commencement address at Hunter College last May. He said then:

"But if they don't work, why oppose them so vehemently? If they don't work, why did Margaret Thatcher apply them to Argentina during the Falklands war? Why did the United States apply them to Poland and to Nicaragua? Why was President Reagan so annoyed that his European allies did not want to impose sanctions against Libya? If sanctions are so ineffective, why does the United States still maintain a blockade of Cuba? But we have all this wonderful sophistry when it comes to South Africa."

In fact, the failure of the international community to adopt economic sanctions only encourages the architects of apartheid to increase their repression. As the Eminent Persons Group pointed out, "It is not whether economic sanctions will compel change; it is already the case that their absence, and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, deters change."

Second, the Administration argues that sanctions will be counterproductive, because they will exacerbate the pathological siege mentality of the South African government. But as the co-chairman of the Eminent Persons Group, Prime Minister Fraser, said yesterday, "We reject completely the argument that international pressure will force the South African government to withdraw into itself. This commonly held view is masterly disinformation. It has hitherto been successful in persuading major states not to take substantive measures of sanctions against South Africa. The Afrikaners have, in fact, only changed course when under extreme pressure."

Third, the Administration suggests that economic sanctions will injure the very people they are intended to help, the black majority in south Africa. But that argument has been consistently rejected by black South Africans. Recent surveys report that 70 percent of all blacks in South Africa support economic sanctions. According to Bishop Tutu, "Blacks are saying, 'We are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering.' . . . I must ask, to whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen, or to the perpetrators of apartheid and those who benefit from it?"

Finally, there are those who say that sanctions will destroy the South African economy and leave that nation in a financial and economic morass. But if the South

African government continues on its present course, then with or without sanctions, the South African economy will be destroyed by the violence and bloodshed that are now threatening to explode into all-consuming civil war.

Opponents of sanctions also claim that such steps will do economic harm to the Front Line States. It is clear that the nations of Southern Africa are vulnerable to economic retaliation—as well as military retaliation—by the Government of South Africa.

But yesterday, Senator Weicker and I heard the testimony of the U.N. ambassadors representing Zambia and Botswana. Zambia is the leader of the Front Line States; Botswana, one of the most vulnerable nations to South African pressure, is the Chairman of the South African Development Coordinating Council, composed of nine Southern African nations which are heavily involved with and economically reliant upon South Africa.

Their testimony on this subject was powerful and persuasive. They concede that South Africa has the power to do serious damage to the economies of the other nations in the region. But they are unanimous in their support of sanctions.

As the Ambassador from Botswana said: "If we must choose between the suffering of apartheid and the suffering of sanctions, we are prepared to accept sanctions. Any measure that can be applied that will end the pestilence of apartheid should be applied, regardless of the consequences."

He pointed out that the apartheid system already imposes serious economic costs on the neighboring states today, because of the refugees fleeing from South Africa and the economic dislocation resulting from South Africa's efforts to destabilize its neighbors. SADCC has estimated the cost of apartheid to be approximately \$10 billion over the past 5 years, or \$2 billion a year.

The Ambassador from Botswana also appealed to the West to listen to the views of the nations in the area that are most involved. He said, "It is unseemly for nations thousands of miles away, who will not suffer from sanctions, to substitute their own judgments for the nations of the region who will. We are willing to accept the hardship that will be necessary to end that evil system."

And the Ambassador from Zambia delivered an equally powerful message:

"To those who oppose sanctions because they will damage the economies of the Front Line States, I say, 'You are not protecting us; you are protecting apartheid.'"

Steps can be taken to ameliorate the impact of sanctions in other nations. I believe that the United States, in conjunction with the other nations of the West, should join together to implement such measures as we impose sanctions against South Africa.

For example, the SADCC nations depend heavily upon rail transport through South Africa to the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town for their exports. A group of private businessmen and government representatives from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have formed a consortium to seek alternative outlets for their products. A delegation from that group came to Washington last week with a plan for the re-construction and improvement of the Beira-Harare railroad—which they call "the Freedom Corridor." They claim that by 1989 this rail link to the Port of Beira—which is being re-built and expanded by the Netherlands—can accommodate one hundred percent of the tonnage that presently passes from the SADCC nations through South Africa.

The overall cost of the Freedom Corridor is \$250 million. The consortium has asked the United States to provide \$30 million in the form of locomotives and rolling stock, in order to improve this important rail link, increase its capacity, and reduce their dependence on South Africa. I urge the Committee to support their request as part of any plan for sanctions against South Africa.

In sum, the case for comprehensive economic sanctions is clear. Quiet diplomacy has failed; only strong economic pressure from the international community—combined with peaceful pressure inside South Africa—can stop the descent into violence and persuade the apartheid regime to change course. The challenge to both Congress and the Administration is clear, and I look forward to working with the committee as we seek to meet our responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

Let me take just a moment to address the issue of schedule and procedure with respect to any South African legislation because all members are concerned about the timeliness of our deliberations.

Yesterday, as all Senators know, the majority leader and the distinguished Democratic leader engaged in a colloquy at the beginning of the session, in which a number of foreign policy issues were

raised. They included some discussion of arms control policy, including SALT II and/or other policies associated with the SDI. They included some discussion of the Contra-Nicaragua problem, which may or may not be taken up as part of our deliberations on military construction, an issue on which at least the administration and I suspect the majority want to have some action; and they mentioned South African legislation.

My own hope—and I have no basis of knowing whether such a hope is shared by the majority and the minority of the Senate, not only the leaders, but the full Senate as well—is that some type of time agreement might be established so that there could be some definition of these important issues, proper debate, and then some resolution of legislation.

I will certainly favor such a course.

I intend to meet with the majority leader late this afternoon to express that hope and to determine whether a series of time agreements constitute a viable option.

But it will require cooperation in terms of unanimous consent requests, not just on the part of the leadership or those of us who have these concerns, but everybody.

So I take this forum just to indicate that I share the concern of the Senator and would like to see definition of these items so that we could have resolution of them.

Senator WEICKER. To follow up on what Senator Kennedy has stated, it is not the desire of either Senator Kennedy or myself or any of the cosponsors of this legislation to circumvent this committee. It is our preference, very frankly, that there be a bill to come out of this committee. I realize that you cannot guarantee what is going to happen on the floor of the Senate. I think you can give a more definite assurance as to getting a bill out of the committee and onto the floor.

A matter such as this, really, as far as we are all concerned, should not be tacked on to debt ceilings, or supplementals, or whatever. We are talking about the most important statement of this great constitutional democracy that we have made in several decades. It should stand out there by itself. It should certainly be out there standing, in terms of time, rather than something we are talking about at election time back home.

That I want to make clear.

I would be offended were I on this committee, were I the chairman of this committee, if, indeed, an end run were pulled on a matter of such great import to the world and to this Nation. I just want to assure you that I support exactly what Senator Kennedy has said, which is that we want to work through this committee in a timely fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

Let me just raise one additional issue, and perhaps other members will have questions of these Senators.

Senator Kennedy has mentioned the Eminent Persons Group, a group composed of Commonwealth leaders. In the case of the two leaders that have been with us in Washington, they include a former Prime Minister of Australia, and a former President of the State of Nigeria. They have offered testimony in the colloquy that

the Senators described and they will be meeting with many of us today.

The group, as I understand it, is making the point that, in the event there is not decisive action taken by the United States, the Commonwealth, Great Britain, European countries, or at least some of the above, with respect to apartheid, this guerrilla warfare can be anticipated in South Africa. Sir Malcolm Frazier has expressed the view that 3,000 or 4,000 persons engaged in this kind of warfare could create havoc in that country and be well beyond the control even of the very concerted military juggernaut that the government has.

Now, as I understood the two leaders yesterday, I think they have offered some ideas on sanctions which they believe would be effective. They are not necessarily the sanctions in the bills that Senators Weicker and Kennedy have presented, or Senator Kassebaum, or others, although some of the sanctions appear in those bills. But they have adopted a rather rifleshoot approach to the problem.

Specifically, their first group of sanctions deals, as I recall, with the end of landing rights for South African aircraft and the end of visas for South African nationals in an effort to try to bring home to the leadership group in South Africa that we are taking these things seriously.

They go beyond that, as I recall, with certain banking ideas, such that South Africans who presently profess that they are going to stay, but, in fact, are depositing moneys in American banks, might have their bank accounts frozen.

I make this point because this committee and the Senate as a whole may have to arrive at a judgment as to what would be effective in order to reach some policy consensus and in order to develop a majority view in committee and in the Senate as a whole.

Other Members may vote for no sanctions at all. But I merely mention that the Eminent Persons Group is trying to adopt a graduated approach to sanctions with specific targets, including the leadership group.

This is a different course than total withdrawal. That is an issue all by itself, I suspect.

I do not want to quarrel as to which our course ought to be. In my own statement, I indicated that I believed we ought to be involved, but have not precluded the fact that sanctions such as the ones proposed by the Eminent Persons Group may make sense in trying to encourage dialog, the beginning of negotiations for the end of apartheid and a constitutional system.

Senator WEICKER. I would concur with the chairman. But you left out one point which they made, which I think is No. 2 on their list, and that is the closing of consular facilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WEICKER. Their No. 1 priority is the airlines. There are both, and the consular facilities, the banking area, trade, credit, access to overseas accounts, and a ban on commodity exports.

Listen, let me tell you that what they advocate here is very rifleshoot, and very, very tough.

I am certain that there is no great pride of authorship as far as Senator Kennedy or I am concerned. If, indeed, better firsthand knowledge comes along, we are willing to go ahead and adopt that.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that is my question. In the event the committee were to adopt some of the sanctions, or at least to follow more the course of the Eminent Persons Group than that prescribed in the original legislation, or either piece of legislation that you have proposed, is it conceivable that you could be supportive of some other set of sanctions, as opposed to the ones in your bills?

Senator WEICKER. Absolutely.

And, in addition to that, Senator Kennedy and I have never considered ourselves "eminent persons." [Laughter.]

What we are interested is in the best resolution of this problem, and I think both of us would agree that from what we heard yesterday in testimony from these individuals, believe me, anything that they conceive of as a solution would certainly have my support.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. They had mentioned some elements which you and Senator Weicker had reviewed, which had not been included in previous bills. I think the offshore banking provisions were enormously interesting and a valuable recommendation. That, really, I think, would be a powerful factor, as would the other kinds of provisions.

So I think it is worthwhile to consider those.

Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate that I do think that the preferable way, still, would be a disinvestment program. I would not object to the adding on to the legislation that if they release Nelson Mandela, that sanctions would be terminated.

I would say that I am not interested in punitive actions. I am interested in something that will move the political process.

I cannot help but believe, Mr. Chairman, that if we were to pass a disinvestment bill, and the President of the United States were to sign it, that that afternoon, Nelson Mandela would be on his way out of prison.

I just have to believe that. I think that that would be the most useful and important contribution that we could make.

Senator WEICKER. I think in regard to that also it is important to point out the testimony of General Obasanjo yesterday to those who say that we advise an approach where such and such, and such and such, and such and such will take place within the year unless you release Nelson Mandela. It is their advice that you impose the sanctions now and, upon release, that you lift them. In other words, that the first action to take place is the imposition of sanctions and that they will be lifted if such and such takes place, rather than the other way around.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any questions?

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask this.

I would like to include the EPG report as part of the record. I don't know whether it is the desire of the committee to have it all reprinted. But I think it is very valuable, quite frankly, and it would be of value to the Members of the Senate to have it readily available. I will leave that up to the committee.

But I would like to have it made available within the record of these hearings.

The other is the excellent study that was done by Prof. Tom Lodge on the leadership of the ANC. This article is the most comprehensive review of the membership of the ANC. It pulls no punches. It identifies certain individuals who have been Communist and who he believes still are Communist. But he also talks about the other members of the ANC, and reaches the final conclusion that, "Essentially the ANC is a movement of pragmatists, not ideologues, with a heritage of political knowledge and experience spanning five decades. The ANC is the oldest national political organization in South Africa. Its leadership represents some of the most important authentic traditions in the history of South African political life."

I would like to make it a part of the record and leave it to the committee as to which parts would actually be included.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kennedy, we will make the statement by Mr. Lodge a part of the record. The book by the Eminent Persons is very important, and we will try to make certain that that is readily available to the Members of the Senate as a whole.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I want to recognize Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Rather than taking up the time of the committee now with an opening statement, I will ask a few questions, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PELL. I believe it is correct to say that we already have in place sanctions against Cuba and Nicaragua, Libya, and Iran. With regard to South Africa, the thought has come up that perhaps we should adopt a "least-favored-nation policy," and institute sanctions against South Africa which parallel those sanctions already imposed against those countries.

Would that make any sense to either of you two?

Senator WEICKER. The very point that you raise was raised in yesterday's testimony by General Obasanjo, that is, that we have imposed sanctions against these other powers. So apparently we must consider them to be of some effect. But we have not done so vis-a-vis South Africa. That is the very point that you raised.

I think it is interesting that it was raised by General Obasanjo, because that point does not go unnoticed by black Africa.

Senator PELL. Speaking of what goes unnoticed or noticed, isn't the whole question about divestment really more a psychological question? From the viewpoint of actual impact, there is very little difference if university A sells x number of shares of IBM to somebody else who buys it. The economic impact is negligible. Rather it is a psychological impact which is important. Isn't that the reason for divestment?

Senator WEICKER. I don't think there is any question about that. Again, that was emphasized in yesterday's testimony from the Eminent Persons Group.

Let's stop kidding ourselves. We can, in all of our sophistry, debate what is going to work and what is not going to work, debate this sanction and that sanction, et cetera. The very simple fact is

that the blacks in South Africa are willing to die for their beliefs. And, as we heard in testimony yesterday, the Front Line States are fully willing to take, again, that consequence on their shoulders by participating in any sort of sanctions program.

They understand the consequences—consequences which we will never feel in the United States, and they are willing to accept them, even to the point of death.

I think that is what shames me into saying, you know, what are we going to do here, and what is the impact going to be, and what is the effect. We sit here in a great academic debate. But this is a very real tragedy.

That is the reason why we have to move on it.

Believe me, I cannot give you all of the consequences. But I suspect that black African and the African in the border state full well knows the consequences, that he may never see the next day or his children or the rest of his family. And they are willing to accept those consequences. We should not accept anything less.

Senator PELL. But isn't disinvestment a much more preferable measure, because that has a real impact on the Republic of South Africa, while divestment really has zero economic impact.

Senator WEICKER. I think that is true.

Senator KENNEDY. There is one point that I would make, first of all, on the question of sanctions.

I think if sanctions could ever work, they could work here. You can say that they did not work in Zimbabwe or other places in southern Africa. That is primarily because South Africa was a key element in keeping the white regimes afloat in those areas.

But now you have a situation where those other countries on the border areas would support sanctions. I believe if the United States leads, that, as Malcolm Frazier and General Obasanjo have pointed out, the United Kingdom will follow and the European Community will follow. And Malcolm Frazier has had sufficient conversations to believe that the Japanese would follow.

So I think the action of the United States by itself might be marginal. But I do believe, and I think those who have given this the most serious consideration also believe, that the ripple effect would be significant in terms of economic terms. And I think moral considerations leave us no other alternative.

Senator PELL. On the question of divestment, this may come up if we move this as a policy. There is the question of capital gains.

This is not a quibble, either. Suppose, for example, that Harvard University decides to divest, what will be the effect with respect to paying of capital gains taxes?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are going to be other attendant elements that you are going to have to give consideration to. I would hope that we would focus on the policy questions of disinvestment.

I think we are going to have to address the economic needs of the Front Line nations. They have to expect that if we get economic sanctions here, there might be corresponding action by South Africa against them.

I think there have been other times and other situations when we have had financial interests.

But the bottom line is that those American companies have profited enormously over a long period of time and have received extraordinary returns on their investments.

I think, up to about 2 years ago, the return on investment was about 33 percent.

Senator PELL. If we chose a policy of disinvestment, as in the House bill, then the whole question of divestment would be academic. To my mind, disinvestment, while it could result in harm to the corporations and the American stockholders, would still be the fair way of doing it. You would then have a situation where IBM would pull out, by selling its shares perhaps at bargain rates. Would that be the best policy to pursue?

What would be your views on that?

Senator WEICKER. I would agree. I would agree with the distinguished Senator.

Let me say this right now, too. Yes, there is a price to be paid. But I repeat what Senator Kennedy has said. These Front Line States are going to have prices to be paid also. Let me put it this way.

How did we react? It will be interesting to see what our reaction is then, because that is going to cost the taxpayers money. What was our reaction when Berlin was encircled—which is the case with these other nations, both within the actual South African borders and on its borders? It could very well be that you will be doing some airlifting. I don't know.

But, yes, there is going to be a consequence to be paid. But I think that is far preferable to the lives that are going to be lost, the lives that are going to be lost in the absence of such economic measures.

Senator PELL. Then we all agree, basically, that disinvestment would be a good idea and would eliminate the debate over whether divestment should take place?

Senator WEICKER. I would certainly agree. I would agree with the view on disinvestment.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask if there are further questions from the committee? We do have two more witnesses and we may have exhausted some of the patience of our current witnesses. But I do not want to cut off the questions if there are any.

Senator Sarbanes, do you have any further questions of these witnesses?

Senator SARBANES. I do, Mr. Chairman. But I don't know if I am next.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, please proceed.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

I want to address the argument that sanctions are going to harm the blacks of South Africa. I would simply quote Bishop Tutu, who said that "Blacks are saying we are suffering already to the end that you will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering."

I must ask to whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen or to the perpetrators of apartheid and those who benefit from it?

It is your view, I take it, that it is clear that the blacks themselves, in order to bring apartheid down, are prepared to suffer the further punishment that will come from the economic impact of sanctions.

Is that not correct?

Senator WEICKER. That is correct. And that is also the testimony which we received yesterday.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator, I think I heard someone say that if we were to apply that principal to American history, you might agree that you don't want to abandon slavery because it would create an unemployment problem. I think there is a little bit of that in this as well. Those who have been the most vigorous in talking about the burden that is going to fall on the blacks for the most part have not been the ones that have been standing up for better rights, better opportunities and the elimination of apartheid in that country.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, Bishop Tutu went on to say that there is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid, but it is the last nonviolent option left, and it is a "risk with a chance."

I ask that this eloquent article [indicating] of the bishop's be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator SARBANES. Second, I would observe that in a very moving article by Coretta Scott King, "Africa Policy at Crossroads," she states, and I quote her: "Ironically, one of the most compelling arguments in favor of economic sanctions against South Africa has come from the apartheid regime itself. In the words of former Prime Minister Jon Vorster, 'Each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment, is another brick in the wall of our continued existence.'"

I ask that the Coretta Scott King article be included.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator SARBANES. I want to address one question to the two witnesses. It concerns the assertion that sanctions will be ineffective unless they are joined in by other countries, and the observation that there seems to be an opportunity at this moment for U.S. leadership to lead to the imposition of sanctions by other nations.

The Commonwealth countries are scheduled to meet beginning the third of August. The Commonwealth is under enormous stress. Half the countries have withdrawn from the Commonwealth games. News accounts in the British press suggest that the Queen's concern over what has happened to the Commonwealth and its potential fragmentation has led to differences between herself and the Prime Minister.

What is your view of the impact that action here in the Congress, American action on sanctions, can have on the actions to be taken by the Commonwealth nations at their meeting beginning the third of August?

Senator KENNEDY. Senator, I would like to answer that perhaps in the way that Malcolm Frazier answered it. He said let's respond in this particular way: if there is no action by the Commonwealth countries in the early part of August, if they refuse to take the rec-

ommendations of the Eminent Persons Group, and if there is no action by the Senate of the United States and by the American Government, that that, in and of itself, sends such a powerful message to those individuals, the black and white alike, to those who are hanging by a small thread, with a hope that violence and civil war can be diverted, that that thread will inevitably be cut and the inevitable outcome will be a dark, and bloody time in South Africa.

I think that is one way of looking at it. I think all of us, as hopeful individuals, would like to believe that there will be action taken by the Senate in the very near future, and that at least if the Commonwealth countries will have some understanding that we will take action in the Senate, that might help stiffen the backs of those forces urging the Commonwealth countries to take action in early August. Hopefully that will take place, and at least there will be a greater chance for hope in South Africa.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, finally, I would observe that without sanctions on the statute books, Nelson Mandela has not been freed from prison. So that approach has not produced his release from prison. It seems to me that it is time to try a new approach, as suggested by our two witnesses today, and to move with sanctions legislation. This may, produce his release from prison.

In any event, if it does not, it will be no different from the current situation, and it will clearly place the United States on the right side of the critical moral issue of our time.

I thank the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I would like to address a question to my colleagues. But, first of all, I would compliment them for their outspoken stands on this issue. I know they have both traveled there.

In my opening statement, I said that I had voted for sanctions a year ago, but, after visiting South Africa, I have become convinced that they are not the best approach. Indeed, frequently sanctions will have the opposite effect of what we are trying to achieve.

Although it is quite a different situation, people say regarding Romania that we should end the most-favored-nation status and there would be more religious freedom there. The fact of the matter is that if we end it, we would probably force them more into the Soviets' hands and there will be an opposite result, there will be less religious freedom.

I think that to some extent, South Africa might be the same situation. It is assumed that sanctions will force the Botha government further to the left. I tend to believe that it will force it further to the right.

Also, we have seen the stories in the Washington Post about "necklacing," the tactics of blacks killing black. They point out that 26 black persons have died in 6 days, and only one white, and that the violence was black against black.

Do you believe that if sanctions really disrupted the government there, and let's say that the ANC took over or another group, do you really believe that there would be less violence of this sort?

Senator KENNEDY. I would subscribe to this view.

The Cochairman of the Eminent Persons Group, Prime Minister Frazier, said, as recently as yesterday, "We reject completely the argument that international pressure will force the South African Government to withdraw into itself. This commonly held view is masterly disinformation. It has hitherto been successful in persuading major states not to take substantive measures or sanctions against South Africa. The Afrikaners here in fact only change course when under extreme pressure."

I would subscribe to that view, Senator.

The other point that I would make I made reference to earlier in the course of the hearing. Cliff Wharton, the former president of Michigan State, and currently chancellor of the New York State schools and member of the board of Ford Motor Co., said with regard to the presence of U.S. companies, the following, and I quote:

There is no evidence that U.S. presence and practice are making any substantial permanent progress in breaking down the legally sanctioned and brutally enforced South African policies of apartheid. In a perverse way, it might even be argued that this limited success actually is serving to sustain and perpetuate the most evil features of apartheid, or at least delay its demise.

I have in the past supported the Sullivan principles. We are in the fourth phase of the Sullivan principles. These companies are supposed to be active in breaking down apartheid. But the fact remains that this conclusion of Wharton, I think, is much closer to what the reality is today.

The Eminent Persons Group also speaks to the issue about whether economic sanctions will drive the South African Government into what they call the lager, and that group comes to a contrary conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am less concerned about whether sanctions will harm black citizens or harm the neighboring black countries; I think you have both made the case extraordinarily well and forcefully that they are prepared to take the pain, if there is some, to achieve some change.

My concern is that we impose sanctions to the degree we are talking about imposing sanctions and find that the South African Government can live quite well under those sanctions. Then where are we?

Let me again refer to the editorial in the Economist which I referred to in my opening remarks, where they say that most enthusiasts for sanctions:

Assume that governments should forbid their businessmen to sell to South Africa any of the \$14 billion of goods and services which that country buys from abroad each year. About half of those \$14 billion consists of manufactured goods that could be shipped from almost anywhere else, carrying labels saying they were bound for Brazil, Israel, Tangiers, you name it, and then end up in the South African economy after a delay of a few weeks. That would not cripple the smallest economy in Africa, much less the largest.

Even if half of these imported manufactures, representing about 5 percent of its gross product, had eventually to be made in South Africa at an average cost perhaps 50 percent higher than today's cheaper and better foreign goods, that would mean a once and for all rise in prices of 2.5 percent, or perhaps an extra inflation of just 1 percent a year for the next three years, hardly something that will bring down a government.

That does not mean that it is not important to engage in those sanctions.

I guess my question is this. As this editorial goes on, it is something that I think we have to consider: "Sixty percent of the total foreign exchange of the South African economy comes from two products, gold and diamonds." Are we prepared, or would you support any kind of move that would lead to a threat and potentially the carrying out of that threat to depress the price of gold and attempt to bring the South African economy really closer to collapse? Such actions would be far, far more intense than any total sanctions on other goods that we are talking about. Would you support such a move, recognizing that that has some extraordinarily potential disruptions in our economy and in other economies throughout the world?

What would our observations be to that?

Senator WEICKER. There are two observations that I would make to that.

No. 1, everybody has agreed that it is impossible to speculate as to the result of the sanctions which are now being suggested, whether by the Eminent Persons Group, whether by Senator Kennedy, and myself, by Representative Dellums, by whomever.

So, you cannot speculate as to what the future effect might be. But what you can do is assess the present. That assessment is not a matter of speculation.

You have the dead, the dying, the oppressed, and so on, down the list. You have the laws of South Africa to make all of this legal, that have a category of subhumans, the likes of which we have never had since Jews were in that position under Hitler.

Those are the facts today. That we can assess.

I have to repeat that, as far as the speculation as to effectiveness, noneffectiveness, et cetera, all I know is this, and this brings me to the second point in response to your question.

It is not just a question of South Africa. It is a question of all of black Africa. And this is the point on which all are agreed. This is what should take place in one form or another.

I am not going to dispute with you the closing down of the gold and diamond businesses. That would certainly be a very effective sanction, in whatever form.

Senator EVANS. A more effective sanction than all that we are talking about.

Senator WEICKER. Probably that is true, I think.

But, right now, what is being looked to is some action, and I fear that we play into the hands of those who either like the policy of constructive engagement or are within the Government of South Africa when we debate as to what our remedy is going to be. I think the time has come to do something and to do something as effective as we deem it to be, and certainly as effective as it is deemed to be by those who are most affected; that is, the black South African and the black African.

That is what is at issue.

Senator Kennedy suggested in his testimony as to how we are viewed by black Africa, and I can assure you that this point was reiterated in the testimony yesterday, as to the black South African.

So, to come from you to my good friend, Senator Pressler, nobody is trying to have Mr. Botha move to the left or to the right. What we are trying to do is to have Mr. Botha move to reality. That is what is of concern to all of here.

It is not a matter as to what I think or you think—you having taken the time to go to South Africa, as to whether it will work or will not work. It is deemed by those affected to be the response they want to see the United States make. And they are the ones that are going to suffer even more than we when we make that response in whatever form.

Senator EVANS. Let me add to that that I do not disagree with anything that you have said. The irony of all of this is that we are moving, or if we move, toward the proposals that you, Senator Kennedy, and others have made, and add them all up into a strong package, and they have the effect of being painful to other states surrounding South Africa and to blacks within South Africa, and they are willing to accept that pain, we are doing something that, frankly, is not very painful at all to us. We are taking no risk.

Senator WEICKER. That's right.

Senator EVANS. We are not willing, or have not been, up to now, to take steps that may be painful to us but more effective in terms of reaching the goal we want to reach.

I guess that is the thrust of my question. Should we at this point be moving in the direction that may be difficult, that may be painful, that may be tough for us, that may be even radical, in an effort to really be effective in what we are trying to carry out?

Senator WEICKER. Senator, I think my response—and I should probably have given you this response first—was the statement that I made at the banking hearing earlier. As far as I am concerned, we ought to have an Embassy in South Africa, and that is the beginning and the end of it, as far as any activity for intercourse as between the United States and South Africa.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just comment very briefly, because I know the time is passing.

What the Senator points out with regard to the sale of gold—you know, there have been some very interesting suggestions that could be made on it. That is, you could announce from the central banks in Western Europe and the United States that in 2 months we would start in with a significant sale of gold, and that most of those who have been involved in following the various gold policies believe that the smaller gold holders would actually start the run on it, and it probably would not even be necessary for governmental action during that period of time, and that that would send a shiver through the whole financial community in South Africa. That would be something of substance.

That is executive leadership, working with the Fed in doing that. We have had none of that, Senator. We just have not.

I don't think any of us would suggest that we have exhausted the possibilities of executive action. Obviously, they ought to consult with the Banking Committees and run through that.

But that really is not where we are today. There could be effective action by the President. I don't think any of us would question that effective action should have been taken. We would like to see it.

But we are dealing with what we are faced with today. And now is the time. The next 3 weeks are the critical periods, and I would hope that we would take the action.

The final point I would make is this.

On the whole question of American investment. It is not a question of noninterference. By being there at all, we are interfering.

We have a presence. We are the American presence—companies, corporations, other kinds of relationships exist now.

We are basically saying is that the United States should also step away.

One final brief point.

Prime Minister Frazier said very eloquently yesterday that he has seen a dramatic escalation in terms of American prestige and influence around the world, and he indicated his support for the President on different foreign policy points including Nicaragua. He says that it is important for the United States to take this position in order to strengthen the whole cause of democratic institutions and democratic governments around the world.

I do not think that that ought to be a point that is lost in terms of the whole question about what democratic institutions are going to stand for around the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair intervene at this point and thank both Senator Weicker and Senator Kennedy for their testimony today.

We appreciate it very much.

I will call now on Senator Wallop and Senator Denton for their testimony.

We thank you, gentlemen.

Senator WEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senators, we appreciate very much your coming. We appreciate your patience and apologize for the length of the hearing already. It has been a good hearing, and we know that your contribution will make it a more substantial one.

At this time, I would like to call upon Senator Jeremiah Denton and then Senator Malcolm Wallop, in that order, for their testimony.

Senator Denton.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEREMIAH DENTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM ALABAMA

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have listened to some of the testimony already given today, and it certainly reminds me of rationales that I have heard applied to places like Iran, Cuba, and, in the old days, Nicaragua, and not too long ago in Vietnam, which is most intensely in my memory. The injustices existed and solutions were offered, which rendered those nations' peoples much worse off in the application of the solutions than they were in the first place, and which also intervened to preempt any possibility that the lot of those people would improve.

In other words, they went from injustice that had a chance of being gradually removed or, in many cases, as in Iran, was being removed, to substitution of communism and an enslavement and a

misery, as in Southeast Asia, which was an infinitely worse outcome. It seems amazing to me that we undertake an analysis of this question with an apparent ignorance or forgetfulness of those previous situations.

So, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your committee today, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I will address the issue of whether economic and political sanctions, as moves by us, are appropriate policy for the achievement of our stated objectives in South Africa.

I believe I am correct in stating that among those objectives are the complete elimination of apartheid and the peaceful transformation of South African society into one in which all South Africans, regardless of race, have a voice in their governance and adequate protection for their individual rights and civil liberties.

Ultimately, of course, the decision about the form that the society will take must be made internally by the South Africans.

I do not believe the subject legislation—that is, disinvestment and similar sanctions—will accomplish any of these noble purposes. In fact, if the developments of the past 9 months are any indication, the imposition of further sanctions against the South African Government can only be counterproductive and will likely lead to a bloodbath, possibly eventuating in an infinitely worse lot for the people, with no help and no possibility for gradual improvement.

It seems to me that the better part of discretion and morality is to take the sure path of gradual improvement, rather than the ultimate end, the finality of the other likelihood, which is a Communist takeover.

I am dismayed at the haste with which both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been moving to impose sanctions, with little regard for their internal consequences, and with no clear understanding of the complexities of achieving a genuine solution.

By moving drastically to express further our repugnance of apartheid, I believe that we would give tacit encouragement, if not outright moral support, to those groups whose aspirations go beyond securing full political rights to the black majority to the destabilization and complete overthrow of the South African Government and its replacement with a Communist regime, resulting in chaos for the people there, making what has been existing seem like pea soup.

The people of South Africa will not benefit from that development. One of the considerations that I think we should take into account is the interest of the United States.

We cannot afford that development. United States policy, while being humanitarian—and I believe that these two motives, humanitarianism and self-interest are parallel in this issue—must clearly and unequivocally reject the revolutionary option and demand of all opposition groups, equally as much as we require it of the South African Government, their good faith, constructive participation in a peaceful process for change. If the radical opposition continues to use harassment, intimidation, and murder to derail negotiations or even the possibility of negotiations for political powersharing, we should respond.

A failure to do so can only lead to a repetition of the kind of humanitarian and foreign policy disasters that we sustained in Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, and Nicaragua. These failures have been costly to ourselves, but they have been particularly so for the millions whose fates we sealed to enslavement under Soviet supported totalitarian regimes.

We sealed them with similar rationales as we consider today, with similar haste, and fanatical clinging to underestimating the likelihood of a worse fate befalling them, with sneers at those who would say that there is something here that is not being assessed properly.

There is a Communist undercurrent. There is a likelihood of Communist takeover. How can we ignore those previous sacrifices of human beings to a worse fate and not remember that there was a bloodbath, that there were dominoes in Southeast Asia, and that Thailand exists not because of fear of United States wisdom and policy but because the Communist superpowers are fighting like jackals over the spoils left, the human and natural resources, in Southeast Asia.

We are fools if we ignore the fact that the Soviets have a particular interest in southern Africa, which Brezhnev so well described in Prague in 1973. I quote Mr. Brezhnev: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends . . . the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa."

For an outline of Soviet active measures in southern Africa, I refer this committee to a 1982 report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Included in the report is a Soviet document obtained by the FBI. I have it here for submission to the record, and believe that you will find an interesting correlation between events in South Africa and the stated Soviet agenda.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator DENTON. Mr. Chairman, as you know, having served for nearly 6 years as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, I have followed internal events in South Africa quite closely, particularly the activities of the African National Congress. I make note that many of those who advocate sanctions believe also that the African National Congress represents a real alternative to the present South African Government, and a concerted campaign is underway to broadcast that organization as the patient, long-suffering black nationalist movement that it once was.

Unfortunately, although many South African blacks and whites who express support or sympathy for the ANC may share our vision of a peaceful transition to a government based on the consent of the governed, and which protects the rights of all, copious evidence presented in 1982 before my subcommittee clearly established that the ANC leadership does not share that vision or any part of it.

The brave testimony of several witnesses, all black, coupled with numerous original ANC documents—original ANC documents—irrefutably established the degree to which the goals, strategies, and leadership of the South African Communist Party, the SACP, and the ANC, the African National Congress, are integrated.

One of our witnesses is perhaps the most unforgettable character I have ever met. His name was Bartholomew Hlapane. History should accord him a monument, but much of his testimony was scarcely covered in the national media.

He held top leadership positions concurrently in the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. He was murdered within weeks of the publication of our hearing report because of his testimony.

I hope it is not too much of a personal departure to mention that before the hearing, when we gave him maximum security from Kennedy Airport to National here in Washington, and brought him to the anteroom outside the hearing room with a mask with eye-holes cut for him, some of the correspondents mocked me and said I was trying to be sensationalist and that the man did not need any security.

As soon as I got everyone out of the anteroom, I acceded to Mr. Hlapane's request to have a private talk with me. In that talk, he said that he had read a lot of U.S. history and world history. He was a rather well educated man. He said he had read the book I wrote about my experiences in South Vietnam.

He said that he wanted me to know that he loved his country as those who serve this country do and that he was about to sacrifice his life by telling the truth before my committee, and that he wanted me to know that he knew he was going to die for what he spoke.

He spoke and the ANC publicly took credit for his assassination, which also left Bartholomew's wife dead and one of his young daughters, Brenda, a paraplegic.

It has been charged today by a previous witness that disinvestment is justified because blacks are willing to die for their cause. Mr. Hlapane died for his. He told the truth. He would not have wanted disinvestment any more than he would trust the ANC, of which he was a member for many years.

We have tried, my staff and I, to acknowledge our debt to Mr. Hlapane for his courage and commitment to a free future for his people by looking out for his children. We took up a collection, and thanks to the contributions of many generous people, his two surviving daughters, Charmaine and Audrey, are now studying at Montevallo University in Alabama.

If anything, what I am hearing here is the opposite of the facts that we very painstakingly derived in that 1982 hearing. The evidence that has become available since the 1982 hearings on ANC intentions and links to the Soviet bloc and international terrorist groups further substantiates our conclusions reached in those hearings.

At its first party conference in many decades, the watershed Kabwe Conference in June 1985, the ANC acted to expand Communist influence on its National Executive Committee.

I have heard many say that they were once Communist but that they have become less so. That is the opposite of the way they have trended.

Roughly two-thirds of the committee are now SACP members or Communist advocates.

The U.S. intelligence community has provided the subcommittee with detailed classified information on SACP influence in the ANC. In the intervening years since our hearing, the ANC has acted to solidify its ties to its foreign allies. Virtually all of its material support, estimated at \$80 million, comes from the Soviet Union.

Incidentally, the testimony of a Ms. Del Cave, who was lured over to the ANC by promises of a college education, includes her reacting negatively to training for terrorism, which they introduced her to, instead of a college education. She said she would not do that. She would not blow up a schoolroom. She would not derail a train full of civilians. She would not do any of the things that they immediately started training her to do.

Well, for indoctrination, they took her not to some place in Africa. They took her to Moscow, and they multiple raped her, and they kept her in a room with dead men for over 3 days and 3 nights. There were unspeakable horrors wreaked upon her.

She then decided to play along with it, said OK, she would go back and do the terrorism, came back to Africa, escaped, joined the group that testified before my subcommittee, and we derived a lot of important information.

Why that information is not being considered as we decide what we are going to do is something that I hope my testimony remedies today.

The ANC conducts a persistent anti-Western rhetorical campaign, which includes generous expressions of solidarity with the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Vietnam, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and others.

Last week, a high-ranking representative of the Iranian Government met with Oliver Tambo in Lusaka to strengthen relations between Iran and the ANC.

To diverge from the Communist theme for a moment, the ANC and the PLO have maintained ties since at least the early 1970's.

In 1981, ANC cadres received training from the PLO in Mozambique. In 1982, further training was conducted in Tyre, Lebanon, and, as I understand it, the PLO offices in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia serve as communication and supply links for the ANC.

The ongoing PLO-ANC alliance has finally become serious enough to draw the attention of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. Its May 1986, bulletin carries a revealing article by Nathan Perlmutter and David Evanier. I ask that it be included in the record of this hearing and urge all of you to review it for additional detail on the issue of the ANC and its alliances.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, there is further cause for us to reject the notion that the ANC provides a respectable solution to South Africa's internal problems. The African National Congress is openly committed to revolutionary armed struggle. That is really an understatement.

What is going on is the deliberate attempt to introduce bloody chaos so that the police will have to intervene to preserve order, as in the classic Uruguayan example.

Now, Uruguay had a more broadly representative democratic government at the time than South Africa does, but the pattern is the same.

Many times, South African State President Botha has asked for negotiations. The necklace is negating the motivation on the part of moderates to meet that invitation.

So, they have us in a scissors.

I refer you to only one of many statements by the ANC leadership on the subject.

On July 23, 1985, Oliver Tambo, the head of the ANC and a so-called moderate in it, declared: "Our own tasks are very clear: To bring about the kind of society that is visualized in the Freedom Charter, we have to break down and destroy the old order."

He goes on in the July 2, 1985, Harare Star Africa, giving his view of negotiations, where he says: "In any case, even if there were talks and if we thought the time had come for talks with the Pretoria regime, we would not abandon the armed struggle. We would simply carry on."

Now, I think that my colleagues here, who have equally humanitarian interests, are interested in a peaceful solution that leads to a condition that is better than the present one. If they do, I hope that we will pause and not act hastily under a political impetus that is not entirely without some domestic civil rights element. I hope to clarify the issues and the probable consequences of a sanctions bill before this thing is wrought.

ANC statements are totally consistent with the South African Communist Party objectives. For example, in the SAC journal *Umsebenzi*, volume 2, No. 2, 1986, the statement appears: "In the first place, our objective is not to work for the regime's abdication but to bring about its revolutionary overthrow."

It is, therefore, not surprising that at the Kabwe Conference the ANC announced the beginning of a new operational phase in its campaign to destroy South Africa, or that the military decisions taken there have resulted in an upsurge in classic terrorist activity aimed at whites in South Africa and in an increase in black-on-black violence in the townships.

1986 was formally declared the "Year of the People's Army." They have an African name for it—*Umkhonto We Sizwe*. That is the Communist-led military wing of the African National Congress.

Tambo called for an intensification of the people's war, and he announced that "the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' targets is going to disappear in an intensified conflict."

The precise meaning of that declaration I just gave, the distinction between soft and hard is going to disappear, has become apparent in the latest series of bombings and limpet mine explosions and the necklacing.

The ANC has not only abandoned its practice of minimizing casualties, which it once did, it has turned to deliberately targeting civilians and trying to maximize casualties—women and children.

As the South African Government has moved toward political accommodation it has sacrificed a third of its own political support, can't we in the Senate remember that the United States leaned successfully on the Shah of Iran for decades to get him to move to the left, to liberalize. We leaned on him far enough that he exceed-

ed the tolerance of his own right-wing. The same people who in spirit are insisting on this devastating action regarding South Africa at the time pointed to the heroic, bearded savior in Paris, the Ayatollah, and said "bring him in."

We didn't even give the Shah of Iran a place to die.

Now, that is not only foolishness, it is disgraceful.

Of course he was not perfect. He was just a lot better than the alternative, and he was moving the way our policy wanted him to move.

And so is the South African Government.

The National Party has lost a third of its own political support. They have excited Afrikaner extremists in trying to accommodate the need to reform and eliminate apartheid. In other words, they are beginning to exceed the tolerance of their right.

Who are we? Yes, we want justice, but justice by what means, with what likely result?

The international community has responded by adopting policies to further isolate and discredit the presently white-dominated parliamentary government, and the ANC has reaffirmed its active commitment to revolutionary armed struggle.

The most horrifying aspect, the armed struggle, Mr. Chairman, is what is now taking place in the black townships themselves.

I have pictures here (indicating) of children, babies, women, which I hesitate to show, along with tapes of necklacings, burnings to death, and an article from Newsweek magazine, not exactly a far-right publication, saying "Comrads Decree Death by Necklace."

Please let's don't go along with the same kind of wrongness with which we proceeded on council foreign policy questions before, with the cost to humanitarianism and to our own interests, as we seem to be bent on doing now, without pausing and looking at the truth about this thing.

A careful reading of general press accounts would leave one with the impression that by far the general township violence is comprised of largely unprovoked South African police attacks on innocent anti-apartheid protesters. I believe that the most casual observation of what is going on would prove that that is a lie, that the facts do not support that contention.

Recent published figures indicate that 284 blacks were killed by radicals between March 1986 and June 1986. One hundred seventy-two of them were by the gruesome "necklace," which the ANC makes no bones about. "We are using that." "That's our thing."

The total figure represents 65 to 70 percent of all violent black deaths—all. The South African police were responsible for the remaining third of the deaths, and they say that it was in defense of order, according to them.

I do not think that we can, out of hand, discard that claim.

I can say in deference that there may be, that there unquestionably have been, some acts of violence, perhaps, which were absolutely unjustified on the part of the South African police. But we are looking at a policy, a deliberate policy, on the part of the ANC to murder, to intimidate, to terrorize, to horrify.

Some of the black-on-black violence is the product of roving street gangs, and I don't think the ANC can be relieved of complicity in some of that. But the police certainly can be.

The ANC has repeatedly called for the townships to be made ungovernable and urged retaliation against anyone who collaborates with the government.

The definition of collaboration is very broad. That is what the Newsweek article is about.

Retribution is not limited to attacks on the so-called collaborator himself, like the 11 year old boy who was hacked to death in May of this year because his father was a town councillor in Port Elizabeth.

Is that the kind of humanitarian justice we are trying to achieve?

Newsweek reporter Richard Manning reported on June 6, 1986, that collaboration includes almost any comrad-perceived sin. "Township officials and black policemen have been executived—but so have migrant miners, since mines are pillars of the system, and liquor store owners, since they operate under government licenses."

He reports that an old woman who worked in a funeral home was necklaced because she sold funeral insurance.

Let's not get reversed about which side is the humanitarian side.

We all agree we must do away with apartheid. The question is how. The question is what is going on over there right now, in truth.

If anyone questions that the ANC could possibly be involved in encouraging the use of the so-called necklace, let me share a few ANC statements with you.

On May 21, 1986, the CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported that the ANC had repeated its call to render the tricameral parliamentary arrangement unworkable and to isolate those who serve in it.

An ANC press release issued in Lusaka on July 1, 1986, reads,

Let us turn every corner of our country into a battlefield . . . every patriot a combatant, every combatant a patriot. . . . The charge we give to Umkhonto We Sizwe and to the masses of our people: attack, advance, give the enemy no quarter—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

Nelson Mandela's wife, who is perhaps the most reverently referred to person in some of our newspapers, said, according to an April 14, 1986, "Washington Post" article: "The power is in our hand—we have people's power . . . with our necklaces we shall liberate this country.

An ANC spokesman and South African writer, Alosi Moloi, stated during a meeting at a California State University on October 10, 1986, that "Among us, we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others."

At the same meeting, Tim Ngubane, another ANC official, said, "We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of doing it."

Again, it is not just the collaborator, but it is his son, his daughter, his sister, his friend, whatever.

It is clear that in its rhetoric and its call to make the townships ungovernable, the ANC has, at a very minimum, provided moral license and political cover for murder as a means to satisfy grievances. Among those grievances is rising black unemployment, which was at first truly the product of the recent worldwide reces-

sion, but is now sustained by the dislocations caused by the psychological effects of the international sanctions campaign.

Now South Africa is not only South Africa's source of revenue and prosperity, to the degree that it exists, but it is that for all of southern Africa. We are talking about millions of human beings. We are talking about cutting off our nose to spite our face.

I believe that the ANC is highly responsible for the black-on-black violence in the townships, and I do not believe that subjectively. I believe it from intense study.

I occasionally wonder about the role of some members of the United Democratic Front as well. One of its members, Mr. Curtis Nkondo, said: "Anybody who does not want to join the liberation struggle must join the police. There is no such thing as the politics of neutrality."

I am a man who has had scores of people come into his office—Indians, coloreds, blacks, whites—and say to me—and as a man who has some knowledge of human nature, I know they are telling me sincerely that this country in its cultural look at this thing and its political look is grossly distorting what is actually the case there. They say if we only will let them, they will bring about a solution that is infinitely better than the one which will take place unless we wise up to what is really going on.

What Mr. Nkondo said about no room for neutrality is exactly the same Marxist-Leninist terror that engulfed Nicaragua, where everyone was forced to choose sides and where there is only one choice that is safe.

I respect my colleagues who truly believe that the proper thing to do is disinvest. I have heard things and seen things which make me rather spirited in my opposition. But I do not wish to imply by any statement of mine that I do not respect the motivations of others.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to a statement made by Oliver Tambo regarding the importance of international sanctions to the achievement of the ANC's objectives. He made it during his 1984 annual address, which was heavily cited in the fourth quarter 1984 issue of another African National Congress publication called "The African Communist."

This is his statement:

Our revolutionary struggle rests on four pillars. These are, first, the all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures of the ANC; second, the united mass action of the peoples; third, our armed offensive spearheaded by Umkhonto We Sizwe; and, fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime.

I hope that we will do the courageous thing, the wise thing, and at least look into this further before we rush on with sanctions legislation.

I urge the members of the committee to condemn the tactics and strategies that are now turning the townships into areas that are ruled by terror beyond our imagination, intimidation of the worst possible kind.

In responding to the perceived need to make another statement against apartheid, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that our actions have very real consequences.

Let us look at the likelihood of each of the consequences. Let us look at our own national interests in terms of the minerals and

metals which we can lose there, which Brezhnev said he would deny to us. And, of course, let us look at the humanitarian issue there, but let us look at it fully, not partially, blowing with the winds of present widely expressed opinion and definition of the issue.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that the articles and documents that I have referenced in my statement, including these still photographs of victims of ANC-inspired violence, be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator DENTON. And I thank you very much for your indulgence.

[The prepared statement of Senator Denton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DENTON

Senator DENTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your Committee today. I am sure that subsequent witnesses will address many of the technical and legal aspects of the pending sanctions legislation, including the short and long term implications for U.S. business and our domestic economy. I would like to address the broader issue of whether economic and political sanctions are an appropriate policy for the achievement of our stated objectives in South Africa.

I believe that I am correct when I state that among those objectives are the complete elimination of apartheid and the peaceful transformation of South African society into one in which all South Africans, regardless of race, have a voice in their governance and adequate protection for their individual rights and civil liberties. Ultimately, of course, the decision about the form that that society will take must be made internally by the South Africans.

I do not believe that the legislation that is the subject of this hearing today will accomplish any of those noble purposes. In fact, if the developments of the past 9 months are any indication, the imposition of further sanctions against the South African government can only be counterproductive and will likely lead to greater polarization in an already deeply divided polity.

I am therefore dismayed at the haste with which both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been moving to impose comprehensive sanctions, with little apparent regard for their internal consequences, or without clear understanding of the complexities of achieving a genuine solution to the current political, social, and economic crisis in South Africa. By moving so rapidly, intent upon using drastic action further to express our repugnance of apartheid, I believe that we run the real risk of giving tacit encouragement, if not outright moral support to those groups whose aspirations go beyond securing full political rights for the black majority to the destabilization and complete overthrow of the South African government, and its replacement with a communist regime.

The people of South Africa will not benefit from that development. Neither can we afford that. U.S. policy must clearly and unequivocally reject the revolutionary option and demand of all opposition groups, equally as much as we require it of the South African government, their good faith, constructive participation in a peaceful process for change. If they continue to use harassment, intimidation, and murder to derail negotiations for political power sharing, we must respond.

A failure to do so can only lead to a repetition of the kind of costly foreign policy failures that we sustained in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, and Nicaragua, costly to ourselves but particularly so to the thousands who have been enslaved under Soviet-supported totalitarian regimes. The Soviets have a particular interest in southern Africa, which Brezhnev so well described in Prague in 1973: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the west depends . . . the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."

For an outline of Soviet Active Measures in southern Africa, I refer this Committee to a 1982 report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Included in the report is a Soviet document obtained by the FBI. I have it here for submission to the Record and believe that you will find an interesting correlation between events in South Africa and the stated Soviet agenda.

Mr. Chairman, as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, I have followed internal events in South Africa quite closely, particularly the activities of the African National Congress (ANC). I make note that many of those who advocate sanctions also believe that the African National Congress presents a real alternative to the present South African government, and a concerted campaign is underway to broadcast that organization as the patient, long-suffering, black nationalist movement that it once was.

Unfortunately, although many South African blacks and whites who express support or sympathy for the ANC may share our vision of a peaceful transition to a government based on the consent of the governed, which protects the rights of all, evidence presented in 1982 before my Subcommittee clearly established that the ANC leadership does not.

The brave testimony of several witnesses coupled with numerous original ANC documents, irrefutably established the degree to which the goals, strategies, and leadership of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC are integrated. One of our witnesses, Bartholomew Hlapane, who had held top leadership positions concurrently in the ANC and the SACP, was murdered within weeks of the publication of our hearing report, because of his testimony. The ANC publicly took credit for the assassination, which also left Bartholomew's wife dead and one of his young daughters, Brenda, a paraplegic.

We have tried to acknowledge our debt to Mr. Hlapane for his courage and commitment to a free future for his people by looking out for his children. Two daughters, Charmaine and Audrey, are now studying in Alabama, thanks to the contributions of many generous people.

If anything, the evidence that has become available since the 1982 hearings on ANC intentions and links to the Soviet Bloc and international terrorist groups further substantiates our conclusions. At its first party conference in many decades, the watershed Kabwe Conference of June 1985, the ANC acted to expand communist influence on its National Executive Committee. Roughly two-thirds of the committee are now SACP members or communist advocates. The U.S. Intelligence community has provided the Subcommittee with detailed classified information on SACP influence in the ANC.

In the intervening years since our hearing, the ANC has also acted to solidify its ties to its foreign allies. Virtually all of its material support, estimated at \$80 million, comes from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it conducts a persistent anti-Western rhetorical campaign, which includes generous expressions of solidarity with the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Vietnam, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and others. Last week, a high-ranking representative of the Iranian government met with Oliver Tambo in Lusaka to strengthen relations between Iran and the ANC.

I think that Alfred Nzo, Secretary General of the ANC, explained the ANC's foreign alignment best in a contribution to the *World Marxist Review* in December 1984:

"... the ANC invariably stresses that the socialist countries and all democratic, progressive forces which help the oppressed masses of South Africa in their struggle against the apartheid regime at home and against imperialist pressure from abroad are friends we can rely on. This struggle is part of the overall anti-imperialist struggle... The African National Congress is very active in the worldwide peace movement and in other movements which mobilize the forces of peace in different countries to rebuff imperialist forays..."

"We express our solidarity with all those who uphold their legitimate rights and rebuff attempts on their countries' sovereignty and independence. We support the courageous Palestinian people who are repelling the imperialist and Zionist aggression and affirm that the objectives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African National Congress are similar. The ANC supports the peoples of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile and Lebanon in their struggle. We urge greater unity of the democratic and progressive forces fighting off the imperialist onslaught in all parts of the world."

The statement gives only a hint of the ties that exist between the ANC and the PLO, a relationship that has existed since at least the early 70s. In 1981, ANC cadres received training from the PLO in Mozambique. In 1982, further training was conducted in Tyre, Lebanon, and as I understand it, the PLO offices in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia serve as communication and supply links for the ANC.

The ongoing PLO/ANC alliance has finally become serious enough to draw the attention of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. Its May 1986 Bulletin carries a revealing article by Nathan Perlmutter and David Evanier. I ask that it be

included in the Record of this hearing and urge all of you to review it for additional detail on the issue of the ANC and its alliances.

Mr. Chairman, there is further cause for us to reject the notion that the ANC provides a respectable solution to South Africa's internal problems. The African National Congress is openly committed to revolutionary armed struggle. I refer you to only one of many statements by the ANC leadership on the subject. On 23 July 1985, Oliver Tambo, the head of and a so-called moderate in the ANC, declared: "Our own tasks are very clear: To bring about the kind of society that is visualized in the Freedom Charter we have to break down and destroy the old order."

In the Harare Star Africa of July 2, 1985, Tambo commented on the ANC's view of negotiations: "In any case, even if there were talks and if we thought the time had come for talks with the Pretoria regime, we would not abandon the armed struggle. We would simply carry on."

Not surprisingly, ANC statements are totally consistent with SACP objectives. For example: "In the first place our objective is not to work for the regime's abdication but to bring about its revolutionary overthrow. Umsebenzi, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1986."

It is, therefore, not unusual that at the Kabwe Conference the ANC announced the beginning of a new operational phase in its campaign to destroy South Africa, or that the military decisions taken there have resulted in an upsurge in classic terrorist activity aimed at whites in South Africa and in an increase in black-on-black violence in the townships.

1986 was declared the year of the People's Army, Umkhonto We Sizwe, the communist led military wing of the ANC. Tambo called for an intensification of the people's war, and he announced that "the distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' is going to disappear in an intensified conflict."

The precise meaning of that declaration has only recently become apparent in the latest series of bombings and limpet mine explosions. The ANC has not only abandoned its practice of minimizing casualties, it has turned to deliberately targeting civilians—women and children—for attack.

As the South African government has moved toward political accommodation, sacrificing a third of its own political support and exciting Afrikaaner extremists, and as the international community has responded by adopting policies to further isolate and discredit the presently white-dominated parliamentary government, the ANC has reaffirmed its active commitment to revolutionary armed struggle.

Mr. Chairman, the most horrifying aspect of the armed struggle is what is now taking place in the black townships themselves. A careful reading of press accounts would leave one with the impression that by far the majority of the township violence is comprised of largely unprovoked South African Police attacks on innocent anti-apartheid protesters. I believe that the facts do not support that contention.

Recent published figures indicate that 284 blacks were killed by radicals between March 1986 and June 1986. 172 of them were by the gruesome "necklace." The total figure represents 65-70% of all black violent deaths. The South African Police were only responsible for the remaining third. Some evidence suggests that at least some of the black-on-black violence is the product of roving street gangs. I do not believe that the ANC can be relieved of complicity in this violence.

The ANC has repeatedly called for the townships to be made ungovernable and urged retaliation against anyone who "collaborates" with the government. The definition of collaboration is very broad, and retribution is not limited to attacks on the so-called "collaborator" himself—like the 11-year-old boy who was hacked to death in May of this year because his father was a town councilor in Port Elizabeth.

Newsweek reporter Richard Manning reported on June 6, 1986, that collaboration includes almost any comrade-perceived sin. "Township officials and black policemen have been executed—but so have migrant miners, since mines are pillars of the system, and liquor-store owners since they operate under government licenses." He reports that an old woman who worked in a funeral home was necklaced because she sold funeral insurance.

Lest you question that the ANC could possibly be involved in encouraging the use of the so-called "necklace", let me share with you a few more ANC statements.

On May 21, 1986, the CIA Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported that the ANC had repeated its call to "render the tricameral parliamentary arrangement unworkable and to isolate those who serve in it." As you may recall, an earlier such challenge resulted in the murder of a colored member of the South African Parliament.

An ANC press release issued in Lusaka on July 1, 1986, reads, "Let us turn every corner of our country into a battlefield . . . every patriot a combatant, every combatant a patriot . . . The charge we give to Umkhonto We Sizwe and to the masses of

our people: attack, advance, give the enemy no quarter—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”

Nelson Mandela's wife recently promised, as reported in the April 14, 1986, Washington Post: “The power is in our hand—we have people's power . . . With our necklaces we shall liberate this country.”

An ANC spokesman and South African writer, Alosi Moloi, stated during a meeting at a California State University on October 10, 1985, that “among us we have people who have openly collaborated with the enemy. You have to eliminate one to save hundreds of others.” At the same meeting, Tim Ngubane, another ANC official, said, “We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of doing it.”

Cassius Mandla, commenting on “collaboration” in the November 1985 issue of the ANC official publication, *Sechaba*, encourages necklacing by not condemning: “Life in the townships is no longer like it was before. . . . Here collaborators and informers live in fear of petrol, either as petrol bombs being hurled at their homes and reducing them to rack and ruin, or as petrol dousing their treacherous bodies which are set alight and burned to a charred and despicable mess . . . Lucrative it still is to sell out, but it carries the immediate hazard of having one's flesh and bones being reduced to unidentifiable ashes.”

It is clear to me that in its rhetoric and its call to make the townships ungovernable, the ANC has—at a very minimum—provided moral license and political cover for murder as a means to satisfy grievances. Among those grievances is rising black unemployment, which was at first the product of the recent world wide recession but is now sustained by the dislocations caused by the real and psychological effects of the international sanctions campaign.

I believe that the ANC is highly responsible for the black-on-black violence in the townships. I occasionally wonder about the role of some members of the United Democratic Front (UDF), as well. For example, when I read statements like the following from UDF executive member, Mr. Curtis Nkondo:

Anybody who does not want to join the liberation struggle must join the police. There is no such thing as the politics of neutrality.

The above statement sounds very much like the Marxist-Leninist terror that has engulfed Nicaragua, where everyone is forced to choose sides and where there is only one choice that is safe.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to a statement made by Oliver Tambo regarding the importance of international sanctions to the achievement of the ANC's objectives. He made it during his 1984 Annual Address, which was heavily cited in 4th Quarter 1984 issue of another ANC publication, *The African Communist*. “Our revolutionary struggle rests on four pillars. These are, first, the all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures of the ANC, second, the united mass action of the peoples, third, our armed offensive spearheaded by Umkhonto We Sizwe, and fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime.”

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues on this Committee, I urge you to do the courageous thing and not approve this sanctions legislation. I urge you to condemn the tactics and strategies that are now turning the townships into areas that are ruled by terror and intimidation of the worst kind. In responding to the perceived need to make another statement against apartheid, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that our actions have very real consequences. To the extent that our policies foreclose options for a peaceful solution and give encouragement to the view that an armed revolutionary struggle can be successful, we will share responsibility for the kind of violence that is now destroying the lives of so many in the townships of South Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Denton.
Senator Wallop.

STATEMENT OF HON. MALCOLM WALLOP, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING

Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I am aware that the hour is late and the committee has been sitting for some time.

I come here with the opinion that sanctions will become the ultimate triumph of the poles in South Africa and not the center, which we seek to expand, and that violence, not transition, will be the consequences of our frustration. And our frustration is that we,

here in Washington, or in London, or somewhere else, will not be the force that changes apartheid.

I have a statement of my own which I would ask you to be inserted in the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator WALLOP. I have a shorter statement which I would wish to read, with your indulgence, realizing the hour, written by a man named Alan L. Keyes, who I think is probably known to the chairman as the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Mr. Keyes is a black, and I think his statement reflects what my statement reflects, only it is hard for a Senator to admit that he is more eloquent in his statement than I am in mine.

His statement follows.

Not every crusade against evil and injustice leads to the Promised Land. Many instead are lost in a wilderness of violence, a vicious circle of repression, retribution, and revenge.

Will this be the fate of South Africa?

Will the demands and hopes of a people long oppressed end in a quagmire of civil war, black against white, black against black, white against black against white, until equality and suffering and atrocity grimly refute the hateful premises of racism?

In a world beset by so many ills and host to so many deadly and intractable conflicts, it is awfully hard to see through the ugly realities of present day South Africa to a better day.

On the one hand are people determined by any means to throw off the yoke of physical oppression and indignity imposed upon them by the heinous apartheid system.

On the other hand are people too crudely arrogant or terrified to share power or to use it well.

Bound together now by the iron bands of a long and bitter history, they must live and let live, or kill and be killed together. The one side will never give up, for suffering only sharpens the thirst for justice. The other will not easily yield, since fear and misbegotten pride are often willing partners in self-destruction.

As these antagonists come to grips, not only South Africa but the whole southern African region will be embroiled in conflict. There are some who contemplate this prospect with grim resignation, feeling that if this is the price that must be paid to end the long nightmare of apartheid, so be it.

Apartheid is the evil against which we fight, but we do not fight against evil for the sake of evil. We fight against evil for the sake of a present and future good.

It is not enough that we seek to destroy apartheid unless in the process we see and help to build the foundations for a South Africa that is just, democratic, and free. Yet, how is it possible to see the ingredients for such a future in the present welter of stubborn discrimination, injustice and repression?

It is unfortunate that among the chief victims of apartheid is the ability to see beyond the premises of racism that apartheid represents, to see without racial blinders the problem of governance and nation-building that confronts the South African people. Apartheid is not unjust only because it is racist. It is unjust because it manip-

ulates racism in order to achieve the arbitrary domination of the whole society by one group or faction within it.

But if the injustice lies in factional domination, justice cannot be achieved simply by substituting the tyranny of one faction for that of another, even if the new faction is a majority of the population. Justice, therefore, is not simple majority rule.

As an American, but especially as a black American, nothing is more evident to me than this oft-neglected truth.

In the history of the United States, simple majority rule meant slavery. Simple majority rule meant Jim Crow. Simple majority rule meant the unjust repression of a vulnerable minority.

Fortunately, the basic principles of the American Constitution did not sanction unlimited majority rule. They demanded respect for individual rights, whether the individuals composed a majority or a minority of the population.

What we often forget, however, is that guarantees for individual rights were not originally intended to protect the welfare of poor, vulnerable minorities. They were intended to prevent the personal and property rights of the wealthy few from being invaded and expropriated by the poorer and more numerous majority. They were part of the overall system of checks and balances through which a political system based upon the authority of the people could avoid tyranny, demagoguery, and endless factional strife.

As it turned out, the same principles that protected the wealthy few from the arbitrary abuse of government power could later be invoked to protect a poor, black minority.

The American experience suggests that, when rightly conceived, the constitutional protections afforded a privileged minority can become bulwarks for all against arbitrary and tyrannical uses of government power. What seemed at first to be limits on democratic rule were revealed instead as guarantees of democratic freedom.

On the basis of such a concept of democratic justice, one can begin to envisage a democratic future for South Africa. It is a future in which all have an equal vote, but in which the power of the majority is limited and constrained by laws and practices which protect the persons and property of minorities.

It is a future in which the archaic or artificial divisions of race and tribe are gradually replaced by the more productive and useful divisions of economic, professional, and social interests.

It is a future in which white and blacks understand that human beings may have more in common than language or race or even the shared experience of oppression and the struggle to overcome it.

It is a future in which the long repressed but undying spirit of black Africa joins with the stubborn pride and careful industry of white Africans in the crucible of a new national identity, one that could point the way toward the brighter future for the entire continent.

Strange as it may seem, in that future land the very community that today maintains a system to repress freedom in South Africa could be the anchor and shield against repression.

In the new South Africa, the white community would retain the advantages of economic power, of technical and managerial expertise, of skills invaluable to the maintenance and progress of society.

Too few to dominate, they would nonetheless be too powerful to oppress.

Individuals and groups that would otherwise be exposed to the arbitrary abuse of power could, by forging alliances with whites, successfully thwart efforts to rule by fear or brute force.

The pattern of arbitrary rule by one man or one party that prevails in so many other parts of Africa and the world could be successfully forestalled if the whites could be brought to play a constructive role in the political system.

The key to this success, however, will be to avoid any system of reserve voting or representation for whites. Such a system would merely perpetuate the false white political enclave created by apartheid. It would isolate the whites from the rest of the political system, depriving them of the critical balancing influence they otherwise will have.

I believe that a just constitution for South Africa will protect property, but accord no privileges to race. It will allow a certain influence to economic interests, but without recognizing such interests as the privileged possession of any race or ethnic group. By respecting the balance of public and private forces within the society, it will guarantee that all have the instruments with which to protect their interests while none has the power to destroy or dominate the interests of the rest.

Taking advantage of geographic as well as economic divisions, it will aim to prevent tyranny, but to compel shifting patterns of cooperation along nonracial, nontribal lines. It will aim to preserve the existence of a thriving private sector in South Africa. This sector will serve as both the refuge and the base for Afrikaners no longer able to enjoy the privileges of the present racially exclusive welfare state. It will avoid reliance upon government power as the engine of progressive social and economic change.

Without the racist blinders of apartheid, such a future for South Africa is easy to imagine.

Justice in South Africa cannot wait until the campaign against apartheid is over. Laying its foundation must be an integral part of that campaign. In a campaign of destruction, bombs and bullets might suffice. But in the effort to construct a just society, we must seek to transform the pillars and walls of oppression into the bricks and mortar of a new mansion of freedom.

If we wish to foster such a process of transformation, the first step is to realize that it is a process that must involve all the people of South Africa. The common error that is made on all sides in the current discussion of the South African tragedy is the assumption that the white government and the white community are the arbiters of the country's future. Whether the goal is pressure or engagement, the primary object of every existing approach is to influence a change of heart among South Africa's whites. The non-white population is perceived as either victim or threat, the target of repression of the source of angry violence.

The tragic irony of apartheid lies precisely in this insidious triumph of its racist presumptions.

When shall we come to see in the angry faces of striking students not only the desperate hatred of oppression, but the desperate passion for learning and truth?

When shall we come to know in the grim determination of striking workers not just the burning reaction to repression, but the deep will to labor with dignity, rise with merit, and pass on to a future generation a legacy of achievement?

When shall we be able to see beyond the "necklaces" and battling shantytown gangs to perceive the unquenchable spirit that can light a hearth-fire in the deepest poverty, maintain the bonds of family through long years of separation, keep home and even hope alive despite every brutal blow of degradation? When shall we see beyond the categories of victimization of the strong, resilient human beings whose passion, will, and spirit are the constructive flame in which the better future of South Africa can be forged and tempered?

Despite every effort of the apartheid system, these people have already been the makers of a profound revolution in South Africa's life. Blacks compose over 75 percent of South Africa's labor force, and without them, scarcely a crop would grow, hardly a drill or a screw would turn. They are the indispensable builders of present-day South Africa, the positive power of its economic life.

The very economic arena in which blacks were unjustly deprived of arable land, discriminated against in wages, unjustly denied promotion for their skill and merit, nevertheless provided the framework for development the most potent form of power now in the hands of South Africa's blacks.

It is not their power to destroy that offers the most potent threat to the apartheid system, but the indispensable necessity to South Africa's existence of their power to labor and build.

Blacks do not have this power because South Africa's white government permits them to enjoy it. They have it because neither the government nor the country could long survive without it.

So those who talk of power sharing in South Africa as if it were a future goal have been duped into forgetting that despite every effort of repression, it is a present reality. The question is not whether whites and blacks will share power, but, rather, how blacks, effectively using the power they have, can work toward the justice they have been denied.

Seen in this light, the question for Americans and for others in the international community is not with what well intentioned gestures we can show our hatred of apartheid and our sympathy with the suffering of its black victims, but rather how with concrete action we can support the expansion and use of their constructive power.

Will we serve the latter through a campaign which, in order to bring pressure to bear on the white South African Government, sacrifices the modern economy?

Will we serve that purpose by withdrawing our effective presence from South Africa, leaving a weakened black community alone, with an armed oppressor, facing the desperate choice of combat or surrender?

The proponents of punitive economic sanctions claim that such sanctions are the last means of avoiding an all-out civil war.

I believe that, on the contrary, by depriving South Africa's blacks of their most potent nonviolent tool for change, these sanctions will, in fact, make such a war inevitable.

Given the future for which we hope, given the positive goal of justice for which we strive, we should oppose sanctions, not because

they will hurt South Africa's blacks, but because they are not the most effective way to help them.

Our goal should be to help South African blacks transform the economic revolution that could not have occurred without them into the political revolution that is their moral right. To achieve this goal, we must not dismantle or withdraw from our role in South Africa's economy. We must seek broadly and effectively to develop and use that role in ways that explicitly enhance the actual power of South Africa's unjustly oppressed black majority.

Our effort should not be undertaken in the token spirit of reformers, but in the spirit of peaceful revolutionaries.

It is no accident that the South African business sector has gradually become to be among the most outspoken opponent of apartheid repression. It is no accident that South Africa's modern economic sector has yielded everstronger antiapartheid labor unions and associations which continue to grow despite repeated assaults upon their leadership by the South African Government.

Those who read history with some insight will realize that in the face of such dynamic and widespread economic forces, the only way the South African Government can long hope to preserve apartheid is by destroying the modern capitalist economy.

Thus do the proponents of punitive, destructive sanctions against the South African economy become the unwitting allies of apartheid's preservation.

This does not mean, of course, that left on their own such economic forces will simply overwhelm the apartheid system. Even were this possible, it might take several generations.

What is needed is a conscious effort to harness and accelerate the effects of the financial and organizational forces of the modern private sector. We must continue and intensify the sharing and use of power in the economic sense as a base and instrument for change in the political arena.

This can be accomplished in three broad areas:

Within the modern corporations and enterprises themselves, and in their relations with the black community;

Through massive support for the increasingly effective South African labor movement;

Through a program of expanded capital ownership that seeks to facilitate ownership by black South African workers of shares in firms doing business in South Africa.

In line with the spirit of quiet revolution, efforts in these areas must go beyond reformist schemes to improve the conditions of life for blacks.

The aim should be effectively to incorporate the black community within the power structure of the economic sector, and to use some portion of the resources of that sector to support black efforts to build and sustain effective bases of economic, social, and political organization.

The American corporations in South Africa, as well as those of other foreign states, are the best available positive leverage the international community has in that situation.

If we throw this leverage away in order to create pressure, we will deprive ourselves of the ability to create change, and to build the future now.

This is not to say that these corporations or the private economic sector are the only potential instruments of change in South Africa, but they are the one over which we, as outsiders, can have the greatest influence, and through which we can hope to achieve the most immediate and direct effects.

I do not mean to suggest either that using America's position in South Africa in the way I have outlined will bring immediate and fundamental political change, though I believe it is the best way to make the maximum positive use of America's limited, but important, influence in bringing about the conditions for that change.

In the final analysis, basic political change in South Africa will come about only as the result of negotiations among all South Africans of goodwill, black and white.

Violent repression and the violence it foments are the chief enemies of South Africa's present and future hopes.

If international pressure serves a useful purpose in this situation, then it should be as a means of discouraging violence on all sides, beginning with the repressive violence of the South African state. This, not the destruction of the economic engines of change, should be America's immediate aim and the aim of all people of goodwill in the world at large.

That, I think, Mr. Chairman, is a most eloquent statement, has much to recommend it, and I think is difficult to refute.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wallop follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WALLOP

America's approach to the world has always been devoted to protecting and spreading those inalienable rights contained in our own Declaration of Independence—life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

During Ronald Reagan's Administration, the people of Grenada have been released from a Marxist tyranny; the Haitian people have replaced a dictatorship and are seeking to build a true democracy there; free and fair elections have developed democracy in El Salvador; Filipinos are building a structure to guarantee greater liberty and opportunity.

Americans have delighted in these and other victories for human freedom and we continue to seek concrete ways to assist the people in other countries to build systems based on the consent of all the governed, protecting the rights of all.

For decades South Africa has been burdened by a system that classifies its citizens according to their race, and then parcels out society's benefits based on race. That system undermines the potential of South Africa by squandering human potential and frustrating economic growth and opportunity.

Apartheid is wrong, as virtually all South Africans including the South African government have admitted. It must go. But make no mistake, foreign pressure will not end the apartheid system—that must be done by South Africans.

For nearly 25 years, successive Presidents have let the South African government know how much the American people oppose apartheid. Our government has imposed in the past carefully targeted sanctions. At best, sanctions are merely a signal of disapproval—they have not produced a change in behavior anywhere they have been imposed: South Africa, Nicaragua, Cuba, or Libya.

Some Americans now advocate general sanctions against South Africa. The recent passage by the House of Representatives of a reckless and radical sanctions proposal typifies this approach. The simple fact is that sanctions will not end apartheid.

And so I come before you today opposing *both* apartheid and sanctions. For while apartheid has sapped human freedom and opportunity in South Africa, sanctions would block the road to peaceful change there through negotiations with the moderate elements among both the whites and blacks in South Africa. These are the ones who have the most to gain through a peaceful dismantling of the apartheid system—not the radicals on either side.

South Africa's State President, P.W. Botha, has committed his government to ending the apartheid system and to real power-sharing at the highest levels of gov-

ernment. This would allow the black majority—currently deprived of a vote in national elections—fully to participate.

It is the job of the South African government both to create the climate for negotiations and to facilitate their commencement. It is not our job to negotiate, nor is it the responsibility of our European allies and it is certainly not the job of the so-called Front Lines States—mostly made up of one-party Presidencies for Life with a ruling clique imposing its will on a supine majority.

But by our actions, we can either encourage the South African government to move ahead with its commitment to early negotiations with moderate black representatives or we can inadvertently encourage them to retrench.

The South African Parliament and the upcoming Congress of the National Party needs the leadership of State President Botha to outline a clear plan for apartheid's demise and for the negotiating process indispensable to build a government based on the consent of the governed.

But those arguing for political pressure on Pretoria to isolate South Africa by imposing Congressional sanctions should realize that the radicals, who coincidentally also support sanctions, do not want negotiations and do not believe they will be assisted by such actions. Secretary Shultz has characterized this as a Pontius Pilate approach. He has called on Americans to stay and build in South Africa, not cut and run.

What are we doing today if it is not preparing to cut and run? This Senator can have no part of that, it is a recipe for continued violence, terror and intimidation in South Africa. Only radical South Africans—such as the communist dominated African National Congress or the Afrikaner Resistance Movement—will take heart from such actions.

Last year, Mr. Chairman, I urged President Reagan to signal his willingness to veto Congressionally-mandated sanctions legislation. I support his intention to do so this year for several reasons.

First, suppose—just suppose—that the South Africans begin the negotiating process and further act to unravel the fabric of apartheid? Congressional enactment of sanctions would re-inject South Africa again and again into the daily business of legislating—a la Nicaragua. The debate would be over the sincerity of the South African government and their level of commitment to apartheid's demise and serious negotiations. Endless votes and confrontation with the Executive would result.

For those of you who believe you must politically embrace sanctions because you think South Africa will therefore vanish off the Senate's screen—I assure you—you are wrong.

Second, suppose the Congress forces sanctions—or even enacts Senator Kassebaum's proposal codifying the President's Executive Order of September 9, 1985. The communist-dominated African National Congress will surely smell a victory. But this organization is no blissful group of New England town meeting participants. They are out to be the toughest dog on the block.

ANC leadership, which unfailingly spews the Moscow line from the ludicrously-named "Radio Freedom" in that haven of democracy, Ethiopia, will take sanctions as Western capitulation to their program.

The ANC will rush to the peace-loving United Nations and insist on being named the "sole legitimate representative of the South African people" just as the UN has blessed terrorist SWAPO and equated zionism with racism. The stampede will be on and the prospect, for a peaceful transition through negotiation will be reduced tremendously because the radicals will know the West no longer cares what form of government prevails in South Africa.

Third, those elements in and out of the white-dominated South African government who believe they can stand alone against outside pressures will certainly scrap the reforms of the Botha era. Violence and reprisal will escalate as terrorism and intimidation increase among radicalized black opponents.

Fourth, much has been said about how supporters of President Reagan "inordinately" (to use ex-President Carter's term) fear communism in South Africa. But do you not believe that the Soviets and their puppets will dance in the streets when South Africa can no longer deliver goods to the rest of southern Africa and to the world.

All the foolish talk by Front Line leaders welcoming sanctions will be washed aside by mass starvation and the inability to move raw materials of the region through functioning South African ports via South African railways and trucks. In addition, of course, finished products from South Africa and the rest of the world would be blocked from transport to the interior of the region. It would not take long for the interdependent economic system of 100 million people in a dozen countries to grind suddenly and perhaps permanently to a halt. Do you really want that—and

have you contemplated its consequences? South Africa and its hateful problem does not exist in a vacuum as much as we would wish it to.

Finally, there is a more fundamental problem with the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. America stands for freedom and respect for the human rights of all men. We do so not because of their race, color, or creed, but in spite of it. Let us make no mistake: There are scores of countries, including many of those in southern Africa, that deny fundamental human freedoms to their peoples in a far more repressive and systematic way than in South Africa. They do so not in the name of apartheid, but in support of one or another forms of the totalitarian rule that Marxism ultimately engenders.

Despite this fact, I hear no calls in the Senate chamber or from this committee for sanctions against them. I believe this is an obvious and egregious example of wrong-headed and racist thinking. If respect for fundamental freedoms in this world, such as those found in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, are what we are fighting for—as I believe they are—then there exist many other countries far more deserving of economic sanctions than South Africa. Shall we recommend here today to impose sanctions on all of them?

For these five and other reasons, sanctions are wrong and ought to be opposed on principle.

A few in Congress actually believe violence is the only way to individual liberty. Surely no members of this Committee can sensibly advocate this bloody course. Yet sanctions are the best way to encourage excesses by South African authorities and opponents. In fact, I would argue that recently-imposed sanctions have only served to raise the expectations of a victory by radical opponents.

Mrs. Nelson Mandela, for example, has proclaimed 1986 the "Year of Liberation," and has promised—in her role as the "Mother Comrade" to liberate South Africa with the grisly "necklace." Death squads of the young (and older) comrades are perfectly well prepared to move in this direction, particularly if they perceive sympathy for their cause in the witting or unwitting West.

America's role in South Africa must be positive, consistent, and continuing. Because we are committed to stay and build in South Africa, not cut and run, we must have a workable policy consistent with our own values. Punitive sanctions have no place in such a policy.

So what positive steps can be taken by this government to move the South African government in the direction of negotiations with moderate black leaders? And what steps can we take to help ensure that the radical elements in both the Afrikaaner movement and the ANC do not win out?

The proponents of economic sanctions believe that these sanctions are the only remaining way of avoiding a bloody civil war. But in reality, economic sanctions, by tearing down the strength of the South African economy, a strength that is dependent on the productive spirit and energies of millions of blacks, will remove from moderate blacks the one, effective non-violent tool for change they possess. We should oppose sanctions then not just because they hurt blacks, but because they are not liable to help them in the long run either. Through sanctions then you will in effect have started the civil war you say you seek to prevent.

In my opinion, therefore, sanctions will denude the power of the most effective white advocates of dismantling the apartheid system: the South African business sector. If the strong capitalist economy in South Africa can be destroyed through a combination of economic sanctions and political violence, extremists on both sides will be the winners.

What is needed in South Africa is basic political change, not an exchange of one form of repression for another. This can only come about as a result of negotiations between all the moderate elements of South African society. This in turn can only come about if the U.S. plays a constructive role in strengthening the power, bargaining leverage, and political credibility of those moderate elements, not by destroying the South African economy, but by strengthening it.

I would like to end with a quotation from a recent excellent speech by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization, Ambassador Alan Keyes: In speaking of the aim of U.S. policy, he said:

"The aim should be effectively to incorporate the black community within the power structure of the economic sector, and to use some portion of the resources of that sector to support black efforts to build and sustain effective bases of economic, social and political organization."

Those who seek something more than just opposition to apartheid, who have a vision of the future for South Africa that is positive, must realize that an American alliance with the moderate elements in South African society is the only hope to

avoid a bloody civil war and seek political change to dismantle the last vestiges of the immoral apartheid system.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Wallop.

Senator Helms, do you have any questions for the witnesses?

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much and I regret that I was detained earlier today. We had the eulogies to my late colleague from North Carolina, Mr. East, on the Senate floor, and I know that the Chair will agree that it was appropriate for me to be there, even though I would very much have enjoyed being here and having the opportunity to ask Senator Kennedy and Senator Weicker a few questions.

Now, there is not any doubt about the way the news will be played tonight on the television and in the papers tomorrow morning. I just observed the correspondent for the New York Times walk out when these two witnesses now before us sat down. He, of course, was here for the testimony and the declarations by Senator Kennedy, and we all know how that works.

I will say, furthermore, that as I was leaving the Senate floor, a delightful Senator, with whom I do not agree philosophically, nor he with me very often, stopped me and said, "Let me talk to you about South Africa." He said, "I don't know what the solution in South Africa is. There may be none." But then he began to discuss the possibility of partitioning South Africa. I listened to him with great interest because apparently it never occurred to my friend, whom I respect and for whom I have great affection, that he is talking about apartheid. So this is how confused we are.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the New York Times or the Washington Post or CBS or NBC or ABC or any of the major news media call on the African National Congress to stop this brutal business of killing people with necklaces and the rest of it.

If I were the President of the United States, I would say to the African National Congress and to all of the rest of the people inciting the violence over there that we are not going to do one doggone thing until the violence stops.

Well, conversely, can you imagine the outrage, political, journalistic, and otherwise, if the South African Government had done 1 percent of the atrocities that are clear?

I want to commend the Senator from Alabama for his testimony. It ought to be made common knowledge among the American people, and they would then have a greater appreciation for the complexity of the problem over there. But, here we go again.

What's more, I fear that we are moving in haste on an issue that is terribly complicated and almost impossible to solve. There has been a lot of talk—and talk is cheap, talk is easy—about the need to ensure that South Africa has majority rule. What I fear is that the course of action recommended here will not provide majority rule. It has not anywhere else. What it will provide is minority rule of a kind that has been realized so far in Africa only in Ethiopia. I am talking about Communist rule. That is the issue in South Africa. There is none transcending that issue in importance or even approaching it in importance. The question is: Do we want South Africa and, consequently, all of Africa to fall under the con-

trol of the Soviet Union? Those who do not understand that do not understand the problem. That is what it is all about.

I say again that the distinguished Senator from Alabama, who will always be a sort of hero to me, has performed a tremendous task of research and identification. He has shown us what the ANC is all about. There are those who are saying that we should make friends with the ANC now because the ANC will inevitably rule South Africa. Well, if the African National Congress ever rules South Africa, it will be a tragedy for all Africans, black and white.

I remember a little bit about the past, and I think it ought to be brought in as we try to focus on this issue. How many times are we going to go down the same road? The same interest that clamoured for the rise to power of Mao Tse-Tung in China—here they are involved in South Africa. The same crowd that said Fidel Castro is just a nice little agrarian reformer and he ought to be installed in Cuba—here they are involved in this. And you could go down the list as the Senator from Alabama did. There is Iran, and oh, that great triumph for freedom in Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe. There is the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. You could go on and on and on. What was it somebody said, that if you don't look at history, the mistakes of history are doomed to be repeated. So, here we go again.

As Bob Dole said accurately the other day, "I view this as sort of a civil rights issue in the United States for political purposes."

I have been in the Senate since 1973, Mr. Chairman, and long before that I was in the news business, and I did what little I could to raise the storm warnings about a coalition, however unintentional it may have been, between the major media of this country, the Marxists, and the State Department. There was an unholy alliance. As I say, it probably was unintentional, but the effect was the same.

I mentioned many times here with respect to Cuba that somebody ought to go and ask our Ambassador to Cuba at the time if Battista was being driven out and Mr. Castro was being ushered in. Ask Earl Smith, who now lives in Florida. Go ask him how our State Department functioned then. They wouldn't even let the Ambassador be in contact with the President of the United States. They circumvented it. Ambassador Smith has that in a book that he wrote, but nobody ever thinks about that.

Look at where we are with respect to communism in the world. How do you like what has happened: Castro, the Shah's successor, and so forth?

Whatever faults Battista and the Shah of Iran and Somoza had—you could go down the list—the people of those countries with the new leadership, if you want to call it that, look back to those days as the good old days.

It was clear even then that the successors to these people who were driven out of office were about to institute tyrannies far beyond anything the world had ever imagined.

When you look at Africa and the implications, I would say that the little quotation on the Archives Building downtown, "What is past is prologue" is an understatement.

You ain't seen nothing yet until Africa falls into the clutches of communism.

I thank these two Senators. You will be ignored tomorrow morning in the newscasts. You will be ignored on the newscasts tonight. And the New York Times is not even here. So, don't turn the pages avidly looking for any reference to what you said. But what you said was absolutely on target and I commend both of you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

I share your appreciation for our witnesses.

I would offer at least as a consolation thought that your testimony was carried live by C-SPAN, and could have reached, if people were willing to dial it, 35 million homes, four times as many as are watching the Senate floor, which is on C-SPAN, too.

Senator WALLOP. I would say to the chairman that in order for me to have looked fervently through the New York Times for any reference to my testimony would have required me to buy it since I do not subscribe to it, and that is not likely.

I really think it is important, just to make the point, that economic forces that are in South Africa tend to be far more ecumenical than any of the radical forces that could be engendered by effective sanctions; that, indeed, you cross more tribal lines through trade unions and job opportunities than you do by reducing the country to a struggle between the Afrikaners and the ANC, which requires the moderate middle to choose sides in a struggle in which I think they really basically would rather not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. I want to ask Senator Wallop if his testimony essentially consisted of reading Alan Keyes' statement, and where that article appeared and when, so that we could have reference to it.

Senator WALLOP. Well, it was first given by Mr. Keyes in early July in a speech to the International Lions Club. It was then given to the Urban League. This summary of it appeared this morning in The Washington Times.

Senator SARBANES. Has the full speech been published, to your knowledge?

Senator WALLOP. It has, yes.

Senator SARBANES. Where could we find it, please?

Senator WALLOP. I can arrange to have it sent to your office.

I don't really know. I have not seen it published. I have just seen it in speech form in its entirety.

Senator SARBANES. If one wanted to read the entire speech, where would one go in order to do so?

Senator WALLOP. I will send it to you. I have one, or I will find out where it has been published.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10:01 a.m. on Wednesday, July 23, 1986.]

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SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Helms, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Tribble, Evans, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Eagleton, and Kerry.

Also present: Senator Kennedy.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

This morning, we are privileged to have as our witness the distinguished Secretary of State.

But before I call upon Secretary Shultz, I would like to call upon members of the committee who have opening statements. Some statements were made yesterday. Other members were not able to give their statements at that time.

For the purpose of opening statements, I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In the last 2 years, the situation in South Africa has deteriorated steadily and dramatically. The turmoil gripping South Africa is obviously rooted in the evil and inhumane system of apartheid.

For the last 5½ years, the administration has sought to encourage the South African Government to move away from apartheid through its policy of constructive engagement. This policy, which increased cooperation with the South African Government, while reducing public, not private criticism and pressure, is widely regarded as a failure. We have created the impression among white South Africans that we are sympathetic to their plight, and it has led black South Africans to conclude that we do not support their struggle. It has tarnished our image as a humanitarian nation in the international community and has undermined long-term interests in southern Africa.

I had hoped the speech the President gave yesterday would contain some major new policy initiatives that would put effective pressure on the South African Government to abandon apartheid.

Regrettably, it did not.

The President has chosen to cling to constructive engagement despite its failures.

The President called upon the South African Government to lift the state of emergency, establish a timetable for elimination of apartheid laws, release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, unban the black political movements, and initiate a dialog with the black community on the creation of a political system protecting majority and minority rights.

I think all of us agree with the President that these are necessary components of progress in the South African situation. Unfortunately, the President has failed to explain how the administration expects to get the South African Government to take those steps.

Moreover, by categorically rejecting the idea of sanctions, the President has made it clear to the South African Government that there will be no penalties for failure due on their part.

The British Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, a highly respected group of statesmen, a group of sharp-eyed, and experienced political leaders, have taken their stand, ahead of us. If we are to lead, we must hurry up or be bypassed by the rest of the world, God forbid, by bloodshed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Mathias, do you have an opening statement?

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, because we are all anxious to hear the Secretary, the fact is that we are caught up in the calendar here to some extent. The current sanctions will expire within a matter of weeks, and some action must be taken by the U.S. Government.

It seems to me clearly inadequate to simply extend the current sanctions.

In my judgment, we need precise and specific steps that will make it clear to the Government of South Africa that in the view of the United States it is absolutely necessary that the Government of South Africa should, at least, begin to communicate with its own citizens on these vital matters of human rights. I think that those clear, precise, and specific steps need to be debated here in this committee, and I hope that we can recommend them to the full Senate within a matter of a very few days.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, this series of hearings comes at what I think we would all agree is a watershed moment in the relationship of our country with South Africa and the situation in South Africa.

The situation in that country has been steadily deteriorating, in my opinion, and has reached what most of the world recognizes as a crisis situation. Yet, I believe, as President Reagan revealed yesterday, that he intends to cling to the policy which I believe is a failed policy, of constructive engagement by another name, at least by dropping the name, the phrase, "constructive engagement."

In June, the South African Government imposed a brutal state of emergency, claiming that it is the only way to restore order in that very troubled land. But, as the Nobel Prize winner, Bishop Desmond Tutu, told Prime Minister Botha yesterday, the state of

emergency does not help solve the situation. It is the cause of the unrest that must be addressed, but which the South African Government chooses to ignore, and it is that abhorrent regime of apartheid which deprives black South African people of their basic human dignity and of the freedoms that have come to be taken for granted by all of us in the United States.

The South African Government is trying to quash internal dissent and to prevent the world outside from knowing of the grim developments that are taking place there.

This series of hearings, Mr. Chairman, and the legislation which overwhelmingly passed the House and which is now pending before the Senate, are testimony to the fact that the American people can not and will not forget. They will not ignore the plight of black Africa.

I would like everyone to hear the impassioned plea of the distinguished white South African novelist, Andre Brink, who is outspokenly critical of his own Afrikaner government.

In a letter to President Botha, he called out and said:

You are confident that you have finally reduced us to silence. But you have not. There may be some temporary silence in the land; the silence of prison walls so thick you cannot see the blood on the inside of them or hear the muffled screams. But that blood and those screams have a way of filtering through into the pens of writers. I appeal to the writers of my land to bear witness. We shall not be silent forever. We have history on our side and we have truth on our side.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it is time for us to bear witness, that it's the purpose of this series of hearings to bear witness to the truth, and this is something that our own Government, I believe, has been unfortunately unwilling to do heretofore.

Although the Reagan administration claims it opposes apartheid, it is unwilling to use economic leverage to force Pretoria to change. It opposes the state of emergency, but defends the right of the Afrikaners to maintain order. It calls apartheid morally wrong, but mistakes trivial reforms for real progress and extends a reassuring arm to a nervous white South African community.

To my mind, this so-called constructive engagement has meant our unconscionable collusion with apartheid.

The bitter fruit of constructive engagement has been the imposition of a state of emergency this month in South Africa, far more stringent than the martial law that descended upon Poland. Yet, in Poland, as in Nicaragua and in Libya, the President called out for economic sanctions. In the case of South Africa, he claims it won't work.

We can no longer afford to indulge the administration in its pursuit of policies that give Pretoria the benefit of the doubt. They no longer warrant any benefit of the doubt, anywhere in South Africa.

For a long time, I resisted the concept of severe and total sanctions, and especially disinvestment because I had hoped less stringent measures would succeed.

The time has long since passed for us to nudge the South African Government gently with rhetoric, nor can we fall back on academic arguments about whether economic sanctions are always successful.

Economic sanctions would cut to the core of white Afrikaner interest by the only peaceful means left. Malcolm Fraser, the co-

chairman of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group and former Prime Minister of Australia, told a group of Senators yesterday that sanctions are the only way to prevent black African leaders from concluding that the West has abandoned them and initiating a full-scale guerrilla war.

He concluded, and I quote: "No one can guarantee sanctions will work, but they are the only remaining alternative open to the West."

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, notwithstanding what I have said, I welcome the Secretary of State in his appearance before this committee and I urge him to address the critical choices that we face today with respect to South Africa. A new policy is necessary—not just a charade which pretends to provide a remedy to the crisis in American policy by sending a new Ambassador who is black, if we find one. It is not the race of the Ambassador that matters, but the policy he has been charged to carry out which matters.

Whoever the new Ambassador is, he or she must be sent with a new message, a new, strong message that heralds a new era. For, as I said before, I truly believe that, although it has not been wittingly done, our policy of constructive engagement has been unconscionably a policy of collusion with evil, an evil that we must speak up to, whether or not economic sanctions work, whether or not it is something that we have empirical evidence will change the situation in South Africa.

We have no choice but to speak out.

It reminds me of the comments that we hear, not merely from the President, but from all across this Nation, from people about how, well, we have to take it slow, we have to wait, part of it is being brought on by the blacks themselves.

In the testimony we heard yesterday from some of our Senate colleagues who are opposed to sanctions, I was reminded of the echoes of the past in this country, when people said ah, we must go slow in the South, we must slow things down, we must understand the problems the blacks have and take it slowly.

Every time I heard that, about how we must go slowly, that blacks have brought this on themselves, that a radical element is behind it, every time we slowed the process, and every time we slowed the process, we delayed progress. It is time for us to take a moral stand if for no other reason than that it's the right thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly, Mr. Secretary, your testimony before this committee is always greeted with a great deal of interest and respect, and I think no more so than it is today.

Yesterday, the President gave a major address and a broad policy outline of his views toward South Africa.

I think in many details of that speech we would all agree. We, certainly, share his condemnation of apartheid as a system of racial repression.

I think that we all would agree that we are seeking peaceful and productive change in South Africa.

I would agree with the President that a total United States withdrawal from South Africa through disinvestment or a total trade embargo at this time would be unwise and a futile course.

There are no miracle cures, we all know that, for the deep difficulties that face South Africa, and we should have no illusions that we can resolve those difficulties from here.

Despite those basic agreements, I was deeply disappointed in the President's speech. I have long believed that President Reagan is the one person who could influence the Government of South Africa to move forward to address its problems.

However, the President's speech yesterday contained no new initiative. It gave no new direction for our policies toward South Africa. And, perhaps most importantly, it offered no renewed vigor in our pursuit of peaceful change there.

I believe the time for quiet persuasion has passed. We cannot stand still at a time when we badly need to serve South Africa as a true friend.

A true friend speaks candidly and thoughtfully to one who is in deep trouble. A true friend does not ignore the hard truths or sugarcoat difficult solutions. A true friend does not acquiesce in self-destruction.

I agree with the President that we must not cut and run in South Africa. But neither can we simply sit down and shut up.

Now is the time to speak forcefully and wisely to a friend in need and to use every tool available to us to see that our message is heard.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that today you can help fill the gaps in a blank policy page.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Cranston, do you have an opening comment?

Senator CRANSTON. Let me simply say that I think it is very unfortunate that the White House has, in effect, folded its hands on apartheid. Constructive engagement has become an embarrassment. It is dead. Only the White House fails to recognize this.

The United States refused to do business with Hitler, with Nazi Germany, and the United States must refuse to do business with apartheid and South Africa.

What the administration incredibly fails to understand is that there is more to life than a paycheck. Moderate black leaders in South Africa will risk not only their jobs, but their lives for freedom. America, the land of "Give me liberty or give me death," should, of all nations, understand this.

The liberation of American slaves threw blacks out of work. But they chose liberty over jobs in slavery.

To protect U.S. interests, to put us on the right side of history, Congress must act and act now, and act on strong sanctions, not on token slaps, not on trivial pursuits.

I predict we will act and, if need be, we will pass a strong bill over a Presidential veto.

Mr. Chairman, many Senators are so upset by the White House pronouncements that they want to move South African legislation on the floor today or tomorrow on the debt ceiling bill.

I will counsel holding off to give our committee an opportunity to act on a matter within its jurisdiction if you can give assurances that we will have a markup at some reasonable and early date.

I ask if you can do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just respond to the Senator because this question, I am sure, will be asked by others.

It is the intent of the chairman to have a markup at an early date, and I would just counsel all Senators that we all ought to be thinking today, tomorrow, and the next day about the form of the legislation that seems most appropriate. But we will have a markup and all Senators need to be advised to be ready for that opportunity.

Senator CRANSTON. And soon?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. I had an opportunity yesterday, Mr. Chairman, to make such statements as I had, although I must join with my colleagues in expressing my disappointment in the President's message. I give him an "A" grade on stating the problem and stating the hoped for resolution of the problem. But what was missing was any effective way to get from one to the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, just briefly, first of all, I welcome the Secretary here this morning, and Chester Crocker as well.

Mr. Chairman, once again, I find myself in a situation of commending you for your courage. While you and I might not totally agree on the sanction question itself, I think it took a great deal of courage in the last couple of days for you to express your feelings on this issue as forcefully and as directly as you have. I commend you for that.

I think it shows real leadership on this committee and in the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, as well, I think it is important that we are getting the sense of bipartisanship that so often is sought. While it may not actually appear to be a seamless garment of bipartisanship, I think we are far closer in the Congress of the United States than in the Executive when it comes to expressing what we believe are the strong feelings of our constituencies across this country.

Even at this late date, it comes I think as a surprise to many, as the President's statement on South Africa reminds us, that there are those who would say that the blacks, the coloreds, and the Asians of South Africa can wait, that justice will come in its own time, and that our strategic and geopolitical interests in the southern African region, as important as they are—and they are extremely important—outweigh moral imperatives and political values, and that we in the United States ought to counsel those who have been abused, exploited and exiled to have faith in the very people who have perpetuated that very system.

I reject, as I think most of us do, Mr. Chairman, that advice and counsel. I reject it because in good conscience we cannot ask the blacks of South Africa to wait any longer.

I reject it because we know the South African Government is determined, as it has demonstrated over and over again, to perpetuate its system of racial injustice and to feed off the suffering and misery that that system imposes on the black majority of that country.

I reject it, Mr. Chairman, because we have something far better, I believe, in this country to offer the people of South Africa than our investment dollars and our technological know-how. Eternal patience and wishful thinking will no more benefit the blacks of South Africa than they have benefitted the blacks in this country or those who marched in Selma and elsewhere at the head of the great civil rights movement that swept this country in the 1960's.

Recalling the events of that time, I ask that we carefully listen to the words of one American who was at the forefront of that movement, not unlike Nelson Mandela, who today finds himself in prison, and who penned these lines while sitting in a prison cell. I quote him. He said:

Actually, time itself is neutral. It can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill-will have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the bad people, but for the appalling silence of the good people.

That letter is from Martin Luther King, dated April 16, 1963.

There may be some who find the words of Dr. King less than compelling. I am not one of them, Mr. Chairman. Now is the time to break our appalling silence on South Africa. Now is the time, I believe, to impose meaningful sanctions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Eagleton.

Senator EAGLETON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am anxious to hear Secretary Shultz' testimony, as he will apparently advocate the President's policy of more of the same, and more of the same that has availed nothing.

Sanctions may be an imperfect remedy, but sanctions are a far superior remedy than that which has already been shown to have availed nothing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I again want to commend you on the prompt scheduling of these hearings on the urgent question of United States policy toward South Africa, and I welcome the Secretary in his appearance before the committee today.

The situation in South Africa today is very grave, far more serious than it was a year ago, when the Congress deferred taking legislative action. The fundamental intransigence of the South African Government remains unchanged. Apartheid remains in place. South Africa's black political leadership remains imprisoned. South African military forces continue to engage in acts of aggression against neighboring states.

We need, urgently need, an appropriate United States response to South African governmental policy. The policy of constructive engagement is not merely a failure. It was a failure long ago. It is now a tragedy and a disgrace. And it makes a mockery of our principles and undermines our national interests.

The issue is sanctions against the Government of South Africa. This issue cannot be avoided.

The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group has concluded, and I quote:

The question is not whether sanctions will compel change. It is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared defer change.

A recent letter signed by nearly 100 presidents of major American colleges and universities declared, and I quote:

Sanctions legislation offers a critical opportunity for the United States to make a forceful, bipartisan statement against apartheid. Legislation will convey more effectively than anything else the breadth and depth of national feeling against apartheid.

Bishop Tutu, in an eloquent article in the New York Times on the sixteenth of June, addressing the question that sanctions will hurt blacks, said, and I quote:

Blacks are saying we are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering.

And he goes on:

I must ask to whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen, or to the perpetrators or apartheid and those who benefit from it?

Clearly, the past year has made clear that time is not on the side of those seeking a negotiated solution that will minimize dislocation and bloodshed. The time for us to act, therefore, is now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. I'd rather hear the Secretary.

I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, we are here to listen to the Secretary and I welcome his testimony. I refrained yesterday from saying anything, to await what the President would say, and I would like to comment just briefly now.

I think it is fair to say that yesterday, much of the world was watching—certainly all of the Congress was watching—with an anticipation that begged for the strongest possible statement of American condemnation of apartheid and of actions that we might take to try to do something about it, limited, as my colleague from Missouri has said, those actions may be.

I went back and looked at the former comments and former speech of the President on this subject a year ago, when he took away from Congress a certain momentum that was building toward sanctions, and there really is nothing different.

Instead, we heard a rehash of American reluctance to join morality with policy, a reluctance to sever ties, no matter how painful that might be, with one of the most abhorrent regimes on the face of this planet.

Everything that we are and everything that I think we stand for as a people, everything that we mouthe as Senators and Congresspeople, is based on a notion about freedom and a notion about peo-

ple's aspirations, about opportunity, about individual worth and human rights.

Yesterday, in excusing current South African Government attempts to stay in power by saying that they had made changes and that those changes moved it closer to a new policy, whether pass law changes or other minimal changes, I think the President took us down a path that suggests to Americans that we don't have to care as much about those principles or, when demanded by the world and by ourselves and our own sense of propriety, we don't have to take those strong positions; that it's all right to put our sense of right and wrong on the back burner for a while; that it's not important, in this particular instance, for the United States to go firmly on record with the message that blacks in South Africa as well as the rest of the world cannot mistake.

I think that the response from leaders, from Bishop Tutu to others, makes it clear that this was a message that is not mistaken, but, unfortunately, is not mistaken for all the wrong reasons.

The President said that South Africa is like a zebra, and if the white parts are injured, the black parts will die, too.

Well, I unfortunately, liken the President to an ostrich with his head in the sand, because he blindly hopes that what you can't see or feel is not going to hurt you, that by wishing it away, it somehow could go away.

I think that all the world knows, and I believe the Secretary knows, I think everybody at this panel knows, that if South Africa is like a zebra, it is clear that the black parts are being decimated today, and that, as a consequence of that, the white parts are already dying. South Africa is dying.

Unless the United States makes an effort to try to say that we will be part of the radical change of surgery to cut out the cancer, rather than to allow it to ravage, that is going to continue.

The Eminent Persons Group said, and I quote them:

We draw the conclusion that, while the government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is, in truth, not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, not to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its program of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face. Its quest is power-sharing, but without surrendering overall white control.

Now I, as one Senator, certainly find it confounding, when you examine each and every one of the steps the President said have been taken that are positive steps. They are not real steps.

If you look at the pass laws, while South Africa claims to have abolished them, they have replaced them with a new ID card, called the uniform identity document. This document still lists the race of the person carrying it.

As far as the repeal of laws banning interracial sects and interracial marriage, sure they took away the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriage Act. But, couples who intermarry are still affected by the Group Areas Act, which means that they must live in the area designated for the partner with the lowest racial classification and cannot live where they choose.

The influx control laws, which govern where people can live, indeed those have been repealed. But those who live in the black

homelands are not covered by the reform, and that is most of the people in South Africa.

So, step for step, where people allege there has been a change, those who watch closely and who really are not ostriches with their heads in the sand, understand that they are not real changes and that the government is not intent on making those changes.

So, I will join with my colleagues in listening. I certainly join with my colleagues in continuing to hope. But I will also join with my colleagues in taking the step that I think this Government should have taken yesterday, which is to make the strongest possible stand, to send the strongest possible message, and to make it clear to the world that those notions which are at the foundation of our Government are indeed something we care about and indeed something we are willing to put into policy, and that it is not too late for this country to join morality with policy from this point on.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Tribble, do you have an opening comment?

Senator TRIBBLE. I do not, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

I thank all members.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. May I ask unanimous consent to place in the record a letter to the President dated June 12, calling attention to the need to act prior to September 9.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the letter will be placed in the record.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Shultz, we appreciate your coming. I think the dialog has been lengthy, but useful, and I hope that you share that thought.

We look forward now to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE,
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. CHESTER CROCKER, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND HON. PETER
McPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT**

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is always a pleasure for me to appear before this committee, and especially today when I have an opportunity to expand on and support the President's ringing denunciation of apartheid yesterday, his call to South Africans of all races, and for all of us here who are interested in what happens in that troubled country, to have in our minds a vision of what can be if apartheid can be ended and if and when a government exists, where the rights of majority, minorities, and individuals are respected by constitutional guarantees, and where full advantage can be taken of the extraordinary resources and talents that are there.

That is our vision. That is what we are trying to achieve.

Third, the President called attention and specified what it takes to get there, primarily what it takes on the part of the people of South Africa to get there.

He talked about the role of the United States in helping to support those objectives.

It was an important, vigorous, and principled statement, of which we can all be proud.

We Americans are witness to a mounting tragedy in South Africa that stirs our emotions and prompts us to ask ourselves those very American questions: What can we do about apartheid? What can we do about the violence and destruction it generates, and about the spillover effect of South Africa's trauma on its many neighbors? How can we help all South Africans; that is, South Africans of all races, build a just and prosperous society?

Those are our questions, and I recognize them in the statements that have been made here.

In the past few months, the situation in South Africa has taken a further, sharp, turn for the worse. Slender hopes for peace and reconciliation have fallen victim to a headlong rush toward violence. Doors that need to be open have been slammed shut. Forces of political fragmentation and racial polarization have been set loose. They will be very difficult to contain.

Our policy toward any region takes into account changing facts on the ground. While our goals and basic purposes remain constant, U.S. interests and values—values—and hence our actions, are directly affected by what happens.

We have reviewed the southern African situation. We have concluded that, despite narrowing odds, we should be doing all we can to reverse an impending tragedy.

In my remarks to you today, I will describe the forces at work in South Africa and the region, discuss the broad approach which President Reagan outlined yesterday in his speech, and make clear what actions we think make sense in this new situation.

First, I want to outline the approach the President and I believe we must follow.

It is the leaders of South and Southern Africa and their people, black and white, who have the major responsibility. The fate of southern Africa is in their hands. This is their drama, their dilemma, their challenge.

Let us remember that.

But, they are not alone. We are prepared to talk to all of them, and to help them talk to each other. We, and our allies, will engage our influence in every way possible to help them meet the challenge. But, most fundamentally, it is they who must rise to it.

Second, the nature of the challenge the South African Government faces is clear. Progress toward peace there requires:

a timetable for the elimination of all apartheid laws; and timetable meaning that they will end, and when they will end;

the release of all political prisoners, including, especially, Nelson Mandela;

the unbanning of black political movements;

an end to repressive measures, especially the state of emergency;

the urgent beginning of dialog among all parties, leading to a democratic system of government in which the rights of majorities,

minorities and individuals are protected by a bill of rights and firm constitutional guarantees.

Third, the choices before black South Africans are equally clear. We call on them:

- to avoid the easy descent into violence, terrorism, and extremism;

- to demonstrate by their actions that they understand the need for compromise;

- to remember that they may soon share the responsibility for governing and reconstructing South Africa; I would say sooner or later—and the sooner the better—that they will share it and they have to think that way, of that responsibility;

- and to seek out and accept realistic openings for dialog and negotiation with the Government.

Fourth, our policies and those of our allies should ensure that expanded political liberties in a postapartheid South Africa are accompanied by an expansion of economic opportunities for all—all—South Africans. This will require an expanding South African economy, that is strong enough to meet South Africa's pressing social and economic needs, healthy enough to raise black living standards rapidly toward those of whites, and open and vigorous enough to spur economic development regionwide.

Finally, a free South Africa is essential to the kind of southern Africa we and most southern Africans seek. Only a South Africa which preserves Africa's strongest and most developed industrial economy can galvanize a dynamic and balanced regional economy, mobilize capital and labor, spread advanced technology and management, and strengthen trade and transport ties. Only a South Africa of democratic freedoms can foster such freedoms beyond its borders. In this connection, there is no place in our vision for South African forces in Namibia or Cuban forces in Angola. Both the South Africans and the Cubans must go home.

These are the objectives to which all our efforts must be directed. This is our approach. We commend it to the American people. We commend it to our allies. And we commend it to African peoples and their leaders across the continent. Let there be no doubt—no doubt whatever—about what the American Government and what the American people stand for.

I daresay, in listening to your comments and reading things that all of you have said from time to time, that on these objectives and these steps, which are the guts of the matter, there is broad, bipartisan agreement.

Let me review the current situation and its implications.

It is essential to understand the facts in southern Africa to judge what the results of various courses of action by the United States might be. I have said there is a bad situation, getting worse. Let us look more deeply at what is going on and what it means.

The market is speaking clearly about where the hardening positions of the South African Government and its violent opponents are taking South Africa.

South Africa is under siege by self-imposed economic sanctions. Foreign capital, technology and expertise are pulling out. Currency controls, import controls, and import substitution policies cannot replace them.

The index of South African business confidence now stands at only three-fourths of what it was in 1980. Gross fixed capital formation fell by 40 percent in 1985, and is continuing to decline. Gross domestic product was down by 1 percent in the first quarter of this year. There is net emigration among whites for the first time since 1977. Most significantly, an increasing number of the country's skilled professionals are leaving.

Over the past year, the book value of American investment in South Africa has fallen by about a third. Investment from other countries is falling by comparable orders of magnitude, and voluntary disinvestment is accelerating. Nearly 200 corporations are in various stages of disengagement from the South African economy.

The commercial rand has depreciated to less than 40 cents from \$1.28 in 1980. The financial rand, used for offshore transactions, now trades around 20 cents. Despite the government's frequent and heavy interventions in the exchange markets, South Africa's currency shows no sign of recovery. Capital flight between September 1985, and March of this year was about \$1 billion, equivalent to more than a month of imports. Sweeping exchange controls have not staunched the outflow, which seems to be accelerating. There is no new lending from abroad. In the past, South African foreign exchange reserves have been sufficient to cover 5 to 6 months of imports. Now they barely cover 1 month's imports. Ninety-five percent of this year's debt service payments have had to be rescheduled.

The government is holding the prime rate at an artificially low 14 percent. Inflation persists at 17.5 percent, so interest rates are, in fact, negative. This should stimulate borrowing and investment. No doubt that is their intent. Nevertheless, real borrowing has fallen by 5 percent, and rates of investment are now so low that they cannot cover the depreciation of plant and equipment. The wages of white workers rose by 10.5 percent from mid-1984 to mid-1985, but inflation then stood at 15 percent, leaving them worse off. The fall in the standard of living for whites has since accelerated. Real per capita income is declining even more rapidly for blacks.

The turn toward a siege economy only increases the size and costs of government at the expense of productive economic activity and the tax base. Three-fifths of employed Afrikaners and one-fifth of the English-speaking white workforce already work for the South African Government or its agencies. Military call-ups under the state of emergency are diverting additional resources out of the productive sector. The recent arrests of labor leaders have brought chaos to labor-management relations, adding further to the economy's woes.

Unemployment among urban blacks now stands at 25 percent and runs over 50 percent in some urban areas. And, for the first time since the National Party came to power, white unemployment is a serious problem.

From March 1985 to March of this year, 40,000 whites lost their jobs. There are over 250,000 new job seekers in South Africa every year. The economy needs a real growth rate of 5 percent just to keep unemployment at current levels. With no growth in prospect, the country cannot create jobs for either blacks or whites.

South Africa has costly economic and social problems which cry out to be addressed. For example, 3 to 4 million new housing units will be required over the next 15 years. Public health demands immediate attention, with only one doctor for every 25,000 people in the rural areas. Black education is grossly underfunded. The South African Government, to its credit, is trying to increase the amounts of money it devotes to addressing these problems. But the state of emergency is imposing additional heavy burdens on the country's budget, as are the government's military adventures in the region.

Current developments are, in fact, eroding the capacity of any future South African Government to address the country's problems. They are causing South Africa's economic base to deteriorate. Skilled manpower is fleeing the country. Domestically generated capital is bleeding away. These developments are looting South Africa of the patrimony on which its reconstruction in the post-apartheid era must rest. They should be of concern to all who hope to see a prosperous, democratic South Africa emerge from the miseries of apartheid. They should be of as much concern to South Africa's blacks as to whites.

Only the establishment of a system that answers the aspirations of the South African people—all of them—for justice and equality, and ends policies and actions that put South Africa at odds with all its neighbors, can open the path to prosperity and progress for all, not just in South Africa, but throughout the southern African region.

But with so many opponents of apartheid in jail under the state of emergency, leaders on both sides find it hard to meet, much less negotiate. Politics in South Africa is increasingly polarized and shrill. Suspicion and mistrust abound. The youth, black and white, are being schooled in a style of politics that sees violent retribution, rather than open debate, as the natural reaction to any expression of views different from their own. The rising violence provokes terrorism from extremists on all sides, which, in turn, elicits more extreme measures by both the government and its opponents in what is becoming a cruel game of one upmanship.

These trends have implications that resound well beyond South Africa's borders and affect all of southern Africa.

Until 1985, the regional picture showed signs of hope. Our diplomatic efforts were having clear success. This conflict-ridden region was moving, albeit fitfully, toward negotiated solutions. Tireless American diplomatic efforts had brought South Africa, Angola, and other parties within range of a possible accord on Namibia's independence under UNSCR 435 and on a timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

After a period of confrontation, the Nkomati accord between South Africa and Mozambique created a framework for economic cooperation and good neighborly relations. This agreement contained regionwide potential for leashing the dogs of war and ending Mozambique's endless agony of poverty and strife. Fragile, but substantive, exchanges were occurring between South Africa and other neighbors to resolve cross-border security problems. We support continued efforts by South Africa's neighbors to stop guerrilla operations from their territory.

I might say that 2 days after South Africa's raid into Botswana, the Foreign Minister of Botswana was in my office. She told me that on the day before the raid, she had been exchanging telexes with the South African Government about still another meeting on security related matters, having to do with crossborder violence. She stated her view and her government's view that they did not want to harbor any terrorists, and if South Africa would tell them where they are, they would get after them. That night, she was greeted by the raid. And who was killed in the raid? A government official who spends his offhours teaching school—hardly a terrorist.

So, it is a tragedy.

Nevertheless, I think the efforts of South Africa's neighbors to stop guerrilla operations from their territories are essential and we support them.

These hopeful beginnings have been dealt body blows, as I was just saying, by the events of the past 18 months. South African strikes against Lesotho, Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe and Pretoria's continued relationship with the Mozambiquan rebel movement have shattered the emerging climate of regional moderation.

Soviet-armed ANC guerrillas have embarked upon expanded terrorist violence inside South Africa, dragging neighboring states inexorably into a cauldron of conflict with a South African Government increasingly eager to shift the blame for its internal woes to its neighbors.

The MPLA regime in Angola, encouraged by massive Soviet arms shipments, has used South African attacks and internal problems as an excuse to suspend negotiations and pursue an illusory military option against UNITA. Despite hints of possible flexibility, the MPLA has refused to respond constructively to our 1985 compromise proposals on Namibia and Angola, or to explore South Africa's professed readiness to begin implementation of a compromise plan now.

This new shift toward political confrontation is paralleled by economic trends. South Africa and its neighbors are diverting increasingly scarce resources to their security forces. Internal strife and socialist inefficiency in Angola and Mozambique have severely damaged or destroyed the region's natural transport infrastructure, rendering landlocked neighbors increasingly dependent on costly, longdistance routes through South Africa.

All you have to do is to look at a map and you will see how nonsensical, from a rational, economic point of view, what is happening is!

The Benguela rail line, long of importance for the Zairean and Zambian mining industries, is hostage to Angola's civil war. Rail and road links to Tanzania and Mozambican ports, and the ports themselves, are functioning at a mere fraction of their potential capacity. For eight of its neighbors, South Africa now provides the outlet for 25 percent to 100 percent of their export trade. It has 75 percent of the region's rail network, provides a major source of electric power to four neighbors, and is the source of most neighbors' imported chemicals, foodstuffs, petroleum, and machinery. It is estimated that as many as 10 million people in nearby states live on the remittances of foreign workers in South Africa.

Appeals by African states for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa represent a political message to us. Yet those states cannot themselves implement such sanctions and would be the first victims of South African countermeasures now being loudly brandished as a threat by Pretoria.

Don't forget, we are not the only ones that can put on sanctions.

And the declining pace of economic activity in South Africa itself will have direct and predictable results among its neighbors, as capital, expertise, and job opportunities are victims of South Africa's downward slide. We need to understand clearly that the human tragedy in South Africa is occurring in the economic hub of a region that includes a dozen states with some 150 million people. The damage inflicted on South Africa by the marketplace, by political measures of governments, and, above all, by the South Africans themselves, is rippling across and dragging down an entire region.

The fundamental cause of all this damage is the system of apartheid and the mounting and inevitable reaction to it. Apartheid must be brought to an end and be replaced by a democratic system of government in which the rights of the majorities, minorities, and individuals are protected by a bill of rights and firm constitutional guarantees.

Now that is a rather laborious summary of some of the trends that are taking place, and I personally believe it is quite sobering. I think it is quite clear that if you are wondering if there is a message being sent, it is being sent. It is being sent diplomatically, it is being sent politically, it is being sent economically, and it is being sent with violence, unfortunately.

I think there is some merit to the argument that the message delivered by the marketplace is a more powerful and deeper message than a message that might be delivered by some action that would be taken here. If you impose a political sanction, you are, in effect, saying that there is capital and business and everything that is just dying to get in here and take advantage of those opportunities, and you are going to stop it from doing so. It is more devastating to realize that without any such interposition, capital is not coming. Capital is leaving. And the economy is in a rapid, downward spiral. That is a very powerful message being delivered. I think you should think twice before you piggyback on it and, to a certain extent, disturb it.

Now let me turn to the role of the United States.

South Africa is now a society ruled by fear: fear on the part of whites that their property and their values, which they cherish, will be destroyed if blacks attain real political power; fear on the part of blacks that they will be subjected to even greater violence and repression, and despair that their legitimate grievances will ever be redressed. South Africa's true friends can and must make the case that there are actions to be taken to alter this climate of fear and despair.

For, if South Africa is now a country in torment, it is also one of enormous potential. Both the South African Government, which now seems so unconcerned about international opinion, and its black opponents, who often seem to dismiss the efforts of the outside world to help, still look to us for understanding and support.

South Africans, in short, continue to search for solutions. We should help in this search.

Through several administrations, including this one, United States policy has sought the elimination of apartheid and rapid peaceful change to a democratic system. Our voice has, of course, been only one of many urging the South African Government to act. South Africans—some inside, many outside the government—have expressed quiet appreciation for the role we have played in opposing forced removals of population, detentions of individuals, and abuse of detainees. We believe that our support for an end to apartheid has made it easier for the South African Government to go forward with the politically divisive process of ending the pass laws, expanding rights of residence and private property ownership, and restoring citizenship to those from whom these rights were stripped in an earlier era.

We are proud to stand with South Africans who feel as strongly about what replaces apartheid as they do about the urgent need to end it. And our role has gone beyond moral suasion. We and U.S. businesses have not just spoken; we have acted by bringing black and white South Africans together in the workplace and in our homes on the basis of friendship and equality. American business has spent over \$200 million outside the workplace since 1977 to prepare black South Africans for the post-apartheid society they anticipate. The U.S. Government has allocated \$45 million in this fiscal year and the coming one for the same purpose. We want to do more.

I might say that I believe that, rather than excoriating American businesses who are there in South Africa, they should be praised. They have performed magnificently. They have put into place in their workplaces standards that show the way, and they have acted as really good citizens in the community. We can be proud of what they have done.

We do not want them to leave there. They are a force for good. They are a force for progress. But, of course, they are leaving.

The President has forcefully articulated our strategy and the results we seek from it. Getting there from here will require both patience and courage on our part. We must not become part of South Africa's problems. We must remain part of their solution. We must not aim to impose ourselves, our solutions or our favorites in South Africa. Such an intrusion would be unwanted and unwise for any outside party. But we must always be willing to help South Africans in their search for their own answers to their country's ills.

Our access to various groups and individuals gives us openings for using diplomacy and political and moral persuasion, the most effective tools available to us in these dangerous times.

We continue to urge the South African Government to communicate with all parties. And it makes sense for the United States to do the same, and we will.

Like our allies, we intend to raise the level and the frequency of our contact with the South African Government's black opposition, including, among others, the African National Congress.

We have serious questions about the ultimate objectives of the ANC, as well as about the role in its inner circles of the Soviet-controlled South African Communist Party. We are also disturbed

that the ANC appears to be imitating the South African Government's preference for violence and intimidation rather than dialog with its opponents. But the ANC has emerged as an important part of the South African political equation. There is a compelling need to insure that its leaders, like other opponents of apartheid, hear an authoritative statement of U.S. policies and interests and that we have equally authoritative insight into theirs.

I might say, with Nelson Mandela as their President, I have never met him, but I have talked to many who have. Uniformly, they come away from their meetings with him thinking very highly of him as an individual.

In our diplomacy, we are trying to assist an unhappy nation and its diverse peoples lay the basis for a better future. Our moral responsibility each day must be to think through the results of our actions. When President Reagan signed his Executive order on South Africa last September, he said that he wanted to work with Congress to increase bipartisan support for United States policy toward that country. In his speech yesterday afternoon, he added, and I'm quoting: "America's view of apartheid has been, and remains, clear. Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable. The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people, based upon race."

"If South Africa wishes to belong to the family of Western nations, an end to apartheid is a precondition. Americans * * * are united in this conviction."

U.S. policy proceeds from this premise. Our purpose is to underscore our message to the South African Government that the United States, its Executive, its legislature, and, most importantly, its people, reject apartheid and that we, like growing numbers of the South African people, want it replaced by a genuinely democratic system in which all can participate, regardless of race.

In this connection, it is vital to coordinate what we do with our principal allies. American influence in South Africa is limited, but the influence of the industrialized democracies of the EC, Japan, and the United States, as a group, is significant. Together, we constitute South Africa's major trading and investment partners. Together we embody the values of the democratic world that South Africans of all races seek to join. Together we stand a better chance of helping them to do so.

In the coming weeks, both the Commonwealth nations and the European Community [EC] will be consulting about possible measures aimed at inducing positive change in South Africa. In those contexts, a broad range of measures has been put forward. These include punitive actions, such as commodity import bans, further export-import and investment restrictions, curtailing air travel, visa facilities, and various other political sanctions. They include measures to protect our interests against the possibility of catastrophe, such as coordination of stockpiling policies for strategic minerals from South Africa. Let's not forget that we import some very important commodities from there.

Other positive measures have also been proposed, such as increased aid to apartheid's victims. We have our own ideas and are prepared to join our allies in formulating a common approach. As

the President said yesterday, however, it cannot make sense politically, economically, or morally, to compound the suffering of an entire region and remove our remaining influence as a gesture of outrage. That is not responsible.

A special EC emissary, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, has also been mandated to visit the region to pursue possibilities for negotiations. He is now in South Africa. He will meet today with state President Botha, and expects to meet with him again on July 29. The President and I conferred with Sir Geoffrey last week. He has our full support in the difficult mission he has undertaken. His findings and his recommendations at the conclusion of his trip will have a major bearing on the decisions we shall be considering in concert with our allies. His mission, and our diplomacy, will aim at restoring the hopes for dialog first kindled by the EPG, whose negotiating concept made more headway than many thought possible.

We cannot, and should not, attempt to deal with the crisis in South Africa in isolation from the disastrous consequences it can have for the entire southern Africa region. Accordingly, I am asking AID to join the Department of State in our consultations with our allies.

We will consider a range of positive measures that would give substance to the President's wish to promote economic progress throughout the southern Africa region. South Africa now dominates an economically irrational regional transport network that provides high cost outlets for all of its neighbors except Angola, and which renders them vulnerable to retaliation and economic penalties. These front line states have shorter, more economic, alternatives, but these routes have deteriorated over the years, are inefficient, and require upgrading. We and our allies have already begun to work on a program of rehabilitating some transportation links. Similarly, we intend to pursue ways of opening the region to more commerce, developing transportation routes and industry along the major alternative corridors, adding to the locomotive and rolling stock of the front line states, and stimulating more trade between South Africa's neighbors.

For example, the Beira corridor, through Mozambique, is a nature egress to the sea for many of the landlocked southern African states. It is an economic, if partial, alternative to dependence on South Africa for states as far away as Zaire, which now sends 43 percent of its mineral and metal exports through the South African road and railway system. Development of the Beira corridor could be vital to the future economic growth of the region, lowering export costs and improving terms of trade, regardless of what happens in South Africa. Support for this project would lay a more balanced foundation for economic relations between the front line states and a post-apartheid South Africa.

Investments in regional transportation and trade development projects are not simply gestures against South African domination of the economies of its neighbors. These are solid foundations for the future of the regional economy.

These investments would also reduce the extent to which we depend on South Africa for access to the region's mineral supplies. U.S. participation in these positive, forward-looking programs dem-

onstrates to all the front line states our commitment to the region's postapartheid future. They are subjects of vital interest to everyone concerned about what happens in southern Africa after apartheid has passed into history. We intend to consult closely with Congress on these and other proposals that address the problems of the region.

Here I want to point out the obligation we all share toward Africa, the poorest continent. We all know the grim statistics of Africa's economic crisis. But there is also a message of hope as nation after nation discards discredited statist economic development policies. African leaders have joined a growing chorus—heard loud and clear at the U.N. Special Session on Africa in May, which I attended, and found to be an inspiring event, because you saw the change in thinking that is going on throughout that continent—that recognizes that free market forces are the key to ending the continent's economic tailspin. Now is the time for Americans to be at Africa's side economically. This administration has played a leading international role in helping shape the new policy consensus on Africa. And the economic support initiatives that the Congress approved and which we got going, the concept of which then appeared in a World Bank document a couple of years ago, and which we see reflected very clearly in the U.N. Special Session's statement, by the Africans, by the OAU, are important developments. Resource flows have expanded to help us back Africa's winners and support the politically costly process of policy reform.

But congressional foreign assistance levels threaten this important American achievement. We have many important priorities and responsibilities around the globe, including in Africa. To be effective, our foreign policy and national strategy must—I repeat, must—be adequately funded. And, ladies and gentlemen, it is not being adequately funded in the kind of budget numbers that are being talked about. It is being cut to ribbons. And our ability to do anything constructive in the area we are focusing on today, let alone other areas, is being reduced to a shambles.

And so I wonder when I hear of all the calls for economic sanctions against South Africa whether people have thought of the economic price tag for southern Africa. Instead of focusing on how much damage we can do in sending a message, let's send a message to South Africa's neighbors of our support for their economies, their infrastructures, and their independence.

But it costs money, and we don't have it.

Meanwhile, I know this committee has before it several legislative proposals designed to send messages to the South African Government. These proposals include the House bill, which amounts to a declaration of economic war on the people of southern Africa. Its passage would end our capacity to have any positive influence on the struggle for justice and human rights in southern Africa. Other legislation, although less extreme, would similarly weaken our ability to have a positive effect on what happens in South Africa.

The President and I share the sense of outrage at the situation in South Africa that has led you and your colleagues in the House to consider these actions. We are prepared to take action, with our allies, to change the mix of our pressures—positive and negative—to meet the rapidly changing course of events in South Africa and

to play an essential supporting role in advancing South Africans toward the objective of a decent, democratic, prosperous, and civilized society for all who live there.

But I want forcefully to underscore the need for us to have maximum flexibility to carry out our diplomacy. This is not a situation in which we can afford to be locked in the straitjacket of rigid legislation, no matter how well intended or carefully drafted to anticipate events that may or may not occur. There is a lot taking place right now and over the next month or so, and you cannot foretell it. We need the authority to act. Presidential discretion is necessary to introduce new measures if we conclude that they are necessary, or, equally important, to lift some should real progress be made.

Remember, we are not talking about whether measures should be taken or not. There are lots of things in place. They go back to the early 1960's, when President Kennedy joined other countries in embargoing shipments of arms to South Africa. And they have continued since, including the President's Executive order. So, there are lots of things there.

The question you have before you is whether you are going to pull the final pin, and leave.

We feel strongly that the way to proceed is not to take actions that assuage our indignation but aggravate the currently deteriorating situation in South Africa. As I have said, from the standpoint of economic sanctions, they are doing it to themselves. And it is a very powerful message to them to say look, the way you're conducting yourself, never mind what anybody else thinks, you're ruining yourself. There's no hope for your economy unless you turn it around. It's not what somebody else is doing to you; it's what you're doing to yourself. This, of course, is saying that if you want to change, you can change.

We need to maintain our capacity to play a role in the emergence of a new South Africa. We must not condemn the inhabitants of the South Africa of the future to a life of economic stagnation. The way to proceed is not to punish those South Africans persecuted by apartheid, but to target pressure on those who defend and enforce apartheid. The way to proceed is not, in short, to add to the misery of South Africans, but to set about helping them solve South Africa's problems and to build a society of expanding liberties and economic opportunities.

Let me sum up.

The South African Government has, by its policies, isolated itself politically and diplomatically. Its most recent actions are having the effect of isolating it economically as well. If current trends continue, the outlook for South Africa is dismal. In such a South Africa, there will be no winners, only losers. We have a different vision of South Africa's future. We want a democratic and prosperous South Africa, where all races participate politically and economically, at the center of a peaceful and rapidly developing southern African region.

To achieve this, apartheid must go. All South Africans need to be represented in negotiations to determine the system of government that will replace it.

Such negotiations are urgent. We cannot prescribe their outcome. But our policies and actions must be calculated to encourage the process of peaceful change and help it along.

And to do this, we must, as I have indicated, coordinate with our allies for maximum effect. The international consultations we have begun and our own review process, as well as our gauging of South African Government intentions will all come to a conclusion in September, when further exchanges with our key allies will cap the process of coordination between us. We will be coming to you for your support and will consult closely with you as we examine how we can best achieve the results we all want.

Upcoming events give State President Botha ample opportunities to set out on a path that would take South Africa out of its present stalemate. He will be speaking to his party convention, as I understand it, on August 12. We urge him to seize such opportunities. The responsibility to save South Africa from the violence, impoverishment and hopelessness into which it is slipping rests first and foremost with the South African Government. It is that simple. If courageous and far-sighted decisions are taken, South Africans will find us ready to join with our allies in helping them to build a better future for all the people of their country. The industrialized democracies must be prepared to take actions to help South Africans hasten apartheid to an early end and to help them replace it with a democratic society in which the rights of all are respected and protected.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary Shultz, for a most comprehensive and thoughtful statement, and your additional elaborations. Those were most helpful for emphasis.

The Chair would like to ask unanimous consent that, in our question period, we restrict ourselves to 5 minutes due to the numbers of Senators present. The Chair would simply announce, without being discourteous, that when 5 minutes come to an end, questioning will have to cease, or 5 may turn into 10 and we would be in some trouble.

I will begin the questioning and I hope the timekeeper is ready.

Secretary Shultz, one problem that I see down the trail is that, in the event that there does not appear to be sufficient hope given to blacks in South Africa who are not a part of a dialog, and if, in fact, there is no sense of negotiations on ending apartheid, then sporadic activities of terrorism or even a low-grade form of guerrilla warfare could take place that would polarize the parties further and make the possibilities for those negotiations even more remote.

I suppose that things could move along just about as they are presently, with all their grim aspects, or that the South African Government could simply stamp out, even by ones and twos, each person who is in opposition. In that event, perhaps time would exist for the approach you have projected and that the President did yesterday.

But I do not sense that time is on our side, and for that reason I think that something more is required, and more swiftly.

Would you simply give your own judgment as to what the time-frame for action might be and what the response is likely to be of blacks in South Africa if there is no hope forthcoming from this

government, the Commonwealth, or from Europe in the next 2 or 3 months?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is very hard to be optimistic about what might happen there. But the consequences of a lack of action are terrible to contemplate.

So, even though the probability is low, it seems to me that we have to work with that probability and try to make it into a significant one.

This is what we all are trying to do. This is what Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission is about, to focus on and call attention in the most vigorous way we can to what is taking place, and the inevitable future slide, unless a change of course takes place.

I know that Senator Kerry wrote off all of the things that have happened. But things have happened. And, obviously, there is a tremendous road ahead. I am a believer that what you say counts. Sometimes, particularly in a capital like this, people think they just throw away lines. But I think what you say really counts. And when it is said by the South African Government that it has recognized that apartheid is obsolete, I think that is important. This is because if you know it is obsolete, it follows that, somehow or other, you are going to have to do something about it.

So, there are narrow possibilities, and I think we have to work on them. That is what Sir Geoffrey Howe is doing. That is what others are doing, and that is what we are trying to do.

We are not able to call the shots in South Africa. We have to remember that the people who are going to call—I guess call the shots is not the right image I want—who are going to make the decisions are the people of South Africa themselves—black, white, colored, Asian. Those are the ones we have to appeal to.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe it significant that the President's speech was played in its entirety on the state-controlled television and radio yesterday and welcomed by the Government, whereas Bishop Tutu condemned it?

Would this give you optimism that the course of action the President suggested in the speech is leading to more reason or flexibility with regard to the negotiations?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is very difficult to interpret, Mr. Chairman.

The President's speech, read in its entirety, which I have tried to summarize and develop in my testimony today, is—and I would say contrary to the reactions of the members, as I listened to them—a very powerful message and call for change.

I think it fully recognizes in a comprehensive way the situation. There are many aspects to it. It is not a simple situation.

But if welcoming that speech means that the South African Government will do the things that the President said he thought they should do, then I am sure we would all agree it would be of tremendous significance.

Our disagreement here I think is not over the kinds of things in the first part of my testimony. Apparently, there are members who think that if you do a few more so-called sanctions, that that will make a big difference. And the burden of what I have tried to describe is, particularly on the economic side, that it is going downhill in a hurry. The message is very powerful from the marketplace.

It must get home, and we seek to get that message across through the President's speech, through supporting testimony, through various channels that we have. And I hope that in one way they will reach Mr. Botha and his colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming the Secretary here today.

In the New York Times this morning, there is an article indicating that we had exchanged intelligence information with the South African Government, specifically given them information on the African National Congress.

Was this done in the past, and is it still being done?

Secretary SHULTZ. This morning I received a telephone call on a secure line from the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Casey, who told me categorically that that was not true, and had not been true during the course of his administration there and, to his knowledge, before that.

I said, "I would like to be able to say publicly that you told me that." He said, "Help yourself," so I'm helping myself.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

We have already imposed strong sanctions in the past on other governments that we thought should change their policies—Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and Iran. I am wondering if we might not develop, as opposed to a most-favored-nation a least-favored-nation approach implementing policy. That is, impose sanctions against equivalent to those already imposed South African on countries with which we have strong policy disagreements.

What would be your reaction to the idea of a least-favored-nation approach?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it's a pretty tricky concept.

I think that, on the whole, economic sanctions do not do that much. Where they work, they work if they are done in a coordinated way, so that the full force of opinion, as well as the flow of commerce and investment, is exerted, and it is not possible for the market to go around them.

That is the reason why, as we work at these things, sometimes more successfully than others, we try to do things in coordination with our allies. Sometimes we succeed, and sometimes we do not. But in this case we are working with our allies very closely and talking to them about what they plan to do, and so on.

We think that is the right way to approach it.

Senator PELL. I can recall in the past, at another time, when you rather opposed the idea of economic sanctions. But we do apply them now to a number of countries.

I am wondering why there should be an objection to the imposition of them against South Africa, whose policies we find repugnant and which we are seeking to change.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, first of all, there are sanctions in place, and they have been in place for quite some time. What is being discussed is whether or not some set of additional ones should be—

Senator PELL. To turn the screw.

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. Should be applied. And some of the screws are in the kind of wood where they don't take. That is,

if you say you are going to stop new investment, there isn't any new investment to stop. If you say that you want to encourage disinvestment—it's happening, all too fast. So, the economic sanctions are being imposed by South Africa on itself by its behavior and the message that the market gives to that behavior. I think that is a very powerful one.

But in the case of Libya, say, that regime, in its terrorist activities, conducted all around the world and against us, is a regime that we wanted to cut off from completely.

In the case of South Africa and southern Africa, it is a very important region to us and we do not want to cut off from them. We want to work with them. We want to work with the blacks, the coloreds, the Asians, the whites, with all the people of South Africa. We hope they will give us a chance by changing their behavior.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I was struck by Bishop Tutu's response to the President's statement. I was distressed by it, too, because as a member of the same faith, to have a bishop, and a potential archbishop, say to a great part of the world "Go to hell" obviously indicated an exasperation on his part.

Do you see any way of maintaining contact with him so that he can be a leavening influence?

Secretary SHULTZ. The message that the President gave yesterday was a message saying that we think the responsible leaders, those who are in jail, should be let out of jail, and that the South African Government ought to get going on a process of discussion and negotiation, and that in calling on them to do it, we should be willing to do it, and enrich our dialog.

Of course, Bishop Tutu has been to the United States many times. He has met with the President. I don't like to hear anybody use language like he used about a Presidential statement that, among other things, had many eloquent statements in it about, I presume, things they both care about.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, there were news reports this morning to the effect that you were ready to meet with Oliver Tambo, the head of the African National Congress.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Are you going to have any stipulation prior to any such meeting with respect to terrorism, especially the necklacing or are you going to meet with him in any case?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are unequivocal in our view about terrorism and the necklace is a particularly repulsive form of it. We want to see him face to face to tell him that and to hear what he says about it.

Senator HELMS. Well, what if he says, "I can't do anything about it," or gives some excuse? Are you still going to meet with him?

Secretary SHULTZ. We'll meet with him and we'll give him our views.

Senator HELMS. You don't have any fear that this will undermine the President's position on terrorism?

Secretary SHULTZ. No; I don't.

I think we should meet with the leaders. Mandela is the presumptive leader. If he is out of jail, we should be ready to meet with him. And we need to say our piece to people.

We would, I think, be on firmer ground the greater the dialog is. I have no excuse for the violence under any circumstances, but I think the fundamental argumentation in an open and democratic society is that you have alternatives.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, don't you think it would be helpful to stipulate in advance that we expect to stop this necklacing business and this terrorism and start on a level playing field?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; we have stated that.

Senator HELMS. But you are still going to meet with him whether he responds or not?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; I think we should meet with him.

Senator HELMS. There are 30 members of the Executive Committee of the African National Congress.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't know for sure, Senator.

Senator HELMS. My understanding is that a majority of these 30 members are also members of the Kosa tribe.

If we negotiate with the ANC, do you think that the Zulus, for example, and other traditional enemies of the Kosas will accept Kosa domination? How are you going to get all of these people together when you are dealing with just one part of the African population.

Secretary SHULTZ. We're not going to negotiate with them. It is not for us to negotiate with them.

We think that we might be able to help by enriching our dialogue with all of the parties. Chief Buthelezi, with whom I have met and who has been here, is the leader of the Zulu. He is a very strong figure, and I should think any rational discussion with leaders of South Africa would necessarily include him.

There are a lot of different people. There are a lot of labor leaders. There are a lot of church leaders. There is an emerging richness of leadership to talk to.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, those groups are not hanging tires around the necks of people.

I have no feeling whatsoever about your meeting with everybody, but I do think you ought to stipulate something about this necklace business.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not disagree with you at all. I think it is a horrible thing to do, and I have seen the pictures. I doubt there is a person on this committee who would disagree in any way.

Senator HELMS. That's the point. May I ask you, sir, to have someone supply to this committee an unclassified letter identifying the tribal affiliations of the black members of the ANC Executive Committee?

Secretary SHULTZ. To the extent we can get that information, we will supply it. I don't know how available it is.

Senator HELMS. I would appreciate your doing that.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator HELMS. Yesterday, in the President's speech, he said he was instructing you and Mr. McPherson to prepare a study on the possible use of United States funds to develop a new transportation system linking Zimbabwe and the African coast.

Does this constitute an endorsement of the so-called Beira corridor project?

Secretary SHULTZ. As a concept, yes.

I think that, if you look at the map and look at the way things are moved around in southern Africa, what is happening now from a straight economic standpoint is ridiculous. That is, you have potentially good ports and potentially perfectly workable railroad, road, and pipeline routes that would be much more economic than what is presently taking place. These routes are in disrepair or subject to guerrilla activity, as in Mozambique. So, it is hard to keep them going.

But, from the long-run standpoint in southern Africa, the present transportation network does not make economic sense. I believe that we should be trying to help develop a network that does make economic sense.

Senator HELMS. Well, it is interesting because just 2 weeks ago, we cut off economic aid to Zimbabwe. I don't know whether that is a windshield wiper or not.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Secretary SHULTZ. I had a group come and make a little presentation to me about the Beira project the other day, and the thing that interested me most was that it was the representatives from other countries than Zimbabwe or Mozambique who were pushing it very hard.

In other words, they see it essentially as something to which they link. They see it as a regional project, in other words, and not a country-to-country project.

I recognize all of the problems that are there and, of course, the fact that it is so obviously economic in the abstract. And yet, it does not exist, and gives you a message about the difficulties that are there.

But that does not mean that you shouldn't try.

Gee, if you look at these maps—I just happen to have a map [indicating]. I know you can't really see it, but I know you are all familiar with it.

Take Malawi, just to take an example. Produce going from Malawi out—what does it do? It goes by truck across a very dicey section of Mozambique, into Zimbabwe, and way down here, it is shipped out at Durban. It goes through all of that.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, you can't hear for all the clicking here. I'm sorry. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. When you look at where it is, you see that here is Dar es Salaam, up here, which is a potentially good port and does not operate anywhere near its potential, and here is Mozambique, which is a potentially terrific port, and here is Beira [indicating]. They are all much nearer.

So, if you just look at it from an economic standpoint and said if there were political stability of some kind in the area, what ought

to happen, if you just let the market work, Malawi would not take its stuff out that way.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, first of all, I'm amazed that Bishop Tutu was as restrained as he was because people are being mugged, shot, imprisoned, killed, smothered. I admire his restraint, not his assertion.

I suspect if you or I were in his position, if we were a black South African leader or otherwise, and I've found you to be a very principled man and a combative man, I don't doubt whether you would be on the ramparts, I suggest. I know I would be and I think you would be.

So I think he has been pretty restrained, No. 1.

No. 2, with regard to terrorism and necklacing—

Secretary SHULTZ. I'd have to disagree with you, Senator. I think to say that President Reagan's statement yesterday was nauseating is not anything that I could agree with under any circumstances.

Senator BIDEN. I am referring to not whether you agree with it or not but to the frustration that he must feel. I'm surprised he hasn't said more.

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course he feels frustration. We all feel frustration.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, but his people are dying.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's what's coming through here.

Senator BIDEN. His people are dying. You feel frustration, but they're dying. They're being shot.

Children—we're talking about necklaces—they're lining up and shooting children.

Secretary SHULTZ. It's a terrible situation, and what we need to be thinking about is—

Senator BIDEN. Is what to do about that.

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. What to do about it.

Senator BIDEN. What disturbs me—and I will try not to be disturbed—is not merely—

Secretary SHULTZ. You'll remember that I'm a taxpayer.

Senator BIDEN. I remember you're a taxpayer.

Secretary SHULTZ. Just because I'm Secretary of State, you can't kick me around. I'm a taxpayer. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. I understand that.

But I want to tell you something.

What disturbs me more than the policy—if you call it a policy—is the rationale for the policy. The rationale for the policy—you set out four principles that you adhere to, and I will go over them in a moment. Then you say, on page 14, "We must not become part of South Africa's problems; we must remain part of their solution. We must not aim to impose ourselves, our solutions or our favorites in South Africa."

Dammit, we have favorites in South Africa. The favorites in South Africa are the people who are being repressed by that ugly, white regime. We have favorites.

Our loyalty is not to South Africa, it is to South Africans. And the South Africans are majority black, and they are being excoriated.

It is not to some stupid puppet government over there. It is not to the Afrikaner regime. We have no loyalty to them. We have no loyalty to South Africa—to South Africans.

And the fact of the matter is we—I mean, I listen to this rationale. First of all, “it is the leaders of South Africa and their people, black and white, who have the majority responsibility”—“they must rise to it.”

Well, they are rising to it. They are rising to it with the only thing left available to them in that repulsive, repugnant regime of Afrikaners there. It is the only way they have. They’ve tried everything for the last 20 years. They begged, they borrowed, they crawled, and now they’re taking up arms.

The second thing, “progress toward peace requires a timetable,” a timetable in relation to what? What’s our timetable? What are we saying to that repugnant regime? Are we saying you’ve got 20 days, 20 months, 20 years? We ask them to put up a timetable. Well, what’s our timetable?

Where do we stand morally?

Third, “the choices before black South Africans are equally clear. We call on them: to avoid the easy descent into violence, terrorism and extremism; to demonstrate by their actions that they understand the need for compromise.” Hell, they’ve tried to compromise for 20 years. They’ve tried everything—everything in their power.

And look what’s happened to them, they’re being crushed.

And then you say the fourth principle is that “our policies and those of our allies should ensure that expanded political liberties in a postapartheid South Africa * * *”

Mr. Secretary, maybe it is because I come from the civil rights movement in this country. We sat there and we heard the same kind of argument, the same exact arguments: we cannot impose from the North a solution on the South; they must work out their problems, black and white together; we cannot, as a nation, expose them to the economic ravages that will come; we must consider what will happen after segregation before we eliminate segregation.

My Lord.

And, finally—

Secretary SHULTZ. That is not an accurate parallel because we don’t say we have to consider what happens—

Senator BIDEN. Let me read your—

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing.] After apartheid before we end it. We have said again and again and again that it’s an abhorrent system.

I can be just as emotional as you can about that.

Senator BIDEN. You say four principles. I assume that—

Secretary SHULTZ. And it needs to end.

Senator BIDEN. You say four principles. I assume they are equally important.

You say, “Fourth, our policies and those of our allies should insure that expanded political liberties in a post-apartheid South

Africa are accompanied by an expansion of economic opportunities * * *

My God, worry about that when it comes. These people are being crushed, and we're sitting here with the same kind of rhetoric, the same thing we heard.

We heard "go slow." We heard "we have to take care of the problem afterwards." You heard, "We can't impose——"

Secretary SHULTZ. You are totally misconstruing the testimony that I gave.

Senator BIDEN. Let me read further.

Secretary SHULTZ. Furthermore, Senator, let me say that I hate to hear a Senator of the United States calling for violence.

Senator BIDEN. I'm not calling for violence.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's what you're doing.

Senator BIDEN. I hate to hear——

Secretary SHULTZ. That is exactly what you're doing.

Senator BIDEN. I hate to hear an administration and a Secretary of State refusing to act on a morally abhorrent point. I hate to hear this country, I am ashamed that this country puts out a policy like this that says nothing—nothing. It says continue the same. We put no timetable on. We make no specific demands. We don't set it down.

I'm ashamed that's our policy. That's what I'm ashamed of. I'm ashamed of the lack of moral backbone to this policy.

You may be ashamed. We'll I'm ashamed, too.

Secretary SHULTZ. I resent that. I resent that deeply because there is tremendous moral backbone in that policy on a bipartisan basis and has been for many, many years.

Senator BIDEN. There is no bipartisan basis for this.

Secretary SHULTZ. I doubt very much if there is any real disagreement with the objectives set out there, with the steps that have to be taken if there is going to be the kind of change you want. There is no other way but to get those things to happen.

Now the question is what can we do that will get those things to happen.

I think that I outlined the course that is there, and also have tried to point up——

Senator BIDEN. The only way you can avert violence is to act.

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. To you and to the South African Government the terrible situation they are creating for themselves.

Senator BIDEN. Obviously the action has caused violence, or at least has not stopped the violence. There is violence, overwhelming violence, in South Africa today.

If you want to avoid more, the former Prime Minister of Australia is correct: let the South African blacks know that we stand with them foursquare.

Secretary SHULTZ. We do. We have let them know.

Senator BIDEN. They don't believe it, and neither do I.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you can believe it or not. I might say I read my testimony a different way than you did. I'm surprised that it could be——

Senator BIDEN. I quoted exactly what you said.

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. Read with those inflections.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Mathias.

Secretary SHULTZ. Could I make a comment, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may.

Senator MATHIAS. Not on my time.

The CHAIRMAN. No, on the Chair's time.

Senator BIDEN. Not without my being able to respond if it's going to be about me.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, in fairness, that we allowed a little more time to go on, and the Secretary ought to have an opportunity to respond, and then we'll move on to Senator Mathias.

Secretary SHULTZ. I said in my statement and you picked it up and criticized it that we shouldn't, so to speak, have favorites.

What I meant by that was that we shouldn't be trying to pick out who should be the Government of South Africa, what are the right blacks to be the ones to meet with. We'll meet with all-comers, and there are lots of them. It's a complicated situation. We shouldn't be trying to designate who the leaders are. We have to take them as they come.

Now, I'd like to disagree on another point.

Obviously, the blacks are repressed and change needs to be made, urgently. I agree with you completely on that.

But I don't turn my back on the whites. They are also people, and they have their problems. And we need to work with them, and South Africa needs them.

It isn't a question of just saying let's throw all the whites out and be for the blacks. What we want is a society that they can all live in together.

So I don't turn my back on the whites and I would hope you wouldn't.

Senator BIDEN. Let's be for the oppressed, whatever they happen to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, if I can dig my way out of the lava. [Laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, I was very glad to hear your testimony with respect to future relations with the African National Congress. I was glad to hear you say that you would meet with Oliver Tambo. I think that that's important. I think it is a very essential step. I think we need to be in communication with all parties.

I was a little curious as to some of the language in the President's statement yesterday, which was not quite as forthcoming with respect to the African National Congress as you have been today.

What did he mean when he said that all African black political movements should be unbanned? Are you elaborating?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, they have been banned. So they should be unbanned.

Senator MATHIAS. And therefore it's possible for us to communicate with them.

Secretary SHULTZ. Therefore they can be legitimately there.

Senator MATHIAS. In other words, they should be legalized?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes—well, the word unbanned I think is common because it is by way of saying that you undo a ban that was there.

Senator MATHIAS. Incidentally, I was glad that in his statement yesterday he was unequivocal about calling for the release of Mandela—

Secretary SHULTZ. Absolutely. He said that.

Senator MATHIAS [continuing]. Political prisoners. I think those are both so important points.

Secretary SHULTZ. As people have pointed out, it's nothing new. It's a crime if you give a speech and you say something that you've said before, but I think it needs emphasis.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I would encourage you to go forward promptly with your meeting with Tambo and with other leaders of the African National Congress.

Now, in your prepared statement—

Secretary SHULTZ. Let's not misunderstand me.

I don't have a date set for some meeting. The question was would I be willing to have a meeting, and I said yes, I would.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I'm glad to hear that and I'm urging you to set a date.

Secretary SHULTZ. All right.

Senator MATHIAS. In your prepared statement, you talked about subjects which were being discussed within the Commonwealth nations and the European Community, and you ticked off some specific subjects: "commodity import bans, further export/import and investment restrictions, curtailing air travel and visa facilities and various other political sanctions." And although you didn't say we were considering those, you said they were considering it, I gather that you were not totally hostile to the idea.

In your prepared statement, you said, "We need the authority to act." Is there any relationship between that enumeration of possible actions and the need for authority?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, as has been pointed out, the President's Executive order expires on September 9. So he will have to decide at some time before that whether to allow it to lapse, to continue it, or to change it in some respects.

Our view of the so-called sanctions issue has been made clear. At the same time, we see an evolving situation. We'd like to see it turn for the better, and strenuous efforts are being made in that regard. There are lots of people who are meeting and considering and going to South Africa and so on.

As I said, state President P.W. Botha has an important statement that he will be making. I have no basis for believing that anything in particular will be in it. But, at any rate, he'll make that statement. So it is an opportunity for him to say.

So, we'll have to see these developments, we'll consult with our allies, and I'm sure the President will be gathering information before he makes that decision on the Executive order.

Senator MATHIAS. So, then, none of these particular steps are being considered, as you said in your statement, in other fora are excluded in our own situation at this time?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it's an open situation.

On the other hand, I think I tried to paint a full picture of my own attitude, which is the same as the President's. But we listen to what our allies have to say.

As I said, I think we all recognize that a coordinated effort probably has a greater impact than a hit/miss kind of effort.

Senator MATHIAS. I would agree with that absolutely.

I would probably agree with you philosophically on the general subject of sanctions, that they are not usually very successful or effective.

But, if we are faced with a mounting death toll and rising numbers of deaths are resulting from civil disorders and sanctions seem to be the only option, then I think we have to move in the direction of sanctions as the lesser of two evils. And we have some experience. In Zimbabwe, for example, it finally got up to the point that there were, what, 45,000 or 50,000 casualties before a solution was reached.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think, insofar as sanctions are concerned, the lesson there was that they didn't work much and there they were coordinated and very widespread. And it did not have much impact.

Most people who know the situation closely—I don't claim to know it closely—in the South African economy believe that, if it really came to it, they could crawl into their shell and probably get along for quite a while.

But it's a miserable existence, and I've tried to paint a picture of what's going on now—and also, to point up to you that these developments, coming from the marketplace, are I think in many respects a deeper message and a more severe sanction, if you will.

What would it be made out of if we passed something that said no new investment? There isn't any new investment.

That would put people in South Africa into a frame of mind of saying well, gee, I guess there would be new investment except that the United States has imposed this sanction. But that would not be true, and, thereby, you would dilute the message of the marketplace.

I don't think you should dilute it.

Senator MATHIAS. There are other sanctions, of course.

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't say there aren't other things. But, of course, we buy some things from South Africa that we would be hard pressed to get along without.

Senator MATHIAS. There are some things that would deliver a very direct message, such as air travel limitations.

Secretary SHULTZ. Air travel would probably deliver a message.

Senator MATHIAS. I would conclude only with the observation that the lesson of Zimbabwe may have been—

Secretary SHULTZ. Sir?

Senator MATHIAS. I might conclude by saying that the lesson of Zimbabwe may have been that sanctions alone did not achieve a solution, but that it took sanctions plus other things before a solution was finally achieved.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias.

The Chair recognizes, with pleasure, the presence again of Senator Kennedy, who is with us today for the second day, with our committee.

We are delighted to have you here, Ted.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, very briefly, in response to Senator Pell, you noted that you had talked with Mr. Casey about the allegations this morning in "The New York Times," and I gather from the response that you didn't have the opportunity to talk to other people within the intelligence community in this country to confirm whether or not, in fact, that the statement of Mr. Casey would apply to all intelligence agencies of government.

Is that correct, or do you have information that would apply?

Secretary SHULTZ. I talked to him. I didn't spend my morning scurrying around about that story. He called me, and I would call to your attention that he is the DCI, not just the head of the CIA. So he has responsibilities for the whole intelligence community.

But you'll have to ask him. I just quoted him.

Senator DODD. Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Secretary, that majority rule, black majority rule, is going to come to South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't have any doubt at all that sooner or later a system will have to emerge whereby the people of the country, all of them, have a chance to participate in a different system. The questions are when will that come and how will that come.

I think the sooner it comes, the better, and I think if it comes as a result of negotiation, rather than through violent upheaval, it's much more likely to be the kind of system that we all will feel good about and will offer genuine freedom. So that's what we want to work for in my opinion.

Senator DODD. In light of the statements of Bishop Tutu yesterday, who you would hardly call one of the radical elements in South Africa, and certainly the statements of those, as you point out in your testimony, from the African National Congress which is growing, and will play obviously a pivotal role, regardless of how that situation emerges, whether it is through dialog, through political compromise, or through the regrettable path they seem to be following today, what do you think would be the likelihood of the protection of the long-term interests of the United States?

Apparently, they are not going to be moved by the moral questions, the question of value and principle here. But you seem to dwell tremendously here, as the President did yesterday, in talking about the economic situation.

Secretary SHULTZ. No, sir, let me correct that.

Senator DODD. What will be the long-term situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the fundamental thing here is the moral dimension. Our economic stake in the sense of direct investment is miniscule.

Senator DODD. Well, you seem to dwell on that a bit.

Secretary SHULTZ. I dwelled on that because of all of the reactions about sanctions, sanctions, sanctions. So I tried to spell out for you in some detail what is happening to that economy and the very deep sense in which it is sanctioning itself or that it is conducting itself in such a way that the market is leaving it.

Senator DODD. My point to you is this.

The long-term interest of the United States, it seems to me, given the reaction to the President's statement, would suggest that we are coming out on the wrong side of history on this issue, and that we are apt to be paying a far more dear price if you will only be concerned about those particular questions—and I'm not suggesting that you are. But if you are only concerned about that, wouldn't it appear at this juncture that we are casting our lot with the wrong side of history, given the reaction?

Secretary SHULTZ. If that were the case, it would. But it is not the case.

It is the case continuously that our government, your government, of which you are a part and I am a part, is unified in its attitude about apartheid and unified in its attitude about what ought to happen.

We are having arguments about what I think are basically tactical issues. But what we are trying to see happen is not disagreed about.

Senator DODD. Let me ask you about the tactical question.

You have had a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives on a bill calling for sanctions. You have heard in the last 24 hours a reaction from the Senate which would clearly indicate a bipartisan opposition, if you will, to a stronger statement from the President. You have had the reaction from Bishop Tutu in South Africa, among others.

It would appear at this point that, with the exception of Mrs. Thatcher and a handful of others, the administration finds itself in an isolated position on this question.

Is there any possibility that the administration might reevaluate its position, as expressed by the President yesterday and by you today, in light of the significant disagreement over tactics, if you want to call them that, and come around to the possibility that we have a united, strongly bipartisan, effort that would impose some sanctions and contribute to what you have properly addressed as the powerful message of economics?

We are talking about economic sanctions here—a powerful message in some form of sanctions which might even further encourage the South African Government to change its policies with regard to apartheid as we all have agreed is the fundamental issue in this whole debate.

Is there any chance the President will reevaluate that policy?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are continually examining matters, but we have a thought-through point of view, and I have tried not only to express it to you, but to explain it to you.

You mentioned various things to consider. There is the House vote.

I might take note of something. You said it passed unanimously.

Senator DODD. By voice vote.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would say it passed by a voice vote, which I would interpret to mean that they didn't care to get recorded one by one on it.

Senator DODD. Some did not.

Secretary SHULTZ. It's such an extreme measure that it can only be described as washing your hands and leaving. That's the only way to describe it.

It is not a desirable policy for the United States.

I think it would be completely wrong. The President feels that way.

I don't know. Do you think that that's the way to go? I would be surprised if you want to walk away from South Africa. Because of the moral side, there is also a strategic interest. Let's not forget about that.

Senator DODD. No one's denying that, Mr. Secretary. No one's denying that at all.

You have heard not one voice up here that would suggest there is not a strategic interest. But it seems to me, in this particular instance, the walking away that is being done is being done by the administration.

You have heard now from people with whom you do not have fundamental philosophical agreement on the majority of issues that come up here. And they are saying with a voice to the administration that we have to do more on this situation.

In your statement, you equate the fears of a white minority who may lose some property with the fears of blacks that would like to be able to enjoy full participation in that government.

That's a terrible message to be giving.

Secretary SHULTZ. Don't put words and values into my mouth because they don't belong.

I'll stand by my statement. But don't try to impute things to me that are not there.

Senator DODD. Well, I'm not imputing. You said it in your statement. It's right there, on page 12 of your statement. I would just ask you to turn to it, to that first paragraph. You say, "Fear on the part of whites that their property and their values, which they cherish, will be destroyed" —

Secretary SHULTZ. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Fear on the part of blacks.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; there is a fear. There is a fear.

Senator DODD. Is there any legitimacy? Is the legitimacy of both those fears equal?

Secretary SHULTZ. I didn't say they were equal. I said they were present, and what we see in South Africa now is a situation dominated by these fears.

And I think that is a true description.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm sorry to intrude.

Senator DODD. I realize that.

Sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator KASSEBAUM.

Senator KASSEBAUM. First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, as chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I have valued and will continue to value the expertise of Assistant Secretary, Mr. Crocker, and I think Mr. McPherson, as Administrator of AID, has tried very hard to get as much money as possible for Africa.

I note that you addressed this problem of aid. I also wish Africa could receive a larger share of the pie, which seems to go everywhere else before it gets to Africa. I can appreciate your frustrations.

In my opening statement, I commented that the President's speech yesterday offered no renewed vigor. To me, that was a key element. You have addressed some things here and readdressed some of the comments the President made that I think are important.

It was President Reagan who called for the unbanning of all black political parties, and that includes the ANC.

I think if this message is to be strongly conveyed, however, the President must continue to follow through, and speak in a very clear fashion, so there can be no misunderstanding.

Of course, there are the terrorist aspects. There is great tragedy all around.

But the key, it seems to me, was when you said, "I believe what you say counts."

I feel strongly that what President Reagan says will count and weigh heavily in South Africa. Otherwise, the South African Government is going to say oh, well, that's the State Department, it isn't President Reagan.

I think this is why what he says carries such weight. Unless it's said with vigor, unless it's said with an understanding of the full implications, then we have a hard time here trying to lend support to what in many ways has much merit as a total policy, as you outlined it.

I would just like to comment on a couple of things that you addressed. One was support for transportation, the Beira Corridor project.

I have always believed that unless there was a strong transportation system in sub-Sahara Africa, it would never progress. I think this is a very vital alternative to all transportation having to go through South Africa.

So, I hope the President will continue to keep that at the top of his agenda.

I would add that that is a private sector initiative as well as receiving Government funding. It has the strong support of Prime Minister Thatcher, and Great Britain is putting funding into the project.

I think that one of the disappointments is that essentially we have been delivering the same message for 6 years. And you yourself say that we are prepared to take action to change the mix of pressures in coordination with our allies.

I wish the President had said that yesterday. I wish he had given greater focus to the willingness to up the ante and change the mix of pressures.

That's why I guess I am not castigating you, Mr. Secretary, or particularly asking a question. I could ask after a couple of months, if we take no action, what do you see happening. But, then, who can ever read a crystal ball?

I think it is important for us to continue to speak vigorously, for the President to flesh out what he intended to say, because I think that followthrough will be crucial.

Thank you.

Secretary SHULTZ. If I could just make one comment, the President and I discussed this issue at length over many meetings, both

in private meetings and in larger groups. I think I have a good idea of what he thinks.

Then we discussed and he decided upon a way of presentation of his thoughts. And this was to have him make a speech and then follow that on directly with testimony, in which there would be a greater opportunity for detailed exposition.

But I'm not putting forward to you my views, although I agree with the President, so they are my views. I am putting forward the President's views.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I know that you are, Mr. Secretary.

I just hope he will continue to follow through, and say them again himself. There will be, I am sure, many occasions on which he can emphasize the importance of some of these initiatives, if they can be called initiatives, and if they are to be, I think he has to clearly follow through with them and continue to enunciate them himself in a much stronger fashion than he undertook yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Mr. Secretary, Senator Biden has asked me to indicate that he will not be able to continue with this meeting. He must go to the floor to manage the Manion nomination. But he wanted to leave his respects with you. The exchange was a heated one, but he felt one in good humor and good spirit.

Senator DODD. There should not be such a look of disappointment on the Secretary's face over that comment. [Laughter.]

Secretary SHULTZ. Oh, no; this is my day to be here. I'll be here all day, if you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Eagleton.

Senator EAGLETON. Mr. Secretary, the administration has been in power for 5½ years and has 2½ years remaining.

What do you foresee to be the political picture in South Africa 2½ years from now if your policies stay as they are?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not claim powers of prediction, but I think we have to have policies that maximize what impact we can have for the goals that I think we all share.

It seems to me at this point, at this moment, the ideas that I put forward are the ones that we advocate, and we think that maximizes the chances.

I hope that by 2½ years from now there would be an end to the apartheid laws—there are three basic ones that need to be repealed—and a negotiation well underway or completed for a different of constitutional system.

But I can't tell you that I predict that will happen. I couldn't do that.

Senator EAGLETON. Part of a foreign policy is to foresee future events, to anticipate them, to avoid pitfalls and to enhance opportunities, et cetera. That is part of foreign policy.

But do you foresee in 2½ weeks, 2½ months, 2½ years, a system where, to use your words, all can participate regardless of race?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, that's our object, and I hope that comes to pass.

I believe that if it doesn't come to pass—

Senator EAGLETON. Well, just when?

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. What we will see is a continuing violent, smoldering, repressive, declining situation where people will be killed, maimed, deprived, white and black, and in the whole region, and it is very undesirable. We don't want to have that happen.

To a degree, I think by pointing out what is now the case and what is likely to happen if change isn't made is your most powerful argument to the Government of South Africa in particular that they just have to follow this path.

Senator EAGLETON. Does "all can participate regardless of race" equate to one-man-one-vote?

Secretary SHULTZ. Just exactly what sort of system would be developed by people if they got at it, I would not want to prescribe, and I don't think we should try to prescribe. We want something that everyone participates in.

That phrase is sort of one in general that we all subscribe to. But I would call to your attention that we don't have that in this country.

My vote for Senator counts for a lot less than yours does because my state has a lot more population. So, I am heavily diluted, compared with you.

So, we have that part of a Federal system; whereas with the House of Representatives, we tried to design it more in line with what you might say is one-man-one-vote. We produced something that has some sort of balance in it.

Senator EAGLETON. Would we urge them, then, strongly to have a bicameral legislature similar to ours, one-man-one-vote in the House of Representatives and apportionment by states or regions in their Senate? But I wouldn't quibble about the exact form.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would not try to prescribe.

I have talked, and I'm sure you have, to a number of blacks as well as whites from South Africa, and I find that they are quite smart, and they have thought about these things. There are lots of different ways you can go about it that will work.

But the one that will really work is the one that they design, not that we design. Anybody can sit down and write something out.

Senator EAGLETON. In your prepared statement, you say with some sense of almost pride or praise that the South African economy "is in a downward spiral." From the standpoint of sanctions, then, they are doing it to themselves.

Yet in another part of your statement—

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't have any part of pride or satisfaction in that. It's an observation.

Senator EAGLETON. Wait a minute. I'm still posing my question. I'm posing my question by lifting quotes from your statement—accurate quotes. I wrote them down.

And you want us not to take any action because that is occurring, by your own judgment. Yet, you want American businesses to remain in South Africa and even to enhance their rolls economically in South Africa.

How, on the one hand, are you comforted by the demise of the South African regime with its downward economic spiral—they are doing it to themselves, or, to put it in another way, they are shooting themselves in the foot—and yet you say to American compa-

nies remain and, indeed, enhance your participation in South Africa?

Do you want to thwart the downward economic spiral?

Secretary SHULTZ. First of all, I didn't use the words "I'm delighted that" or "I'm comfortable with the fact that." I described what was happening.

Senator EAGLETON. It was at least with tacit approval.

Secretary SHULTZ. I described what's happening. I describe it as the sanctions of the marketplace, and they are very powerful.

Now, insofar as our firms are concerned, American firms, and I think Western firms generally, but we will just focus on U.S. companies, I think we can be very proud of the way they have performed, in their internal employment practices, in their training efforts, in their education efforts, in their outreach in the community. I think they have done a darn good job and have been good representatives, so to speak, of the United States. They get criticized all the time.

So, I just want to put in a plug for what I think is so.

Senator EAGLETON. My time is up.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I will yield my time to Senator Murkowski, who has another engagement. I think that my questions would be somewhat repetitive, in any case.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz.

Secretary SHULTZ. I hate to see Senator Boschwitz sitting on that side of you. What's going on here, anyway? [Laughter.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That's my good ear, Mr. Secretary, that's all. [Laughter.]

Senator MURKOWSKI. It strikes me that this particular hearing is being conducted somewhat like an annual shareholders' meeting. I think the fact that you have seen fit to address the administration's position on South Africa reflects on my colleagues' and all our shared frustration as to what we should be doing on a responsible, bipartisan basis. I am somewhat distressed as I reflect on our responsibility, too, which I think is more than just general criticism, but specific identification of what alternatives we have before us.

We have heard about trade, disinvestment, and transportation sanctions but we have not reflected on the individual merits of which of these are the most appropriate further sanctions to be taken.

At least you, sir, have given us your plate, if you will, of proposals, and we are still expressing our frustration. But I think we also have a responsibility to come up with some specific alternatives. I do not pretend to have any, but at least I want to remind my colleagues that this is also a responsibility. We are simply stating that we don't think it's enough. But the question is "What is enough?"

The position of the administration, as I understand it, specifically suggests that the administration have the flexibility of continuing to propose economic sanctions as needed. The question we have

before us is whether that is enough or whether do we have a responsibility legislatively to initiate sanctions.

My concern, Mr. Secretary, is our inability to direct political sanctions. Short cutting any other avenue is not open to us. So, we go in and initiate economic sanctions and, hopefully, we get political reaction or political reform.

I am concerned, specifically, on how effective we are going to be with our allies as we obviously pursue more significant, more extreme economic sanctions so that our presence is simply not replaced by another friend—the Japanese, the Koreans—or by someone else.

It may make us feel much better to initiate these economic sanctions, but the reality of accomplishment is somewhat limited to our collective ability to impose sanctions with our allies. And if we were to initiate disinvestment or a transportation curtailment, what, in your opinion, on the basis of your conversations with our allies, can we expect them to do?

Secretary SHULTZ. In my testimony, I outlined the types of things that they seem to be talking about, judging from what they have stated publicly and in my own private conversations with them.

Incidentally, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany will be here later this afternoon, and I am going to spend time with him then and this evening. He represents another of the countries with a major interest.

So, we talk with them, and I think we all agree that coordinated action is going to be more effective than individual action. No sovereign country gives everybody else a blank check. We have to think for ourselves in the end.

But we are going to be more effective if we work together.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, my question is can we work together?

Secretary SHULTZ. Everybody here is riveted on certain possible so-called sanctions, and I have this feeling that here is this gigantic problem where really deep and fundamental decisions have to be made, primarily by other people, and we want to have a positive influence on them, and I think we have to be careful that we don't lead ourselves into thinking that by doing some thing that in and of itself is describable and has some impact, that we think we are going to move this gigantic problem. Or aren't we going to be more likely to move it by our more broad approach.

That is the wicket that we are on right now.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Secretary, we saw in the Libyan situation an effort where we went to our allies and tried collectively to urge them to cut off trade and commerce with Libya. They chose not to do it.

Secretary SHULTZ. That's correct.

Senator MURKOWSKI. What makes us think that in this particular case we are going to see them respond to our concern and our expansion of sanctions, which you have indicated in the general discussion here to be the only alternative we have?

Secretary SHULTZ. I don't think it's the only alternative we have by a long shot. And neither do other governments, does the European Community.

Sir Geoffrey Howe now is in Pretoria, on a mission, and his mission is commissioned by the European Community. Of course, he is

the United Kingdom Foreign Minister, but he is there in his role as a representative of the European Community.

So, they are trying to work with the parties to see if the types of things we are talking about cannot be brought to pass.

The CHAIRMAN. This will have to be the last question because of time.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Ultimately, sanctions appear to be the only significant "telegraph" means of communications available to us, and the question we're debating here is how strong should the sanctions be.

I still cannot seem to get a response as to whether or not you think that if we initiate sanctions, subject to your flexibility and the administration's or subject to this committee's legislative sanctions, our allies will join us or not.

Can you give us any indication of whether you think they will stand fast with us, or is it something you just don't know?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our experience over a period of years is that when we go about something through a process of consultation and with care and it is seen by everybody to be important, that in the end we are pretty coherent.

NATO is always talked about as though it is going to fall apart. But over a long period of time, it has been a very staunch alliance. Partly that is because of the close consultation. And it has been bipartisan.

I call your attention to the fact that the dual track decision that was implemented took place in 1979 and it was carried out.

In the case of Libya, as you pointed out, we took our actions as far as the economic things were concerned. Others did not follow us.

On the other hand, we kept after it, and Libya's conduct became more and more clear and more and more countries have moved, so that by this time, Libya is pretty well isolated politically and diplomatically. There have been a lot of expulsions of Libyans from European countries.

At the Tokyo Summit, we came together and made a strong statement on terrorism and named Libya.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We took strong action in Libya, too.

Secretary SHULTZ. My point is that this process goes on and we came together on it.

Now, in the case of South Africa and southern Africa, there is a great deal of sense of the importance of this region for the morality of the West, for our ideals, and also for our strategic interests. Let's not forget that.

So, it has people's attention. And particularly the attention of the main countries involved are ourselves, the British, the Germans, the Japanese, the French; the Swiss buy most of the gold, or half the gold; the Canadians, to a lesser extent. So, it is the same group of countries. And we talk to them a lot.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I wish you well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to Senator Kerry, who has been here for quite some time. I will take my turn on the next round.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Mr. Secretary, throughout your testimony, you have said that you want the leverage and the flexibility to take further actions, if necessary, and repeatedly the administration talks about leverage, wanting to maintain it, with the possibility that you might take some action.

In your proposed statement, you say: "Presidential discretion is necessary to introduce new measures if we conclude that they are necessary."

What new measures are you talking about? What are you contemplating?

What is the leverage that you talked about that is contemplated? To do what?

Secretary SHULTZ. I believe, as I was just saying, that the principal leverage is the leverage of persuasion and of what is inherent in a situation that calls for change.

Now, as far as things that can be done, we can all draw up the same list, and you can do it as easily as I can.

Senator KERRY. Do you think there is any benefit stating to the Government of South Africa, somewhat along the lines Senator Biden was saying, that these are the actions we will take if you don't do X, Y, and Z?

Isn't there a benefit to that?

Secretary SHULTZ. On the whole, I think when you threaten governments, you tend to push them in the other direction. They do not respond very well that way.

I hope we can be more persuasive—and this is what we're trying to do—by saying to them look at what you are doing to yourself and look at the calamity that is befalling not only you but all the people in the region. And we grieve for you and we think you should change and here is the way to change, and we will support you if you do.

Senator KERRY. Then, again, I come back to my question: What new measures might you contemplate? You say it, that we need to take new measures if we conclude they are necessary.

What are those measures?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we'd consult with our allies. I listed some of the things that they are thinking about and you have listed some. We will just have to see if we think they will do any good on a coordinated basis.

But I say that against the background of the kind of skepticism that I have expressed about it.

Senator KERRY. You again used the words "coordinated basis," and you emphasized in your testimony that sanctions should be coordinated.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think they are going to be more effective if they are.

Senator KERRY. Are sanctions against Nicaragua coordinated?

Secretary SHULTZ. No; they have not joined us.

Senator KERRY. Were they against Libya?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator KERRY. Were they against the Soviet Union and the pipeline? Were they coordinated?

Secretary SHULTZ. We worked at all of those things and we tried. I think, looking back, our decisions look pretty good. But, at any rate, we were not able to get support.

In the case of the pipeline dispute, we achieved quite a lot there in my opinion. We negotiated with our allies as it was brought to an end—this is one of the first things I was involved in—a much stronger COCOM regime, and also an agreement—I refresh your memory—that you all were insisting upon, that we should be willing to have normal trade with the Soviet Union but we should not subsidize it.

We worked hard to get others to agree to that.

Senator KERRY. But most of the world, Mr. Secretary, and certainly blacks in South Africa see those same distinctions. They look at the noncoordinated, unilateral actions which we were willing to take with respect to other governments. And, given the nature of the confrontation in South Africa, they understand, just as we all do here, that Western European countries, Japan and others, would be ready and willing to take sanctions and would be forced to do so, probably, if we took the lead and did so.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it didn't work that way in the other situations, and they were closer to the violence being perpetrated by the Libyans than we were.

I think they are coming around and we have seen a lot of progress. But, in the end, we had to act alone there.

Senator KERRY. Do you not think this is a different situation, with different exigencies, different compelling factors?

Secretary SHULTZ. Every situation is different, and this one certainly is.

We do not want to separate ourselves from the people of the Government of South Africa. We want to influence them to change their way of governing. That is what we want to do.

Senator KERRY. Well, if that's true, over the last 5½—

Secretary SHULTZ. But in Nicaragua, we wanted to cut off our economic connection. And I might say that many in Congress told us that that is a precondition to getting my vote on voting for assistance to the Contras.

So, we took your advice.

Senator KERRY. Not mine, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. It wasn't your advice, but we got it from a lot of people in your Senate.

Senator KERRY. I wish it was my Senate. [Laughter.]

We hope it will be soon. [Laughter.]

We're working on that, too, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, in the Senate. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. You have time for just one more question.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think, Mr. Secretary, rather than ask a question, I would simply make the point here and perhaps would implore you, if it is possible, to perhaps reevaluate, as Senator Dodd has suggested, that there is enough that is different about this situation, and enough that is compelling about it, and that there is enough that is

clear over the last 5½ years during which I think essentially the same message that you are sending today has been sent.

I, for one, reading the Eminent Persons Group report and listening to others in their report fail to see what it is in the last 5½ years that has convinced the Government of South Africa that they do not really still have an ally in the White House.

The cut-and-run statement of Senator Laxalt to President Marcos in the Philippines has not yet been made. And, absent that kind of cut-and-run statement, I fear that they will continue to take succor, if you will, from statements such as they evidence they have done from yesterday's.

As long as that is true, the reasons they have not set a timetable, the reasons that they change laws but do not change them, will simply continue.

I, obviously, know that there are some pitfalls in taking sanctions, but I think the alternatives are far worse.

You and Senator Biden had an exchange about violence. I do not accuse the administration of this and I am not trying to do so backhandedly. But I think we are party to violence today unless we offer greater opportunity for change and make more clear the need for it.

I hope you will reconsider and will think about that.

And I thank you for listening.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you very much for your testimony here. I will say that I had a great learning experience in a trip that I made to South Africa within the last year, and it changed a lot of my views.

In my time there—and I will put this to you in the form of a question—I became convinced that the strongest engine for change against apartheid was the business community, be it black, colored, Asian, Indian, white, Afrikaner, or foreign, as you pointed out—our companies.

Indeed, I think that the engine for change there, the business community, the businessmen seem more interested in getting rid of apartheid and working on that in an effective way than almost any other single group, and more effectively than the universities, the churches, or anyone else.

My trouble with sanctions—and I tend to agree with the President's speech—is they would destroy the one positive force in the country even if done on a unified basis.

You seem to suggest that if we could do it on a unified basis, we probably could do it. But I really wonder if we would want to do that because I am convinced that frequently sanctions have the exact opposite impact from what we want them to have.

For example, we are debating most-favored-nation status for Romania. I am afraid that if we do not extend it, the Romanians would be forced more into the Russians' hands and there will be even fewer religious rights than there are now. Almost everywhere, sanctions have almost the opposite impact.

If sanctions were conducted on a unified basis in South Africa, wouldn't that virtually destroy the business community, foreign and domestic?

Secretary SHULTZ. I welcome your comment because it allows me to clarify if there was a misunderstanding.

I am not saying that if we can get our allies to go along with us on a lot of extended sanctions, then we'll be for them. That is not the message.

We described our position, the President has and I have, about the various things that are being currently proposed. But we also believe that, as a general proposition, we are going to be most effective if we are coordinated with our allies, not only on any possible further measures of one kind or another that could be taken, but, I would hope, more importantly, in ways that we can encourage change in a positive way.

This is why we have been so supportive of Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission. That is why we were so supportive of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group, and it was a great disappointment to everybody, I think, that they seem to have made considerable progress, and I think particularly are quite convincing in their statements that if the South African Government were to make a strong and positive move, there would be a response from the blacks and the blacks would talk to them, and there is still there a real potential for a constructive relationship.

So, all of these things are going on and we want to be part of that process. We think it is better if we work together, rather than say here goes the United States, all by itself, doing something or other.

Senator PRESSLER. Also, it is my judgment that the Botha government would not cut-and-run, to speak, but would move further to the right, rather than to the left. That is my judgment.

Would it be yours?

Secretary SHULTZ. That's what is going on. As the polarization increases, it is being accompanied by all of the things we have all described to each other—the violence, the economic decline—and it is a very dismal scene.

So, what we would like to see happen is not to retreat into the lager, as the saying goes, but to come out, into the open fresh air, and do the kinds of things that are suggested by the President, which are not unique to him but which are basically the things that need to be done.

Let's do them.

Senator PRESSLER. In your judgment of the various institutions that are working to change apartheid within South Africa, where would you rate the business community?

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with you. I think that the business community, our business community, other foreign investors, much of the South African business community itself, have basically concluded on moral grounds and also just on the grounds of what it takes to do business successfully that the environment that is there and in prospect is just not going to be conducive to that.

So, they want it changed, and they have done a whole variety of things to make that plain.

Senator PRESSLER. In the countries surrounding South Africa—and I must say that the only one I went to was Zimbabwe—maybe I talked to the wrong people, but the people I talked with seemed to feel, to informally hope that sanctions would not be imposed because they would cause so much chaos, economic chaos, just in terms of the delivery of medical supplies, the movement of food, trade, and so forth; although the official policy of the Government of Zimbabwe is to support sanctions, their ministers and people in positions of authority there seemed, informally at least, to indicate the opposite.

Have you gotten the same feedback informally from countries surrounding South Africa or have they stuck to the official line of sanctions?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think people are torn, and there is what you say, public statements and private statements.

They want to see an end to apartheid for good and sufficient moral reasons, but also because it is tearing up their region. And if there is some club that somebody can use that will bring that about, I suppose they are for that. But I think it is questionable whether that is the right thing to bring about change. That is what we are arguing about here.

Furthermore, from the standpoint of those countries, they do not impose sanctions themselves. Why not? Well, as I was saying earlier, all you have to do is to look at the way goods move around in southern Africa, and you know that if they did, they would not be able to get along.

A million people from other countries work in South Africa. There are 200 million dollars' worth of remittances per year. That lends support to some 10 million people in these other countries, in addition to all of the direct links.

So, it is a very tough situation. I think you have to look at it realistically.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. May I just ask one more brief question?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, very brief.

Senator PRESSLER. There is an assumption in this whole debate that if you blockaded South Africa and had total sanctions, the Botha government would fall. Everybody assumes that.

I came not to have that assumption.

What would be your assumption?

Secretary SHULTZ. My guess is Mr. Crocker could speak with more authority than I can on this. But I think they have prepared themselves for a kind of isolated existence. They could probably go on for quite a while. But I cannot imagine that anybody would like it very much because it would be far more than just economic degradation. There would be the atmosphere of fear that I referred to, and I recognize that you criticized me for that. But I think it is very prevalent, underlying all the time. It accounts for the fact that you have net white emigration now.

That is no way that anybody wants to live.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, is it your intention to replace our Ambassador in South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir; but our present Ambassador has done a very good job, and he remains our Ambassador, of course. He is helping us, and he believes and we believe—he has been there now for close to 5 years, I think—that we should rotate. We do that all the time, and so it is our intention when the President decides to make a change.

But I say that in full support of him and with great praise for the job that he has done.

Senator SARBANES. Do you intend to be sending the nomination of a new ambassador to the Senate shortly?

Secretary SHULTZ. I hope so.

Senator SARBANES. Would the United States be concerned if the Commonwealth broke up over the South African issue?

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course.

Senator SARBANES. Why would we be concerned?

Secretary SHULTZ. Because it is a grouping in the world, and I think that these groupings that we see develop add a kind of cohesion and coherence, and they are a good thing.

So, the tention in the Commonwealth and over the games, for instance, I think is too bad.

Senator SARBANES. Do you see a possibility or a likelihood that the Commonwealth might break up over the South African issue?

Secretary SHULTZ. I hear it talked about to some extent, but I also hear even those who talk about it say that they don't want it to happen and wish that it does not happen and so on.

So I assume it basically will not.

Senator SARBANES. You think it will not, if the policy toward South Africa does not change?

Is it your assumption that the current policy could continue without impacting on the Commonwealth?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is very divisive in the Commonwealth. We all know that.

But I keep wanting to return to something. What needs to change is what is going on in South Africa. We need to keep it in our minds; that is our object. That is what we are all trying to work for. I know we share that goal.

Senator SARBANES. How much weight do you think should be attached to the report of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group? Do you regard the EPG as a serious group and their report as a serious report?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Now, in their report, they say the question "is not whether sanctions will compel change. It is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared defer change."

In effect, they are saying that not having tried sanctions, we have gotten no change. They are suggesting the use of sanctions in order to induce change.

Secretary SHULTZ. I respect them. As I said, I think they are a serious group and they did a very good piece of work. But I believe that statement is wrong.

There is not an absence of sanctions. There are a lot of sanctions, and some have been there for a long time. The question of the moment that seems to be in everybody's mind is whether there should be some further ones, and if so, which ones.

To a degree, what I am trying to persuade you of is that that is not the central issue. The central issue is what can be done in South Africa. How are we going to get that to change?

Senator SARBANES. Do you plan to renew the very limited sanctions that the administration put into place last September by Executive order?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President will have to decide that as the time comes. As I have said, there are lots of things going on right now that we will want to observe, and that the President will consider before he makes that decision.

Of course, what we would hope is that there would be a basic decision for change in South Africa, and then you'd want to go in the other direction.

Senator SARBANES. Absent such a basic decision for change, would it be your intention at least to renew those very limited sanctions?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I do not want to sort of scoop the President on what he may decide at that moment. Obviously it is a serious, very serious matter, and has to be carefully considered.

But I do not want to try to say what the President will do.

Senator SARBANES. Are we sending a message to the South African Government at this very moment that in the absence of change, even the limited sanctions now in place may cease to apply?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I am not sending that message.

I am just saying that there is an evolving situation. There is no need for us to make up our minds right now, or for the President to, and there will be more information of possibly an important sort by early September, and that is the time to decide.

Senator SARBANES. In your prepared statement you said that the administration was prepared to change the mix of pressures, positive and negative.

What negative pressures is the administration considering?

Secretary SHULTZ. There are various things on your list and ours that people can contemplate.

I have said and say again that we are not impressed with the potential effectiveness of various economic measures that one could contemplate. I think Senator Pressler brought that out, and I agree with his line of thinking. But, at any rate, we consider all of these things, and particularly we coordinate with our allies and have their views in mind, and what comes out of Sir Geoffrey Howe's initiative and other initiatives that are being taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Time for just one more question, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. I will be very quick, Mr. Chairman.

Do you understand that black Africa perceives constructive engagement to be an indulgence of the apartheid regime by the United States?

Secretary SHULTZ. If they do, they are badly mistaken and they misread the President and all of us.

Senator SARBANES. But do you perceive that to be their perception of the policy?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not really see how they can so perceive it, although it is described that way by many people here in particular. So we have not used that term.

But I think that what we want to do—and I expect we would all agree that it is important that the United States maintain a presence, an interest, an involvement, and be part of an effort to bring about a better situation, and that we would agree that if a better situation comes about through a process of negotiation, that that is better than some sort of violent upheaval.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that if we drop the use of the term but do not change the policy, we will cease to be perceived as indulging the apartheid regime?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is no basis for anybody thinking that our view is to indulge the apartheid regime—not in anything that we have said, not in anything that we have done.

And so, rather than worry about those two words, we just tried to describe straight-on our abhorrence of apartheid, our urging for change, our specification of the kinds of things we think are needed for the change to really mean something.

I disagree with Senator Kerry that the changes they have made—I think you felt they were more or less meaningless. I think they had some meaning. But they are far from anything that is satisfactory.

I agree on that.

So that is our position.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Just for the record, Senator Murkowski has asked me to indicate that because Senator Laxalt's famous quote and advice to the former President of the Philippines has been mentioned twice, the actual words were "cut and cut cleanly."

So for the good of the record, we will state it that way.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, as a nonmember of the committee, to have the chance to sit in during the course of the hearing and to listen to the response. I will abide by the 5 minute rule.

I really have no additional questions, but I really have difficulty in remaining silent.

I have been listening to a person for whom I have an enormous regard and a high degree of respect, who I think has made a very special contribution to our country in the areas of foreign policy. But hearing him testify before this committee, he is trying to defend an indefensible policy.

The policy of constructive engagement is an unmitigated disaster, Mr. Secretary. If you do not know it, I am amazed by that.

It has the contempt of the South African Government. Blacks in South Africa have lost all hope about the United States. It has resulted in making the United States the second most despised government in South Africa and in southern Africa. That is reiterated by both white and black, the Eminent Persons Group and others, who are strong friends of the United States.

When you talk about the value of words, never forget that Adolph Hitler said he was for democracy, and Joe Stalin said that he was for a betterment of the human condition and for human decency, and P.W. Botha says he is for abandoning apartheid.

They are all phony statements. Any examination of the record would indicate that.

You are asking us up here in the Congress of the United States for further delay, for further wait, to continue a bankrupt policy.

Mr. Secretary, I will say to you what I said in my statements before, and I want to say it very clearly: the President does not speak for the United States on this issue. He does not speak for the American people.

After listening today, I would hope that the Senate of the United States would speak in a bipartisan way to say that the President's statement, his policy, and his comments really do not represent what this country stands for, what we ought to be representing throughout the world, what we ought to be doing in behalf of all freedom-loving people around the world.

This had been a statement, not a question, and I appreciate the chairman for letting me make it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask each member now, as well as, most importantly, our distinguished witness this question.

We have been meeting for only 5 minutes less than 3 hours. The Secretary has been very generous with his time and he has, I am certain, other requirements, as do members.

I am wondering, first of all, if the Secretary has more time, and, second, if members have more questions. Can we try to organize for a moment as to how to proceed or to wind up the hearing.

Mr. Secretary, what are your time requirements?

Secretary SHULTZ. I will stay here as long as you want me.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe we just heard an audible gasp from the press. [Laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Sarbanes. Do you have a suggestion?

Senator SARBANES. I want to commend the Secretary for his response.

In all seriousness, that is an attitude that he has consistently reflected in his dealings with this committee and with the Congress. I think it is one of the reasons there is a respect for the Secretary. This is an important issue. It deserves time and careful consideration.

The Secretary in his response has reflected an attitude which he has consistently evidenced on matters of national and international concerns before the committee, and I thank the Secretary for his response.

The CHAIRMAN. Well stated. I think all of us are appreciative to you, Mr. Secretary.

Well, let us proceed, then, with a second round of questioning, hopefully with a 5 minute time limit again. We will try to keep within that as best we can.

Let us set, however, 2 p.m. as adjournment time because we know we will have a rollcall vote on the judicial nomination at that time.

Let's make that the outside time.

We will proceed, then, with 5 minutes a crack until that stage.

I will pass on the second round and will turn to my colleague, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have just one question and that is in connection with Nelson Mandela.

Has the administration made any effort in the past to obtain his release?

Has any contact or direct conversation taken place between a representative of our government and Nelson Mandela since he has been in prison?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have made efforts in the past to make our view known about that, about the importance of release. We have worked at it in one way or another.

As to official contact with him, I don't think we've had any—with him, personally.

Senator PELL. These efforts to secure his release, were they are the last few months or have they been going on over a period of years?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I am familiar in the last few months. I believe they've been about 2 years in various ways.

Senator PELL. A specific request of the U.S. Government has been made in the past, as well?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it has been a very peculiar issue in that the South African Government has wanted to release Mr. Mandela with conditions, and he has not felt that he could accept the conditions.

More recently, there have been suggestions of a release in some form of an exchange, and just what the meaning is of that is not too clear.

But then, there have been the urgings and the undertakings with respect to the Eminent Persons Group, and we have associated ourselves with that. We have made public statements, and I think, of course, the President's public statement of yesterday is a strong one.

Senator PELL. Have you instructed our ambassador, to request a meeting with Mr. Mandela? Will you instruct any future ambassador to do so?

Secretary SHULTZ. I see no reason why he wouldn't, but it has not seemed to be possible before.

Senator PELL. So that instruction you think would be given to our ambassador? He may not succeed, but at least he would make the effort to meet with Mandela.

Secretary SHULTZ. We have thought a great deal about the problem of dialog and negotiation, and we have heard from many members of the committee. Recently I heard from Senators Kassebaum and Lugar on this, very eloquently.

I am persuaded that we should try to engage ourselves with all comers, so to speak, and we ought to have a presence, as we do, where we talk with these names that everybody hears about, but we ought also to talk with the musicians, with the writers, with the whole of society, and be engaged with it as best we can.

There are lots of places where that has been done in an outstanding way.

I noticed, for instance, somebody suggested that we should close our consulates. Well, our consulate in the cape is a place where we have had a very good representation and a rich dialog has emerged from that. I do not see that that is a sanction that you would want to apply.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Will an instruction be given to our ambassador to seek to converse with Mandela?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I would think so.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

I would like to join with Senator Sarbanes not only in having welcomed you here but in congratulating you on your response.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up on Senator Pell's question for a moment.

Is not one of the reasons Mr. Mandela has not met with many that one of his conditions for such a meeting is a recognition of his political party, the ANC?

Secretary SHULTZ. He has not wanted to meet with people, but the government has not been particularly anxious for that to happen either.

I think if the unbanning process takes place, that eases matters considerably. The two things are connected with each other.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Was this not part of the negotiations of the Eminent Persons Group in which the ANC agreed to suspend violence, which had been one of the requirements?

Secretary SHULTZ. That was a very interesting part of their mission, and I think the Eminent Persons Group did make headway. I hope we can, so to speak, pocket some of that headway.

I was disappointed myself that they decided to disband themselves because it was quite an interesting and eminent group, properly named.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I just want to comment briefly.

As you know, I have introduced legislation which would ban new investments and new loans, as well as landing rights for South African Airways. In that respect my bill is similar to the first legislation that Senator Weicker and Senator Kennedy introduced.

I thought your reason for not supporting that was rather convoluted. As you noted, new investment and capital have already slowed to a trickle.

I certainly will want to work toward specific targets, such as the chairman has spoken of.

I would share your concern in many ways about the closing of the consulate. I know that is one thing that has been looked at in the past, and I suppose I am struck with what happened to us in Libya, where we severed all diplomatic relations. We have no real eyes and ears on the ground once we do that.

I think reducing diplomatic access cuts off a part of human intelligence, which is terribly important to us.

Secretary SHULTZ. Beyond that, you and others are urging us as a government and as a people to enrich our dialog with people of all races in South Africa. We cannot do it if we are not there.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would agree with that point.

I would just like to say that I will continue to press forward with my legislation, and want to work with the chairman on any ideas he has.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

I would just say publicly that I am going to be looking to the Senator for leadership in this area, as she knows and as the Secretary knows.

I deeply appreciate her willingness to chair a subcommittee for an area of the world that is interesting and important, but difficult.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few questions.

I will try to move through them very quickly.

Mr. Secretary, would you urge United States companies to expand their presence in South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think it is a constructive thing if they were to do that. But I don't think they will.

Senator SARBANES. But you are urging them to do so?

Secretary SHULTZ. We are not going around beating the drum. The problem is that they are leaving and with an accelerating pace. The net investment of the United States now is down to less than \$2 billion, which is tiny.

Senator SARBANES. Have any high ranking officials of our government had any discussions with ANC leaders?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes. We have had a dialog for some time.

Do you want to describe it?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have had contact and communication with the ANC from the beginning of this administration at a variety of levels, usually in the field, usually in the places where they are represented.

Senator SARBANES. I said "high ranking officials" purposely. I do not regard a political officer in Lusaka as a high ranking official. Recognizing that I am drawing such lines, is the response to my question still the same?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, if you mean an ambassador, I think the answer is no.

Senator SARBANES. An Assistant Secretary.

Secretary SHULTZ. On the other hand, I think that whether something is authorized or not in an official way is important, and these contacts have been officially authorized.

Senator SARBANES. The Eminent Persons Group report, in its conclusions, state, and I now quote: "From these and other recent developments, we draw the conclusion that, while the government"—this being the Government of South Africa—"claims to be ready to negotiate, it is, in truth, not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its program

of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face."

Do you differ with the conclusions of the Eminent Persons Group in that statement with respect to the South African Government?

Secretary SHULTZ. Certainly the government has not come forward in response to what I thought was a pretty good set of positions that the Eminent Persons Group developed. Their conclusion is based, to a considerable extent, I think, on that fact, and it is a powerful fact.

I hope that if that is the case, it will change. It has to change sooner or later.

The sooner it changes, the better.

But I do not have a basis for differing with them. But I would hope that it changes.

Senator SARBANES. My final question is this.

If you were part of a group—which in this instance is not a minority but is a majority in your country—a group that was denied access to political participation and powersharing, and, therefore, denied the route to become full citizens peacefully, would you be prepared to renounce violence as a path to becoming a full citizen of your country?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I would have to say that I admired very much the leadership that Martin Luther King, Jr., gave in our own civil rights struggle.

I worked on that subject a lot myself in my various capacities very directly, and I recognize that our country is different from others. In some ways we are—well, we are different.

But I would like to think that the nonviolent mode is the way to go. It was certainly a way in which we had leadership from Mahatma Gandhi, in India, and from others here. So I would look to that example.

Senator SARBANES. What is your view of George Washington and the use of force—

Secretary SHULTZ. He's the Father of my country.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. And the use of force to gain freedom?

In other words, I think it is a perfectly reasonable request to talk in those terms if a peaceful path toward decisionmaking and power-sharing is available. But if people are frozen out and denied, then to say to them—well, what recourse do they have?

Secretary SHULTZ. First, let me say that, as far as George Washington is concerned and the Boston Tea Party and so on, we had a foreign power taxing us without representation, and in one way or another not behaving acceptably toward us. So we had a revolution about that.

The South African situation is a much different one because there you have people who have been living together in a country under conditions that in our judgment and in the judgment of certainly most of them and perhaps a good proportion of the whites are not only unjust and unfair, but they cannot really see how they can continue. And so, it is a different kind of situation.

Senator SARBANES. Well, Mr. Secretary, we fought a Civil War in this country in part to end slavery.

I am not trying to press you into some particular position, but I find it very hard to understand, given our own history, that we cannot come to grips with the fundamental fact that a clear majority, an overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa are being denied, the most basic and fundamental rights of citizenship in their own country.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with that. I agree with that.

Senator SARBANES. They have a foreign power, in a sense, dominating them, a power which will not let them participate in the process.

Secretary SHULTZ. I agree with your sense of the outrageousness of the situation for people but it nevertheless seems to me that what we should be advocating is a negotiated change, not a violent change.

This is, first, because people get killed and maimed; second, because it leads to a deterioration in the society; third, because the outcome is less likely to be a genuinely positive one if it comes about through a cataclysmic blood-letting than if it comes about through negotiation and a form of consent.

Senator SARBANES. I agree with all of that.

Secretary SHULTZ. So those are the reasons why I do not advocate violence.

Senator SARBANES. No, no. No one is advocating violence. The only question is, what do you expect the black South Africans to do if the Afrikaner regime will not dismantle apartheid?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think we have to seize every opportunity of any kind that we have to try to persuade them to make the changes that are necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me add my voice to those that have already expressed our gratitude to you for staying on here a bit longer.

I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that I had the pleasure the other day of being at a luncheon at the State Department for the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in which he noted that the Secretary had completed 4 years in his capacity of Secretary of State.

While I know you have had your disagreements with many of us up here from time to time, I think the general conclusion would be that you have done an excellent job.

We appreciate it, and your being here.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, sir.

Senator DODD. I have just a couple of cleanup questions.

I apologize for coming back to the intelligence question again, but just so I understood what you were saying, your interpretation of your conversation with Mr. Casey this morning was that in his capacity of DCI, he was speaking for the intelligence community as a whole. Now, he didn't necessarily say that to you, but you would glean from that that he was speaking across the board and not just for the CIA.

Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, sir. Yes. But I just related to you a conversation that he authorized me to make public—

Senator DODD. Correct.

Secretary SHULTZ [continuing]. And I think if you want to go into this further, you properly should do it with him.

Senator DODD. I understand that.

His response to you was, or his comment to you was that the report is entirely fallacious.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator DODD. Was there any effort to check with Bishop Tutu about the President's speech yesterday? Was he informed in advance of what the President's position would be in that speech?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

We worked on that speech right through until just before it was delivered, and coordinating it with the testimony that I gave here today. So it was not distributed for comment in advance by people.

Senator DODD. I presume there was some discussion about what Bishop Tutu's response would be to the President's remarks. Was his response an unexpected one? Was it harsher than the President or you were advised would be his response to that position?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, by and large, as I have observed, the President, as he goes about these special kinds of speeches, does not listen very much to arguments such as gosh, you'd better watch out for this group or that group and how they are going to react. He more takes the view that he has to think it through and develop what he believes and state it, and that others can state what they believe.

Senator DODD. I didn't mean to suggest that he should tailor his remarks. I just wondered and presume there would be those who would say "Here is our position and here is the likely response from various quarters around the world," including the kind of response he is apt to get from so-called moderate leaders, in South Africa.

Secretary SHULTZ. I would just take the opportunity to say that we hope that Bishop Tutu might read again the whole speech and, in particular, look at the President's ringing statements about what is wrong, his call for and vision of what should be, and the particular steps that he outlined that are needed, and see if he can't agree with those, while perhaps still feeling that we ought to inflict some more punishment to the extent we are able.

I think on these matters, various kinds of negotiations—and you have all been involved in a lot of negotiations—the sort of confrontational approach is all wrong, and there are stages of negotiations. But there comes a time when what you want to do as a negotiator is to look at what people say for things you can agree with and then build on those things, and see if you can get that kind of interaction back and forth, rather than at the things you disagree with.

Even in the context of what has been said in this hearing, I personally think that the broad objectives, values, and standards of the United States are held very much in common by members of the committee across the board and the administration. And we have focused on differences of view that I do think, in the full perspective of things, are much more tactile than they are in the broader strategy of what needs to happen.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, just one last technical point and then a broader question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. I realize the red light is on. But I hope we can finish up here.

Did we ask that the President's speech be carried on state-controlled television in South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. We didn't make any request of anybody that I know of. He gave the speech. It was set up to be televised by those who wanted to televise it. I really don't know where it was carried live and where snippets of it were played, or just what.

Do you happen to know?

[Pause.]

Senator SARBANES. It was played on the South African television network. That was their decision.

Senator DODD. I want to clarify something. I was not trying to be argumentative with you when I raised the question earlier in reading your statement.

I think you very accurately said at the outset of your remarks that words are important, particularly in this forum. This is because what is left unsaid carried great import.

As I read your statement here this morning, I was not trying to put words into your mouth but merely trying to give you as one person sitting on this committee, reading your statement, what I glean from it.

There are a couple of things that stand out.

There is a very significant and very direct, unequivocal condemnation of apartheid, both in the President's speech yesterday and in your statement here this morning.

However, I find in no single example in your statement here this morning nor in the President's speech yesterday any linkage between the policy of apartheid and the Government of South Africa. There is no criticism of the government which perpetuates this policy.

There is condemnation, clear condemnation of the policy. And it seems to me that the absence of that linkage is what contributes, I think, to the impression that we have taken a side in all of this.

I offer that statement to you not because I am suggesting that that is necessarily your intent, but merely to give you an opportunity to either agree with that or disagree with it.

This is why when I raised the question about the fear paragraph, since both fears are kind of linked together, I think both of us would agree that the fear of blacks in South Africa about not being able to participate fully in their government is one that you and I would share. The fear that a white minority may lose some property or may have their values, whatever they may be, diminished or destroyed is not something to think we would probably attribute legitimacy.

My concern was that linkage of both fears seems to give both of them the same degree of credibility. And without making that distinction, I think that creates at the very least confusion.

That was my point here.

Senator SHULTZ. Well, my guess is, that the fears are quite vital and go to personal security as well as all other aspects of life genuinely across the board in South Africa now.

It is a destabilized situation. The Government, in its efforts to maintain law and order through the state of emergency has, as the President said yesterday—he was very direct about it—have gone beyond the law of necessity. I think those were his words.

In saying that, he called for an end to the state of emergency.

I think that when we say we condemn the system of apartheid and call for its change, we are saying that it is the Government that put it there and the Government has to take it away—and is identified with it and everything we say about it.

Now, I would hope that a process of negotiation would be part of ending apartheid, because, it seems to me, it is important for people to see a genuine negotiating proceed and to see that negotiations can work. That perception will tend to reinforce the negotiating process.

They do not have that experience there. That is one of the problems.

Senator DODD. So, there should be no doubt whatsoever that the President's remarks yesterday and your testimony here this morning, even though not stating so specifically here, or lay blame at the doorstep of the South African Government for the perpetuation of the policy of apartheid?

Secretary SHULTZ. Let me just read to you, if I can find it here, what the President said. Where is that quote?

[Pause.]

Secretary SHULTZ. It is in my prepared statement "America's view of apartheid has been, and remains, clear. Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable." This is the President. "The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people, based upon race."

I thought that was a pretty strong statement.

Senator DODD. And that was his statement.

Secretary SHULTZ. That was his statement.

Senator DODD. My last question to you is: Should there be no doubt in the mind of the Government of South Africa at the conclusion of your testimony this morning that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State lay the blame for the perpetuation of the policy of apartheid at the doorstep of the Government of South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes; they have to change. It has to end.

Senator DODD. My last quick questions, Mr. Chairman, if I could, are the following.

Again, I do not disagree with your statement earlier about the focus of attention on the tactic, if you will, of sanctions. I think I saw Assistant Secretary Crocker agree with your comment on that, that there is a tendency, inevitably, to give disproportionate attention to some things.

But the impression I was left with in some way—and I will give you the opportunity to clarify this for me—is that the administration subscribes to the theory that sanctions, whatever form they may take, really do not work.

Am I incorrect in that assessment, that in this particular situation the administration believes that, no matter how well intended, specific sanctions will not work at all and would complicate mat-

ters rather than in assist in achieving a political resolution of the difficulties in South Africa?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think a response is more complex than that.

You can think of sanctions that would not make any difference because you deny people the right to buy something in the United States and they can buy it just as easily somewhere else, and this causes a slight momentary problem of shifting where you buy something.

You can think of interruptions of trade that can cause more of a problem than that if you are talking about some article of commerce that fits into a complicated system of some sort, where there is a design problem and so on, so there is more of an inconvenience.

In the case of the United States, it is the largest, most diverse, and most open market in the world by a vast margin. So, any country that is cut off entirely from it is missing something—the vibrancy and zest that comes out of interaction with our market. So, it has an effect.

I think when a company leaves a country, obviously it has assets there, and the manner in which it has to leave can make a difference. For example, the worse things get in South Africa and the more, let's say, a United States company that has assets there is under constraints to sell within a certain number of days, the poorer their bargaining position is in getting a decent price. And perhaps you would say well, who cares whether the company makes out or not, although I think we ought to care about U.S. assets.

What you are saying is that those who get those assets get them at a very low price. And if you are trying to make a point to the Afrikaners, say, and you do something that allows the Afrikaners to get these assets for nothing, that is kind of an interesting point you have made.

So, you have to think of that aspect of it.

Then, it seems to me sort of obvious on the face of it that the broader based anything that is done is, the more difficult it is for the economic system to go around it, although if the economic system really wants to go around some form of controls it usually can find a way.

But, a broadly based effort carries a special political message as well as an economic message.

But the fact is that South Africa is totally isolated in a political sense. They do not participate in the United Nations, they don't participate in the Olympic games. They are isolated.

Senator DODD. I do not disagree with that last statement at all, in this sense, I suppose. If you were back wearing your private sector hat, sitting around a board of directors, I presume if someone suggested that we make a new investment in South Africa today, you would probably raise at least one eyebrow, if not two, just on a purely economic-business judgment sense. That is one form of sanction, if you will, that carries a message with it.

There is obviously another form of message, and that, of course, is a Government-imposed sanction, which is really what we are talking about here.

Maybe I should have asked this question of you first.

Am I to glean from that last statement that, in retrospect, the decision by the administration a year ago to impose by Executive order sanctions was either an unwise decision at the time, or, if not unwise, that the imposition of sanctions have had little or no effect whatsoever on any of the changes that have occurred in South Africa—the pass laws, the prohibition on interracial marriage, the modest opening up of the parliamentary system, for instance. All of those would have occurred in the absence of sanctions?

Secretary SHULTZ. Last year, as the President constructed his Executive order, he tried to pick out the things that we felt would have their maximum impact on the system of apartheid and the people administering the system of apartheid, as distinct from things that would have an effect on the economy generally. As the President has said in considerable part, this is because if you have an impact on the economy generally, the people who are going to lose their jobs mostly are blacks.

The President spoke yesterday about the employment in the various mines, and if you close the mines, whose employment is it that you are talking about? Whose jobs are you talking about?

So, he tried to make that distinction.

Now, take computers. Well, you can get computers elsewhere, no doubt. We think ours are pretty good. So, they would lose out on access to the U.S. computer market for certain forms of activity. But others can fill in.

I do think there was a political message in the fact that President Reagan did this and did it with basically the full support of the Congress. This is not to say that there weren't Members of the Congress who wanted to do additional things. But there was not any dissent on those things.

So, there was a broadly based bipartisan, or national, I'll say, not bipartisan, a national message involved. To the extent that we can keep doing it that way, I think that we are well advised.

Senator DODD. I could not agree more with that, particularly with the last sentence. The reason why I raised the point earlier—and I obviously do not expect you here this morning to necessarily answer that positively—but I would just close, if I could, Mr. Secretary, with that observation.

I know the President graciously saw Senator Kassebaum and Senator Dole the other day. I know he has listened to the chairman as well and appreciates his comments, as you do, when he speaks. You have heard in a variety of different ways here this morning, I think, by and large, an expression that the President's decision a year ago by Executive order to impose those sanctions is one that enjoyed broad national support, as you described it. I agree with that.

My own sense is that before too much more time elapsed I think it would be so much more constructive if we were able to—

Secretary SHULTZ. Watch your language, now. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. I didn't say engagement. [Laughter.]

I think it would be so much more constructive if you would carry back, as I am sure you will, the reactions that you have had this morning from this committee to the President so that we do not find ourselves in a situation again where we have Congress going

off in what is perceived as one direction and the White House in another.

My own assessment is that we did have an impact. I would like to believe that the South African Government made those changes in those laws because they thought they were wrong. But I am not convinced that that is even remotely the case; that they made those changes because, frankly, the President of the United States imposed some sanctions, and that if he were to continue pressing in the way he did a year ago, we might further see those changes that you have identified and that we have all agreed were needed, if there is any hope at all in achieving some peace and stability in that country, and, of course, ultimately the full participation of all members of that society.

With that closing thought, I thank you for coming and would truly urge you to carry that message back before we end up splitting off into different directions and causing more damage to ourselves and to the country, obviously, of South Africa.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Let me just follow up for the moment on a point Senator Dodd has mentioned, and that is that the South African Government believes us in terms of our idealism but does not find credible our ability to do very much about it. And, as a result, there has been the extraordinary repression of the past month or so and the attempt to censor the news media.

These rather stark attempts to simply cut us out of the process are obvious and they are noticed by many nations of Africa. I think part of our problem is one you have expressed many times very eloquently; namely, that what we have to do and say with regard to the white Government of South Africa has implications in terms of our credibility with black African states.

This message comes through loudly and clearly. If one were to play the devil's advocate, one could say that nothing we do with regard to sanctions, political, economic, or statements we make would make any difference with regard to the white South African Government. But it would make a difference, I believe, in our perception by black African states, and that may be very important for the future.

That, I think, has to be weighed very carefully in the balance.

I suppose what I find to be a bit distressing about the President's message—and he surely did not mean this, but he may be able to clarify it—and it came out a little bit in our dialog today—is this: On the one hand, Senator Helms was mentioning the horrible process of necklacing and asking you for assurances that you would not talk to Oliver Tambo until he renounced that practice, and you indicated that it was not your intent to have those preconditions.

We have not really imposed upon President Botha the thought that he would renounce repression before we talk to him. It seems to me we are in a situation presently in which we are describing violence of the blacks, and it is horrible, but describing a context which Malcolm Frazier of the Eminent Persons Group suggested to me is much like persons in Nazi Germany or in the Soviet Union or in Asian states, with which he is more familiar, where people who are repressed do strange things. There is the New People's Army in the Philippines, with which I am most recently acquaint-

ed, where people show up without arms and digits or strange things happen to them if they are thought to be informers. Within that particular society, they use all sorts of methods to attempt to break out of the mold.

I fear that we can anticipate more of this sort of thing not only in South Africa but in the rest of the world if we do not follow our idealism.

So, I would hope that somehow in this dialog between the Congress and the administration, we can move beyond the President's message to a national statement of purpose which combines in our South African policy the ideals and self-interest of the United States.

I think the President's message was an important one and I think your testimony today has been extraordinarily helpful.

I think we are making headway. I am encouraged by this.

I think within our committee we have a good, bipartisan feeling for action. It may not be precisely the course that you would have suggested or the President would have suggested. We will press ahead with our committee responsibilities and seek to work with you as we progress with legislation.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there other questions or comments?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I just want to be clear on the answer to the technical question Senator Dodd put to you.

The South African state television did carry the President's speech live yesterday; is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. The speech was recorded on television, and whether they recorded it live or got a feed or what I don't know. But I am told that it was shown on their television. C-Span was there, cable TV was there, all the networks had cameras there, although I don't think they went live with the speech.

Senator SARBANES. Did the South African Government know generally ahead of time the substance of what the President was going to say, either through their own sources or through our people?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, they read the same papers that we can read and there was lots of speculation about what the President was going to say. Senators Dole, Lugar, and Kassebaum made comments when they left the White House and so on.

But no one had a copy of the speech ahead of time and it was worked on and——

Senator SARBANES. Did we officially let them know what was coming in some way?

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator SARBANES. Did our Ambassador know what was coming?

Secretary SHULTZ. Our Ambassador was here, consulting with us. I think it is pretty clear. Anyway, you could predict the message. The message was: End apartheid, form a different kind of system, do it right away, here are some things that you need to do to get there, and your situation is miserable and it's getting worse, so you should act. That is the message.

I don't know that anyone should have expected a different message.

Senator SARBANES. Well, the message was also no sanctions.

I am just curious as to why the South African Government carried the President's speech.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10:03 a.m. on Thursday, July 24, 1986.]

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:03 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Evans, Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, and Kerry.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

This morning, we will have three panels of distinguished witnesses and we will ask that their opening statements be limited to no more than 10 minutes in duration, so that we will have an opportunity to hear everybody.

It is the Chair's hope that we will conclude the hearing sometime in the next 3 hours. Yesterday we made it in 4 hours, you will recall. These tend to be not only well attended hearings but ones of great interest to all of our members and to the public.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. When you finish, I do want to make an opening statement, after the ranking member.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I would be happy to recognize you.

Let me just review for the benefit of members and for the benefit of the press and the public the parliamentary situation that I see ahead of us with regard to legislation that may come from these hearings.

From time to time, it comes to the attention of the Chair that there are Senators who are prepared to offer amendments to the debt ceiling legislation, which is now on the floor, or, for that matter, to other pieces of legislation, amendments that would pertain to South Africa. It certainly is their privilege to do that.

We have indicated in this committee that we would have 3 days of comprehensive hearings. The ranking member and I have discussed informally the thought of asking members to set aside next Tuesday and next Thursday for discussion and/or markup of legislation, so that we might proceed in an orderly and timely way and have independent legislation for the floor.

The ranking member and I have worked with our respective leaders, Senator Dole and Senator Byrd, in support of unanimous-consent agreement on time certain for legislation on South Africa, for legislation with regard to Nicaragua and the Contra issue, and

for debate that might take place on arms control issues, including SALT II.

We believe, as do the Republican and Democratic leaders, that it would be useful to have periods of time, maybe 2 days, on each of these areas during which the legislation could be considered carefully, amendments offered, and either free-standing legislation or amendments to military construction, in the case of Contra aid, adopted.

Sometimes parliamentary procedure does not lend itself to such simplicity, and there may not be a willingness on the part of 100 Senators to adopt a unanimous-consent agreement to take up any of these three issues with time limits or in any specific order. But, for the moment, both of our leaders are attempting to gain agreement of Senators on those sorts of options.

In the event that that agreement cannot be obtained, then it seems to me that this committee has to be prepared for debate perhaps on all of these foreign policy issues in the context of debt limit legislation. Members of the committee need to be advised that we may be on the floor every day of next week and maybe the following one, dealing with any of these issues, all in the form of amendment to debt ceiling.

I would just say that there are any number of Senators who can play that game and offer amendments, substitutes, table each other's efforts, and go back and forth with it. That would not be the desire of the Chair nor of the ranking member. We have indicated our belief that we ought to take up one thing at a time and intend to do that.

I appreciate that on the South African issue, on the Contra issue, on SALT II, and so forth, there are members who are so eager to pass legislation, that they may be over on the floor at this moment polishing their amendments.

If so, of course we have scissors and paste and we will have develop substitutes, and we can work it out over there, as opposed to over here.

I simply want to make that point.

Senator Pell and I are not oblivious to all sorts of activity, but we are attempting to proceed in a responsible manner, to listen to public witnesses, to listen to governmental witnesses, to formulate legislation as carefully as we can on a very serious matter.

I simply wanted to take this moment to outline the situation as I see it and to alert members for committee action on Tuesday and Thursday with respect to South Africa, or, in the event the fat is already in the fire, to just proceed to the floor for full-sale debate. Rather than having a committee markup, we may just have it all over on the floor.

Having said that, Senator Pell, I would like to recognize you.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to support your statement and say that the orderly and correct procedure is the one that has been outlined. It would be best to have these matters taken up in the committee—this is where they should be discussed, as we have prime jurisdiction—and then move on to the floor.

If possible, we should follow the course that has been suggested, although naturally, we retain our freedom to vote as our con-

sciences dictate on the floor. But, until that time comes, I would like to see these matters thrashed out and resolved in this meeting here.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that this morning we will hear from many fine witnesses. But my concern about the hearings to date is that we have not had, if I could use the term, intellectual rigor in terms of analyzing the real foreign policy issues.

Now we all want to get rid of apartheid, but it has become very much a civil rights domestic vote. Before these hearings are concluded, I feel strongly that we really need to have some intellectual rigor in certain assumptions under which we are operating.

I say this as one who voted for sanctions a year ago. But, after making a trip to South Africa and taking a train across that country and spending some time there, I have come to the point where I support President Reagan's speech, which he gave, very strongly.

In these hearings we have had no intellectual rigor on the assumption, the assumption which seems to be accepted by everybody, that if we have sanctions, it will force the Botha government to the left or force it to fall.

My belief is that it would do just the opposite, that it would move it further to the right. Indeed, any political threat to the Botha government is from the right, not the left.

The hope that it would fall, that there is going to be somebody "cutting and running," is just not going to happen with the Afrikaners and the current situation.

Second, there is an assumption that does not seem to be questioned by anybody that everybody in the country is against the white government; that is, that everybody else, racially divided, is united. That is not necessarily true.

There are a many black tribes, the so-called colored population, Indians and Asians who look to the white government for protection.

Let us consider the view that the Botha government is going to fall or move to the left as a result of more sanctions, and that there is going to be some kind of new government. There has been no analysis of what would come next. If there were a civil war, it would not necessarily be whites against everybody else because many of the tribes would be on the side of the Botha government. You have the Indians and the Asians and the colored groups.

But we have had almost no analysis of that in these hearings, and we are here to make foreign policy, not domestic policy, and we all want to see apartheid ended.

Next, it is assumed that if the business community is hurt, this will somehow end apartheid. But the business community is the strongest engine to end apartheid. Indeed, the business community, be it the Indian business community, or the black business community, or the colored business community, or the white business community, has been the strongest spokesman for change in that country, and this very engine for change would be destroyed.

We seem to be going ahead without enough analysis of these foreign policy issues.

Finally, there has been no analysis of the effect on neighboring countries, such as Zimbabwe, or, indeed, at the level of human rights or freedoms that exist there. These areas are completely overlooked.

So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I support the President's statement strongly. I hope we have analysis here today, which we have not had.

I hope we do not take this strictly as a domestic civil rights rating vote, but that we try to analyze what is going to happen next.

Many of the statements by Margaret Thatcher stress that sanctions frequently have the exact opposite effect from the one intended, and I believe that would be the case here.

We seem in such haste to go forward and, in terms of the formulation of foreign policy, this has been a disappointment to me up to this point.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses today. I see a former professor of mine, Derek Bok, whom I admire greatly, and many others, and I look forward to hearing them.

But I did want to say at this point that, in terms of formulating foreign policy, in the opinion of this Senator, we have not had a rigorous analysis of what the consequences would be.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator Boschwitz, do you have an opening statement or comment?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No; I really do not have an opening statement, Mr. Chairman, except that I hope that our witnesses will deal with the solutions rather than a restatement of the issues, with which I think we are all very familiar.

Also, I share Senator Pressler's concern about the impact on the economy that sanctions would have on the neighboring eight or nine countries and the impact on our own budget because, in the event we undermine the economies of those countries, I presume we would have some appeals to us to support those countries financially.

Having said that, I hope that some of our witnesses are able to steer us toward some solutions of the South African problem because clearly it may get worse and we may be faced with some of the kinds of problems that Senator Pressler alluded to, and of which I am fearful in any event.

It is not an easy problem that we face, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

The Chair now welcomes our first panel of witnesses this morning. They are Mr. Jeffrey B. Gayner, counselor for international affairs, the Heritage Foundation of Washington, DC; Mr. David Hauck, Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC; and Dr. Pauline Baker of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.

I hope that the witnesses will be able to observe roughly a 10-minute time limit for presentation and a summary of your testimony so that we might then proceed to questions on the part of the panel.

We deeply appreciate your coming.

Your statements, in the event that they are more lengthy, will be made a part of the record in full so that everyone will have an opportunity to avail himself of those statements.

Will you please proceed in the order that I announced you, with Mr. Gayner first.

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY B. GAYNER, COUNSELOR FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GAYNER. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar and members of the committee. I do deeply appreciate the opportunity to testify here this morning.

I have provided a rather lengthy written testimony to you, so what I think is most useful for me to do this morning is not only to simply summarize that, but, instead attempt to integrate that testimony into some of the comments that have been made over the last 2 days, of hearings. Moreover, my comments will address some of the questions raised this morning.

I would also like to note that a colleague of mine at the Heritage Foundation, Bill Pascoe, in the last week has issued two other studies relevant to this issue: One on the relationship of the African National Congress to the Communist Party of South Africa, and another one on the Soviet role in southern Africa. I hope that both of these studies, can be inserted into the hearing record as I think they would contribute to a understanding of the problems confronting United States in southern Africa.

With at least three different bills, or even more of them, as the chairman indicated, now pending before various committees in the Senate, with one of them already passed in the House, it seems to me clearly the principal discussion here necessarily will center on sanctions.

Little doubt exists in my mind that support for sanctions against South Africa stems from a profound dissatisfaction with the character of white-dominated society in South Africa, coupled with the brutal violence that we have seen over the last 2 years.

But the desire to send this message of protest to Pretoria should not include, I believe, the kind of counterproductive actions envisioned in nearly all of the pieces of legislation being contemplated by the Senate.

Clearly, the United States should not support institutions of apartheid in South Africa, and I think in recent years, the United States has not in any way been directly supporting such institutions. But, taking any kind of arbitrary actions which simply damage the economy of South Africa and probably create much greater hardship throughout southern Africa does nothing to promote fundamental change in South Africa.

Further sanctions on trade and investment or the termination of landing rights, by South African Airways in the United States will not lead to a more rapid dismantlement of apartheid. Indeed, I think a much stronger case can be made that these actions will only further delay what has already been an arduously slow process of change in South Africa.

Almost nobody, it seems to me, believes—and we will undoubtedly get into this to a much greater extent this morning—that South Africa will accede to the demands being made by the proponents of sanctions legislations. In other words, if sanctions legislation is passed, no one believes, that the South African Government will abide by whatever the restrictions are in those sanctions in order to have them lifted, or thereby immediately implement the kinds of reforms many people in this room obviously would like to see the South African Government adopt.

In fact, under the House passed legislation, the President of the United States does not even have an opportunity, to remove those sanctions. They are imposed by law, and there is no provision for termination, other than the repeal of the law.

So, once the United States imposes sanctions, it is very uncertain how much of an impact they will have on South Africa. Moreover, it is very doubtful in my mind that other countries will adopt the same measures. In particular, I think this is probably true of Great Britain, which has the most at stake in South Africa, with estimates of as much as \$14 billion of investments, over \$2 billion in trade. Possibly over 100,000 jobs in Britain depending on their economic interrelationship with South Africa.

I also think it is worth noting that Japanese companies have already begun to take business away from American companies—in computer business, in terms of a Toyota plant there. Under the existing uncertain circumstances, we already have other countries and companies moving into South Africa; simply substituting other companies for American companies I do not think would necessarily have much of an impact upon South Africa.

Thus we may end up, I believe, imposing sanctions and finding few significant followers and little impact upon South Africa.

Then the adverse impact of sanctions would actually be greater on the United States I think than it would be on South Africa.

On the other hand, if, as proponents of sanctions here have hoped, that most other Western nations will join in imposing similar sanctions, then the costs to South Africa and, moreso, to all of southern Africa could be quite high. But, as with previous sanctions on petroleum and military equipment, in my view, the South Africans may attempt to devise often cumbersome and expensive means of coping with such adversity. They may have to develop new indigenous industries or import products, as Rhodesia did for many years when sanctions were imposed there. They may have to import products by rather circuitous means. They will try to export to neighboring countries. I believe, the rising unemployment that may result from any kind of broad-based effective sanctions.

Sanctions can damage, though I think they would not destroy the South African economy. Obviously South Africa itself generates much of its wealth and investment internally.

Sanctions will harm, as has been indicated I think on numerous occasions, those who survive at the margin of the economy in South Africa. Most particularly this would, of course, be the blacks. And in southern Africa, I think it would mean the inhabitants of many of the already nearly destitute countries surrounding South Africa, like Mozambique, which suffered a severe famine several

years ago when supply lines were open and when workers in Mozambique were already working in South Africa.

So I think the cost of broadly supported sanctions against South Africa should be much more carefully weighed, as I think two of the Senators here this morning have already indicated.

Instead, I think we have listened all too easily to some of the rhetoric coming from the leaders of some of the countries surrounding South Africa that they are willing to bear the cost of sanctions. I think in several of these countries—Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, in particular—extreme costs have already been paid by the citizens of those countries by the kinds of regimes that have been imposed upon them by their own governments.

But I think it also bears emphasizing that sanctions will hit hardest those in South Africa with the most progressive views on racial questions, the entrepreneurs who interact most with the world economy. I think Senator Pressler has raised this particular point.

American companies, which largely abide by the Sullivan principles, have been at the forefront of change in South Africa by providing successful models of nondiscriminatory employment for the rest of South Africa. Destroying those models and forcing them to be sold at huge discounts to either foreign concerns or possibly reactionary Afrikaners will only further set back race relations.

Moreso, those least hit by reforms, in my analysis, would probably be the staunchest proponents of apartheid, which are the farmers in South Africa, who, if anything, may indeed benefit to some extent by sanctions.

Nearly all of the most articulate critics of apartheid in the business community in South Africa and the South African Parliament oppose sanctions. It can be argued that a major force for positive change in South Africa has been the dynamic economy, which has desperately needed a trained and skilled black work force as an integral part of its continued growth.

A free enterprise system in South Africa has created the largest black middle class in Africa today. It has had a corrosive effect upon the kind of restrictions that form an essential foundation of apartheid.

Apartheid has become, in other words, an increasingly anachronistic means of running any kind of modern state, and, for practical as well as moral reasons, I think they have been moving away from it in South Africa.

The growth of blacks assuming responsible positions in business has fatally also undermined the stereotyping of blacks by many South Africans, who advocated the separation of societies there.

Consequently, I would urge and argue that, rather than disinvestment, we need to maximize the positive impact that American firms can have on South African society. To the extent that economic activities in South Africa are conducted on a nondiscriminatory basis, we should, in fact, remove existing restrictions that we have dealing with OPIC, the IMF, and Eximbank activities in South Africa.

Building up the economy of South Africa should be a major component in any realistic effort to bring down the relatively tottering system of apartheid. To be sure, as Secretary of State Shultz I

think made clear yesterday, the continuing state of emergency, excessive actions by police authorities, as well as the number of violent confrontations in South Africa, have all made any discussion of investment or disinvestment really somewhat irrelevant at the moment.

But we should be prepared to take any actions necessary to encourage investment and trade with institutions committed to integration in South Africa. This includes especially the progressive-minded business community in South Africa.

We have other ways, I believe, of accelerating the destruction of apartheid and paving the way for the creation of a genuinely representative form of government in South Africa.

In this respect, I think we should take on the challenge posed by reforms that have been passed by the South African Government. The leaders of the National Party in South Africa have maintained that they are committed to eliminating discriminatory practices and have indeed introduced and passed numerous laws that move in this direction.

Obviously other laws, especially the Group Areas Act, need to be repealed also.

But in each area that the government has proclaimed its intention to proceed with positive changes, we should use whatever means and programs we have available to accelerate the speed and expand the scope of such actions.

Thus, in the area of improving black education, for example, I think we should provide more scholarships to blacks at integrated universities within South Africa, a much more efficient allocation of resources I think than bringing black students to the United States for education.

In terms of discrimination itself, I think the United States should expand legal assistance to victims of discrimination and promote peaceful judicial challenges to continuing injustice in South Africa.

Moreover, now that blacks can operate in formerly white business areas, organizations, such as the Center for International Private Enterprise at the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as the Entrepreneurial Training Program at AID, should focus support on businessmen attempting to exercise what otherwise may be abstract rights on paper.

More broadly a lot can be done by various elements of AID, USIA, and the Endowment for Democracy, to help build the necessary infrastructure of a viable representative form of government in South Africa. There are about 22 U.S. Government programs now in place to help bring down apartheid. These need to be more integrated into the process of change there.

I fear that if sanctions are passed, the existing programs, in fact, will no longer operate in South Africa, and we will lose all of our impact.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gayner and information referred to appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gayner.

Mr. HAUCK.

STATEMENT OF DAVID HAUCK, DIRECTOR, SOUTH AFRICA
REVIEW SERVICE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HAUCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other committee members.

I am pleased to testify today on the question of adopting sanctions against South Africa.

I work for the Investor Responsibility Research Center, which was founded in 1972 by institutional investors—

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Would you bring the microphone a little closer, please.

The CHAIRMAN. Just pull it closer.

Mr. HAUCK. OK.

Is this better now?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will listen.

Mr. HAUCK. The Investor Responsibility Research Center was founded in 1972 by institutional investors to provide impartial reporting and analysis on public policy issues affecting U.S. companies.

Our funding comes from research fees paid by institutional investor clients and, except for their purchase of our publications, we receive no funds from American firms with operations in South Africa or from the United States Government.

In my remarks this morning, I will focus on three of the proposed sanctions in legislation before the Senate today.

First is no new investment in South Africa by United States firms. The second is the complete withdrawal of United States companies from that country. The final one is a prohibition on new bank loans to any South African borrower.

In order to assess the impact of a ban on new investment by United States companies in their South African subsidiaries, it is important to note the extent of such investment in recent years.

Referring to table I in my prepared testimony, I am looking at the lines labeled "Intercompany Debt Flow" and "Equity Capital Flow," which measures the flow of capital from the United States to South Africa, and one finds that from 1982 through the end of 1985, there was a net capital flow of \$14 million from the South African subsidiaries to their United States parents, rather than the reverse.

In fact, in 1985, the net capital flow from the South African subsidiaries of American companies to their United States parents came to \$17 million.

This is hardly surprising, that United States firms are taking money out of South Africa rather than putting it in, considering the degree of political unrest in that country and the poor state of its economy.

But the fact that the flow is from South Africa to the United States underscores that a ban on new United States investment is not likely to have an impact on the South African economy.

In addition, the South African Government is very likely to block this flow of capital from South Africa to the United States if sanctions are applied, with the result that the pool of investment cap-

ital in South Africa might actually grow somewhat following sanctions.

Looking at the second sanction, the withdrawal of United States companies from South Africa, if a ban on new investment would have little direct impact on the South African economy, what about requiring United States corporations to sell their South African assets and withdraw, as proposed in Senate bill 2570?

Once again, one finds that this economic sanction would have little direct impact on the South African economy, despite the fact that United States direct investment was worth some \$1.3 billion at the end of 1985.

The reason that a total pullout by United States companies would do little to harm the South African economy is that Pretoria reintroduced a two-tier exchange rate on September 1, 1985. South Africa now has two exchange rates—one for the commercial rand and another for the financial rand.

The commercial rand is used for foreign trade dealings, imports, exports, the payment of dividends to foreign owners of South African stock, and for tourists, who are exchanging money.

The financial rand rate is used when a foreigner sells an asset in South Africa and then exchanges the rands he receives from the sale for dollars.

When an American firm sells its assets to a South African company, the rand proceeds from the sale go into a financial rand pool. Non-South Africans, wishing to invest in South Africa, buy the financial rand from the pool. If the supply of financial rands exceeds demand—in other words, if there are more foreign investors pulling out of South Africa than seeking to come in—the value of the financial rand will fall until a balance between supply and demand is reached.

Theoretically, if no foreigners wanted to invest in South Africa, the value of the financial rand would fall to zero.

The advantage of the financial rand from Pretoria's viewpoint is that a decision by a foreign company to sell its assets and take the proceeds out of the country has no impact on South Africa's capital flow account. Because of the financial rand system, South Africa would experience no net loss of capital, even if all United States companies pulled out. And, as a result, the size of the South African economy would not be affected.

The third sanction proposed is a ban on loans by United States banks to all public and private sector borrowers in South Africa.

By adding private sector borrowers, these bills go beyond President Reagan's Executive order of last September, which effectively banned new loans to the South African Government and its agencies. If passed, this legislation would legally mandate what the United States banking community is already doing in response to the political and economic developments in South Africa, as well as in response to Pretoria's decision on September 1, 1985, to suspend the repayment of foreign loans owed by South African private sector borrowers.

As table II of my prepared testimony shows, the value of United States bank loans to South African borrowers has declined steadily since September 1984, a period marked by increased political unrest in that country.

From a high point of \$5 billion in September 1984, United States banks drew down their South African exposure by more than \$1.5 billion prior to Pretoria declaring a debt moratorium in September 1985.

Even without sanctions legislation, few United States banks are likely to lend to the South African public and private sector as long as the debt moratorium stays in place and South Africa's political unrest continues.

Moreover, even before President Reagan's Executive order of last September, U.S. banks already were reducing their loans to the South African public sector.

Now, in conclusion, I would like to anticipate some of your questions about the testimony.

Since IRC's charter is to be impartial and not make recommendations on legislation, I cannot say yea or nay on the bills before you. But I would like to give you some idea of whether the actions contemplated by the bills are likely to meet certain policy objectives.

If the goal of the United States Government is to undermine white support for continued racial domination in South Africa and to restore the credibility of the United States Government with black South Africans, there is, I believe, a package of measures that would meet those goals. The package would include four items.

The first would be imposing noneconomic sanctions targeted at South Africa's whites.

The second piece would be prohibiting foreign companies, United States companies, and United States banks from making new investments and loans in South Africa.

The third piece of the package would be increasing the frequency, level, and visibility of meetings between leaders of black opposition groups, including the African National Congress and Western political leaders.

The fourth and final part of the package would be to develop a multilateral assistance program with our allies that would address South Africa's enormous social and economic problems, a program of assistance that would be implemented once white domination was ended.

Noneconomic sanctions can be devised that would fall most heavily on whites in South Africa, increasing their sense of being cut off from the West. Isolating South Africa's whites from the world community through restrictions on South African Airways landing rights and downgrading diplomatic relations by closing consular offices would help to undermine their self-confidence and cause more of them to question and, hopefully, to challenge Pretoria's policies.

As I have attempted to show in my remarks, two of the proposed sanctions against South Africa—the no new investment and no new loans—would essentially mandate what the United States business community is already doing. The legislation would have an impact, however, if the situation changes in South Africa and companies and banks, in the absence of sanctions, would be tempted to increase their investments in that country.

If a goal of the United States and other countries is to maintain any credibility with the majority of black opposition leaders in

South Africa today, instituting these economic sanctions would constitute an even more important reason for adopting these sanctions. The sanctions would not worsen the difficult economic situation South Africa currently finds itself in, therefore they would not worsen the condition of black South Africans nor would they harm United States firms and banks, which have already adopted these restrictions.

But they would send a signal of support for the black opposition.

Finally, the last point, the economic and social assistance, I believe that we have to offer a fairly large carrot to the South African white population and not just hit them with sticks. We have to point out that there is an alternative political, economic, and social future for South Africa that the West is willing to back with resources, with support, if the political deadlock is broken and a true nonracial, representative government is instituted in South Africa.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hauck appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hauck.

Ms. Baker, welcome back to a committee that you have served well in the past. We are grateful to have you here as a witness today.

STATEMENT OF PAULINE H. BAKER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. BAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. This is an issue that I followed for several years, including during the time I worked for the committee itself.

Since I have been at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I have focused even more intensively on this issue.

I returned from a trip to South Africa last March, the latest in a series of visits to that country over the past decade.

I have been asked to review the policy of constructive engagement and the question of sanctions as it relates to overall United States-South African relations. I plan to do this in three stages: First, a brief assessment of the record of constructive engagement over the last 5½ years; second, a comment on how constructive engagement has been read by the South African Government; and, third, a summary of what Congress should be doing at this precise point in time.

The central argument of constructive engagement is that through an essentially friendly stance, Washington could use its influence to restrain the South African Government from external aggression and promote internal reform.

The President argues that quiet diplomacy, not sanctions, is the best way to pursue these goals.

The announcement by the administration that it was reassessing its policy was encouraging news, and the President's focus on this issue was long overdue. But Congress must insure that the policy review includes a fundamental reexamination of the validity of this approach as measured by the test of time.

What influence has the United States had in South Africa with constructive engagement? What have we gotten from our infinitely patient penalty-free policy of back-channel communication?

First, for most of the Reagan years, Pretoria distracted Washington with fruitless negotiations over Namibia. This is neither the time nor the place to analyze why those talks failed, but it is important to recognize that the Namibia negotiations produced not only a stalemate, but diverted Washington from concentrating on the growing crisis in South Africa itself.

Second, South Africa embarked on a policy of destabilizing its neighbors.

Since 1981, it has used a variety of measures, including economic sanctions, covert aid to anti-Government forces, cross-border raids and outright invasions to impose its will on the region. Even the much hailed Nkomati accord, the security package South Africa and Mozambique concluded in 1984, which was considered the high water mark of constructive engagement, collapsed as a result of secret South African aid to Mozambique rebels. More recently, South Africa launched brazen attacks against Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana, hitting no significant military targets in States that represent no significant military threat. Pretoria justified its actions by comparing its aggression to President Reagan's attack against terrorist bases in Tripoli, a position that shows that South Africa is prepared to exploit its relationship with the United States to justify actions of which we disapprove.

Third, the South African Government has responded to the black unrest over the last 2 years with mounting repression. The state of emergency declared last month is harsher than the martial law imposed on Poland in 1981, the culmination of an iron-fisted approach to demands for black political participation.

Not only have we failed to exercise influence over the Botha regime on this score, but President Reagan's personal appeal for restraint was rejected outright.

Fourth, the South African Government has refused to enter into negotiations with authentic black leaders.

The Commonwealth delegation of Eminent Persons concluded in June, after 6 months of investigations, that "the range of pressures adopted so far has not resulted in the fundamental changes we have sought over many years."

The group called for economic measures and has warned that without them the country will continue to drift toward a conflict that could result in the worst bloodbath since the World War II. Finally, Mr. Chairman, Pretoria has brushed off the West in a series of signals that indicates an unprecedented disregard of world opinion. Pretoria has thumbed its nose at President Reagan, scuttled efforts of the Commonwealth delegation to start negotiations, cold-shouldered British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe in his efforts to explore further possibilities in this direction, and has virtually invited the world to impose sanctions—a display of bravado rarely seen among supposed United States allies.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha has dared the West to get touch, declaring that it really doesn't matter if we impose sanctions—in fact, he stated, and I quote: "The sooner, the better."

This is what constructive engagement has wrought.

In each case, whether on Namibia, South African relations with its neighbors, or its response to internal unrest, the record shows that subtle methods and quiet diplomacy, the hallmarks of constructive engagement, have not worked.

Nevertheless, the President remains opposed to tougher measures. If the President refuses to apply tougher sanctions, then he needs to explain to the American public precisely under what set of circumstances such measures would be justified.

Is the United States to wait until tens of thousands are dying, until there is a full-scale race war, or until the Soviets appear to be gaining a real foothold? When is constructive engagement finally going to draw the line on apartheid?

If quiet diplomacy has failed, then we need to ask if the option of sanctions is the next best alternative.

My response would be that it is not a complete response, and certainly an imperfect one, but it is a good beginning to correct the essential flaw in the policy.

The central weakness of our policy has been the failure of the administration to convey to the Botha regime that there are limits to American patience and that there are penalties to continued defiance. We must convey to South Africa that it has to deliver, that there are costs to defense of white rule, that we hold the Government to its promises, that lines of communication with credible black leaders must be opened up, and that we will not permit ourselves to be manipulated.

As a result of the administration's staunch opposition to sanctions, Pretoria has concluded that it is virtually immune from outside pressure of any significance, and that in matters concerning the region, it can act with impunity.

President Reagan's calls for negotiations will not be taken seriously as long as no specific plans are discussed and no concrete pressures are applied.

In Pretoria, the free world is seen to be so politically divided over this issue and President Reagan is regarded as such a close friend, that the South African Government is confident that it need not worry about Western calls for negotiations, most of which are seen as political expediences designed to respond to domestic pressures at home.

What should Congress do?

There has been much muddled thinking and political posturing connected to the American debate over sanctions. Opponents of sanctions have argued contradictory positions: That sanctions will destroy the economy and hurt blacks; and that they will not work because of the resiliency of the economy.

Many proponents of sanctions have exaggerated expectations. Some claim they will bring down apartheid. Others argue that sanctions will give us clean hands.

The sanctions issue has become a litmus test on civil rights and racism in this country, with both sides claiming high moral ground.

What gets lost in the debate is the reality of what is taking place in South Africa, and a reasoned assessment of the impact the United States may have if it decides to speak with one voice.

We are poised at a crucial turning point in our relationship with South Africa. If Washington does not act in a clear and forceful way and if the administration remains attached to the fundamentals of constructive engagement, then the likelihood is that the United States will become irrelevant and the situation will drift irrevocably toward a revolutionary upheaval.

Right or wrong, in the end, the United States will be blamed by the majority of the population in South Africa, indeed probably throughout black Africa, for failing to prevent the bloody tragedy that will follow.

With the stakes this high, endless debates over the economic impact of sanctions tend to miss the point.

No one can predict with certainty what economic impact sanctions will have in South Africa. The economy is, by African standards, fundamentally strong. By Western standards, it is weak and in trouble.

The Government is bracing itself for sanctions of some sort, correctly recognizing that even if measures are not enacted by Government action, they are occurring as a natural economic response to the deteriorating political situation.

There is no better indicator of the sanctions already imposed by the marketplace than the declining value of the rand. Worth \$1.30 in 1980, the financial rand last week fell to below 20 cents. Apartheid, not sanctions, is destroying the South African economy.

What should not be overlooked is the political and psychological impact that serious sanctions would have on the South African Government and on the morale of the white population. Whatever loopholes the Government may use to evade sanctions—and there are many—there is no denying the political effect of a determinial American posture. Indeed, sanctions probably would be more effective today than ever before—not because they could be enforced more effectively, but because the economy is vulnerable, whites are uncertain of their future, black pressure has reached the stage of open insurrection, world attention is focused on the issue, and the measures could be reversible if real steps toward negotiations were forthcoming.

The economic impact of sanctions will probably take years to be effective. But the political and psychological impact will be immediate.

If used skillfully, sanctions could be a positive instrument to implement a stronger diplomatic initiative.

The basic justification for sanctions, Mr. Chairman, is to get across the political message which constructive engagement has failed to convey; namely, that a bipartisan consensus exists in the American public that apartheid must go, that Pretoria's refusal to negotiate with authentic black leaders will entail penalties, and that the United States is going to get serious.

Congressionally imposed sanctions would also send the administration a clear signal that the American people want President Reagan to stand up against racism. Whatever measures President Reagan adapts to take the rough edges off constructive engagement, they will fall short of the mark if they only deal with peripherals and merely heighten the rhetoric.

Subtle measures have not worked in the past, and they have even less potential for working in the future. We must state unequivocally that we are no longer going to do business as usual and join sanctions with serious diplomacy which gets down to specifics on negotiations.

To do anything less is to risk a major foreign policy defeat, a loss of international credibility, and a domestic controversy that will reverberate not only in the corridors of Congress, but in the racially torn neighborhoods, corporate boardrooms, and university campuses across America.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Baker.

The Chair would ask unanimous consent that in this round of questioning, members observe a 5-minute time limit.

I will ask the timekeeper to begin that period as I initiate my questions.

Mr. Gayner, in your longer paper, you have indicated suggestions for policy. I simply want to give you an opportunity and a little more extended time to explain why, for example, you have suggested, restoration of sales of krugerrands—that is, the rescinding of last year's order or other parts of the Executive order. I think you proposed as well additional investment in South Africa, an upgrading of technical change, and so forth. This obviously is a set of policies that would run counter to sanctions already in force. As a matter of fact, I think your proposals would move almost 180 degrees in the other direction.

Now, given the urgency that some have suggested in terms of black disapproval of that Government and the potential for attacks or even incipient guerrilla warfare, given the fact that apartheid does not appear to be diminishing rapidly, nor talks with regard to any constitutional future proceeding, how would the policies you are suggesting enhance any of these goals, or do you think that they are important goals?

Mr. GAYNER. Clearly, Senator Lugar, I believe they are important goals. The lifting of all of these kinds of restrictions on economic interaction with South Africa has to be integrally related to the integration in South Africa.

As I think I stated it briefly in my remarks this morning, any kind of benefits flowing from the lifting of such restrictions must only go, for example, to businesses that operate on the Sullivan principles of nondiscriminatory employment.

In other words, I would not propose that loans be granted to a South African Government that continues to maintain, for example, a segregated school system under the Group Areas Act or something like that.

But as long as these things are related to the process of integration in South Africa, I think programs which include economic benefits provide a further incentive for the South African Government to move precisely in the direction we want them to move, rather than a disincentive.

At present, as they become increasingly, if you want, isolated and removed from the benefits of various programs we have to help disadvantaged people in Africa and other parts of the world:

thus they have fewer incentives to interact with us in a positive direction.

I think that is what we want to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. Some have argued that this type of incentive—namely, the rescinding of past sanctions plus additional assistance—might be misinterpreted by the South African Government as encouragement to maintain their current practices.

Indeed, part of the problem may be the perception of the South African Government or the surrounding black governments in Africa of our policy.

How would you explain your policy so that they do not get the wrong impression?

Mr. GAYNER. It has to be explained obviously in terms of a greater acceleration and expansion of the scope of the existing reforms in South Africa.

I think that the reforms offered by the South African Government or even passed into law are significant. The problem is the implementation of them. This is where I think there is legitimate criticism.

But the way we can more effectively be involved in their implementation is to provide incentives for them to indeed be carried out. I am not sure that we are sufficiently doing that at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

Senator Pell, do you have questions?

Senator PELL. A couple, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hauck, what is the record, the track record, of other Western nations when it comes to investing in South Africa? Are they increasing or decreasing their investments?

Mr. HAUCK. To the best of my knowledge, the Western European nations over the past few years have not been increasing their direct investments. I think this is largely because of the depressed state of the South African economy, which is not creating many opportunities for foreign investments.

Senator PELL. What would be the percentage of the foreign investment in South Africa that is American or from the United States?

Mr. HAUCK. Approximately 20 percent of all foreign investment in South Africa is United States investment.

Senator PELL. Are you familiar with any moves on the part of other Western countries to disinvest?

Mr. HAUCK. There have been, over the past few years, several large British companies which have sold their South African interests to their South African partners in the venture.

I do not have any numbers of the total. But there have been those instances.

Senator PELL. Obviously, if we pass disinvestment laws, that will mean that divestment is no longer necessary.

In this regard, if there is total disinvestment on the part of American business, what would be the impact on the South African economy?

Mr. HAUCK. If all U.S. companies pulled out, sold their assets, and just came back?

Senator PELL. Sold their assets—which, presumably would be bought, perhaps at bargain prices by somebody else—what would be the impact on the economy?

Mr. HAUCK. I would argue that there would be no direct impact because of the financial rand system which has essentially locked in the value of foreign investment in South Africa. So, in order for a U.S. company to pull out, some foreigner has to invest money in the country.

So there is no net gain or loss to the South African economy.

Indirectly, the impact on business confidence in South Africa of a United States withdrawal might be small or might be dramatic. I frankly do not know how to predict that.

If it is a significant impact on business confidence, you know, depressing business confidence, you would see less investment by South African companies, more capital flight from the country through illegal channels, and those indirect consequences might hurt the South African economy.

Senator PELL. So disinvestment would still mean that the assets of that company would remain in South Africa—

Mr. HAUCK. Correct.

Senator PELL [continuing]. Though probably at a lower value?

Mr. HAUCK. And probably owned by South African companies.

Senator PELL. Dr. Baker or Mr. Gayner, would you agree with those views? Would you comment on them.

Mr. GAYNER. I would essentially be in agreement.

Ms. BAKER. I would essentially be in agreement as well, and would add one additional thought. The lack of access to United States technology and management know-how, of course, would be lost to the South African economy and I think that would be an indirect economic impact.

But the greatest impact would be psychological and political.

Senator PELL. And that really is the purpose of divestment, too, the psychological one.

Ms. BAKER. That's correct.

Senator PELL. If you, Dr. Baker, sell your stock to Mr. Hauck, that would not affect the stock, but it is going to have a psychological effect there.

Thank you very much.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to yield for the moment, since I came in late.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I am anxious to listen to the witnesses. I think that I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Noble reticence.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gayner, is it your position that the South African Government should restore significant support to RENAMO so that it might prevail in Mozambique?

Mr. GAYNER. No. I would rather that the process started by the Nkomati accord be culminated with some kind of peaceful resolution of the conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

What I fear is, for example, if sanctions are imposed, whatever incentive there is to move in that direction would be lost, and South Africa for other reasons may well step up assistance to RENAMO, as much as anything, to bring economic hardship upon their neighbors who are calling for sanctions.

As you know, Zimbabwe uses the Beira corridor through Mozambique, and, even have armed forces in that corridor to provide security for the export of goods.

So I think there are regional implications.

Senator SARBANES. Is it true that in South Africa there are elements in South Africa that are currently aiding RENAMO?

Mr. GAYNER. There has obviously been evidence to that, and I think Dr. Baker alluded to it.

Senator SARBANES. Would you regard that as a breach of the Nkomati accords?

Mr. GAYNER. It is, but the level at which they have aided them as much as anything I think is—

Senator SARBANES. Do you think Mozambique, that the Machel regime, is adhering to the Nkomati accords?

Mr. GAYNER. No; they are not either because, as I understand the agreement, there was supposed to be followup and continued negotiations to reach a peaceful accommodation between RENAMO and FRELIMO and Machel has been unwilling to do that.

I think the limited amount of assistance South Africa may still be providing RENAMO has indeed just kept channels of communication open between them. The amount of support South Africa gives to the Maputo government of Samora Machel vastly exceeds anything that may be still going to RENAMO, and, as you know, many of the workers in South Africa are from Mozambique.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think Machel has brought the ANC bases in that country to a halt?

Mr. GAYNER. As I understand it, that has largely been done. That part of the agreement has been abided by.

Senator SARBANES. And South Africa has not brought its support for the RENAMO resistance to a halt?

Mr. GAYNER. No; but those were not the only elements involved in the Nkomati accords, as I understand it.

Senator SARBANES. I would like to ask all members of the panel their view of the statement in this morning's paper by Malcolm Fraser, the former Prime Minister of Australia and the cochair of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in this morning's paper, which, commenting on the President's speech, he said, and I quote—this is Fraser, speaking about President Reagan's speech: "His speech on Tuesday equated the oppressed with the oppressors, the victims of apartheid with its perpetrators, in its efforts to be evenhanded in dealing with the cause and effect of apartheid."

Ms. BAKER. Well, Senator, I think that I largely agree with what Mr. Fraser said. I thought that the President's speech essentially muddled the issue. In fact, there was even one reference in the speech which actually startled me, when he said that the South African Government was under no obligation to talk to people in an

organization whose declared goal was the establishment of a Communist society.

Without naming it, I assume that what he meant was the ANC, and, of course, he was equating the ANC with a Communist organization. It has Communists in it, but to characterize it as such an extremist organization was basically wrong.

Throughout the speech, there was muddled thinking, I think, in terms of cause and effect. I would agree with Mr. Fraser on his characterization.

Mr. HAUCK. I would largely agree with Dr. Baker's view of that.

The other thing that concerns me in President Reagan's speech is the talk about black-on-black violence.

I am afraid that that is becoming a shorthand, if you will, to undercut or demean or diminish black opposition.

There are blacks killing blacks in South Africa, in horrendous ways, in ways that we should all be quite concerned and critical of. But there also is evidence that some of the black-on-black violence is at least state condoned if not state sponsored. And to keep talking about black-on-black violence without seeing that in some ways it is being used by the state to weaken the black opposition also muddies the waters down there.

Mr. GAYNER. I would say for precisely the latter point just raised that the President was essentially correct. He properly condemned not only the brutality involved with police actions that the South Africans have taken, the way they have raided churches and things like this; but he also denounced the terrorism that clearly is an element of the role of the African National Congress. The so-called necklacing of people I think is something that cannot obviously in any way be condoned. Yet, Oliver Tambo, for example, refuses to condemn it, and we also find within the ANC Winnie Mandela saying that this is a method of achieving liberation.

It is a method of intimidating more moderate elements of the black community who I think also have a role and a voice to play in the process of South Africa. They are the ones that I am afraid we are not hearing at all while the current struggle is going on between the South African Government and the revolutionary movement which is promoting violent means of changing that Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I want to ask Mr.—oh, I'm sorry. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am concerned about what we are rushing to do here in the apparent determination of the Congress to impose strong sanctions which I fear may have marvelous results in terms of our moral feelings and very little result in terms of changing South Africa.

I would be interested, first, in the reaction of each of the panel members to that general statement. Is it right, wrong, or would you modify it?

Ms. BAKER. Senator, I think you have put your finger on the most important issue with regard to sanctions, and that is how do we most have an impact.

I came away from my last trip to South Africa convinced that, without sanctions, any other efforts would fail. The reason I think so—and this is consistent with the conclusion of the Commonwealth delegation—is because all other efforts have been tried. Constructive engagement is essentially a no sanctions, let's push for negotiations, let's push for reform approach.

Essentially, none of the main urgings, particularly for negotiations, have worked.

The Commonwealth delegation was the most serious effort to concretize that.

Senator EVANS. Let me interrupt for just a moment.

Have they really not worked, or has it been the pressure of what has been done by this government and by others over the last few years that has led to some change?

Now, we can say that it is too slow, it is not enough, it does not really do the job, but there have been some significant changes internally in South Africa, have there not?

Ms. BAKER. There have been changes.

Senator EVANS. Would they have occurred absent the pressure of the last period?

Ms. BAKER. I think that the main motivations for the changes that have occurred are internal; that is, the pressures that blacks themselves and the business communities themselves have been exerting, the change in the nature of the Afrikaner population itself, their increasing urbanization, their realization that the classic kind of apartheid was not helping. And so, they are making internal changes, and they are not to be dismissed easily.

But the essential point is that the changes that they are making do not get down to the heart of the matter, which is power sharing. That is the issue now.

I do not think that the current policy efforts, nor any of the other ones which have not had any teeth in them, so to speak, have exerted sufficient pressure to get down to the issue of genuine power sharing.

Senator EVANS. Isn't that the puzzle that we find everywhere in the world, however, that governments, whatever they are or however they are constituted, are virtually never willing to share or give up power they retain? That is the essential problem with Nicaragua today. It is a problem throughout the world.

The first commandment of any government is political survival.

How are we going to effectively change that? And I agree with you that that is the fundamental question, of a minority government in a largely black or colored community not being willing to even share under any circumstances.

How do we achieve that?

Mr. HAUCK. I agree with that point, Senator Evans, that the South African Government is not willingly going to hand over power or share power. There is a very large and growing black opposition and also whites joining in the opposition movement to the authoritarianism of the present South African Government.

I think what the United States and the other Western powers have to think of is a program of sticks and carrots, if you will, that will help to change white attitudes. After all, it is the whites who keep voting this government into power.

So there is a sort of democracy for whites there.

But we also have to reach out and regain our lost credibility with black opposition groups in South Africa. That is why in my testimony I was suggesting instituting some noneconomic sanctions that would put some psychological pressure on whites, instituting economic sanctions in the sense of no new loans, no new investment, which do not really change the situation there, but which I think goes some way toward regaining credibility with black leaders.

Finally, and this is in the future, I think if the West is serious about having an impact in South Africa, we may have to have a situation like the Lancaster House talks with Zimbabwe, when it was Rhodesia, where the West guarantees or promises some sort of economic and social assistance package that holds out a different scenario, a different future scenario to white and black South Africans.

So, rather than after the white government comes the deluge, we can say after the white government hands over power comes a vibrant, strong South Africa that is nonracial.

Senator EVANS. That is devoutly to be wished. The difficulty is how to get there.

Mr. Gayner, what do you think are our responsibilities, if any, in South Africa? Or do you believe that it is entirely an internal matter that South Africans should puzzle out for themselves—in terms of the kinds of government, whether it is white controlled, shared, or majority ruled?

Mr. GAYNER. I think that, clearly, we have a responsibility there, as we do elsewhere in the world, to try responsibly to move the government there in the direction of a much more free and democratic society. I think we have enunciated global commitments to do that. But we also have vital interests there in terms of our economic relations, in terms of strategic relations, and also in terms of the regional implications of anything we do in South Africa.

If I can, I would also like to make two other comments relevant to your initial question.

One is that I think what is remarkable is the reform process that has taken place over the last 6 years or 7 years or so, compared to previous 6-year periods, for example.

I think I would agree with Dr. Baker that most of this is through internal pressures, especially changes in the economic situation, pressures of the business community and otherwise. I also think the United States helped to play a positive role in that process, as opposed to the situation in the late 1970's, when we had a very contentious relationship with South Africa and there was absolutely no movement in the reform direction at that time.

Second, a part of that reform process went to the heart of the question of power sharing.

Indeed, part of the major breakdown that has occurred in South Africa was over one of those reforms—the ending of the whites-only Parliament. Both at the same time that you established the colored and Asian elements of the Parliament, you had the National Party break up. This led to the creation of the Conservative Party because the right wing of the National Party thought this

was the end of apartheid. But at the same time, the tricameral Parliament did not give any rights to the blacks.

Consequently, much more profound dissatisfaction set in within the black community. This is why you had this rapid polarization, I think, in South Africa over these last several years now, since that one decision.

Senator EVANS. I see my time is up.

I would just make one final comment.

You talked about the violence of black against black, which is going to be perhaps pretty difficult for us to have much influence on. But the nature of the call for violence by some, it seems to me that that is the nature of many revolutionary movements, and I hardly think that Patrick Henry, when he said, "Give me liberty or give me death," was talking about negotiations.

He was talking about violent uprising against the government at that time, too.

I am not sure that I can buy the idea that because people ultimately get so frustrated by negotiations that they seek or talk about violence, that we ought to reject any willingness to talk with or work with those groups.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Evans.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

I would make just two points.

First, I would ask for just a quick comment from all three of you, if you could. Yesterday, in part of the questioning, the question was raised about a new Ambassador to South Africa. The Secretary of State indicated that he would hope to be able to have a new replacement on line at some point in the very near future.

I wonder if you might comment on that. Putting aside for a moment the question of the sanctions, what sort of political message would be conveyed if we just decided not to replace the Ambassador, but merely called back our current Ambassador and then allowed the Embassy to function without one there?

Would that be a worthwhile step at all? If so, why? If not, why not?

Ms. BAKER. I think it would be a very easy way to send a message that sanctions, if they were properly applied, could also send.

My feeling is that this whole debate over a black Ambassador or what kind of Ambassador, again, is somewhat missing the point. It is the message and not the messenger that counts here.

If the United States simply did not send an Ambassador, I think that would send a very clear message.

Mr. HAUCK. I would second that point and would point out that we had recalled the Ambassador last year, when there was a South Africa raid on Gulf Oil facilities in Angola. We kept the Ambassador here for several months—I mean on Botswana.

I was also in South Africa at the end of July, when many of the European countries pulled their ambassadors. I can tell you on the ground that the feeling among white South Africans was one of concern. Those were banner headlines, when I think eight or nine ambassadors pulled out.

I think considering the second state of emergency, the most sweeping press restrictions that that country has ever had, with

thousands of people being rounded up, if now is not a time to call an ambassador back for consultations, it is difficult to imagine under what situation you would call an ambassador back.

Mr. GAYNER. I would disagree with that and would say that I think we should maintain an Ambassador there precisely so that we have the highest level possible critic of actions being taken in South Africa that we disapprove of, such as the state of emergency.

I think we can more effectively protest elements of the state of emergency if it is coming from the Ambassador than if it is coming from the Charge d'Affaires at the Embassy.

Senator DODD. Last, let me ask you this question. It is a large question and I do not expect you to obviously answer it in its entirety. But if you could give us a short assessment.

One, I would like to ask if there is any question in any of your minds whether or not black majority rule is going to come to South Africa. I am not asking you to give me a timeframe for it, but I am asking whether or not you question that basic premise. Is that not an inevitability, at least in the foreseeable future?

If that is the case, if you believe that to be the case, I would like you to give me some sort of sense of what you believe to be the perception of the United States within South Africa in both the black, the colored, and the Asian community. We have a tendency to focus on the black community. I would like to know what the perception is in your minds in the Asian and colored communities as well.

Last, in this same context, what in your assessment is the perception of the United States at this juncture, throughout the rest of Africa, and what is it likely to be if black majority rule comes, in light of where we have been positioned, as regard to the present policy toward South Africa?

The CHAIRMAN. Please give very short answers, even though it is a complex question.

Senator DODD. And if you want to submit something later in greater detail, that would be fine, too, Mr. Chairman. I realize it is a tall order.

Mr. GAYNER. I think black majority rule will come to South Africa. The question is what is meant often by "black majority rule."

I think the difficult thing, which obviously needs to be worked out there, is the modality of representation of all segments of South African society in some form of government there. This reflects upon divisions not only between, I think, the colored community, the Asian community, and the whites, but also within the black community. This is why I think they need to develop some kind of system that obviously adequately protects all rights of minorities there. In fact, every single group, if you break groups down enough, turns into minority.

That is why I am a bit uncomfortable simply talking of "black majority rule," as though you were going to end up with simply a black-white division or black and nonblack division, to be more precise, in South Africa.

I would take an example. It is intriguing to me what has happened in Nigeria, where they established a real democratic system. It broke down twice. It is now in its second phase of breakdown.

This time the Nigerian rule insists that they are not going to imitate the Western parliamentary models because they did not work for them. They are going to try to devise some other system that deals with the indigenous problems in Nigeria.

I think that is something they need to do and it is something that needs to be done in South Africa.

Mr. HAUCK. Very quickly, on the first part, yes, I believe that blacks will be incorporated in a political system and it will be in some way perhaps a modified one man one vote, or something like that. But they will gain political power.

As for the second part, the views of the United States in the black community, the black African communities, as we have said, are very negative, and in the colored community, as well, I think they are fairly negative—maybe slightly less so. The Asian community, I would think, is probably a little bit less politicized and a little bit less polarized on the issue of the United States.

Even the colored Labor Party, which has a very large majority—it participated in the tricameral Parliament—last year they had said that they would call for a complete withdrawal of foreign companies I believe in 5 years if there has not been political change.

So, if you will, even perhaps the most conservative wing of the colored community is looking, perhaps, to a time when economic sanctions would be necessary.

Ms. BAKER. Very quickly, I think majority rule is inevitable in South Africa.

I hesitate to use the term "black majority rule," because that tends to conjure up an image of no white role whatsoever, and I have not given up hope. I think that there is a possibility of a democratic option in South Africa if actions are taken soon enough.

But there is no question in my mind that blacks will be in power in South Africa, inevitably.

As far as the perception of the United States is concerned, I think it is the lowest in Africa that it ever has been, over the South African issue, and certainly lowest among the black population and the coloreds in South Africa that it has ever been.

I think the Asian community is less so, mainly because I think the predominant Asian community is not as politicized. They are more commercially oriented.

Again, it is very hard to characterize groups of people on the basis of color. There now are divisions in South Africa that are occurring in terms of pro-Government and anti-Government, opposition and this cuts across the color lines.

In fact, there are whites in South Africa—and this should never be missed—that are very anti-apartheid and very opposed to the policy of this government.

So simply to categorize it in terms of colored, Asian, and black against all whites is somewhat of a misperception.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator KASSEBAUM.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for missing the testimony, and I hesitate to ask any questions since I do not want to be repetitive, and it is getting late.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gayner, I would like to ask you this quick question.

Did you follow the Secretary of State's testimony yesterday?

Mr. GAYNER. Unfortunately, I followed it as long as it was on television. But they cut him off to give us the Dan Manion debate on the floor.

Senator KERRY. But you heard his assertions with respect to a downward economic spiral and the notion that the marketplace was, in and of itself, forcing changes, that it was its own kind of sanctions? Do you agree with that?

Mr. GAYNER. Yes; in his testimony, I thought he made that point very clearly and eloquently, that this is one of the best lessons the South African Government is learning by the current problems.

Senator KERRY. If the downward trend of the economy is, in fact, acting as a form of sanctions, why would not the increased downward trend act as more of a form of sanctions?

Mr. GAYNER. Because one of the impacts of this downward trend, as I indicated earlier, I think, is this polarization in South African society, in which you have a growing number of people who are saying that the downward trend is being caused by the foreign influence, therefore let's cut ourselves off from the foreign influence and sort of go our own way. I think this is the attitude reflected in the Conservative Party within South Africa. I think that there may well be an increase of sentiment for that attitude.

Part of it is it accelerates in that direction I think precisely because the belief of a vast majority of the whites in South Africa is that they have made significant steps in the direction of reform, and that at the same time they have done that the steps in the direction of sanctions have increased parallel to that.

So it has led to an enormous frustration.

Senator KERRY. What do you cite as significant steps of reform? What is the most significant step of reform?

Mr. GAYNER. I would think the most recent one is the lifting of the pass laws, because that is something that affected all blacks in South Africa. There were hundreds of thousands of people who were arrested on that basis every year.

Senator KERRY. Are you aware that the pass law restriction, the lifting thereof was replaced immediately with a uniform identity document, which still lists race?

Mr. GAYNER. It is a uniform identity document that all South Africans carry.

Senator KERRY. It still lists race, correct?

Mr. GAYNER. Yes; it still lists race.

Senator KERRY. So that is not really a move away from apartheid, is it?

Mr. GAYNER. Well, I think it most certainly is. Most countries of the world have universal identity cards, and many of these other countries also list race on those identity cards. I don't think that, per se, is an aspect of apartheid.

Senator KERRY. But it's the pillar of apartheid.

Mr. GAYNER. Apartheid is the restriction of the people's ability to move about.

Senator KERRY. Isn't that the pillar of apartheid? Isn't that the whole essence of apartheid, the classification by race?

Mr. GAYNER. If in our country we write on my driver's license what race I am, I don't think that means that we have an apartheid system.

Senator KERRY. It doesn't have it on ours. Does it have it on other licenses, what race you are? I don't think so.

Is it on your driver's license?

Mr. HAUCK. Senator, may I respond?

Senator KERRY. Yes.

Mr. GAYNER. If not listed now on driver's licenses with photos, it is listed on numerous other documents.

Mr. HAUCK. On the question of the identity document, you are correct in that when it was first proposed, there was going to be a digit explaining the race. Because of protests within South Africa, within the white opposition party in Parliament, the Government has announced that it will drop that digit.

However, the Race Classification Act, where people are racially classified and that determines where they live, the government has not talked about repealing that act. But as far as the digit on the document, that is gone.

Senator KERRY. Let me come back to the line of the economy because I am perplexed.

At the end of your testimony, you spend a considerable amount of time talking about economic engagement. While on the one hand you say that you agree with the Secretary of State that the downward spiral was forcing change, I think you prescribe a policy that would have exactly the reverse effect. You say that to spur change, the Reagan administration should produce a strategy to try to have some investment leverage, and instead of disinvestment, increased American participation in the economy, retraction of the Krugerrand restriction, counter state local disinvestment laws, assistance to American trade unions, et cetera. All of these things would have the impact of reversing the very trends which the Secretary of State places the most stock in in the current process of change.

It seems to me that that totally flies in the face of the policy that you agree with, that it is a total contradiction.

Mr. GAYNER. Well, no. I think the Secretary has also said that what investment and involvement we have had in South Africa has been a positive force for change in South Africa. That is the element of it that I have emphasized.

I think I went into this a little bit possibly before you came in here, that these changes and moves in that direction I would tie to only integrated institutions in South Africa, to companies involved in nondiscriminatory employment.

The Secretary's point that I think coincides with mine. At the present time, obviously there is no movement in that direction because there is no new investment going in to South Africa. But to open up those channels, the South African Government will then know that if they lift the state of emergency and the violence diminishes there, then these opportunities will be available to them. This encourages them to move more rapidly in a reform direction.

Senator KERRY. Given the reaction of Desmond Tutu and other black leaders——

The CHAIRMAN. That will have to be the Senator's last question.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Yes, Mr. Chairman, my last question—and Malcolm Frazier and others to the President's speech and to the lack of some new process by the United States, given that reaction, given your fear and the fear of many people that we are becoming a new recruiter for communism, if you will, because we are not giving people a sense of viable options, given that, how do you feel that we are sending a message or that those steps would send a message that would, in fact, encourage change? Why would it not have the opposite effect and do what has happened for the last 5½ years, which is bring people to this point of frustration where, in fact, violence is encouraged rather than discouraged?

Mr. GAYNER. Because I hear other voices coming from the black and other elements of the nonwhite community in South Africa that say that these are the kind of things we need to do so that the more moderate elements within South Africa can get together and work out a peaceful accommodation.

I am afraid that we possibly listen far too much to the voices of the African National Congress and think that they speak for the great black majority in South Africa.

There is little effective polling there, so it is always difficult to precisely gauge attitudes in the black community.

I just came from a meeting this morning with nine pastors, who represented various churches in South Africa whose membership total several million. They very strongly endorse the general direction that the President took in his speech, feeling that it was in the direction of conciliation in South Africa. They think they have been relatively successful in moving toward a reconciliation between all racial groups within South Africa, and they would like the United States to help them in that process.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Gayner.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Pressler, do you have questions of these witnesses?

Senator PRESSLER. I have just two brief questions, and I apologize for being absent. There was another hearing, on a scientific matter, where a large group from my State was testifying.

There is an assumption, a generally accepted assumption, that if the worst type of sanctions were placed against South Africa, somehow the Botha government would move to the left or would fall.

Do you share that basic assumption?

Mr. GAYNER. I do not, and I think I made it rather clear in my testimony that, if anything, I think it would have rather the opposite effect.

The Botha government at this point fears more erosion of its support to the right rather than to the left. In fact, in recent elections there has been a consolidation of more liberal support, I think, for the National Party, and the division in South Africa is now between the Conservative Party and the National Party. There is not growing strength for the more liberal, or Federal Party, in South Africa.

Senator PRESSLER. How do you see that?

Mr. HAUCK. Just to follow up on that, I agree on the facts, but I disagree on the conclusion.

I think if there were very broad-based sanctions that did have a direct and dramatic impact on the economy of South Africa, the right wing would mount a greater challenge to the National Party, and the National Party would lose some voters to the right. But they would also pick up voters from the liberals, to the left.

I think, in net terms, the National Party would remain as strong.

Psychologically, it may feel weaker, it may feel threatened. But I don't think there would really be a challenge that would oust the National Party.

Senator PRESSLER. If there were a civil war in South Africa, in trying to analyze the future, with which side would each of you fall? Let's say that it is assumed that the Afrikaaners and the whites would be on one side. Which side would you say Chief Buthelezi and the Asians and the coloreds, would be on?

How would you see the sides lining up, so to speak, if there were a civil war?

Ms. BAKER. First of all, if there were a civil war, I don't think you could draw divisions in terms of just two factions. But I think Chief Buthelezi would probably try to maneuver himself into a position of working with whites but not with the present government.

It is very difficult to characterize that. The coloreds, I think, would, as they have been doing, drift with the blacks, and do identify largely with the blacks, and probably the Asians would be swept into that background as well.

Senator PRESSLER. The Asians would be on which side?

Ms. BAKER. With the blacks, probably.

Senator PRESSLER. How would you see such a potential situation?

Mr. GAYNER. Slightly differently, I suppose.

I think the Asian community in South Africa is the largest Asian community anywhere in Africa, and they are especially sensitive to much of the talk of black majority rule in a threatening sense. I think they well realize, for example, what happened with the Asian community in Uganda, and they are more sensitive to developing some kind of institutional mechanism to protect minority rights.

The problem is that within the black community, such keen divisions exist that to emphasize the division of South Africa into simple black-white conflict, especially in terms of a civil war, is not that relevant a one. What I would say is very interesting is the largest element of the black community, which is the Zulu element, in fact are reaching an effective accommodation with the more progressive government in Natal province, with this proposal of a Kwa-Natal political consolidation. If they can work out this modality in the middle of the great struggle going on between the far left among the blacks and the Afrikaaners, then I think that provides some great hope for South Africa.

Senator PRESSLER. My whole difficulty—and I thank you very much—the reason for asking that is I think we need to look into some of the assumptions under which we have been operating. I think if we dig into them, they are quite different than the generally accepted assumptions in the fever that we find on this issue.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

I would say to our witnesses that we thank you very much for your excellent testimony and your willingness to respond to questions.

You are excused.

The Chair will now call a second panel to the table, consisting of John Silber, the president of Boston University; Derek Bok, the president of Harvard University; and the Honorable Edward Regan, comptroller of the State of New York, in Albany, NY.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I will not be able to stay for the second panel. But I have read the testimony of President Silber and President Bok.

I must tell you that the testimony of the president of Boston University, John Silber, is among the most creative and nonconventional that I have seen, and I will be very interested to read the record and see how he answers the questions that will undoubtedly be put to him by some of our colleagues.

But I think that he has hit upon some possible solutions that perhaps will lead us out of this. I, unfortunately, see the options on all sides as rather grim, at the moment. He seems to have a rather constructive way of dealing with it, and I compliment him for that.

I apologize for not remaining to listen to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boschwitz.

Gentlemen, let me just mention again, because some members of the committee have come in during the time of the first panel, that we will ask each one of you to testify within a 10-minute period of time and then we will have 5-minute question periods for committee members.

Let the Chair mention that we are grateful for such excellent attendance of committee members but it does mean that our questioning period extends. I would just comment that at the rate we have proceeded through our first distinguished panel, we will clearly be here at 2 o'clock.

Now that is not all bad. But, nevertheless, I want everybody to be advised of the timetable under which we seem to be working.

If members will cooperate with the time limits, we will make certain that we have fairness for everybody.

I would like to recognize in the order that I introduced the panel first of all President Silber, then President Bok, and then Comptroller Regan.

President Silber.

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. SILBER, PRESIDENT, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MA

Dr. SILBER. Senator Lugar, I am very pleased to have the invitation of the committee. I don't believe I can live up to the advance billing of Senator Boschwitz. I am not at all convinced that I or anyone has the solution to this tragic problem, but I welcome the opportunity of addressing it.

In 10 minutes, it is not going to be possible to be as rigorous as Senator Pressler suggested. But I hope my written testimony is

more satisfactory on that point. I will look first at the problems, very briefly, and then at a proposal for some steps that may be needed.

The problem of apartheid is very much like that of slavery. It is an institution that bears a very unpleasant resemblance to slavery. It is for that reason, I am sure, that the issue of apartheid in South Africa so profoundly affects and moves the people of the United States. We recognize our own tragic history, in which we participated in an institution even more evil than apartheid. And yet apartheid is close to slavery in many respects: The debasement of human dignity and the distortion of family relations, the distortion of relationships at the workplace, are such that no one can look at apartheid and fail to feel anguish for those who suffer under it.

As a matter of fact, we are all united by our opposition to apartheid. Our opposition is not only commendable; it is commonplace. This is not what divides us. The question that divides us is how to end apartheid: How to face this evil and do something about it without in the process creating a situation more evil than the situation we are trying to alleviate.

For that reason, I think it is instructive to look at the example of Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States who had to face the problem of slavery. He was a very unpopular President, at least in his first term. In his first term, when the Union was threatened by division, he looked for moderate means to save it. He rejected the strident counsel of those who would either engage in war to destroy the Union, or who would engage in war to preserve it. He came up with a plan that was ridiculed at the time, and culminated against by prophetic orators: His plan was to buy the slaves. That plan was thought to be immoral by the abolitionists from Boston. It was thought to be trading with the slave power, and it was rejected. It was also opposed by the New York bankers, who thought it was too expensive.

As a matter of fact, it would have been the least expensive and by far the most moral alternative to the tragic situation faced by the United States when Mr. Lincoln became President. And I think we ought to be guided by his example, which is to forsake the rhetoric, to forsake the exercises of moral outrage which provide motivation for change but do not provide guidance for change, which, if anything, blind us to the rational path by which a solution may be found. Instead, like Lincoln, we should seek moderation and see if there is a way to end the evil of apartheid without introducing greater evil.

I don't believe any of us would be interested in the services of a doctor who said, "Oh, I know how to cure cancer. You can kill cancer by killing the patient." And this is very much the situation that we face in South Africa, where many of the advocates for change demand actions that are so destructive of human life and values, especially for black South Africans, that no one could morally justify them.

Oliver Tambo and the African National Congress should be subjected to close scrutiny by the Senate of the United States, because they are not the equivalent of Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, although they are passed off as such by many people in the United States. The ANC is a group

that intends a violent overthrow of South Africa. They plan a revolution; they say so openly. And Oliver Tambo, one of its leaders, has said that he will rule in the ruins.

It is instructive to read the words of Johnny Makatini, the African National Congress' delegate to the United Nations. He said, "If only 4 million on us are left after the revolution, that would be better than the present situation." Lincoln wouldn't have said that; Martin Luther King wouldn't have said it; Chief Buthelezi, Alan Paton, and Helen Suzman wouldn't say it, and neither would I. Makatini was saying that the destruction of perhaps 17 million black lives would result in a situation better than the situation at the present time in South Africa. That is the voice of abstract cruelty. That is the statement of somebody who doesn't care about black South Africans but who cares about an ideology, about putting in place a new form of government more to his liking, no matter what the human cost. In a situation like this, it is very important not to be abstract, but to be concrete, to be aware of the human suffering that is involved.

A wise human being must examine the relation of means and ends and recognize that if he forgets the distinction between means and ends, focuses too much on the means, he may, as Emerson said, "By marrying the means lose the ends". We must remember that our end is to abolish apartheid. We are not committed to divestment, to disinvestment, to sanctions, or to any other particular means; we are committed to whatever means can be shown rationally and thoughtfully and through experience and commonsense and careful analysis to be the most effective means by which apartheid can not only be ended, but be ended with a minimum of suffering for black South Africans and for all South Africans. Just to end apartheid by dropping an atomic bomb on Pretoria is not the kind of solution we are looking for, although that would probably end apartheid. We must find a more thoughtful, compassionate way out of this terrible situation.

Now, there are complex reasons why sanctions as proposed thus far will not, in my opinion, work. Many of those have already been laid out for the committee. First of all, some proposals, such as the House resolution on sanctions, are formulations that, if passed into law, would elevate hypocrisy to the level of national policy. If we impose sanctions on trade with South Africa that exclude everything except strategic minerals, we will be engaged in an act of profound hypocrisy. And if we added strategic minerals to the embargo list, that would succeed only in giving a monopoly on those materials to the Soviet Union, which would not only have a deleterious effect on our economy, but would put our national security at risk. I don't see how anyone could advocate that.

We have also learned from our experience with our grain embargo on the Soviet Union that these policies can backfire. The grain embargo hurt our farmers; it hurt our trade position; and it was a great benefit to Canadian, Argentinian, and Australian farmers. We have to be more thoughtful than this. If we are not engaged in hypocrisy, if we are not engaged in public relations stunts, then the introduction of sanctions on trade will either do nothing more than make us feel good, by providing us with an immediate release from our moral indignation, or the sanctions will truly be effective. And

if they are effective, they will accelerate the downward spiral to the point that the Government and the economy of South Africa collapse. If that happens, the destitution and misery will be so severe that bloodshed and civil war will be the only alternative.

Let me now move quickly to what I think might be done in a more positive way. I think we must identify the extremists among the whites; we must identify the extremists among the blacks. And we must avoid the extremists after exposing them. Likewise we must identify the moderates, and we must do everything we can to encourage them. Chief Buthelezi and his political organization, Inkatha, are good examples of the large number of blacks interested in cooperation with the Government of South Africa to end apartheid.

We can further this by a conference. I proposed last November to the President that a Camp David conference be called to which leaders of all parties, including Mr. Mandela, would be invited. All parties would come together, and it would quickly become apparent who were so extreme in their views that they would not cooperate in finding a solution and who were sufficiently moderate and concerned for the well-being of South Africa that they would cooperate. After identifying that subgroup willing to cooperate, the conference would draft the agenda for the establishment of those structures necessary for the protection of minorities when political power has been transferred and the creation of those institutions necessary for the successful transfer of power to the majority. The conferees would work out a timetable for the practical development of those structures, and then return to South Africa to continue negotiations and begin the implementation of their agreements.

This, in my opinion, could be followed by a second major initiative, which is not to reduce but to expend the American investment in South Africa. The success of democracy depends upon not damaging but expanding the economy of South Africa, and in raising the standard of living of blacks in South Africa. So, with tax incentives, I would encourage investment by American corporations in South Africa that would be willing to operate under the human rights commitments required by United States law. This would add enforcement power to the Sullivan principles. It would expand the scope of the Sullivan principles by ensuring the cooperation of those ninety corporations that have been reluctant to adopt Reverend Sullivan's principles. It would guarantee that American companies doing business in South Africa would in all their operations observe United States laws with regard to civil rights issues.

I would also urge that direct grants be given to individuals and organizations in South Africa who are committed to peaceful change in achieving to an integrated society, and can provide specific programs that will further this objective.

The United States must reject the policy and practices of the African National Congress. It will not do for us to encourage the ANC and then sit here watching our television sets while Armageddon takes place in South Africa as a result of our support of the ANC or of policies that by destroying the economy of South Africa bring destitution and a desperation that makes civil war inevitable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Silber appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, President Silber. President Bok.

**STATEMENT OF DEREK BOK, PRESIDENT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA**

Mr. Bok. My name is Mr. Bok, president of Harvard University. I should emphasize, since universities are quite particular about not taking political positions on matters not directly involving higher education, that I come here to speak my own personal views and do not purport to speak for as unruly an institution as the one that I represent.

It is a particular pleasure to see among the Senators two former students and a former parent. I know that each will have his own personal reasons for being particularly savage in their questioning of me, and I look forward to that. [Laughter.]

I testified last year on this same subject, and sent a letter, along with Don Kennedy of Stanford a few months ago, saying that events in my view, in our view, justified a further look. We then sent another letter enlisting about 95 colleagues, presidents of other universities, backing further sanctions. And so it is a particular pleasure to have a chance to discuss that very subject and see the interest which the Senate and the Congress are taking in it.

If I could be very brief, because I know you want to get to questions, let me try to put into a capsule the main points of the testimony that I have submitted in written form.

First of all, one may ask what can we hope to accomplish by sanctions. I do not think a serious look at the situation would give us a great deal of hope that there is some kind of economic leverage so powerful that it will bring the Afrikaner regime to its knees.

On the other hand, I think there are other objectives that we have that are more realistic to think about, and they really depend on viewing sanctions not only as exerting economic pressure, although they will do that, but, as we have emphasized in various ways this morning, to pay attention to their psychological dimension, recognizing that probably the most likely way in which apartheid will come to an end will be when the white population of South Africa no longer cares to remain the kinds of human beings which they increasingly will have to be in order to enforce apartheid and keep it in effect.

Therefore, the psychological dimension of what we do is important. It is important to see what we can do to persuade South African moderates—and I would include the business community—that the disapproval of this country is genuine and profound, that the isolation in which they are increasingly slipping is very real, and that the long-term economic consequences of the continuation of the present regime are significant.

In this connection, it is worth remembering that, according to polls published in the Rand Daily Mail 18 months ago and earlier, there is a very sizeable portion of the white community that favors negotiations with the black South Africans.

I also think we need to worry about what impact we are having on South African blacks and how we can persuade them that we are genuinely committed to their welfare and to the ending of

apartheid. I think we have to worry about how we can show the rest of Africa, the rest of the world, indeed how we can convince significant elements of the American people that we are sincerely committed to freedom, equality, and not just to our particular self-interest. And finally we need to try to persuade other advanced countries to follow our lead in developing a package of measures which will help bring about an end to apartheid.

Those seem to me to be our objectives.

I do not believe that the status quo or the Executive order of last year does a very good job of achieving these goals. The sanctions imposed in that order are too weak. There are no specific objectives or targets listed. And, worst of all, the way in which the Executive order came in blurred the essential message, made it not a universal, strong expression of our condemnation of apartheid, but, rather, a last minute maneuver to head off even worse sanctions. It therefore lacked the power and strength that a piece of legislation enacted through both Houses of Congress and signed by the President would have had.

I also believe that total divestment is not an effective alternative either. We have heard, I think, persuasive evidence that the economic effects are not anything like what they might be cracked up to be. There are also a long series of polls indicating that black South Africans by a substantial majority oppose total divestment. It seems to me that one needs to be very clear, much clearer than any reasonable person can be, that divestment will have a substantial and positive effect before one can introduce remedies that are that drastic and that have the potential of harming innocent bystanders to that extent.

I do try to lay out in the testimony certain criteria that I would hope sanctions would meet. I believe they should make a definitive and convincing showing of American feeling on the subject of apartheid, a feeling I think that can only be convincingly made by a law passed by Congress. I think they should be strong enough sanctions that they are credible, and make our convictions believable. I think that they should, to the extent they can, minimize harm to blacks and other innocent bystanders and focus it on the South African Government and its supporters. I think they should have specific objectives, such as the ending of the state of emergency, the freeing of political prisoners, the initiation of negotiation, and I think there should be at least the implication of further sanctions if the situation continues to go on as it has.

Without wanting to take up more time, I would subscribe very much to much of the analysis of David Hauck in outlining the sanctions, the package of sanctions, that he outlined. I would certainly want to look at some additional ones, such as translating the current Executive order into legislation, which at least has the psychological effect of making clear that it is long term.

I would look at ways of inhibiting the transfer of technology that may be needed by the South African Government, but could be inhibited without harming black South African workers. I would look at whether there are particular kinds of sanctions, in other words, that meet these criteria, in addition to the ones that Mr. Hauck mentioned. And I would also very much endorse his idea of a carrot as well as a stick, by trying to continue the efforts that the

government, and also universities and others, are making to try to look toward the long-term and help educationally and in other ways to build up black South Africa so that when the inevitable day comes, when there is a transfer of leadership, we have done everything we can to create the conditions for a viable, democratic society in that country.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bok appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, President Bok.
Comptroller Regan.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD V. REGAN, COMPTROLLER, STATE
OF NEW YORK, ALBANY, NY

Mr. REGAN. Mr. Chairman, I am the State comptroller of New York State. I am the sole trustee of the New York Common Retirement Fund with assets of \$30 billion, a member of the board of trustees of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System, with assets of \$19 billion, and work closely with the New York City pension systems, with assets of \$25 billion. Combined, the public pension systems in the State are worth \$74 billion.

I and the citizens of New York abhor the policy of apartheid under which the South African Government exercises almost total control over its population.

I believe we feel more compassion for the millions of blacks trapped under this system than President Reagan's or Secretary Shultz' remarks would indicate. Apartheid, we believe—and I know this is shared universally—must be eliminated.

I ask specifically that you and the President assert your respective roles as the designers and implementers of United States foreign policy and take strong appropriate action as to South Africa. I specifically ask that you quickly agree on a sanctions bill and pass it.

In any event, I will take strong, independent action to force the issue by convincing the corporations in our portfolio to leave South Africa. I will do this with the help of my colleagues who administer other large pension funds in this country.

Before I explain how we accomplish this, I want to discuss a related activity involving public pension funds which has received some public attention but, as yet, has an undemonstrated effect on apartheid.

In New York, my pension systems have been asked by the Governor and many members of the State legislature to divest—as distinguished, I will show later from disinvestment—to divest, to sell our assets in those companies that have business in South Africa. The New York City system already has announced a plan of limited divestment.

The goal of the Governor and the legislature to express outrage at apartheid is one I obviously and completely share.

But the selling of stocks and bonds of America's largest corporations, I believe, is the wrong way to accomplish this goal.

Some public pension funds of States and municipalities and some foundations and endowment funds are divesting. Others are considering it.

On the other hand, the more than 22,000 private corporate and union pension funds in the Nation, with assets of close to \$800 billion, do not divest, for legal interpretations of ERISA place a cloud over such actions. This movement, then, is focused solely on public pension funds.

Of the public funds, the New Jersey Pension System is the only large fund similar to ours undergoing complete divestment. In the first 4 months, when that State sold only \$439 million worth of stock, out of a scheduled divestment program that could reach \$5 billion, the State Director of Investments reports it has already cost New Jersey \$4.8 million directly in transaction costs and \$45 million indirectly as increased unfunded liabilities.

As to New York, fully implementing the proposed divestment legislation would cost our taxpayers \$465 million to \$840 million, according to a Wilshire Associates study, and \$332 million to \$573 million, according to a New York State Senate Finance Committee study.

The retirement security of our 765,000 members and their families could be affected by this loss.

Divestment, as these studies show, and certainly as they pertain to large systems, is harmful to taxpayers and pensioners alike. And it has not been demonstrated that it affects apartheid.

The New Jersey experience, again, is instructive. The State's investment director very recently said, "I have not received a single inquiry about our divestment program from any representative of any American company or the South African Government."

With the exception of takeover attempts and annual meetings, corporations do not appear to be overly concerned with who buys or who sells their stock, or why they do so.

Let me now return to describe our goals and activities and their effect on corporate presence in the country of South Africa.

As a large institutional shareholder, we will, working with others who share our same goal, continually exercise the moral commitment to force our multinational corporations to abide by high ethical and social standards. Here is how we accomplish this specifically.

For the last 3 years, our pension system has repeatedly demanded that its portfolio corporations subscribe to and fully comply with the Sullivan principles. We have written and continually correspond with them and talk with them and work on the audit and are very, very careful to monitor their performance.

We monitor and publicly critique their Sullivan principles performance. We insist that they join organizations fighting to change apartheid.

We have stepped up these activities with personal appearances now at annual meetings of these corporations, and have repeatedly reminded them in meetings and in writing that apartheid and the free enterprise system cannot long coexist.

In the past months, we voted our shares for 14 resolutions to require companies to withdraw from that country, and not coincidentally, as a result of working with other concerned shareholders, and, of course, the conditions in that country, 41 of our portfolio corporations have left South Africa since January 1, 1985. GE was the latest.

Now that is what we have done so far without any organized national effort, and here is my plan for the coming year.

In early August, we will begin to file shareholder resolutions with the 121 of our portfolio corporations—and the resolution and the corporations you have there—that remain in South Africa for their 1987 annual meetings, requiring them to “implement a disinvestment program by withdrawal from South Africa unless by the end of May 1987 the system of apartheid is statutorily dismantled.”

We will undertake an aggressive national campaign by making personal appeals and attending seminars and conventions to recruit other large pension systems, foundation and endowment funds to vote with us.

Can this plan work?

Let's take General Motors as an example.

As of June 30, 1986, the two State pension systems I am directly involved with held 4,568,000 shares of General Motors, representing 1 percent of the ownership.

Currently, we estimate that the California, Michigan, Texas and Ohio pension systems hold about 6 million shares.

So, hypothetically, working together, we could vote 2.3 percent of the General Motors' ownership.

I might add that GM, as far as my own one system is concerned is a less than average example. For instance, we vote alone 1.6 percent of Goodyear, 1.2 percent of Colgate Palmolive, and the like.

Now, obviously, with an organized 6 month campaign and given the volatility of the issue, particularly if the United States Government does not act, we surely can vote through our collective shareholder strength a much higher percentage than the hypothetical 2.3 percent for General Motors that I just mentioned.

At the last General Motors annual meeting on May 23, 1986, with no campaign, our fund and other shareholders, representing 9 percent of the ownership, voted to require General Motors to cease doing business with the Government of South Africa. GM announced that action that very day.

That, coupled with the pullout of 41 of our portfolio corporations, shows, in my opinion, that this plan will work, and that we will have a dramatic effect on corporate presence in South Africa.

Now, what will be the effect of this action on our pension systems?

Every company that disinvests—that pulls out—from South Africa is one less company we will be under pressure to divest from. And stock prices have long reflected the implication of a company's presence in South Africa.

Therefore, as companies pull out, our asset value will remain unchanged.

So our position of disinvestment, requiring corporate withdrawal from South Africa, as it is achieved, not only strikes a demonstrable blow against apartheid, but will not cost our taxpayers and pensioners anything. It keeps our portfolio fully invested, fully diversified, and secure.

Let me conclude now where I opened.

While the Federal Government is debating sanctions, while you here are debating sanctions and other actions directed to South

Africa, States and institutions will, in fact, exercise those actions, and assert foreign policy for this Nation in a major part of the world. While Secretary Shultz asks for maximum flexibility, we will be limiting that flexibility, closing options.

I recommend that you legislate a timetable and standards for the South African Government to dismantle the system of apartheid and, if that is not done, to alternatively impose sanctions, one of which should be a phased removal of American corporations and investments from that country.

I recommend that you underscore the Federal Government's leadership role in setting foreign policy by incorporating in any legislation a clear statement of preemption under time-tested principles of our Constitution, which provide that foreign policy must be made by the Federal Government.

As major shareholders in corporate America, we have moral and ethical responsibilities which we are exercising to the fullest, especially as they pertain to South Africa and apartheid.

The U.S. Government has major foreign policy responsibilities. We should exercise both our responsibilities forcefully, in harmony with one another.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Regan appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Comptroller Regan.

The members now will observe a 5 minute time limit on questioning.

Let me commence the questioning by noting that through correspondence last year when we were considering South Africa legislation, Comptroller Regan raised the issue of preemption so that various municipalities and local governments would not be seeking to carry out separate and distinct foreign policies. It was the will of the Congress last year that preemption was not a good idea, and I suspect your testimony today is an ingenious demonstration of what can happen in the absence of preemption. Clearly, the role that you and people managing these large pension funds can lay is substantial. I do not know whether many of these companies left South Africa because of the leverage you were exerting through the filing of stockholder petitions, but it is apparent that your influence on the policies of General Motors was considerable. My guess is that these sorts of actions are going to be reflected in the market place.

At least you and Secretary Shultz are in agreement that the American free enterprise system and the stockholders in major companies can mightily affect economic policy.

Let me just ask one additional question, however.

Despite the fact that the situation of your pensioners must be enhanced by American firms leaving South Africa, many people have testified that most American firms are losing money in South Africa in any event. Their assets are diminishing rapidly.

But others have testified that, in fact, we ought to be doing more. Granted that in our own self-interest it might be wise for us all to leave that country, is there a case to be made that we ought to be investing and we ought to have more of a hands-on policy in South Africa?

How would you respond to those advocates?

Mr. REGAN. Your real question, Senator, is one that you posed at the beginning of your comments.

You have just asked a state official a foreign policy question. I cannot respond to that. I can only tell you what I see in front of me.

We control shares in corporations. We are upset at apartheid. We feel that it is better to not sell those shares, but to vote our shares to express our outrage in at least a partial vacuum created by the Federal Government to exercise our limited powers in the way of requiring people to pull out, rather than selling those shares.

You asked me a foreign policy question. I am not sure that I am equipped to answer it. I can only tell you how I respond to the situation I see in front of me.

The CHAIRMAN. President Bok, do you have a thought on this?

Mr. Bok. Yes.

I think a policy of trying to overcome apartheid by encouraging more American investment in that country is very likely to be unrealistic in the extreme. I think whatever good American companies can do by their presence is largely by way of serving as an example. They are a rather small element in the South African economy. I cannot think of any incentives under present conditions in South Africa that are going to lead them to expand their operations there to a point where they will be anything more than an example, and not a major economic force.

So I do not see much that will be improved by trying to expand their process, their presence there.

I think we forego an opportunity if we go that route. I think it will be misinterpreted and the degree to which people to whom we should be reaching out will look at that as an effort to support the apartheid system, and this will vastly outweigh any long-term policy advantages that we seek. We will not get the expanded investment and we will have all of the loss of credit that will come from having backed what will be seen as an erroneous policy of design to support the status quo.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

My time is concluded.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Regan, I was very interested in your own experiences, and also in the fact that when you withdrew your investments there, it did not appear to damage your portfolio.

What about the capital gains taxes? Did you crank that in? Were you required to pay substantial taxes on the gains from the sale?

Mr. REGAN. We are tax exempt. We don't worry about taxes. We worry about a total corporate—if you mean to our system, there is no problem there. We are tax exempt.

It is a status we would like to keep. Please don't get any ideas. [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. Would you explain to me again so that I understand just what you do. You do not sell, correct?

Mr. REGAN. We do not sell shares. I would like to be invested in IBM. I would like to have a full range of choices of investments. I am a fiduciary, a fairly large one by virtue of the fact that I am

the Comptroller of the state. I want to keep maximum flexibility for choosing our investments.

I believe that if we were forced to be out of the major multinational corporations, we would undergo the same experience that New Jersey is clearly undergoing. It is very clear. There are huge transaction costs and huge unfunded liability costs as they shift out of major multinational corporations to smaller, more volatile corporations for their investment. That affects the strength of their system and it affects, obviously, the security of their current membership and their pensioners.

So, as a fiduciary, I do not want to do that.

Second, I do not want to do it because I really do not think that corporations care much who owns the shares. Unless I am Carl Icahn or T. Boone Pickens, they don't really care too much who owns their shares.

Again, the New Jersey experience is quite instructive. It is the largest divestment program in the Nation. There will be another report out that will update those figures in 2 weeks, as to the losses in that State, which taxpayers and pensioners must bear directly. And yet the director of investments said he has not had one call from one corporation.

There are a 1.5 million shares of IBM traded every day. A couple of hundred thousand more or less is not going to bother them.

So, therefore, as an antiapartheid weapon and for my fiduciary reasons, I do not believe in selling shares.

On the other hand, if I can gather up a few of us and vote shares, they do care. They care very much, as we go from our 1 percent, which we hold on the average, just alone, and move to 2, to 3, to 9, 10, 15, 20 percent. I don't know how far I can get in the next 6 months to vote shares to have corporations withdraw from South Africa. But I believe I can get very far.

At that point, as they leave—and here is the heart of your question—as they leave South Africa, our share value does not change at all. In fact, it has just been suggested, perhaps by you or by the Senator, that, in fact, it might even go up. This is because the share value has long since been discounted for the corporation's presence in South Africa. It is very small and many of them are losing money anyway. So the share value will not go down.

So, as a corporation pulls out, as GE just did, I am now free. I do not have to worry about a divestment bill as to GE. I can buy and sell GE even if that bill were to pass.

So, the more corporations that are out, the stronger my system is and the more of a blow we strike for apartheid.

That is why I am going on this campaign.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

It is very ingenious. I am not sure that it can be worked through legislation, though. It has to be worked, I think optimally, the way you do.

Mr. REGAN. Well, that is what we intend to do in the next 6 months.

Senator PELL. I have one other question.

Mr. Bok, have you given thought at all to honoring Nelson Mandela by giving him an honorary degree?

Mr. Bok. No; that question has not come up.

Senator PELL. It has not.

Might that not be an effective way of showing Harvard's position?

Mr. BOK. I do not believe that honorary degrees should reflect those kinds of political statements. I think in our case also we have an unbroken rule that people must be physically present in order to receive an honorary degree.

Senator PELL. Perhaps that might put a little pressure on authorities to release him.

Mr. BOK. I am afraid that the chances of his being in a position to come to Cambridge are regrettably bleak, which is one of the reasons we are here, trying to figure out a way of changing that.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the subject of divestment, I noticed that Derek Bok divested himself of the title of president. I could not help reflecting on how times change.

There is the old story of the person who called Harvard, I believe it was in President Lowell's time, and asked to speak to him, and his secretary replied: "The President is in Washington speaking to Mr. Coolidge." [Laughter.]

Mr. BOK. I hope you think that our new-found humility becomes us.

Senator MATHIAS. One of the real problems in South Africa, which, in particular, President Bok and President Silber could help us with, I think, is the educational system which has denied to the black community not only an equal, but even an adequate opportunity to prepare for the great responsibilities that lie ahead.

One of the suggestions that has been made is that we should encourage the establishment in South Africa of a single department of education with equal standards for the black community and the white community.

Now we are a long way from that. Again, as President Silber has suggested, our talking about it and their doing it are two different things.

I am wondering what you feel about what the American educational establishment can do to promote and help a better system of education, particularly for the black community in South Africa.

Mr. SILBER. Senator Mathias, I think it is instructive for us to realize that when I came to Boston in 1971, the Boston schools were not yet integrated, despite the fact that we had had a Supreme Court decision in 1954 and that they are not integrated adequately now. And the composite SAT scores in Boston are 686 against the national average of 903 and against an average in a much poorer State of New Hampshire of 908. These variations go on right here in the United States. I think it is a will-of-the-wisp to think that there is anything that can be done to equalize educational opportunity in South Africa. Now that does not mean that progress cannot be made.

Senator MATHIAS. My question was not as ambitious as equalizing. I said to improve, because, obviously, the educational opportunities have almost been negligible.

Mr. SILBER. That's right. They have been and this is one of excellent examples of the tragedy of apartheid. Integration of the universities has already taken place to a significant degree. I do not think there would be any problem at all in the universities of South Africa if full integration were introduced into all programs tomorrow. I think the faculties and the chancellors of those institutions, from the discussions I have had with them, are more than ready to do this. They recognize it as a moral obligation. I haven't spoken to any professor or chancellor of a university in South Africa who was not an opponent of apartheid and the policy of the Government in that regard.

Senator MATHIAS. What about the admissions officers?

Mr. SILBER. The admissions officers face a problem that, until you have done something with primary and secondary education, there is no way you can introduce college level instruction for blacks without some kind of remedial program. So what I think would be very helpful—and this is part of what I was suggesting under my notion of direct grants from the United States, it would be to establish institutions that would engage in the rapid upgrading of the educational opportunities of black South Africans so that they would be fully qualified to participate in integrated institutions. And, of course, it would call for the rapid expansion of the university system in South Africa which, while large enough to accommodate white needs, is by no means large enough to accommodate black needs if there were anything like adequate preparation of blacks in South Africa.

Mr. BOK. I think it is very difficult to make a sort of massive assault for the improvement of education in South Africa because at the primary and secondary level, which are clearly vital, education is almost entirely in the hands of the South African Government and the many black educators that I have talked with in South Africa seem to be quite unanimous that trying to work through the Government is fruitless and perhaps even counterproductive.

I do think there are some things that one can do, even though they are in a sense operating at the margin.

I think for carefully selected categories of blacks, education in this country, both for its educational and for its psychological value in giving them a perspective that they would not otherwise have—can be very valuable. Therefore, I would commend the efforts that have been made in this country to bring at least 100 new black South Africans to be educated in this country every year.

I think bursaries, as they call them, to go to universities in South Africa, are also helpful, even though in the end, the education system depends on having a strong base at the primary and secondary level. Still, there are lots of opportunities to improve the education for blacks at the university level, and there are universities there that are very anxious to help—but not only in increasing the numbers who go there, but improving the circumstances in which they study. The dropout and flunkout rates are very high, largely because going to a South African university means you have to commute 30 miles a day and live in a place that has no electric light.

Providing the kind of bursaries that will allow black students to live in dormitories could make a big difference.

I think one could also work outside the regular system to a limited extent through some of the efforts that are being made in black communities to supplement the State education with remedial and supplementary work of various kinds.

I think in terms of equipment, in terms of help on curriculum, in various ways one could support those efforts.

Then there are opportunities for vocational schools, such as those that some American companies have set up, in Soweto, for example, that can make a contribution, too.

All that is not going to add up to a massive change, but it is going to make enough of an effort to be more than worth doing.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, the first and immediate thing to do which is within our grasp is to foster and improve exchange programs, then?

Mr. Bok. Well, I would not say just the exchange programs. I would say the internal bursary programs and the opportunity to work with black groups in South Africa that are giving supplementary education of various kinds to the younger students below the university age.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Bok. I don't get to talk to many presidents these days, so I hope you don't mind if I call you Mr. President.

I read with great interest pages 7 and 8 of your statement, which I commend everyone to reread, in which you have outlined something. You say, "Without proposing a specific legislative vehicle, I would suggest certain criteria to use in fashioning appropriate sanctions."

By my way of thinking you have succinctly and in a very articulate way outlined exactly what the Congress should be doing.

Some of us have been arguing with less articulation and sometimes with a little more anger and emotion than maybe some would think appropriate—although for which I do not apologize—exactly what you have outlined here.

Let me pursue that with you a little bit, if I may.

Mr. Bok. Certainly.

Senator BIDEN. In point 4, you say:

Since experience teaches that sanctions are most effective when used to bring about specific ends, they should be directed toward clear objectives, such as the termination of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, the dismantling of the other features of apartheid, and the start of negotiations with recognized black leaders.

Then you say:

Finally, failure on the part of the South African Government to achieve the specified objectives within designated time limits should raise the prospect of more severe sanctions.

The so-called Kennedy-Weicker bill, of which I am a co-sponsor, as are many others here, attempted to do that.

I am not asking you for an endorsement of that legislation, but I want to go through that with you to see if it is the kind of thing that you think meets the specificity that you call for in point 4.

The main elements of the so-called Kennedy-Weicker bill prohibit public and private sector landing in this country of aircraft and prohibit new investment. And we all understand, by the way, that that is not a major economic impact on South Africa. No one pretends that it is.

Mr. Bok. But it could become so in the future. It has a psychological effect in the present.

Senator BIDEN. Exactly. It bans importation of coal, steel, and uranium. It denies landing rights to aircraft. And, after 18 months, if political prisoners are not released and if political dialogue has, in fact, not begun in earnest, then there is disinvestment in the computer industry. We take a piece, but not the entire thing.

That is the approach that I personally believe is what we should be taking.

But is that consistent—without endorsing it specifically—is that type of outline, are those sanctions that I mentioned in your view sufficiently targeted enough, whether or not you agree with each sanction? Is that the kind of targeting you mean?

Mr. Bok. I would say the direction outlined in the legislation is in accord with what I tried to point out in my testimony.

There are some things on which my ignorance is too great to comment specifically. For example, when it comes to banning imports of particular goods, I guess I would want to look at some figures that I have not been able to examine in terms of what would be the likely consequences on black unemployment, how significant are those markets to the South African Government which is the real target, and are there opportunities to substitute markets elsewhere. I would have to reserve a final conclusion until I was able to weigh how much harm are we doing to innocent bystanders as opposed to how much pressure we are likely to bring on the Government.

Senator BIDEN. Fair enough.

The first point you mentioned—and I would then like to ask President Silber and Mr. Regan also to comment on the first point you make—you say that sanctions should transmit the most powerful, broad-based expression of national sentiment. Such an expression comes from legislation.

Now I would like to ask your two colleagues to speak to that.

Does each of you think it is important that we, in fact, spread a powerful, broad-based expression of national sentiment on apartheid? And, if so, do you believe that the expression, the verbal expressions that have come forward from the administration in fact do that?

Mr. SILBER. I think it is quite important that the United States makes expressions of their attitude on apartheid.

As I said in my testimony before you came in, I think that the close resemblance of apartheid to slavery is one of the reasons why this issue is so important to the United States.

We have to live over the history of slavery and the fact that we only recently, in 1964 to 1968, came meaningfully to the point that there was a national majority consensus in favor of serious civil rights laws, to have some humility in addressing this issue to the South Africans, where, particularly, we had a minority of 11 per-

cent blacks and the South Africans face a majority of 75 percent blacks.

That difference should remove our statements toward South Africa from arrogance.

Senator BIDEN. Can't we be humble and have powerful, broad-based expression at the same time?

Mr. SILBER. Yes; I think you can.

Senator BIDEN. How do you do that?

Mr. SILBER. I think you do that by avoiding the tones of simply moral indignation, and you work seriously to say this is what we mean to accomplish.

That is what I think we should do.

You tell them that the United States is not going to withdraw from South Africa. We are not going to encourage the departure of industries from South Africa or the selling of stock in companies that actually have plants in South Africa. We see the hypocrisy of that because that ignores all the American companies that actually trade with South Africa, either directly or, if the bill that you are cosigning passes, they will do it now, indirectly, through middlemen, who will take their products indirectly to South Africa.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me then ask the question in another way.

Oh, I'm sorry, my time is up. I will come back to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Could maybe Mr. Regan respond, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. REGAN. The answer to your first question is yes, and I vote the shares of the corporations whose stock I hold as a head of a pension system to require corporations to leave South Africa in response to the question that you posed to me.

The answer to your second question is no. I do not believe, as I indicated at the beginning of my testimony, that either President Reagan or Secretary Shultz expressed enough compassion for the situation there. It is ironic, Senator, that this country, that so lavishly celebrated its freedoms in New York Harbor a few weeks ago, cannot send a similar signal to people that have no freedoms.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is hard for us to keep site of the forest for the trees as we try to search for our role and our leverage. But I think it is terribly important that we do this for the long run.

It is not just a question of South Africa, but of Southern Africa and, I would argue, of all of the African continent and how we are going to be perceived there.

I think, when we talk about what we hope to accomplish by sanctions, the one thing we should keep in mind is there are greater and lesser sanctions. It is not just something we should throw in a pot and perhaps get caught up in saying we do not support sanctions.

President Silber, I would like to ask you this because you made a very persuasive appeal against sanctions.

Would you oppose, say, banning the landing rights of South African Airways? Would you oppose specific sanctions?

Mr. SILBER. I think that you have to ask with regard to each of those sanctions what do they have to do with the ending of apartheid. If you are making a public relations gesture and you believe and have good reason to believe that this gesture will help to end apartheid, then you may want to argue for it.

A sanction like that is of such negligible importance in terms of its effect on the economy of South Africa that you could not object, as I would object to some other sanctions, that it could have a serious effect on the economy and therefore bring about increased suffering directly on blacks in South Africa.

It would avoid that objection.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The South African Government does consider it to be a very sensitive sanction.

Mr. SILBER. Well, if you think it does, that is an empirical question that needs to be answered, and if on careful examination it seems to be effective, then fine, pass it.

But I can guarantee you that will not end apartheid or have anything like the impact on the Government that I think a vigorous action that brought immediate enforcement of the Sullivan principles to all companies actually doing business in or with South Africa would have. That, I think, would have a much more profound effect.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I don't think anyone has made the case here, among ourselves or witnesses, that we believe sanctions will bring an end to apartheid.

I go back again to how we are perceived at this juncture and whose side we are seen as being on.

I think that more than anything at this point, we have to carefully shape our response.

It does get very frustrating because I think we should be under no illusions that sanctions will change the Government's policy and I think many of us have stated that.

But at this particular juncture, looking back through not only this administration but past administrations, I think our role has to be one that assists in a peaceful evolution.

Of course, the Sullivan principles are important. But I think that, as events have escalated, time has passed us by in that course.

When you suggest tax credits, I would note that we are in the middle of tax reform right now, in which we are trying to argue that we should broaden the tax base, rather than extend additional credits. I would not see that as a particular plus at this point in policy.

I think Comptroller Regan speaks to something that we all have to acknowledge, the private marketplace, and actions there speak far more loudly than what we can do here, with any sort of legislation.

But I think we also have to be in the forefront here in shaping foreign policy, even though the private sector has a great role to play.

President Bok, I certainly agree with your comment that at this point the status quo is not acceptable if we are to have a role in determining the larger events in the future. I think we have to not be perceived as sitting back in a vacuum. That, I think, is what we are struggling to find—what sort of good leverage we have, and perhaps Mr. Reagan has spoken to it best.

But I think private actions still leave us searching for some answers, and that is why some of us have tried to find some specific legislative measures.

Mr. SILBER. Well, when you have the success of Mr. Reagan's policy of disinvestment in the corporations that actually run companies in South Africa and hire South Africans, you have left untouched the question of whether there should be additional investment by companies that do business with South Africa. That is only covered by trade sanctions.

If you introduce a trade embargo of the sort President Bok has suggested, you institutionalize hypocrisy as a national policy, because he is very careful to exempt the strategic materials from that embargo. There is no reason to believe that South Africa would cooperate with that, and the result of that embargo would be probably that it would not work because the middleman would then raise the cost of those materials to the United States.

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is why I do not support a trade embargo. I believe we should stockpile strategic minerals for several years in advance so that we will not be caught again in a situation where we find ourselves unprepared.

I see that my time is up. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Eminent Persons Group in its report stated, and I quote:

From these and other recent developments, we draw the conclusion that, while the government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is, in truth, not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its program of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face.

I would ask each of the panelists whether they share that perception of the posture of the Government of South Africa.

Mr. Bok. Yes.

I think they are in a much better position to judge than I, and I would have no reason to disagree with it. It corresponds with a variety of things that I have heard, most recently from a very prominent European political figure who spent three-quarters of an hour with President Botha and reported to me what he said. What he said sounded like whatever force was necessary to maintain the essential privileges of whites would be applied for the indefinite future.

Mr. REGAN. As a state official, Senator, I limit myself to what I see in front of me. I will continue to vote my shares, which I am responsible for, and will round up others to vote with me, to have American corporations leave South Africa unless apartheid is dismantled, and we have made the steps for that very clear, as to

what we mean, or, unless somehow through legislation you tell me that I cannot affect foreign policy.

Mr. SILBER. I think, Senator, that I am influenced on this question very much by Chief Buthelezi and by at least one major action by the Government of South Africa, which was to end the ban on interracial marriage.

To end the ban on interracial marriage strikes at the very heart of apartheid. That is a reform that says a great deal and points to a change that, when contemplated, recognizes that the end of apartheid must eventually come.

But I agree with President Bok that the Afrikaners are not very likely to move at any undue speed in the accomplishment of those changes that are necessary; nor do I believe that they are going to respond to the inconsequential loss that would result from the disinvestment by American companies.

I think they are much more apt to respond to the increasing example of integrated workplaces that are effective and highly productive, that would come by the encouragement of investment in South Africa by Americans, and when Americans withdraw, they forfeit their ability to speak. To run from the problem is not the way to make our national witness in my opinion, on this serious problem.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that the imposition of sanctions is running from a problem?

Mr. SILBER. I think the imposition of sanctions is definitely running from the problem.

Senator SARBANES. Was Reagan running from the Libyan problem when he sought to impose sanctions?

Mr. SILBER. I don't think that Mr. Reagan—

Senator SARBANES. Did he run from the Nicaraguan problem when he imposed sanctions?

Mr. SILBER. I don't think they have done a good job on either one of those.

Senator SARBANES. But were they running from the problem?

Mr. SILBER. Well, let me put it this way—maladroitly addressing the problem.

I think that also it is not the case that the sanctions against Libya had any severe consequences on Libyans of the sort that would be the case if we could impose truly effective sanctions on the South Africans.

We pose a dilemma: If the imposition on South Africans does not make any difference because the investment of United States companies is only 1 percent and it does not matter too much, then the imposition of those sanctions is simply window dressing.

If we make it a trade embargo and it becomes truly an effective trade embargo, either we increase the cost of our own national defense and our own economic production by the service of middlemen in providing us with those materials, or the embargo really works and the Soviet Union is handed a monopoly in strategic materials. And then we will find out that the goodwill of the Soviet Union is more scarce than those materials themselves.

Senator SARBANES. Do you regard any compromise between a moral position and practical reality as a hypocrisy?

Mr. SILBER. No, sir; I do not. I believe in compromise for its own sake. I think that that is a far better alternative than the extremes of righteousness and bloodshed.

Senator SARBANES. You have urged tax credits. What is the investment policy of Boston University with respect to South Africa?

Mr. SILBER. Our investment policy in South Africa is very similar to the one that Mr. Regan has spoken about. It is to use our proxies not to sell the stock, but to stay with the stock and to urge the companies to change.

Now, we have endorsed the Sullivan principles and we have strongly urged the compliance with those Sullivan principles. Part of what I had in mind with these tax incentives is to put an enforcement power behind the Sullivan principles which would say to the 90 that have not yet subscribed to them that they have to subscribe to them and create a genuinely integrated workplace that meets the civil rights standards of the United States there in South Africa. And that national witness, it seems to me, is a very powerful witness.

Senator SARBANES. Do you hold stock in companies that do not subscribe to the Sullivan principles?

Mr. SILBER. Yes, sir; we do.

Senator SARBANES. Well, how does that square with the theme of your testimony?

Mr. SILBER. Because we are engaged in the process of persuasion, and, for a second reason: If you divest in stock that you own in South Africa because it is wrong to own it, you've got to persuade somebody else to pick up your moral guilt in the process of buying it.

That policy has no moral seriousness about it at all. If it is wrong to own the stock, it has to be wrong to buy the stock. Therefore, the person who sells it simply transfers his guilt.

There has to be a better moral addressing of that problem than this notion of divestment.

It is the kind of show-biz PR device that is very popular amongst students, but it does not bear up under a serious moral examination.

Senator SARBANES. You have not made any divestment at Boston University?

Mr. SILBER. Oh, we have made some divestments.

Senator SARBANES. With respect to South Africa?

Mr. SILBER. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Wasn't that show business, according to the statement you just made?

Mr. SILBER. Yes, sir.

I want to tell you something. Things happen at Boston University that I do not approve of. [Laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Well, I guess some of us would say "thank heavens."

Mr. SILBER. Yes; I'm sure you would.

Senator KASSEBAUM [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator SARBANES. My time is up.

Thank you.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Let me ask all three of you this question.

First, I am very glad to see Dr. Bok, my former professor from Harvard Law School, who does such a great job of leading Harvard University here.

Let me ask a question that I think Dr. Silber, on page 7 referred to. He said something that I think brings this whole debate into focus.

He says that there is a widespread misapprehension that the African National Congress, or the ANC, is the South African equivalent of Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

I recently appeared on a TV show, and to introduce the show there was a film of Oliver Tambo talking, and then they had a film of the South, of civil rights demonstrations and that movement.

I feel that the nub of the problem we are dealing with here is the assumption that this is the same thing, and it really is not, in my view.

I want each of your views on that.

The fact of the matter is, in every State in our country we are told—I have read this—between 5 and 15 percent of our people, in their voting for Senator, give a very high priority to civil rights, and that is very appropriate, or to feelings about individual freedoms and rights. This bit of foreign policy that we are making really is politically important—and in any Senate race, a shift of 5 to 15 percent of the votes could be determinative.

So we are really dealing with, as I think Senator Dole has said, a domestic civil rights vote. But, ironically, we are making foreign policy without rigorous analysis.

I have listed some other assumptions that are thought to be correct by the news media and everybody else, it seems, in dealing with this issue: the assumption that the Botha government will be forced to the left by sanctions; that if there is a civil war, it will be everybody against the whites. In fact, many feel it would be the colored, the Asians, the Zulus, and the whites against the ANC, and that would not last very long, to be very frank. There is an assumption that if you destroy the business community, it will end apartheid. In fact, the business community has been the strongest advocate of ending apartheid.

There is an assumption that a successor black government would allow more rights, although in the surrounding countries, that certainly has not been the case.

But perhaps the biggest assumption of all is that the ANC, the African National Congress, is the South African equivalent of Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Would each of you comment on that. Do you believe that is the case?

MR. SILBER. I think that the nature of the ANC is that it is, in fact, a Leninist-type organization, and I think you find that point of view when you listen to what the leadership of the ANC has said about it.

I have already quoted the ANC representative at the United Nations who said that if there were only 4 million blacks left after the revolution, that would be better than the present situation. I suggest that that is the highly abstract, murderous attitude of a Lenin,

a Stalin, or a Hitler, and not of one who is concerned for the well-being of blacks in South Africa.

If you take Mrs. Winnie Mandela, who practices an image on American television of being a very concerned and devoted wife, sharing her husband's work in the manner of Mrs. Martin Luther King, what she said elsewhere is the following: "Together, hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our necklaces"—and by her "necklaces" she means the rubber tires loaded with gasoline—we shall liberate this country. We work in the white man's kitchen. We bring up the white man's children. We could have killed them at any time we wanted to."

Now her positive endorsement of the necklace treatment, which has thus far been directed exclusively by the ANC to the obliteration of black moderates who do not choose to cooperate with their program, seems to me to reveal the character of this terrorist organization and to rid one of any notion that it shares the principles of reform that were enunciated by Martin Luther King.

As a matter of fact, Martin Luther King's words on this subject are highly instructive. He said, "When the architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men—yes, black men as well as white men—would be guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Now, King recognized that there was nothing wrong with the Constitution of the United States except it had not been applied to all citizens, and that is precisely the position that has been taken by Chief Buthelezi. He says, I don't want to destroy the Government of South Africa, the political institutions of South Africa, the educational system, the industrial system, the financial system; rather, I want to extend to all South Africans, black and white, the full protections and opportunities of those systems.

That is the position of a moderate who has had extraordinary success in negotiations in Natal and who has a great following, the largest single following, in my opinion, of blacks in South Africa, and it is diametrically opposed to the destroy-in-the-ruins attitude of Oliver Tambo.

For this reason, I think we make no sensible discussion on the subject of South Africa until we recognize that the interests of the African National Congress are not to find a solution to this problem but to bring about a revolution, to exacerbate the problems to the point that bloodshed and war become inevitable.

I do not think that there is any way that a person with a serious moral concern could associate himself with the purposes of the ANC and lend the prestige and the moral concern of the United States to the forwarding of their interests.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I would like to get the other two to be able to respond to that.

Mr. REGAN. I have essentially the same response, Senator.

As a state official, I limit myself to protesting apartheid by organizing a nationwide campaign for corporate disinvestment from

that country, to protest apartheid, as I indicated, and to protect the pensioners of our system. I will continue to do that until apartheid is dismantled or until the vacuum that we sense that exists in national foreign policy on this subject is appropriately filled.

Mr. Bok. I guess my answer would be that it does not seem to me to be helpful or necessary to our deliberation to make a judgment that we like the ANC, we approve of the ANC, we think the ANC is like Martin Luther King's movement.

No two movements are alike. There is certainly a lot of conflicting evidence, some of it quite disturbing. But I think the essential point is this. The thing that we really must be opposed to is the continuation of apartheid, and the thing we must be for is for the implementation of meaningful negotiation.

The fact of the matter is that there will be no meaningful negotiation without at least the participation of the one leader that even Buthelezi acknowledges is the one necessary person to be included at the table, and that is Nelson Mandela. And, therefore, without passing a judgment on that particular movement, if you wish to do whatever you can to bring about negotiations, you must contemplate the presence of Nelson Mandela. If you are not prepared to do that and you are going to say well, we must put up with the status quo, then I suggest that in another 2 years, we will be talking about people who are a great deal more unpalatable than Nelson Mandela, because it is in the nature of these controversies that, if they continue, the radicalization will proceed apace and we will be, in much more serious difficulty of the kind that troubles you than we are at the present.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Silber, I was struck at the outset by your comments in talking about the comparison between apartheid and slavery. I think that is a good analogy, and one that I think most of us could agree with.

You also referred to the Lincoln administration as an example of an effort to try to deal with the issue through means other than what was ultimately effective.

While I pretend to be no great Lincoln scholar, there is one quote that I have always loved from Lincoln. I probably do not have it exactly right, but it is something along the lines of how this country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.

So, whenever they go weary or shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right to amend it or their revolutionary rights to dismember or overthrow it.

That is a rough paraphrase from President Lincoln's First Inaugural Address.

What I am struck by is that in South Africa today, if you were to apply that quotation to the situation that exists there, the black majority population does not have any constitutional right to amend the system there, and what they seem to be left with if the situation perpetuates, of course, is the latter alternative that Lincoln suggested in his inaugural address.

My concern is that there seems to be a lack of sensitivity about events that may have already overtaken us. What we are engaging

in here, in fact, in the last several days, may be moot, that this is an exercise that we are going through as Americans; while South Africans have pretty much decided that this matter is going to be resolved in very unpleasant ways, and that typically, as so often happens, we are a dollar short and a day behind in dealing with this issue at all.

I would like to ask, if I could, in relation to that, this question. I was not clear, Mr. Regan, about your position. You mentioned preemption. I gather you are for Federal preemption in terms of what States can do.

Did I understand you correctly in that?

Mr. REGAN. Yes.

As the chairman indicated, Senator, he has been kind enough to hear me out on the issue several times, and I am very grateful for that opportunity.

Senator DODD. Well, as so often happens—and I am not asking you to make a foreign policy judgment—people in this country have relatively limited access to the Congress of the United States. They have much more direct access to their State legislatures and city councils. In a very articulate way you suggested that going around the country and decrying apartheid and urging a variety of different actions to be taken is something that you believe is one way to approach matters. And yet, at the same time, the arguing for Federal preemption sort of denies the most direct participation to many people. Much of what we are feeling in this country has not come because of speeches that have been given by politicians but because of a genuine sense of outrage that average American citizens feel about what is occurring in South Africa. And the way they express that outrage is, from time to time, through petitioning their State legislators or their city councilmembers to take action.

I am not endorsing every piece of action that they have taken. But it is a way to create an additional set of pressures for citizens in this country.

Putting aside for a second the merits from a technical standpoint of preemption, don't we really cut off, in a sense, the American population from an avenue of expression of outrage if we deny them the opportunity of such through their own State legislatures and city councils. Would we not be denying them the opportunity to express that sense of frustration and anger that is reflected in what has occurred with Governors such as Deukmejian in California, and Kane in New Jersey. I am talking about progressive, liberal Governors across this country—that have created yet additional pressures that we would otherwise lose were that avenue cut off from the people.

Mr. REGAN. Yes, to some extent, and if you want foreign policy decided in our pluralistic system in that way, well then, you can leave it. That is your choice.

The trouble is that, while citizens and groups can protest the way the situation is now, I suggest it is more because of a perceived vacuum than because of the preemption question.

Our citizens do not protest everything that is done through their State legislatures, except in South Africa, and then you, as Federal legislators have to ask yourselves or the President has to ask him-

self why this. I think the vacuum is perhaps more important than the law of preemption.

But let me move back to that.

Sure, our citizens have an opportunity now, without preemption, to protest, and that is fine, except that State legislators and Governors can do so little to affect the system that what is manifested is, in most cases, a selling of shares, which is demonstrably harmful to the taxpayer—and they are not alerted to this—and to the pensioner, on the one hand, and yet, because corporations do not much care who owns, buys, sells, or controls their shares, has no effect yet at all on apartheid.

So, it allows them to voice their opinion. But I suggest the way it is being channeled is not allowing them to accomplish their goals.

I believe that, even with preemption, I still could vote my shares. I don't know that. I would like to see a bill and how it would work. I could still do what I am doing to vote my shares until the vacuum is filled, until apartheid is dismantled, and in that way I have not only given citizens the expression of antiapartheid by voting our shares and voting the shares that, in reality, the citizens and pensioners own, and voting them in that way, but I have also protected them because I do not have to sell our shares.

So that is our position, and presumably still would be allowed under preemption, though I cannot address that question. My guess is that preemption, when you, in effect, have a politician state, "I am going to invade a State trust for foreign policy purposes," when you have that kind of statement, presumably some preemption, on that kind of activity preemption legislation might cut that off, though it would not cut off what I am doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As we reflect on what we have heard for the last several days, the frustration of this committee is evident to you who have been witnesses and others who perhaps are in the audience.

We debate the merits of the tactics, if you will, of sanctions, and whether they be on disinvestment or air traffic activities limitations, or new investments or bank loans or various other things, we are continually waffling back and forth as to whether the administration should have the flexibility to impose sanctions it chooses, or, whether we should initiate legislative activity.

But I think Mr. Silber's reference to our own self-interest, inconsistency and hypocrisy deserves a little bit more examination, particularly in view of the real world, which dictates that strategic minerals are something to which this country must have access. We have been dependent on either the Soviet Union or, more appropriately, South Africa, for these minerals because they have the production capabilities.

I think it would be very interesting to ask our colleagues if we could vote specifically on sanctions, whether we would have a higher obligation to maintain a flow of strategic minerals to this country and whether we would vote for specific sanctions with the exception of, as suggested by Mr. Silber, strategic minerals. This

points out the very hypocrisy of what we are addressing and obviously the benefits to the Soviet Union would be extensive.

I would ask each of you gentlemen if, indeed, we were to extend sanctions into general areas, you would specifically support prohibition on the importation of strategic minerals?

Would you exclude these minerals or would you be consistent?

I guess a yes or no answer would suffice.

Mr. SILBER. I would be consistent by opposing the imposition of sanctions at all.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And just recognizing that we are in big trouble?

Mr. SILBER. That's right—and recognizing that as long as we do nothing to support the moderates, but leave the floor to the extremists in the African National Congress, that we will have a self-fulfilling prophecy on our hands, because at some time the desperation will be so great that the right of revolution will be exercised.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So you would just oppose all sanctions and support your theory of a Camp David type approach?

Mr. SILBER. I would certainly try the moderate way and the reinforcement of the moderate center in South Africa that is very powerful because the people who believe that when that breaks down, they are going to have the end of apartheid and a wonderful new State forget that racism will very quickly give way to tribalism, which is nothing but racism at a provincial level.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Regan, your responsibility and your investment portfolio obviously is in the concerted effort of the rest of your portfolio as well. Without strategic minerals, in what shape would the rest of your portfolio be. As a consequence, would you say yes to consistency or would you just prohibit across-the-board strategic minerals from coming in?

Mr. REGAN. As I have announced, as a State official, I limit myself to what is in front of me.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, this question I am proposing to put in front of you.

Mr. REGAN. Well, what is in front of me is that I own shares, that there is a national policy vacuum, and I intend to vote those shares.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I just want to know what you would do.

Mr. REGAN. I have no idea.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You have no idea of what you would do, then?

Mr. REGAN. I am not a Senator. I am asking Senators to answer that question.

Senator MURKOWSKI. But I am asking the question. Are you going to answer it or not?

Mr. REGAN. As a State official, I do not. I repeat, there is a vacuum. I will practice foreign policy as long as the national conditions are a vacuum and the lack of preemption allows me to. I will practice it, though, in a very limited way, by voting our shares for withdrawal. I have no other power or effect. I consider that considerable, but I have no other power or effect. When the vacuum is filled, when the Federal Government is exercising its duties as Americans see it vis-a-vis South Africa, then you will not have to worry about State officials.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Bok.

Mr. Bok. Well, I would look very hard to develop a package of sanctions plus some other positive inducements to support constructive change in South Africa.

I think in putting together a package of sanctions, I would not include a ban on the importation of vital minerals.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You would exclude that, then?

Mr. Bok. I see nothing that smacks of hypocrisy in trying to put together a package of measures that will do our best to improve the current situation we are now in, and in selecting those sanctions, to take our vital national interests into account.

The fact that we do that does not render us hypocritical in my view, as long as we make a sincere effort to try to find a series of measures that will, to the best of our limited capability, facilitate constructive, peaceful change in South Africa.

Senator MURKOWSKI. The merits of exclusion of some sanctions obviously is an appropriate consideration as we reflect on whether we should impose sanctions.

As a matter of information, Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate to say this because not an awful lot of people who know, but there are a few of us who happen to know that of the major strategic minerals—platinum, cobalt, diamonds, chromium, tin, magnesium, bauxite, and uranium—on which we are dependent on South Africa—we have had several for an extended period of time. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) study of 1983 states that in my particular State there are extensive reserves of mercury, platinum, tin, and chromium, as well as cobalt, nickel, tungsten, magnesium, and uranium in substantial and significant reserves, none of which are in production simply because the economics do not favor it.

So I would offer to my colleagues the fact that there is an alternative source of these minerals if, indeed, we want to address the economics vis-a-vis our domestic sources and realize that if we want to develop our own strategic mineral capability, we could do it. Those reserves are in existence. The only two that are not present in Alaska, which we garner from South Africa, are bauxite and diamonds.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have listened with great interest today. I think it has been a very interesting panel, both thoughtful and thought provoking.

I particularly hope Comptroller Regan will permit me a bit of chauvinism, but I particularly want to welcome the presidents of two of our great universities in Massachusetts, and I am delighted that both of them are here sharing again with us their thoughts and some of what we believe to be something special about our State.

I would like to ask President Silber and perhaps President Bok also to comment on the last thought.

I believe, President Bok, that in your testimony you did single this out. I think it is one of the two most significant statements made by the Eminent Persons Group. At the conclusion of their report they say, and I quote from the report: "The question in front

of heads of government is, in our view clear. It is not whether such measures"—speaking of sanctions—"will compel change. It is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared defers change. Is the Commonwealth to stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, or will it take concerted action of an effective kind? Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War."

Now I have no doubt, President Silber, that you do not take issue that this is a distinguished group of very qualified people speaking. Are we in agreement on that?

Mr. SILBER. Certainly.

Senator KERRY. Well, given that and their recommendation of sanctions, as well as the earlier statement about the conclusion the group drew of their unwillingness to want to change, and the fact that they term the nontaking of action a "deferral of change," how do you square that, if you will, with your position?

Mr. SILBER. I think that this is, first of all, a very difficult problem, and I think that the absence of sanctions does not defer change any more than I believe that the presence of those sanctions would compel change.

They correctly observe that they do not want to stick their necks out on the question of whether the imposition of sanctions would change the policy, and they are right to do that because they have offered no analysis of the causal connection by which the imposition of these sanctions would have the result that they have in mind—namely, to cause apartheid to end.

Nor have they shown any analysis to show that the imposition of sanctions, if they were damaging to the economy of South Africa would not lead to the very bloodbath that they claim they want to avoid.

So, this distinguished group has avoided the very careful, difficult examination of the means-ends relationship whereby they could come to some of those conclusions.

Now, the absence of the sanctions I do not think defers change. I think what defers change is the absence of a set of institutional structures that would protect that white minority if power is transferred.

This is why in my longer testimony I referred to the experiences in Zimbabwe. We had some reference made to Zimbabwe and to the Lancaster House conference this morning.

Well, the South Africans know that Mugabe has announced that he will unilaterally abrogate all of the assurances given the white minority in Zimbabwe. He has not done so yet, but he has threatened to do so and asserted the right to do so, and he certainly has exterminated the effective opposition of political parties there.

The white South Africans, outnumbered at least three to one by blacks, are not persons of a temperament to commit suicide; nor are they English colonials. The Boors came there over 300 years ago, and they are home. They are not in somebody else's home. They are in their own home and they are not about to withdraw.

Consequently, what deters change and defers change is their fear that if they were to make that change, they might lose not only their lives but all of their property.

Now, if we believe that that is an unnatural, human instinct, we should remember what the Southern States of the United States did when we talked not about taking anything more than their slaves when they were accustomed to the protections of the Bill of Rights of the United States and could have looked forward to the continuation of those protections.

In that terrifying situation, I do not think the Boors are going to budge. That is why I have suggested a support for the moderates. We are not trying to see how many blacks they can kill and how many blacks they can persuade to kill whites, but to support the moderates, like Buthelezi, who have been quite successful in giving the assurances to whites that have encouraged the whites to make some accommodation.

That is why I think the central agenda of a Camp David conference should be the identification of those constitutional, political, legal, structures that are necessary to establish effectively in South Africa something equivalent to our Bill of Rights, so that the white minority is now prepared to extend the political power to the blacks.

Senator KERRY. Let me ask, if I can, President Bok to answer that.

What kind of timetable do you think we are operating on and where do you place that statement?

Mr. Bok. I really do think that I am not informed enough to predict on what timetable events are going to change in South Africa.

I think no matter how hard we try to analyze—and we should try as hard as we can—we are going to be left with an inescapable doubt as to what measures are going to influence change in a country very far and very remote from our own.

I think, in trying to resolve those doubts, one does have to look to the judgment of people who are both informed and whose background one respects.

And so, coming back to your initial question, what significance do I attach to this report, it is a significant piece of evidence to my mind because of the experienced of the individuals involved before they came to South Africa, because of the opportunities they had very recently to talk to a wide range of opinion in South Africa. The judgment that they reach, even though it may not be proven in some logical fashion—still seems to me significant.

For that reason, I would pay attention to it, along with other evidence available.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. I notice, Mr. Chairman, that my time is up.

I would just comment, parenthetically, that in your introduction and salutation, President Bok, you mentioned the presence of two former students and a parent. And here I sit, the brother of a graduate, the nephew of a graduate, the grandson of a graduate, the cousin of many graduates, the great-great grandson of a graduate, the great-great-great-great grandson of a graduate and—

Mr. Bok. And you went to Yale.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. And I came to the conclusion that the only reason you left me out is that I went to Yale.

Mr. Bok. Absolutely. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with that summary conclusion, do you have any more questions, Senator Sarbanes, of this panel?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make an observation for the record, because Dr. Silber made a point that the repeal of the mixed marriages law constituted a major and fundamental change in the apartheid system. As I understand the situation in South Africa, while the marriage itself is no longer prohibited, if the couple wants to live together, they must be of the same race, and, therefore, one of the two in the mixed marriage must change his race. Since you cannot change your race to white, it means the white person must change his race to black or colored in order to be able to reside together legally, since residence is limited by racial classification.

Therefore, I do not see that change as in any way fundamental to dismantling the apartheid system.

Mr. SILBER. Mr. Sarbanes, I think you have put your finger on a significant fact, there. But it does not mean that it is not significant.

I think it had the significance, for example, of what Lyndon Johnson's decision in 1964 had, not merely to invite Leontyne Price to the White House, but to dance with her publicly in a close, ball-room dancing style, to set a movement and some fire under the civil rights movement that culminated, in 1968, in some of the most important legislation we passed.

I think it was a symbolic move of the very greatest importance.

When I was growing up in Texas, the commonplace rejection of any progress with regard to desegregation was "do you want your sister to marry a black?" And they did not call them blacks in those days.

That was the commonplace attitude, not only in the South, but all over the United States.

When Lyndon Johnson made it perfectly clear by his gestures in the White House that that day was over and that nobody was worried about the bodily contact of whites and blacks at the very most normative institutions in this society, it had a profound and instructive effect.

I think the erosion of that law, even to the extent it has happened, is in that way symbolic.

But I certainly agree with you that apartheid is effectively administered in South Africa, and it is the outrage that concerns all of us.

Senator SARBANES. The fundamental difference in the analogy you have sought to draw is that Johnson was committed to ending racial discrimination. That was reflected not only in symbolism but also in reality, as evidenced by the legislation he pushed through the Congress, beginning fairly early on.

The difference in this situation goes back to the statement of the Eminent Persons Group about the South African Government. The government's program of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face.

That is the fundamental difference.

Thank you.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there another comment?

Senator KERRY. I know that you want to wrap up and I will be very quick.

I just want to ask one quick question as a matter of guidance.

President Bok, you set up a good, specific set of guiding principles but held off on some specifics. I wonder if it would be your guidance to us that it would be advisable to establish some form of timetable within the framework of legislation that might hold out a more specific set of stringent sanctions or moves that we might take, but which are not instituted at the outset; or whether you would think that the message should be simply immediate and clear and that there should be only one set of sanctions now, and to leave totally flexible and open whatever you consider down the road?

Mr. BOK. I guess my judgment is that the best way to proceed tactically would certainly be to try to introduce a significant and substantial set of sanctions immediately, to talk in terms of timetables, but not be specific, but to create the very clear impression that the issue of sanctions will be revisited without tying your hands in advance as to exactly which ones will be imposed.

Circumstances change. One's analysis may change. The uncertainty of not specifying what you are going to do 2 years from now may actually be an advantage.

Senator SARBANES. If the Senator would yield, sanctions can always be lifted if developments warrant it, just as additional sanctions be imposed if things do not develop in that direction.

Mr. BOK. Quite right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senators.

Gentlemen, we appreciate very much your testimony and your staying with us.

The Chair would like to call our final panel of the hearing: the Right Reverend John Walker, bishop of the Episcopal Church, Washington, DC; Dr. Avery Post, United Church of Christ, Washington DC; Robert Morris, chairman, National Committee to Restore Internal Security; John De Mars, National Education Association; and Randall Robinson, president, Transafrica.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. May we resume the hearing now.

I know that good friends are greeting each other as these panels exchange the baton and we move on to further testimony.

We are grateful to each of you gentlemen who are on this panel for your enormous patience. I think we have had a good hearing, and we look forward very much to your testimony.

I would mention again that we have attempted to adopt a guideline today for the initial statements. I hope they can be held within a 10-minute period of time.

If you will watch the lights, when the red light goes on, the 10 minutes has come to an end. Then Senators hopefully will be limited to 5 minutes in their rounds of questioning.

May we have order in the committee room so that the witnesses can be heard?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, would you please proceed in the order that I introduced you, and I will repeat that order because there may have been confusion at the time you came to the table.

First of all we will hear from the Right Reverend John Walker; then Dr. Avery Post; Mr. Robert Morris; Mr. John De Mars; and Mr. Randall Robinson.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Before they start, I apologize for the intrusion, but I have another meeting that I have to run to. But I hope to get back here.

I simply wanted to welcome a very old friend of mine who already suffers under the burdens of my acquaintance. So I do not want to place too much more of a burden on him.

But he is one of the principal reasons why I am in politics today. We knew each other when I was a student and spent many long hours, late into the night, talking. I am delighted to see him here.

We have seen each other outside of this institution, but I look forward to reading and hearing his testimony.

I thank him for his many efforts on this behalf as on many others.

Bishop WALKER. Thank you, John.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Reverend Walker.

**STATEMENT OF THE RIGHT REVEREND JOHN T. WALKER,
BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, WASHINGTON, DC**

Bishop WALKER. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, my name is John Walker. I am the episcopal bishop of the diocese of Washington.

I am grateful that you have given me this opportunity to appear before you and to express some views that have developed as I have wrestled with the moral, ethical, and religious implications of our country's policy toward Southern Africa in general and toward South Africa in particular.

I come before you out of my concern for the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Africa. I also come as a Christian expressing concern for the millions of fellow Christians as well as others who are victims of the evil system of apartheid.

Over the past 20 months, there has been an increase in the rhetoric about apartheid and about the American policy of constructive engagement, which, by the way, is neither constructive nor engaging.

The frustration of many of our people, black and white, is made clear by the demonstrations and arrests at the South African Embassy and by the thousands of institutions that have divested themselves of holdings in companies doing business in South Africa.

While we debate, the tragedy that is South Africa worsens. Daily, we hear it said, with reason, that we are running out of time, that we must do something, something that will make a difference.

The crisis of South Africa is not simply a crisis of black and white. It is a human crisis, a fight for justice, for the preservation of the soul, for the substantance of humanity, theirs and ours. The system of apartheid is as unjust and morally indefensible as any

system practiced in the world. It is evil in the extreme and must be dismantled.

Since 1948, the South African Government has brought about a system that now borders on civil war. It has stripped millions of black people of their citizenship. It has instituted a series of pass laws that have completely restricted the freedom of movement of black people. It has moved people out of their homes and towns, as wretched as these generally are, to homelands, where it is virtually impossible for them to eke out a living.

Thus, under what they call separate development, a tiny, white minority has forced its will on the majority which comprises better than 75 percent of the total population.

The majority are denied the right to vote, the privileges of normal family life, access to a decent education or even minimal health care, and denied the opportunity to achieve a place in the economic structure beyond the most menial.

What began as a grossly discriminatory system has now become a brutal one of repression and subjugation.

South Africa has become the worst sort of totalitarian state in which basic civil and human liberties are denied, where calculated violence against the black population has become a routine practice.

The South African Government declares its purpose to abolish apartheid and to grant all the people equal citizenship rights. And yet, it is trapped in its own mindset; too obsessed with its past to think boldly about the future; too mindful of preserving the unjust gains of those who have them rather than making whole the rights of those who are denied them.

As pragmatic politicians, the white South African leaders tend to preserve the present with minimal change. Instead, what we need are visionary leaders who will shape the present to seek a better future.

Our Government also condemns apartheid and seeks its removal. And yet, its policy and dialog are more soothing to those in power than comfort to those who are deprived of it. Witness the reaction inside South Africa to President Reagan's speech of 2 days ago.

Our Government's actions are superficial and lack evidence of serious commitment to help the disenfranchised black population of South Africa. The actions of our Government seem to run counter to American political principles and even to our national security interests.

The religious community has condemned apartheid as evil and morally reprehensible. We must do everything possible to seek its demise.

A significant number of the church leaders have also called for economic sanctions against South Africa, including a withdrawal of all investments by foreign multinational corporations.

However, in our desire to do something, we have failed to connect actions with outcome. Our agony over the plight of the black people in South Africa has often trapped us into taking actions that may be more pronounced in their symbolism than in their capacity to bring about substantive change.

Rather than controlling and shaping events, we are increasingly being shaped by them. Unwittingly, we also have become victims of the present.

The foreign business corporations, especially the United States-based corporations, insist on their right to stay in South Africa, claiming that in the process they do more good than harm. They declare that they are a force for positive change and help bring about improved social and economic conditions for the black peoples of South Africa and also by setting an example for others to follow.

As evidence of their goodfaith effort, they point to their compliance with the Sullivan principles, which call for the elimination of all discriminatory practices at the place of employment and require signatory companies to help their workers in the communities they live in.

All of this may be true and quite commendable. However, the question is not what they have done but what else they should be doing in terms of their capacity for action and whether or not they are doing all that is possible.

In South Africa, as in many of the other poor countries that are often controlled by authoritarian regimes, private enterprise is invariably associated with dictatorships and with corruption. It is no wonder that private enterprise and capitalism have come to be viewed as tools of oppression in many of these countries, because the poor have not seen private enterprise as playing the role of providing the underpinnings of a democratic society and protecting individual freedoms.

What must be done?

We start by making two assertions as a matter of faith, and, therefore, given:

One is that apartheid must be abolished, and abolished immediately and unequivocally. It is not even a subject for negotiation. What needs to be negotiated is the form and shape of a postapartheid South Africa and the process by which it should be brought about. There is no longer any question that apartheid will be brought down.

Two, that all South Africans have equal citizenship rights, which includes the notion of one person one vote.

I recognize that many in the United States will disagree with one or another of these assertions, but I submit to you that we must begin with them.

Further, the time has come for the United States and its allies in Europe to put teeth into the rhetoric against apartheid by instituting strong economic sanctions against that nation.

Even as I say this, I do not personally believe that such sanctions will bring down the Botha government. Sanctions do, however, offer a way to put that government on notice that in what we call the civilized world, some behavior is not acceptable.

What should these sanctions include?

They should include:

An end to the availability of loans which make it possible for the government to carry out its evil policies;

A restriction on new investments by U.S. corporations in that country;

An end to landing rights for South African planes in the United States and the encouraging of other nations to do the same, with a denial of overflights in all African nations;

And, finally, that we should adopt other restrictions listed by the Eminent Persons Group and many of those that are already in the bill before this Senate.

On a more positive note, I would want our Government to immediately institute conversations with leaders of the ANC and other groups committed to the destruction of apartheid.

In this regard, the freeing of Nelson Mandela is an urgent necessity.

I would want our Government to increase its foreign aid to South Africa, such aid to be allocated for the well-being of South African black people and directed toward housing, education, and economic development. It should be managed without the involvement of the present South African Government. It should be funneled through black organizations and should combine elements of private enterprise in the United States and initiative and commitment on the part of the black people of South Africa.

The United States Government should also make a declaration of its intent to increase the level of this aid in predetermined amounts in response to specific and immediate actions to be taken by the South African Government in negotiations toward reaching a political solution of the South African problem and also in helping the black population toward improving its economic and social conditions.

The business community must go beyond the mandates of the Sullivan principles.

A first, and extremely important step, would see the business community moving to provide in South Africa or elsewhere experience in business for those black South Africans who have systematically been denied such experiences. Further, they should assist in providing a way to achieve intern experiences in governmental management.

The aim is to guarantee to a postapartheid South Africa business and government a large number of experienced persons who can assume leadership of a democratic government and take their place in the economic and social structures of a new society. To do less would leave the new government and the new society vulnerable as it seeks to solve the massive problems of that country.

As a second step, the business community should move boldly and swiftly in breaking down the barriers of apartheid through actions that are highly visible—for example, buying housing in primarily white areas and assigning them to black employees. An example recently demonstrated by the managing director of General Motors—South Africa—when he offered to defray the legal expenses of any of the company's black employees who were caught on the beaches restricted for the use of white people only.

Other examples include allocating franchises and territories in primarily white areas to black persons. American business should allocate stock in their local subsidiaries to their workers, especially the black workers, as part of their overall wage system. With stock ownership, workers will develop an appreciation of capitalism, the notion of risk and reward, and, above all, the freedom to choose.

As a person, as a Christian, as a bishop in a church with close ties to South Africa, as a citizen of this great free country, I am concerned about the people of South Africa, black and white. I am concerned about their future. I do not want them to have a future that is more miserable than the present. I do not want to see even bloodier strife than we are now witnessing. I do not want to see even greater social inequities and even more poverty than many are now experiencing.

I reiterate: apartheid will end. That end may not come immediately. It may not come peaceably. But it will come.

We need, therefore, to do two things: apply strong sanctions not to destroy the economy, but to give a strong and clear signal about our position; and, two, to begin now to work as though we were already in the time of transition from apartheid to a democratic system.

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I thank you for hearing me. I urge you to consider my words seriously as you consider legislation related to South African-American relations.

And, if you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, I wish to ask God to bless you all in your important work.

[The prepared statement of Bishop Walker appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Bishop.

We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. Post.

STATEMENT OF AVERY D. POST, PRESIDENT, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, WASHINGTON, DC

Reverend Post. Mr. Chairman, I am Avery D. Post, the president of the United Church of Christ, and I appreciate having the opportunity of appearing before you.

I am also cochairperson of the Churches' Emergency Committee on Southern Africa, an interdenominational group composed of 24 denominations, which was created after a World Council of Churches consultation in Harare, Zimbabwe, last December, with 45 South African church leaders attending.

I am accompanied today by the Reverend Dr. Audrey C. Smock, who is a colleague, a world issues secretary of the United Church Board for World Ministries.

The purpose of our being here with you today is to call on the United States Senate to enact legislation which would terminate trade between the United States and South Africa and prohibit United States corporate activity in South Africa. We advocate these measures as the only means to both declare this great Nation of ours to be unalterably opposed to and morally outraged at apartheid and to exert economic leverage on the South African Government to introduce a democratic form of government in its land, reforms it has adamantly refused to undertake up to now.

Responding to the desperate pleas of the South African Council of Churches and other South African church leaders, I recently joined with heads of 13 other Protestant denominations in urging President Reagan to impose comprehensive economic sanctions of

the kind the House passed last month. That is the only action which will declare this Nation to be on the moral high road of justice and democracy, as well as enabling us to exert effective leverage on the South African Government.

I am here as a church leader, representing a wide range of American denominations that are in close association with sister churches in South Africa. The mission ties of the United Church of Christ date back 150 years, and we sustain very close relationships with our partner church, the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa.

During the current crisis in South Africa, we have maintained daily telephone communications with key church people there to keep abreast of events and to offer whatever help we can.

Within recent weeks, hundreds of parishioners and clergy have been arrested during worship services and some worshipers have been killed while attending church.

Just last Sunday, police invaded a service being conducted by the Reverend Alan Boesak, and used teargas during the service to break up that service, and they smashed the windshield of Dr. Boesak's car, very nearly causing him serious injury.

There have been Government-inspired terrorist firebomb attacks against two churches. Missionaries are being expelled from the country. The South African Council of Churches has been ransacked four times by Government agents and several of its staff put in detention without charge.

One of the most poignant recollections of a few months back is of a pastor in a peaceful demonstration in Capetown, kneeling in prayer and then being hit in the face with a gun butt by South African policemen. His glasses were smashed; the glass went into his eyes and blinded him.

Anticipating just this kind of inhuman barbarism, the South African Council of Churches has called on partner churches abroad to find ways to exert international economic pressures to force the Government to change.

The South African Council of Churches advocates a range of economic sanctions, including the withdrawal of foreign corporations from South Africa.

American churches have joined together to form the Churches' Emergency Committee on South Africa to help give voice, one voice, to what South Africa church leaders are saying, that has bearing on American foreign policy.

In a time of severe press censorship and when the advocacy of economic sanctions is a serious felony in South Africa, it is of particular importance that the suppressed voices of South African church people be heard.

I have included in my testimony, Mr. Chairperson, a number of those voices. Let me just read the voice of Alan Boesak.

"We have asked the world to apply economic pressure on South Africa's Government. We have said that this is a peaceful way of bringing about those changes that our country so desperately needs. And the very people in the Western World who keep on telling us that we must not react with violence refuse to support us when we ask them to join us in nonviolent efforts to bring about the fall of apartheid. I do not understand that," he said. "And I

want to say to you, do not be swayed by those people who tell you that we cannot do that because black people in South Africa will suffer first."

The South African Government so feared the witness of Dr. Boesak that it has ruthlessly silenced him by charging him with economic subversion for advocating divestment and disinvestment. This, in itself, provides powerful testimony to both the injustice and the economic vulnerability of the apartheid system.

As a pastor, I hope you will forgive me the recollection of a Biblical parallel to the situation in South Africa. When God sent the plagues on Egypt, it was for the purpose of freeing the Israelite slaves—locusts, darkness, hail, boils, flies, maggots, and frogs. While these plagues were sent as sanctions against the Egyptians and the Israelites were largely immune, they undoubtedly suffered some fallout.

God knew that the Israelites would understand that they must undergo these hardships for the sake of their liberation. God did not tell Moses to coax and cajole Pharaoh and appeal to his sense of fair play and high mindedness. He said, "Let my people go, or I will send plagues upon you."

God did not change ambassadors or emissaries. God did not tell Moses to maintain dialog, even when Pharaoh was deaf to his pleas.

When Pharaoh's obstinence became abundantly clear, God punished Pharaoh and had Moses lead the captive Israelites to freedom.

God did not worry about corporate profits or about undermining the economy of Egypt. The stakes were too high in terms of human survival and freedom to remain inactive or fretful about the exchange rates for Egyptian currency. God acted decisively for the sake of freedom and justice.

That is what the United States Senate is called to do in relation to South Africa.

Now, let me say just a few last words.

The bottom line of my testimony is an urgent, urgent, urgent plea for comprehensive economic sanctions against the Government of South Africa. This means S. 2570, or working from that base.

I speak for the Churches' Emergency Committee on Southern Africa and for the general synod of the United Church of Christ. The sanctions must be strong, very strong. Otherwise, they will be accommodated by the powerful Government of South Africa.

Sanctions must not merely threaten, but they must jolt the Botha government. Gentleness, powder-puff sanctions will be accommodated.

But why strong sanctions? Precisely for five or six points, in a few sentences.

They are, Mr. Chairperson:

First, to signal a policy change. With constructive engagement now bankrupt, these elected leaders of the Senate must now lead.

Second, to express solidarity with an oppressed and suffering community. The relationship of the United States to African peoples and all Third World peoples is at stake. The historic aspect of

all of this is that the relationship of the United States to the global community is now at stake.

We will increase distrust of the United States at great peril.

Third, to awaken the white community in South Africa from its apathy and its complacency.

Fourth, to provide an opening for new coalitions between black leaders and white business leaders and committed progressives in the South African situation, a middle ground community. This will be the effect of sanctions.

Fifth, to provide the leadership that the United Kingdom and Germany will be able to follow. Without our leadership, there is going to be a stalemate.

Sixth, to support, reinforce, and sustain campaigns of divestment and disinvestment going on all over this country, including hundreds of our churches and other institutions.

In the face of a vacuum of leadership, indeed an abdication of leadership by our administration, the responsibility for leadership has now fallen to this Congress, and in these hours and these days to this Senate.

The world is poised and the world is watching, indeed is hoping, and in many cases is praying for your political courage and your leadership.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Reverend Post appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Post.

Mr. Morris.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MORRIS, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO RESTORE INTERNAL SECURITY, MANTOLOKING, NJ

Mr. MORRIS. My name is Robert Morris, and I am the chairman of the National Committee to Restore Internal Security.

The prime purpose of an enlightened U.S. foreign policy should be the protection and advancement of our interests around the world.

We also have another moral obligation, and that is to aid, within the limits of our power, our brothers and sisters in that world to achieve the fulfillment of their God-endowed spiritual and material potential.

On both scores, sanctions, disinvestment and the other punitive measures against the black and white people of South Africa fail to measure up to these purposes.

South Africa today is besieged by an insurgency that has been initiated and aided by Moscow and encouraged by forces in the United States. A directive of the Politburo of the South African Communist Party to its revolutionary forces in the country which surfaced last month tells it all. This is a quote: "Our broad strategy for achieving power is to mobilize the masses for a seizure of power."

The directive further urges that the momentum of the struggle must be built up by partial and general uprisings until it reaches the climax of "revolutionary struggles in the postwar period—Alge-

ria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique"—in other words by these uprisings turn the country into another Vietnam and Angola.

The emphasis of the "ANC-led" struggle rests on the "rising momentum of the people's offensive," but the bottom line is the transfer of power to them.

The basic demands in which many here join them—namely, the release of political prisoners, troops out of the townships, dismantling apartheid, legalizing the ANC—this is what they say will create a better climate for their momentum, "but cannot be regarded as a bargaining chip for slowing down momentum."

Senator, that is a very important quote. In other words, if we give them all of these things, they are just going to consider that an increase in momentum and they are not going to give up their position of demanding the transfer of power to them.

The leaders of this insurgency is the African National Congress, the ANC, and its leadership, more than in many other successful revolution, is highly saturated. It is a totally saturated Soviet proxy.

Its Secretary General, Alfred Nzo, addressed the 27th World Congress in Moscow in March. The head of its military arm perpetrating the violence is Joe Slovo, a white Lithuanian comintern agent.

Its spokesman, Winnie Mandela, who receives the support of press in this country, has pledged fealty to Moscow.

The Soviet newspaper Pravda recently interviewed her and quoted her. This now is a quote from Pravda:

The Soviet Union is the torch bearer for all our hopes and aspirations. We have learned and are continuing to learn resilience and bravery from the Soviet people, who are an example to us in our struggle for freedom, a model of loyalty to international duty. In Soviet Russia, genuine power of the people has been transformed from dreams into reality. The land of the Soviets is the genuine friend and ally of all people fighting against dark forces of world reaction.

Now, the president of Boston University came up with the next quote, which I will pass over. Winnie Mandela, who gets a glamorous press, made the statement: "Together, hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate our country." The goulsh act of tying a tire around somebody and igniting it with gasoline until the poor guy groans to death is referred to.

These people are terrorists. Their AK rifles and bombs are supplied by the U.S.S.R., and while the world is deploring terrorism, it is encouraging the ANC in these depredations.

From March 1 to June 5 of this year, 284 innocent blacks were violently killed by the ANC, 172 of them by the necklaces, more than those killed by Qadhafi and all other terrorists combined. And yet, the press does not blame Moscow, but blames Pretoria for those outrages.

There are other black forces engaged in this unfolding drama.

When I was in the country last year, the moderate blacks outnumbered the revolutionaries by a 3-to-1 margin, as measured by a poll taken by a liberal professor at the University of Natal, which showed that the blacks opposed sanctions by that margin.

While that margin is probably reduced by the intimidations and the violence, there is a substantial group of blacks who, while opposing apartheid and wearing it down, are opposed to sanctions and the violence of the ANC.

They are led by Chief Buthelezi, with whom I identify, the most important black man in the country, who heads up the Zulus, the largest of the 11 tribes.

He has organized a political organization, Inkatha, and is now trying to work out with the South African Government a black power sharing provincial structure in Natal which he calls Indaba. In other words, he is now trying to work to give blacks the power to participate in the democratic process.

These blacks are working for a democratic South Africa. They oppose the ANC and its violence. In fact, the ANC tried to kill Buthelezi. They yearn for further American presence. They recognize that American corporations have uplifted the educational, economic, and political standards of the black workers. They abhor the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the political scene. They are joined in this by the black leaders of surrounding countries, such as Swaziland and Lesotho.

This morning's Wall Street Journal, which I read coming down from New Jersey, tells of the utter destruction that would befall not only the blacks in South Africa but all the surrounding countries if we go ahead and impose sanctions on that unfortunate country.

These people are also joined by the progressive whites, such as Sybil Hotz, former mayor and now councilwoman in Durban, with whom I spent some time, in Durban. She has long been engaged in an organizational campaign to uplift the conditions of the black majority in her province. She groans when she contemplates the devastating effects on her program for the disadvantaged, developmental education for disadvantaged young people growing up, professional and semiprofessional training that she has been organizing.

Now this is the basic composition and content of the forces opposing apartheid.

On which side do we intervene? Do we intervene on the side of the moderates, who are working for a democratic society, who are pleading with us to stay, who are pleading with us not to impose sanctions? Or do we join in on the side of the ANC, who are committing political terror and avowing to work to transform the country into another Vietnam?

I tell you, gentlemen, if you again send a signal to the people in South Africa that you are on the side of the revolutionaries, the perpetrators of violence, this terror will escalate and it will lead to some kind of civil war, which, in fact, is now going on.

The agitation in this country for invoking sanctions, the demonstrations in front of the South African Embassy, organized by one of our witnesses today—Randall Robinson, the disinvestment campaigns, sparked by campus radicals—all orchestrated by the media—have been accelerating the momentum of the ANC revolutionary forces in the struggle. We are thus undercutting our friends of democracy and are aiding our enemies.

If this insurgency succeeds, encouraged by sanctions, the disaster befalling U.S. interests will be immeasurable.

Moscow recognizes this. Its journal, *African Communist*, published in East Berlin, has said:

The balance of forces not merely in Southern Africa but in the whole of Africa and indeed the world would be fundamentally altered if the South African revolution were to succeed in its aims and overthrow the apartheid state.

Indeed, this is the case.

The strategic minerals in South Africa are indispensable for United States industrial and military survival. Between the U.S.S.R. and South Africa, they control 99 percent of the world's platinum, 97 percent of its vanadium, 93 percent of its manganese, and 84 percent of its chrome.

Andy Andrews, head of our Interior Department's Subcommittee on International Trade, has said of our denial of access to these that, "we would have to ground the air force, close hospitals and restaurants." And, of course, President Reagan would not have his SDI.

Actually, we are more dependent on South Africa than South Africa is dependent on us.

I spent the last year writing and updating my book, my geopolitical book, "Globe Under Siege II," and I studied this situation thoroughly. Geopolitically, South Africa is the sole effective force in the southern half of Africa with the capacity to blunt the current Soviet drive to control that whole region. Hence, the quote in the African Communist. South Africa now holds the Cape of Good Hope, gateway to the Indian Ocean. Its base at Simons Town is the only full western base in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. Soviet control of these could result in a geopolitical disaster.

I see a map of the Indian Ocean on the wall in the left side of this room. If you look beyond South Africa, if you look up the east coast of Africa, on the Indian Ocean, you will see one after another of Soviet satellites, where Soviet bases are being established: the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zanzibar, and with the exception of Kenya, you then get into South Yemen, where at Aden and the peninsula on the other side of Ethiopia totally dominate the passage from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Then you go over to Iran and to the subcontinent of India, which has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.

The only substantial friend that we have in that whole region, ally that we have in that whole region, is South Africa, and here we have to behold a spectacle of vital, effective forces here, trying to bring that country down.

Some Senators and Congressmen support Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, and other freedom fighters in Africa. I ask them that they should realize that if sanctions bring down the Pretorian government, Savimbi will fall, RENAMO, the resistance force in Mozambique will be crushed, and the democratic government opposing SWAPO in Namibia will be overthrown.

It is argued by proponents of punitive sanctions against South Africa that even if the blacks suffer hardships from the withdrawal of American presence in the country, it will be worthwhile if apartheid is eliminated.

Dr. Silber certainly showed a great example when an ANC spokesman here in the United Nations said that "if 4 million of us survive" out of the 21 million, the whole thing would be worthwhile.

The logic of this is flawed in that it does not carry to its eventual conclusion. Ending apartheid and substituting ANC rule will plunge blacks, as well as Indians, whites, and Asians, into a gulag, where the deprivations economically and politically will be far greater.

All you have to do is look to Ethiopia to see one of the results of that kind of thinking.

South Africa is a highly complex society. There are 11 disparate tribes with different languages, superstitions, and customs, all hostile to each other. Many of these people live in tribal conditions without any concept of the foundations of democratic lifestyle.

What the advocates of punitive sanctions are demanding is that the United States impose on the people of that country instant democracy or some idyllic structure of government that could not possibly survive the turmoil and intrigue of Africa.

This goal should not be substituted for a foreign policy that advances the political, economic, and military interests of this country. This foreign policy can be pursued while we work to bring democracy to that beleaguered country.

This must be done while working with the democratic forces, the advocates of reform, the moderate blacks and the progressive whites who share our aspirations and not with the terrorists and the revolutionaries who are making the country ungovernable, to use their words.

I could list all of the advantages, all of the progress. Every time I go over there, I see tremendous changes. They have been chronicled. The President mentioned some; there are many more.

If you go to the country, you will see them.

For these reasons, sanctions should be rejected. They encourage our enemies, the ANC, they will slow the progress that has been made and they will deter the economic advances that have been made, and, of course, they will blunt the military success of the United States in the region.

Senators, as for those who are concerned about civil rights, let me say this. Basically, when you analyze this whole thing and you see what the ANC is trying to do to these poor people, basically, sanctions are antiblack. That is an antiblack move, against the blacks of South Africa, trying to maybe destroy them and put them into a gulag.

If this is the high purpose of civil rights, well, then, I think we should have no part of it.

Thank you very much, Senator, for hearing me.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Morris.

Mr. De Mars.

STATEMENT OF JOHN DE MARS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PEACE PROGRAMS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. DE MARS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This testimony is provided by the National Education Association in the belief that it is necessary to include in your delibera-

tions specific testimony concerning the effects of the policies of apartheid on the children of color in South Africa.

NEA is an organization of teachers and other school employees in the United States and in the Defense Department schools overseas, and currently has 1.8 million members.

Internationally, we are the founding members and serve on the executive committee of a worldwide teachers' union consisting of 158 national teacher unions from 102 countries, including the Republic of South Africa, with more than 9 million members.

This international organization, which I just described, the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, includes the African Teachers Association of South Africa, or ATASA, the association which represents all black teachers in South Africa.

For many years, the NEA and our international and its affiliates have been working closely with ATASA in an effort to continue its internal development to enhance its effectiveness of its leadership, to increase the competencies of its members and, more recently, to provide support for the efforts being extended in South Africa to eliminate the widespread discrimination, the repression of the majority, and the commonplace violence against people of color.

The NEA and its international organization has adopted detailed policies against South Africa's apartheid system, and we have strongly supported measures meant to contribute to the increasing pressures upon that Government to urgently take stock and to reform itself toward true political and economic democracy.

We must note that we supported the recently passed House sanctions legislation and will work for the passage of equivalent legislation in the Senate.

While the administration currently pleads that it, too, seeks resolution of the injustices caused by the revulsive policies and conduct of the South African Government toward South Africans of color, more and more of your Senate colleagues have come to conclude that there is little hope that the continuation of these policies, intact and alone, will bring about the intended effects.

It pains many Americans to observe that the country which is, we all believe, the last best hope for democracy in our world, is viewed by our peers in South Africa and throughout the world as the last best friend of the racist regime in Pretoria.

It is time, then, and we sense a growing American consensus that we move to the next stage of activity, which is to resolve to pressure those persons in power in South Africa toward the immediate elimination of that system of apartheid which they, themselves, have acknowledged to be unjust and which must be ended.

Since the 1976 uprisings in Soweto, whose anniversary just passed, the black children of South Africa, and to a lesser degree other children of color, have carried a disproportionate burden in the struggle against apartheid. Wave after wave of regulation and control measures have been applied to them by the Government in an effort to drive from their minds the belief that they will ever be economically and politically liberated in their home country. And those who hold to that belief have been harassed, intimidated, beaten, arrested, detained, and in numbers which would shock us are tortured and killed.

The children's mistreatment begins with their education, but it extends to all aspects of their lives.

Education, which was discussed here in an earlier panel, for black children is neither compulsory nor free, while for whites the opposite is true.

Children of black families are required to pay school fees, despite the knowledge by their government that many black parents have no income whatsoever. In some areas of the country, unemployment rates of 30 to 60 percent are not uncommon.

Black parents and their children and their supporters contend, with proof, that the education of black children is education for subservience in a segregated and racist society.

While it is true that there have been many successes in black education, what affects the majority of these children is much more important.

We have been informed that more than 60 percent of black children leave school by their fifth year. Comparative school funding has often been reported, and reports vary. However, it can be stated that the per pupil expenditures for white children are 800 to 1,000 percent higher than those expenditures for black children.

Teacher-pupil ratios, about which we hear so much in our country, are 1 to 25 for white South Africans, and 1 to 56, with cases reported to 1 to 75 for black South Africans.

We have seen a study which indicates that, in order to provide universal education to all black children in South Africa, more than 180,000 classrooms will need to be constructed.

Quite expected is the poor education and training of black teachers. Most black teachers, an estimated 70 to 80 percent, have an eighth grade education, followed by 2 years of teacher training. White teachers all have matric, as they call it, high school diploma, plus 3 to 4 years of teacher training.

Black children resist this inferior system of education and realize the unsatisfactory futures that this inadequate education promises to them. The condemnation of Bantu education, with its emphasis on education in the language of Afrikaans, serves as the center of unrest among students.

While some may argue that much has changed since the early days, a quote from the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education, 1936, remains instructive. Let me quote:

We must give the native an education which will keep him in his place. If the native is to receive any education, he should have as his aim the idea embodied in Dickens' version of the ancient prayer: "Oh, let us love our occupations, Bless the Squire and his relations, Live upon our daily rations, And always know our proper stations."

Even earlier, Transvaal's first Inspector of Native Education revealed that white employers' interest in black schooling was "to teach the natives to work." "The scheme prescribed"—and I am quoting—"makes provision, therefore, in the first place, for the combination of manual training with elementary instruction, and, in the second, for the shaping of that elementary instruction so as to equip the native for a more intelligent comprehension of any industrial work that is set before him."

Although changes in the nature of work and the requirements of technology to be mastered in order to maintain effective and com-

petitive production are now recognized in South Africa, black people in South Africa view present-day education as having the same intentions and the same effects. Thus, the students have taken to the schoolyards and to the streets of South Africa, first to protest their system of education; but, as they became more informed and more regularly victimized, their protests have become directed to the whole system of apartheid.

They have come to conclude, and they say so, "liberation now and education later."

As a result of their demonstrations and because of the Government of South Africa's determination to end their opposition, children have come into harm's way as the police and now the military forces move violently to repress student dissent.

Student organizations have been banned, such as the Council of South African Students, and leaders have been restricted, silenced, arrested, and detained.

Students have been killed in the demonstrations and they have gone forward with funeral gatherings, where more children have been killed. The cycle of violence against children and their response to it gathers momentum.

While we all condemn the violence from any source in this crisis in South Africa, we must objectively look at the reality of its genesis. Without apartheid and its multifaceted and repressive ingredients, there would be little likelihood that students would find the need to sacrifice the safety of the activities of their school for the dangers of South African streets.

The 1976 uprisings in Soweto, mentioned earlier, were predominantly student-based. In the disturbances of this past year, though broad segments of the black population have engaged in demonstrations and protests and have felt the wrath of Government, it is observed that a major target of governmental violence is children.

The 1985 report of the South Africa project of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, from which many of the following citations are derived, indicate that upon the declaration of emergency and thereafter, 500 members of the COSAS organization, the student organization, were detained. In fact, 26 percent of all detained under the state of emergency were children under the age of 16.

Let me quote from the report:

Children and young people suffered perhaps the most. Over 2,000 children under the age of 16 were detained, many of whom were held for months before their release. At least 201 children were killed by the security forces; 11-year-olds were charged with political offenses and denied bail; and children of 16 required psychiatric hospitalization following brutal torture.

Torture in detention was rampant. There were detailed and consistent reports of detainees being hooded, beaten, given electric shocks, and subjected to death threats. At least 15 people died in detention or immediately following release, and most of them were younger than 25, including Johannes Spogter, who was only 13.

I commend that 200 page report to the chairman and the committee.

I detail further in the testimony a current situation, which I will gloss over very quickly, where currently under the state of emergency the children continue to be harassed and continue to be arrested.

Out of the 2,111 people reported detained in the last 5 weeks in this current state of emergency, approximately 261 have been

either students or their teachers. Our General Secretary of our affiliated organization, Hamilton Dlamlenza, the General Secretary of ATASA, is one of those individuals who was detained. Despite our best efforts to provide him legal counsel, we have been unable to do so.

And, despite our best efforts and interventions to the Government of South Africa, they have refused to allow us to meet with our colleague or to meet with representatives of his union.

If I might, before I close, I would make a couple of observations about some things that have been stated as fact, which I think are overstatements of fact and meaning given in the course of today's hearing.

We heard about the ending of the prohibition on mixed marriages as being an important step forward in the struggle against apartheid. In a report from the Government of South Africa last week covering all marriages that were consummated since the ban was lifted, less than 0.5 percent of the marriages consummated involve people of different races.

We have heard the ANC described in this panel and in others as extremist Communists and alleged terrorist organizations. I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the ANC in exile agreed with a teacher-parent mission in December and gave its blessing and endorsement to an effort that the teachers and their students and parents were making to end the school stayaways and get the children off the streets and back to the school.

That is the terrorist ANC.

Trade unions, we have been told, are free in South Africa. I must say to you again that trade union leaders are free. They are free to go to prison without charges.

We have been told that interracial violence will occur in exchange for apartheid, that we will have tribal violence, that Inkatha will attack ANC.

In this building the night before last, Prime Minister Frazier of the Eminent Persons Group indicated that in response to questions from the Eminent Persons Group Chief Buthalezi indicated that he is willing to subject himself to the leadership of Nelson Mandela.

So, I will close, Mr. Chairman, by contending that it is no longer possible to wait for a voluntary change in the direction of the South African Government.

We urge the Senate to join with its House colleagues in adopting severe economic measures against the Government of South Africa, and we argue that such action by the United States will provide the moral courage and the political leverage to convince other nations now reserving their decision to follow our example.

It is our opinion that, in taking this action without further delay, it may come in time to prevent the inevitable slaughter of South African youth, which we fear will occur in the absence of sanctions.

Finally, concerning the opinions of South Africans for the United States, which has been the subject of questions of a number of panels, it is unquestionably true that, if we do not come as a nation to the aid of the black people of South Africa and other people of colors, the generations of young people currently alive, those who will survive, will feel not that the United States was their friend in

a time of need, but, as Senator Kennedy said, "The last best friend of apartheid".

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. De Mars appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. De Mars.
Mr. Robinson.

**STATEMENT OF RANDALL ROBINSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
TRANSAFRICA, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sarbanes.

In the interest of time, I would like to have my prepared statement inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBINSON. I will make some brief remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. ROBINSON. I would like to associate myself as well with the statements of Bishop Walker, Mr. De Mars, and Dr. Post.

I have been involved in this issue now for nearly 20 years. Some years ago, we thought, all of us involved in this movement for so terribly long, that apartheid would last into the 21st century.

The last 4 years have been quite different. It is now clear to us all in our contact with those in South Africa and those outside, those in exile and those who have struggled and suffered for so long, that apartheid is in its death throes. Its demise is now certain.

The question now is only how soon and at what cost.

So, at the very beginning of my remarks, I want to urge this committee to quickly markup legislation and to quickly have it brought to the floor before the August recess, so that our Nation can take a position consistent with our ideals, while there is still time.

The pace of disintegration in South Africa is much quicker than the pace of appropriate action in the United States.

Two days ago, I believe our own democracy was diminished when the President of the United States, and the leader of the Western World, aligned the most important democracy in the world with the most vicious regime we have seen in the world since the demise of Nazi Germany.

South African whites took an important signal from that. The signal was to stand their ground and make no concession.

South African blacks have now decided that life without freedom is not worth living.

A poll conducted some time ago by the Johannesburg Sunday Times indicated that 77 percent of urban black South Africans want comprehensive economic sanctions, and want them even if they are hurt by them.

Almost 50 percent of South African blacks are prepared to accept violence as a means of achieving their freedom.

And so, it is important for us all to remember, Mr. Chairman, that, while jobs are important, this struggle in South Africa is not essentially about jobs. It is essentially about the embellishment and protection and attainment of human dignity. It is essentially about

the right to vote. It is essentially about the right to own land in one's own land.

It is essentially about the restoration of their birthright.

Many years ago, in Capetown or Sharpeville and beyond, capping a 300-year period of repression, the South African Government would merely respond to an uprising with more repression. It seemed to work.

But the last 4 years have been a watershed period indeed.

Further repression has only increased resistance. And so, these two states of emergency have been met with more deaths and still more unrest. The one last year saw 714 people die. In this one, untold numbers have died. Some 11,000 people have been arrested since 1985. Whites in South Africa now know themselves that the days of apartheid are numbered.

They are leaving the country. They are confused.

For the first time in recent history, no new American corporations started business in South Africa in 1985. Thirty-eight left. Fifteen have left already this year. Thirty-seven American banks will no longer do business with South Africa. The rand is at an all-time low.

It is a society in disintegration.

And so, the question now before us is the price that must be paid. Should this committee delay, should the Senate not act, should President Reagan's statement be allowed to stand for America, then that process will proceed through guerrilla war, and tens of thousands of blacks and whites will lose their lives. The infrastructure of the country will be destroyed, and no future biracially in that country will be available for anyone for years to come, and American interests will be destroyed in the process.

As we did in Rhodesia, we must do in South Africa. We must do it soon. We must do it this month or next month.

We must impose dramatic sanctions that will make a difference.

The South African Government is literally incapable of respecting anything short of comprehensive economic sanctions. For this reason, we give our support to the bill offered by Senator Cranston, calling for complete economic disinvestment.

It is inexcusable, Mr. Chairman, that our Nation should supply South Africa with 50 percent of its computers when it has no capacity to produce its own. It is inexcusable that our Nation should supply it with 40 percent of its oil and refine it, when it has none of its own; with 30 percent of its vehicles; with so much of its capital; with so much of its imported technology; that we consume so much of their gold and their minerals and their precious coins. We have become the legs on which apartheid stands.

So now, when black South Africans look to America, they see America as a country where there is an enormous and yawning gap between its practices and its ideals.

We can intervene now dramatically and make democracy possible, for, if we wait, slaughter lies ahead. I am as certain of that as I am of anything.

I implore you, I urge you to not delay. This is not an issue for us in America of Republicans and Democrats. It is not an issue of black and white. It is a human issue. We must strive to make our presence felt.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I come from Richmond, VA. I grew up in the forties and the fifties. Democracy is a splendid, but fragile, proposition. It rests in the last analysis on our perception of our Government standing for what it says it stands for—perceptions of safety and assurances by law that this Government is a Government under the law, rested and rooted in moral concepts and ideals.

We have flagrantly violated those ideals in our policies toward South Africa. Not only have we made the people of South Africa themselves less safe, but we have diminished our own democracy.

I beseech the Senate to join the House in setting the record straight. But do it now, for, should you wait, purpose will be lost and lives will be sacrificed and there will be no future for any of us.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Robinson.

We appreciate the important and eloquent and moving testimony of each of you.

Senator Sarbanes, do you have questions of the witnesses?

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I really feel impelled to ask Mr. Morris what he thinks of apartheid.

The reason I do so, Mr. Morris, is that I have read all through your statement and I don't see it in there. I feel I ought to put that question to you.

Mr. MORRIS. I, like most of the people in the United States and in South Africa am against apartheid. It is an unfortunate system of government and must be eliminated.

The problem that the U.S. Senate has before it now is how best to eliminate apartheid.

To intervene in the struggle that is going on on the side of the people who are not making the abolition of apartheid their goal, but instead to turn the country over to a revolutionary force that has set as its model what happened in Vietnam, Mozambique, and Angola is the wrong way to go. I think that we should identify with Chief Buthelezi, with Sybil Hotz, and the other wonderful people who are working for a democratic South Africa, renouncing violence, working for free enterprise and to avoid the people who are committing the ghoulish acts that are shocking the world.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think Nelson Mandela should be at the bargaining table?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know.

The South Africans, as you know, have offered Mandela his release if he renounced violence. He has not renounced violence.

I don't understand the position that Chief Buthelezi takes. Now, Chief Buthelezi knows the situation very well. He knows Mandela, and he has hope that, if Mandela is released, maybe they can work together.

Now he certainly does not say the same thing about Mrs. Mandela, who he says is manipulated, and he certainly does not support collaboration with the ANC, which is trying to kill him.

Senator SARBANES. I want to find out how far your embrace of Chief Buthelezi extends, since he is apparently prepared to serve in

a negotiating committee under the chairmanship of Nelson Mandela.

What is your view on Mandela as chairman of the negotiating committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Chief Buthelezi understands the situation in South Africa, and I identify with him. I respect his view that possibly he has something in mind when he said we could work with Mandela. But he certainly has never made the statement that he could work with the ANC.

Senator SARBANES. Buthelezi favors Mandela's release from prison, does he not?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon?

Senator SARBANES. Buthelezi favors Mandela's release from prison?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Unconditionally?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. What do you think of that?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, as I say, I do not understand the inconsistent position of Chief Buthelezi, but I respect it.

He is very much opposed to the ANC, will not negotiate with the ANC, but will negotiate with Nelson Mandela. Possibly his hope is that Nelson Mandela, in the confinement of prison, has matured and sees the world struggle as Buthelezi sees it.

Now I think that is the only rationalization that I have for it, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. Were you in the room when Senator Murkowski made the point that all the strategic minerals located in South Africa are, in fact, present in Alaska?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Yes, I'm sorry. Yes, I was. But, I mean, that is contrary to the findings of the Department of Interior and everything else; 99 percent of the world's platinum and 96 percent of the world's vanadium, and 93 percent of the world's manganese—these are facts that are accepted by the Department of Interior, by everybody who studied the situation.

Senator SARBANES. But that is not what our distinguished colleague, Senator Murkowski, asserts.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I never heard anything like that before.

Senator SARBANES. So you would take issue with him?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, it flies in the face of all of the evidence adduced over the last 10 years.

Senator SARBANES. He adduced, I thought, some impressive evidence for his position.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I respect Senator Murkowski, but I do not know the basis for his information, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. All right.

The final question I would put to you is this.

What do you make of the argument of those who say that the failure to bring about change in South Africa will drive the country into the arms of the Soviets?

You have made a big strategic argument. What about the position that the failure to bring about change is, in effect, radicalizing the situation? The Soviets are prepared to fish in troubled waters,

and the people have nowhere else to turn. In a sense we are simply creating the very monster that we are apprehensive about. What about that?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would pursue the initiative taken by Chief Buthelezi in his efforts to establish what he calls Indaba. That is a black powersharing government structure for the province of Natal.

I think that is the way we should go.

It is the way Rhodesia tried to go, and I know Rhodesia well. I have been chairman of the American Rhodesian Association.

Ian Smith abolished all discrimination laws, gave one-man-one-vote, elected a black prime minister, but that did not settle the issue at all because the West and the Commonwealth nations would not recognize Bishop Muzorewa or the country until the Communists took over Rhodesia.

I am afraid that the same thing is going to happen, particularly when the ANC tell us in that directive I quoted earlier that, even if we concede all of these basic demands, that is not going to stop them from building momentum to convert the country into another Vietnam and Angola.

I am for the Indaba approach. I am for peaceful negotiation and for not giving in to terrorists.

Senator SARBANES. And you think the South African Government is going to change the system fundamentally?

Mr. MORRIS. Botha is trying to. He has made tremendous changes over there. Every time I go over there I see tremendous changes.

Senator SARBANES. What is it you see?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, recently, they have modified the pass laws. They have abolished interracial marriage bans. Blacks now have rights to own property, have 99 year land leases. The educational standards are tremendously uplifted.

If you walk along the streets of Johannesburg and Pretoria, you will see that most of the people are black and they have government jobs at the operational level—bank clerks, people working with computers.

If you go into the restaurant in the principal hotel there, the Carlton Hotel, up to 30 or 40 percent of the guests are black or colored. That is a much higher percentage than you will see in the Plaza Hotel in New York or in some of the bigger hotels in Washington.

Senator SARBANES. Where do you get those long-term leases you were talking about? Is it only in the black townships?

Mr. MORRIS. I used a quote in my book, a quote from former Secretary of Treasury Bill Simon. He has written of that in this fashion, if I may read it: "Until recently, blacks were forbidden to own property outside the black homeland areas. Now they are permitted to hold 99 year leases. Their rights are enforceable in an independent legal system. Blacks now have and are making good use of the right to organize free labor unions. Major sports events and most public restrooms are now integrated. So are almost all the international class hotels and restaurants. The job reservation system which kept blacks out of better paying jobs is in ruins. Blacks are now attending previously all-white universities in

record numbers. South African trade with neighboring black nations, all vociferously antiapartheid, has increased past the \$1 billion a year level."

Those are the facts that I used, from former Secretary Simon.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I know some of the other panelists want to talk about the facts.

Bishop Walker, did you want to react to that?

Bishop WALKER. I am a little concerned about what I consider to be hearsay testimony on the part of Mr. Morris.

I have been in South Africa. He talks about the changes in Johannesburg.

It is still a fact, however, that every day at 6 o'clock, all the black people have to leave and go out to the townships. The trains and the buses line up to take these people back home.

Part of the ways in which this government controls the population is to guarantee that they are in places which can be quickly and immediately surrounded by police and by military forces, so that they can never in any way threaten the city of Johannesburg.

Johannesburg is not as he depicts it. Black people are not filling hotels. They are not going into restaurants. When I go into a restaurant, one of the first things that happens is they ascertain that you are an American, and if you are an American and have an American passport, you are honorary white and you can stay.

Black people are not doing these things. I don't know where he gets this information from.

Second, I think he is quite wrong. If this government, our government, does not offer some aid and comfort to the black peoples of South Africa, we are going to see a bloodbath. It is a mistake for us to continually push people into the arms of communism and then call the Communists because we will not give them the assistance that they need.

We have done that before in the world. I think it is high time that we stopped doing that and became the democratic country that we are and that we have always purported to be, supporting those peoples around the world who need our aid and who are struggling for freedom, as the peoples of this great country are.

The movement in South Africa is not Communist inspired, it is not written in Moscow. It is written in the blood, sweat, and tears of the peoples of that country, who are primarily black.

Anyone who thinks that the South African Government is supporting education is insane or misguided. They are not supporting education except Bantu education which enslaves.

All one has to do is to go into the black shantytowns, into the homelands. I have done that. I have seen the schoolrooms. They are a disgrace to human beings. We would not even ask our dogs to live in places where we ask children in South Africa to study and where the Government supports this kind of institution.

I have never been openly and aggressively in favor of sanctions until now. I have always believed that an American presence is important. And it is still important to me.

I do not think we have to cut and run if we apply sanctions. I think we can do both things. I think we can offer hope to the peoples of South Africa for the development of a stable economy. I out-

lined some of that, that I could not read to you because of the length of my statement.

I think Mr. Morris is dead wrong. I think, with Mr. Robinson, that the world is watching us and we must apply sanctions to this government. This government will not move otherwise. It is set dead center, on the right, and will remain there.

The extremists on both sides may be wrong. The broad group of people who are supporting the end of apartheid include people who make statements as Desmond Tutu made yesterday. While I find that an unfortunate statement, I can certainly understand it, given the frustration that that man has had to live with for the last 18 months in that country and around the world.

I think that if we do not help them, we are asking for the kind of revolution that will guarantee that South Africa will be lost to the West forever.

Like Zimbabwe, South Africa will be free. It does not matter in one way or another if we support them or not. If we support them, then I think it will be without bloodshed—or can be. If we do not support them, it will be with bloodshed. It will take longer and more lives will be lost.

By then, they may well be entrenched in the arms of Soviet power, and I would hate to see that happen.

Mr. MORRIS. His Excellency took issue with some of the things I said.

Bishop WALKER. With almost everything.

Mr. MORRIS. Have I the same right to respond to him?

Senator SARBANES. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. The evidence that the ANC is not Communist—I suggest that the Senate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the first place, read the report of its own Senate Terrorism Committee on the Communist content of the ANC. Pay attention to the statements and utterances and the professions, to Winnie Mandela's pledge of allegiance to Moscow. The leadership of the ANC, Joe Slovo, is a white Comintern agent, Lithuanian.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think that if the United States were to help Winnie Mandela she would pledge allegiance to the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon, sir?

Senator SARBANES. Do you think if the United States would help Winnie Mandela, she would pledge allegiance to the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. No; she would not.

Senator SARBANES. Aren't we driving these people into the hands of the Communists by not assisting them in their struggle to become free?

How are 4 million people going to continue to dominate 24 million people and deny them any basic human rights?

Mr. MORRIS. They are not denying them basic rights. They are giving them, gradually they are going to give them limited control, limited participation. But it has to be gradual.

The people right now have no understanding of the fundamentals of American democracy. An instant one-man-one-vote would be a disaster.

Most of these people still live in tribal conditions, and I think what you have to do is to educate the blacks, bring them up to an

understanding of the democratic process and then, as Ian Smith tried to do, give them more and more political power.

He tried it heroically and courageously and his courageous effort failed. That is something that all South Africans are watching with a sense of alarm.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I think I understand Mr. Morris' position. I don't really need to pursue it any further.

I think that his testimony in this context is really a tribute to American democracy and the free exchange of viewpoints, very frankly.

Mr. De Mars, did you have a comment?

Mr. DE MARS. Senator, I would like to speak for just a minute about the business of education.

We have heard some testimony today that just does not jibe with the facts.

The most recent facts have been provided in a report of the Planning Research Institute last week. I will quote from a South African publication, so I will give you that. According to their calculations, 22.18 percent of all black students left school in their first year. This year, 22.18 percent left school in their first year. Only 27 percent were still in place by the fourth year. Only 12.4 percent of all children are in school beyond standard age, which is approaching 10th grade.

In 1985, altogether 40.3 percent of the total number of black pupils in the national states were in school—out in the hustings; 30.45 in the TBBC countries; and 29.2 percent in the schools under the Department of Education and Training. The Department of Education and Training is the Ministry of Education for black education—29 percent.

What I am saying is that these people who are in power in South Africa have been in power, at least as a party, since 1948. There has been an intentional policy of the Government of South Africa to withhold education from black South Africans. Under these urgent and emergency circumstances, it makes it possible for them to argue that the place cannot be governed by black people because they are uneducated.

I ask you why they are uneducated. It is because of a lack of commitment.

In my earlier testimony, I mentioned that they are short nearly 200,000 classrooms to provide education to these people.

What we are saying is that these are the kinds of things that we have to focus on in trying to fashion American foreign policy. We need to force the Government of South Africa to attend to the democratic future of South Africa, and they are not doing it.

Mr. MORRIS. Senators, I say that the American presence is going to help improve that situation, and our withdrawing from that is going to be a great disservice to the advancement of South African education.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Robinson.

Mr. ROBINSON. I just want to make a brief comment.

I must admit that in listening to Mr. Morris, I did not first think a comment was warranted because of the absurdity of most of what he said—of course, ending with a dropoff into the most blatant expression of racism.

I am shocked and offended, but that is irrelevant to what we are talking about here.

I think we ought to understand something about how Zimbabwe came to be.

Now in Zimbabwe, democracy is working. It has a robust economy, it is exporting food to South Africa, its education reforms have been marvelous and are paying dividends. It has problems, but it has a chance for a future.

It has that chance because the Western community, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, had the courage and the conviction over a long period of time to impose mandatory, comprehensive, economic sanctions that I believe served the interest of whites that are now coming back to Zimbabwe, even more than they served the interests of the black majority—at least one as much as the other. This is because they made a biracial future under democracy possible in that country.

We talk so much about the African National Congress, as if it were going to take over the country. South Africa will win its freedom one way or another. We will either have negotiations that produce a constitution and a plan for an orderly transfer of power and elections so that people democratically can elect those whom they want—it may be Mr. Mandela; it may be Mr. Buthelezi; it may be someone we don't know about—that is not the point. The point is to give all of the people of that country an equal voice in their government, in a democracy not unlike our own.

This does not automatically mean that the ANC will seize power. It means that the ANC is prepared to put itself before its own people, and to apply for office and elections under a constitution, just as we do here.

It can happen that way. Or they can come to power through the barrel of a gun. That would be awfully more costly—and not the least costly to the United States and our interests, because should they have to pay that kind of price, I think they will take a very, very dim view of our record in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. May we have just one last comment?

Will that be satisfactory to you, Senator, for Mr. Post to comment, and then we will conclude this hearing.

Senator SARBANES. Fine.

Reverend POST. I have three very brief remarks.

I suppose it has become a commonplace here over these 3 days to say that apartheid is not reformable. But what we heard at the table today is built on that assumption, that reform can be applied to apartheid, toward the elimination of apartheid.

Apartheid is not reformable. I think we need simply to say it again, for all to hear.

The second is in relation to the ANC. I suppose it is another commonplace in terms of the record that it is an old organization, that it has operated for long years on the basis of a nonviolent commitment, until the Sharpesville tragedy; that it has a distinguished freedom charter, adopted in 1955.

I think we ought to note that the Eminent Persons Group visited with the leadership of the ANC and included this remarkable paragraph in its conclusions:

Amidst all this gloom, the quality of the country's black leaders shines through. Their achievement in bringing about popular and trade union mobilization in the face of huge odds commands respect. Their idealism, their genuine sense of nonracialism, and their readiness not only to forget, but to forgive, compel admiration.

These are precious assets which a new South Africa will need. They will be lost altogether if the government continues to shrink from taking the necessary political decisions with a sense of urgency. The options are diminishing by the day.

It is good to remember that the Eminent Persons Group involved the ANC in its negotiating plan, and that it was by no means the ANC that withdrew, as you well know, from participation in the plan. It was, indeed, the Botha government.

Then, finally, just a word about Mr. Buthelezi.

He is a curious figure in contemporary political life, worldwide. Perhaps even more curious is that so many colleagues here in Washington and elsewhere focus on Mr. Buthelezi and on him alone.

He, obviously, is a person with political ambitions, a person with declining popularity of record in South Africa, a person playing to the white community, giving it the illusion of safety in a tragic and demanding time.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Post.

This morning, at 10 a.m., I mentioned just for the information of everyone that we would ask members of the committee to reserve Tuesday and Thursday for discussion and markup. I have asked the majority leader and the minority leader, and they are working on a unanimous-consent agreement that will make it possible for us to take up each of the important foreign policy issues at a defined time and in a structured debate, and hopefully the South African legislation on its own.

I also mentioned that in the event the unanimous-consent agreement cannot be arrived at, we will proceed undoubtedly to attach the South African debate on some other legislation. That would be less satisfying and the result of that perhaps would be more clouded because of other issues attached and those sorts of things.

But, in any event, we are working rapidly, I think, within the committee. There is a sense of urgency and deep interest.

So, we will proceed, and you have helped us very much in our deliberations.

We thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 9:35 a.m. on Tuesday, July 29, 1986.]

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SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Pressler, and Evans.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Let the Chair explain, to begin with, our procedures for today because there have been various and conflicting announcements. As is obvious from the lack of attendance by many members today, a large number of our colleagues are attending services for Governor Harriman. Many members simply wished to convey their very best respects to our witness today, who has thoughtfully accommodated our time schedule.

Our intent had been to visit with Lane Kirkland this morning and then to proceed into discussion of legislation. We may still do that, although the absence of members makes that unlikely.

In any event, it will be a fairly short discussion today.

Members will be returning to Washington later today, and it is the hope of the Chair that we will be able to have an early beginning for our markup on Thursday so that the committee might take some action on South African legislation by the end of the week.

So, I ask all staff to convey the word to members that that is our hope.

Having said that, we are just delighted that Lane Kirkland, the president of the AFL-CIO, joins us this morning.

We look forward to his testimony. We appreciate his own personal witness in South Africa, and we look forward to his observations before we consider legislation.

I would like to recognize now the distinguished president of the AFL-CIO, Mr. Lane Kirkland.

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STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY PATRICK I. O'FARRELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR CENTER, AFL-CIO; ROBERT M. McGLOTTEN, DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATION, AFL-CIO; AND PEGGY TAYLOR, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATION, AFL-CIO.

Mr. KIRKLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My statement is very short and, with your permission, I would read it.

But, first of all, I would like to introduce Pat O'Farrell, who is the director of the African-American Labor Center, through which the AFL-CIO conducts its relations with the trade unions of the African Continent.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased to have you with us, Mr. O'Farrell.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I very much appreciate this opportunity to present to this committee the views of the AFL-CIO on the critical choices facing our Government in its relations with South Africa.

The situation there is deteriorating rapidly, and our options are narrowing.

The views I express today are not only those of the AFL-CIO. They reflect a consensus that has emerged among the leadership of the black South African trade union movement.

I urge you to give great weight to the position of this movement, whose growing strength and importance, we believe, represents the best hope for the peaceful dismantling of apartheid.

If democratic change is to occur in South Africa, it will come from within. If the United States wishes to promote such change, it will encourage and listen to the democratic forces that are on the front lines of the struggle against apartheid.

If we fail to heed their voices, if, instead, we concentrate on fine tuning Mr. Botha's tactics, we will lose credibility among our true friends in South Africa and we will lose our capacity to influence the outcome of events. We will find ourselves constructively engaged with the past and irrelevant to the future.

I have recently returned from a 5-day trip to South Africa as part of a delegation organized by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which represents 80 million workers in 92 countries. We met with the leaders of the black trade union movement.

We were denied permission to meet with those trade unionists who are held in detention, some of whom have been subjected to brutal beatings and other forms of torture.

Indeed, we heard numerous reports and saw hard evidence of sheer police sadism. This is not an aberration; it is an expression of the essence of a system of state lawlessness.

In the face of this official criminality, our Government is seen as counseling endless patience. Even as apartheid takes its daily toll of blacks in violence, exploitation, and degradation, the administration argued against effective economic sanctions on the ground that they would hurt South Africa's blacks.

Tell that to this man [indicating], whose body is scarred by whip wounds inflicted by the police. I saw many similar photographs during my trip, and I saw in person the scars of apartheid in the flesh.

In light of the price that so many have paid and are paying in their struggle for freedom, the President's recently expressed concern that blacks would be hurt by sanctions can only strike our black brothers and sisters as insulting.

I have been asked by the black trade union leaders of South Africa to convey this message to the Congress: They want strong and effective economic sanctions imposed on their country's racist regime.

Like the workers of Poland and Chile, like those who marched and were jailed with Martin Luther King, they know that freedom is not free. They know that it entails sacrifice and they are willing to bear that burden.

As one of them said to me: "Freedom is worth any price."

We have just come through an uplifting celebration of American independence and the Centennial of the Statue of Liberty. What was that about?

How ironic that the meaning of that celebration should be better understood among black workers in South Africa than in the White House.

I have made available to this committee the statements of the ICFTU outlining an effective program of sanctions against South Africa. The AFL-CIO fully concurs with this program.

Before the march of events and the intransigence of the South African regime narrowed the range of choices, we were ourselves uncertain about the efficacy and impact of strong sanctions.

In large measure, our ambivalence reflected the uncertainty and the divisions within the black South African trade union movement. That is no longer the case.

It is a mark of the deterioration of South Africa's situation that the black trade union movement is united in favoring the imposition of tough sanctions. This is also the position of the AFL-CIO and of a growing number of Democrats and Republicans in both Houses of Congress. I hope it will also be the position of this committee.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkland.

Let me just ask for the sake of the record about the nature of the sanctions which the AFL-CIO favors.

Can you give us some idea at least of the tactics or the strategy that you believe would be most effective?

Mr. KIRKLAND. The position of the AFL-CIO on specific sanctions is detailed in a statement entitled "Beating Apartheid," which was adopted by the executive board of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, at a special session held here in Washington in April 1985.

We subscribe completely to the sanctions that are called for in this statement. It is rather lengthy. If you would like me to read them, I will. Or I could offer them to you for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just noting that on page 2 of that statement there are some specific economic sanctions.

Mr. KIRKLAND. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is not the totality of them.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I think that section is quite short.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you review those so that Senator Evans, who has now joined us, and I can try to think through together the strategy that is to be accomplished by those sanctions.

Mr. KIRKLAND. On page 2 of that statement, you will note in paragraph 6, it says:

Governments should by administration and legislative action build up the following sanctions.

i. The extension of the arms embargo to include sales by South African subsidiaries of transnational corporations, a tightening of the definition of arms sales to include all types of equipment intended for use by South Africa's military security and police services, sales of machinery to South African arms-producing companies, the purchase of South African produced arms and the strengthening of international monitoring to ensure compliance by all major industrial countries.

ii. The ending of investment guarantees, export credits and all trade promotion measures, and steps, product by product, to switch both import and export trade from South Africa.

iii. Prevention of new investment in South Africa by transnationals.

iv. The ending of all contacts for the expansion of the South African nuclear energy and oil from coal programs.

v. The ending of all commercial operations by transnationals in the so-called "homelands or Bantustans."

vi. A stop on bank loans to the African State and publicly-owned companies, and new IMF loans.

vii. Punitive action against the owners of any ships which carry oil to South Africa and against oil companies or oil traders which break or are party to the breaking of the U.N. oil embargo. This will entail intensified national and international monitoring by governments of shipping traffic to South Africa.

viii. A ban on sale of oil derricks.

ix. A ban on purchases of South African coal.

x. A program of compulsory disinvestment by transnationals operating especially in the armaments, energy, high-technology sectors in South Africa, and including all those companies which have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being in violation of internationally accepted standards of labor practice.

The CHAIRMAN. Just as a matter of curiosity, is there a list or some identification of those companies presently?

Mr. KIRKLAND. That section was aimed primarily at support action that the brothers and sisters in South Africa would expect the international trade union movement to take.

We meet periodically with the trade union representatives of South Africa through our South African Coordinating Committee of the IFCTU and develop lists of cases that they want us to pursue.

There is a list—this is in constant discussion. One that operates extensively in this country that we have been asked to do what we can to bring some persuasive influence to bear on is Shell. There are others.

Shell is the one on that list that primarily affects the United States. Others exist which are essentially British or other concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your overall judgment of the ability of South African labor unions to play an effective role in the democratization of that country?

There are many observers who believe that labor unions may, in fact, constitute the basic backbone for a new South Africa.

Can you sketch out, both from your experience as a labor official and, likewise, from your international experience, what we might anticipate from those unions.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I believe that proposition to be quite true, Senator.

The South African nonracial and black trade union movement, since about 1979, has undergone a period of extraordinary growth. I would say of all the developing trade union movements around the world, it has been the most dramatic in its dimensions. It has grown from virtually nothing in that period to something on the order of 1¼ million, combining all of the trade unions outside of the orbit of the old, racially white controlled trade unions.

This movement has negotiated agreements, represented its members, engaged in democratic internal processes. It is, as Bishop Tutu told us when we met with him in Johannesburg, the cutting edge of the movement for fundamental basic reform and democratization in South Africa.

It is a training ground for leadership. It is a training ground on the processes of democracy and a forceful and effective representation of constituencies.

I believe it is the most hopeful sign of an opening for constructive reform and the effective, fair, and democratic implementation of majority rule.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you received by all people that you wanted to see in South Africa, whether they be governmental or nongovernmental?

Mr. KIRKLAND. No; we were not.

We asked to see the minister of law and order. The purpose of this mission was, essentially, to demonstrate to our brothers and sisters in the trade unions with whom we have relations in South Africa that we were deeply concerned with the state of emergency and, beyond prior to the state of emergency, the totality of conditions of life under apartheid, and that we continued to stand squarely with them. It was designed to help their morale and to demonstrate to them that they were not alone and that events were being followed very carefully and had a high priority with the international trade union movement.

Beyond that, we hoped to be able to bring some persuasive pressures to bear to secure the release of the detainees; the trade union detainees, primarily. We called for and want to see the release of all political detainees.

We asked to see the man who is the chief jailer, the minister of law and order, but we were denied that. The only Government official with whom we met was the Director General of the Manpower Ministry. We presented our arguments to him.

Aside from the Government, that is, the regime, we met with everyone that we sought to pack into a short period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the basis for the Government's detention of trade union officials? Were they charged with intent to foment disorder?

Why were people detained from the labor movement specifically?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Senator, I don't know if the committee has—if not, I think it should have—a copy of the emergency decree.

The CHAIRMAN. I am certain that we do in our files.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I have it here.

Simply put, they don't need any reason. There is no reason. There is no charge.

We made the point as forcefully as we knew how when we met with this one Government person that we could see that it represented an impact upon the trade union movement and it was quite clear to us that that was the motivating force. Of the detainees, 269 are key trade union officials, cutting across the spectrum of the black trade union movement—officials of COSATU, AZACTU, CUSA, and of the independent unions. It was clearly to our minds designed to chill and intimidate that movement, both by removing a segment of its leadership from activity and by intimidating those who remain outside and by forcing others into hiding.

It is very difficult to run a democratic organization while underground or in hiding. That, I think, is the purpose of it.

The argument was made or the suggestion was made by—by Mr. Van Der Merwe that there probably was some political reason or some legal reason why they were rounded up and that they must have been engaged in other activities outside of their trade union functions.

We said well, then, charge them. Charge them with those offenses.

But they are not charged. There is no charge. They are held in detention without charges.

His response was, as it was to quite a number of the points that we made, "I take your point."

The terms of this regulation are extraordinary. It empowers any police official to arrest:

Whenever any commissioned, warrant, or noncommissioned officer in a force is of the opinion that the presence or conduct of any person or persons at any place in the Republic endangers or may endanger the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order, or exposes or may expose life or property to danger.

Then he can round them up with no charge. And they disappear. Initially, they were not permitted even to be visited by a lawyer. But that was challenged in the court by the trade unions who have been challenging the terms of this degree in the courts, with partial success. The courts have ruled that they can see a lawyer. But they still cannot see their families nor are their families told where they are.

It is illegal to even publish the names of the persons detained. We broke the law repeatedly when we were down there. We compiled a list of the names as best we could, of the ones known, and circulated it, and presented it to this official.

Well, that is a violation of the law and we can be rounded up for that.

Clearly, that fact, the fact of the sort of iron curtain that descends when a person is arrested, opens the way for this kind of abuse.

I should point out that this is simply one picture of many that I saw [indicating]. These lashings, at least in some cases, are done merely out of the sheer pleasure of it by those who inflict these injuries.

I was told by one person who showed me the scars on his back that he was not interrogated. It was not for purposes of interrogation; just for sheer hatred or, I suppose, to breed fear.

In the statute, there are disciplinary rules for the people who are detained. This is a little bit like the meticulous recordkeeping and concern for regulations that were displayed by the regime in Nazi Germany, where everything was covered by a regulation. Regulations would permit the most extraordinary treatment of human beings.

A detainee who contravenes or fails to comply with any provisions of these rules or who wilfully furnishes a false reply to any questions put to him by a person employed at the prison where he is being detained, is insolent or disrespectful toward such a person or towards an official visitor, or towards a member of the force during the execution of his duties, is idle, careless, or negligent, or refuses to clean the place where he is detained, swears or uses slanderous, insulting, obscene, threatening or any other.

Any other—"improper language, conducts himself indecently by word, act, or gesture" et cetera, et cetera—that's how it reads. Then it has a list of penalties: Withdrawal of privileges or concessions, a fine not exceeding 20 rands a day, solitary confinement, a reprimand, the deprivation of one or more meals on any one day, corporal punishment not exceeding six strokes if the detainee is a male person apparently under the age of 40 years and no other punishment is imposed upon him in respect of the said contravention. Well, that picture shows six pretty damned good strokes, if you look at it [indicating].

It is really a brutal system.

I have heard the argument that the record in other African countries does not suggest that if black majority rule occurs that you will have good government or democratic government or respect for human rights.

I would say the record of the white government, the white tribe that runs South Africa does not set a very good example, and it would be hard to govern in a worse manner than they are doing.

I believe that if majority rule comes to South Africa, in large part because of the evolution—certainly it is a major factor—of the black trade union movement and its role, its increasing role in that society, that you do have the institutions and the element of pluralism that would make possible a healthy and vigorous democratic society under those conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask just one more question, and then I will recognize my colleagues who have waited patiently throughout my questions.

One large issue that surrounds the argument for or against sanctions is that, even given the suffering that has already occurred to blacks in South Africa, sanctions would cause additional suffering.

Some believe that this care and concern for blacks comes at a very late point and that it is patronizing to be concerned in that way. Others believe that additional sanctions would cause considerable suffering, and there is some ambivalence even on the part of those who favor sanctions as to whether additional hardships should be visited on those who have already suffered a great deal.

As you visit with labor union leaders in this atmosphere, clearly they are aware of their vulnerability, and the sheer numbers of persons available for these jobs in mines and elsewhere is a well known factor in the trade union movement.

Given all of this, can you testify to us your general impression as to how trade union leaders might react to legislation which calls

for an embargo on imports of products produced by corporations owned by the Government, the so-called parastatal industries, which, for various reasons, we believe might be an especially effective sanction?

There are many black South African employed by these parastatal industries. Our imports are, by no means, the totality of their business. It is only a percentage. But, nevertheless, there could be some direct harm.

Can you address that issue as best you can?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Yes; there are two or three points that I would like to make on that issue.

First of all, as for the response of the trade union representatives with whom we met, and with whom we discussed these questions in some depth, I should note that the IFCTU position, to which I referred earlier, which is the AFL-CIO position, was formulated jointly with a delegation of representatives of the South African trade union movement. They were parties to this, and they embraced this.

We have taken the position consistently, both in our bilateral relations of the AFL-CIO with these organizations and through the multi-lateral forum of the IFCTU that we will not presume to decide unilaterally what is good for the working people of South Africa or whether or not they should accept and bear burdens and sacrifices and hardships; rather, we will respond to their representations to us about what they want to see us do.

That is what this document is. It is an expression of what they tell us that they want us to support and to do.

At long last, at this stage—and as I note in my testimony, this was not always the case. It has been a progressive narrowing of options because of the posture of that regime—this is now the issue of sanctions. With them, it is now a threshold issue. The situation is that unless they believe that we are forcefully and energetically supporting the imposition of sanctions, our relations with them and our capacity to carry on those relations and to help them and to continue to operate programs of assistance with them would suffer.

Of course, in our view, the author of hardship is not sanctions or the steps that are taken to support the struggle that is going on in South Africa. The author is the institution of apartheid.

Sanctions are the fruits of apartheid, just as tyranny in other countries where we use the instrument of sanctions is the author of whatever consequences ensue.

At this stage, I believe the state of mind is about like that, let's say, of a battalion or a platoon of troops in battle, as happened frequently, let's say, in Vietnam or Korea, which finds itself surrounded and about to be overrun, suffering heavy losses. The surviving senior officer picks up the phone and calls base and says bring in some friendly fire on our position. They are asking for friendly fire on their position because what they are suffering in its absence is less tolerable, much less tolerable.

It is hard to tell a person like that that sanctions will impose hardships. It is hard to argue persuasively to those people who live in these atrocious conditions in these townships, in shacks with no amenities whatsoever, no electricity, no running water, no plumbing, and nothing there except iron cots, only some with iron

springs. And they have been doing it for many, many years, at miserly wages.

It reminds me of that old song that says freedom is having nothing left to lose.

They do not have a great stake in the things of life that sanctions would affect. They don't have much of those. They have much less to lose.

As I indicated, they told me that freedom is worth a price and that, I think, is a common reaction of all human beings struggling for their dignity. It is a basic principle of the trade union movement. We frequently find it necessary, when we pursue aims of improvement in the conditions of life and greater human dignity, to ask our members to incur certain hardships in the short term for the longer good, not only of themselves, but of future generations.

I think that is the circumstance down there.

There is no question in my mind what the issue of sanctions is. If we are to maintain credibility as one of the forces for human dignity, freedom, and democracy, then we have to go through the sanctions threshold to be persuasive and to maintain some influence and some credibility and some capacity to work with those who are under the gun and who are bearing those burdens and sacrifices.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

May I call upon Senator Evans, first, Senator Mathias?

Senator MATHIAS. I wish you would because he has been waiting patiently, No. 1, and, No. 2, I just got a phone call that I must take. I will be right back.

The CHAIRMAN. It all does work out very well, then, doesn't it? Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is a troublesome and difficult problem that we are facing and it is helpful to have the views of those who have been there recently, and, of course, of someone who has had such a long and distinguished record seeking full opportunity and rights of those to bargain collectively and to work in trade union movements.

I have several questions on some of the specifics of the recommendations which are made here.

In item No. (x) on page 2 of the statement, you talked about "a program of compulsory disinvestment by transnationals operating especially in the armaments, energy, high-technology sectors in South Africa, and including all those companies which have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being in violation of internationally accepted standards of labor practice."

That at least does not appear to be a comprehensive compulsory disinvestment. Do I read that correctly?

You talk about certain fields and the fact that you would disinvest those companies which are in violation of internationally accepted standards. Presumably, then, you would not seek compulsory disinvestment by companies who are not in those sensitive fields and who do live up to internationally accepted standards of labor practice?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Senator, this is the formal position of the IFCTU at the present time, one that we embraced and are working in con-

cert with the other affiliates of the IFCTU to urge upon our respective governments.

Speaking personally, and I think I express the attitude of the AFL-CIO generally, we would be prepared to go as far as anyone else is prepared to go in the area of disinvestment at this stage. It is something that is being rapidly overtaken by events. If there were a comprehensive disinvestment measure on the floor, we would support it.

Senator EVANS. You say in terms of government collaboration with the South African regime:

Special note should be taken on the collaboration between the South African Government and other governments. The IFCTU believes that the present racist government of South Africa should be isolated and that visits by exponents of apartheid should never be entertained by any country.

That is aimed at South Africa. Is that a policy that you would express in terms of those who may hold racist views or who represent racist governments of other nations as well, or people who hold positions that are antidemocratic in nature that you do not agree with? Would you ban their visits to any other country as well?

Mr. KIRKLAND. That is a rather broad question. That is opposition with respect to South Africa.

Senator EVANS. Yes; I understand.

But it seems to me that a position of that nature related to one country ought to be based on some fundamental beliefs that could be more broadly applied if we believe in a consistent foreign policy for the country.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I take your argument, sir.

Senator EVANS. I see.

Mr. KIRKLAND. As the gentleman in South Africa said, "I take your point." [Laughter.]

Senator EVANS. Let me ask you one more question.

You mentioned majority rule. Of course, that is our custom and that is what our whole Republic is based on here in this country. Is that necessarily the only answer in South Africa or is that something that we should mandate as the only resolution to the present system of apartheid?

In other words, are we going to couch our contact with other nations in terms of that concept of majority rule only, or are there other solutions, other resolutions, given the nature of their problems, that might be acceptable?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I think our basic position, sir, is that there should be negotiations, serious negotiations, looking to an end to apartheid and full participation in self-government in South Africa by all elements of that society. The particular forms and structures I think should emerge from those negotiations—if they are genuine negotiations with a legitimate cross-section of the leadership or people who represent all of the constituencies in that country.

In my personal view, if they were to ask my opinion of an appropriate result in a democratic society, it would be majority rule, one man, one vote.

If they wish to agree and embrace other forms, that is their decision.

Senator EVANS. Well, if they really and truly did achieve one man, one vote, they would probably be in the upper third of the people of the world in terms of their accession to democracy, maybe the upper quarter even at that point.

I don't think I have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kirkland, why would the unions in South Africa now not simply try to shut down the country? Do they lack the comprehensive economic clout to do that?

What is their situation in terms of ability to influence the train of events in South Africa?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Well, in the first place, like any other trade union movement, their primary aim is the amelioration and improvement of the conditions of life and work of their members and the continuing development of their trade union structure.

Although they have made extraordinary progress in a very short period of time and are continuing to grow, they still have a massive job to continue to increase their membership and their scope of representation and to secure their position as collective-bargaining agents for their members. Even with their growth, they still represent something in the area of 9 or 10 percent of the work force.

Now, their influence, I think, is much broader than that because of their relations with other elements of society. On occasion, when they have called days of action, when they have had adequate means of communication, when they have not been disrupted or had taken away from them their power by such measures as this emergency statute [indicating], they have been able to pull off very effective demonstrations.

In terms of shutting down the country for any extended period of time, I think they might have the capacity to close down some particular industries where they are strong. I believe the National Union of Miners could effectively shut down the mines because they are very strongly organized in that sector.

I doubt that that is true yet, generally, across the country. But they can, and have, when their key leadership has not disappeared or been languishing in prison and their capacity to communicate with their different branches is not disrupted, been able to organize demonstrations and quite effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the position of the American labor movement with respect to actions that would discourage U.S. firms from exporting goods to South Africa or with regard to United States firms currently operating in South Africa? Have actions been taken or are actions contemplated?

Leaving aside the South African picture, would you describe your activities in the United States lately?

Mr. KIRKLAND. We have engaged in a solidarity action against South African products. We have conducted calls for consumer action, such as "don't buy South African products." We have a very concentrated and focused consumer effort with respect to targeting corporations. Shell is the outstanding example.

Our capacity to engage in industrial action, refusal to handle products, as you probably know is somewhat circumscribed by statute and law.

But we also are engaged in efforts to shift pension fund investments away from corporations that have operations in South Africa. We will go as far as we can go without risking the union treasury in terms of fines and the consequences of violating the secondary boycott statutes, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been specifically involved, for example, with efforts that were described to us by the comptroller of New York State, Ed Regan, who indicated on behalf of the pension funds under his control in New York State that those shares were being voted at stockholders' meetings in a manner designed to change corporate practices with regard to buying or doing business in South Africa? Apparently, he is coordinating with Mr. Unruh in California and others who control large numbers of shares to take action either for withdrawal or for changing the circumstances.

I just wonder whether there was a broader alliance with the AFL-CIO various pension funds that come under your control and those kinds of actions.

Mr. KIRKLAND. We have a committee on pension fund investments at the federation level, comprised of representatives from a number of our affiliates that gives advice and counsel to those responsible, to those who serve on pension boards, et cetera, and who negotiate with employers on the handling of these funds. We have circulated lists of companies that have investments in South Africa.

I want to say that this is still in a state of very rapid evolution. Initially, I think, we tended to take the pursuit of codes of practice, such as the Sullivan guidelines, as our hallmark in dealing with these companies and the application of whatever policies the pension trustees wanted to pursue.

I would have to say right now that events are overtaking the Sullivan approach, and it is becoming less and less relevant. I note that even the Reverend Sullivan is also in that state of evolution and is now——

The CHAIRMAN. Accelerating.

Mr. KIRKLAND [continuing]. Yes, accelerating, and pursuing a call for disinvestment.

We are in the same position. We are in the same position.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.

Mr. KIRKLAND. If I may, with regard to the question of what follows in terms of majority rule, I would like to give to you for the record a joint statement that was submitted to the South African Government by the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, the Council of Unions of South Africa, the South African Federated Chamber of Industries. This statement reaffirms their belief in human and trade union freedoms, denounces the emergency proclamation, calls for the release of trade union leaders and their members and community leaders, says that their continued detention creates a climate of escalating tension not conducive to solutions. It says:

Freedoms, rights, and responsibilities are basically divisible and when these freedoms are threatened in any way, all freedoms in our society are threatened.

We reaffirm our belief in a united, nonracial and democratic South Africa, where the rights and freedoms of all citizens are protected. South Africa's current crisis can ultimately only be resolved by involving all leaders in free political activity,

participating in serious discussions about a future South Africa. This can only be achieved if a formula can be found for all leaders, including those presently in prison, to participate in a democratic, nonviolent, political process. The parties to this memorandum pledge themselves to undertake every avenue of peaceful democratic action to sustain sound industrial relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. KIRKLAND. So, when the representatives of business enterprise joined the unions or a sector of the unions in calling for the end of apartheid and restoring democracy in that country, I suggest that we ought to join with them and do everything that we can to help bring that about without speculating about what kind of government would result from the application of democratic principles.

I suppose when the first vote was held on the Constitution of the United States, the outcome was somewhat in doubt, and no one can predict here.

I do believe that there are forces of pluralism that have developed in that society, effective forces, that would yield an articulate, aggressive, and able mix of elements that would produce a stable, democratic dialog and result. Beyond that, I do also believe that there are elements that can be incorporated in any resolution and to the extent that our advice might be sought on that, it can be drawn from American history and American practice, which would give assurances that the rights of minorities would not be trampled upon—white minorities or black minorities or colored minorities. I refer to such as an independent judiciary, a strong Bill of Rights—those are what stand in the way of the same thing happening in this country.

The history of South Africa proves that the abuse of minorities' rights and the imposition of ruthless and oppressive forms is not an attribute of any one race. The whites are doing that to South Africa now, and the white tribe that is now ruling in South Africa is engaging in practices which no American would care to see his own Government condone or in any way associate himself with or apologize for, or do other than condemn.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Lane, some of the recent visitors to South Africa have been appalled by the almost total lack of communication between the white power structure and the black majority. Not only the white political structure, but business leadership, community leadership, will say to American visitors, "If we only knew who to talk to."

Did you observe that kind of gap in communications?

Mr. KIRKLAND. There are communications and there are communications.

If you mean just simple meetings and talks without leading to any effective result, there are communications of that kind going on.

Senator MATHIAS. But you get an occasional thing, like a meeting between Botha and Bishop Tutu, which is highly publicized.

Mr. KIRKLAND. That's right, or this Minister, Van Der Merwe, the Minister of Manpower, meeting with the unions. There are industrial reports that exist for the pursuit of grievance and the set-

tlement of disputes under collective agreements, and that sort of thing.

But serious, basic discussions, looking to the termination of apartheid and the negotiation of a democratic alternative are certainly absent.

Senator MATHIAS. That, it seems to me, should be one of our principal objectives in whatever policy we adopt with respect to South Africa—to encourage serious, positive negotiations.

Mr. KIRKLAND. Certainly.

Senator MATHIAS. Cy Vance has said that he does not think either the Gray bill or the Kennedy-Weicker bill, as they are presently written, is really strong enough to be effective, to bring about this kind of negotiation, that they won't get the attention of the white power structure in a way that will bring about some change in attitude, some change in practice.

I want to test with you just a couple of the things that might be done to sharpen these proposals a bit.

If a white businessman in the Republic of South Africa had to go to Botswana to take an airplane to get anywhere, it would, at least, get his attention. So the question of landing rights and of air space and of some broader international agreement on this question of landing rights and use of air space would be one method of getting the attention of the people who so far are not really paying much attention.

Does that make any sense to you in the light of your experience there?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I certainly would favor that as one ingredient of a larger program. I don't think that alone would do a damn thing, though.

Senator MATHIAS. No, no. We are talking about all of the elements, if they can be brought to bear together.

Mr. KIRKLAND. As long as you can get into South Africa by Lufthansa, by SwissAir or by a variety of any other comfortable modes and means of travel, including British Airways—the fact that the businessman can't take South African Airways directly would be of little consequence. It might give business to BA and Lufthansa and SwissAir, but they get quite a lot of it anyway.

Senator MATHIAS. It has to be a broader based agreement, as, in fact, any sanctions really have to be.

It is pretty hard to apply them unilaterally and give them anything more than a moral effect.

One of the problems with the air flight situation is, of course, there are a large number of British transport holders resident in the Republic of South Africa, and that would create some anguish, I suspect, cutting off their ability to go to their homes.

Mr. KIRKLAND. Just terminating rights for South African Airways is not going to inconvenience anyone down there greatly.

Senator MATHIAS. We are thinking about what we can put into a mix that cumulatively would have an effect.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I would favor that.

Senator MATHIAS. Another thing that has been suggested—and I am not proposing it because it is only just a thought at this point—is some limitation of telecommunications to increase the sense of isolation.

Mr. KIRKLAND. The people who are doing the best job of interfering with telecommunications are the Bothe government.

If you read this emergency statute [indicating], you will see how it is directed. It is illegal to take a picture of anything that is going on down there practically that is of interest to this committee. There are under strict censorship.

When we were detained in Alexandria, their spleen seemed to be directed more at the news cameras that were following us than at us. They were not allowed to photograph what happened there.

Senator MATHIAS. I don't know what kind of legal problems would be created by any attempt to limit telecommunications in this country. There may be first amendment questions, something to be thought about.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I would direct the main thrust, sir; at commercial relations, trade, and investment.

Senator MATHIAS. One of the difficulties that a new majority government in South Africa would ultimately have is the denial of adequate education to large numbers of Africans over a long period of time.

Have you thought at all of what we could do to be helpful in trying to bring about a kind of affirmative action program which would help to make-up some of the lost time for these people who have been denied their educations?

Mr. KIRKLAND. That, sir, is one of the consequences of apartheid.

It is certainly a critical problem and it is one of the hardships that the majority of the people down there suffer under that regime.

If I got one, clear message when I was there, and what we have had for some time from our association with our colleagues in that country in the trade unions, it is that their aim is not to ameliorate apartheid or to make apartheid more comfortable, more tolerable, but to eliminate apartheid. I would suggest that the thrust ought to be to go directly to the source of the problem.

If you eliminate apartheid and bring in democracy, I think the educational system will be reformed quite considerably, as well as the housing situation that the blacks suffer under and any number of other consequences of the system that is enforced there at the point of a gun.

Senator MATHIAS. One last question.

Simon Jenkins, who is a reporter for the Economist, spent some time in South Africa in the last year or two, and he argues that the American and European companies doing business there are the most positive force in existence, and that if you withdraw that leadership, you retard rather than advance the calls for abolishing apartheid.

I just wonder, in light of your own experiences, how you would react to that position?

Mr. KIRKLAND. I have a bias on the subject, sir, and I guess it is a trade union bias.

I have serious doubts as to whether fundamental reform is going to come at the hands of the business community.

The picture with respect to the relations with the various corporations that are operating down there, according to reports that we receive, is quite mixed. Many have signed on to codes of fair prac-

tices, like the Sullivan code, but we are told by our friends there that the results in daily practice are not necessarily manifest and that they are not persuasive, absent an effective and strong monitoring process or machinery in which the trade unions have a role.

There is no such monitoring system there, as far as I am aware, or we are told there is not. So, it is possible to do a lot of cosmetic things that really do not affect anything very much except making you look a little better for public relations.

The fact is that the wages and conditions that these people suffer are miserable. There are companies that have signed the Sullivan code that draw their labor from people who have to live in hovels and shacks and under conditions that you would not want to endure, that I would not want to endure for a night.

You can drive along the highway from Johannesburg to Pretoria, as we did, and see one unending line of factories and industrial parks of all nations, many of those plants looking rather new, quite new. I didn't see any housing for workers or any real effect on the conditions of life that exist there.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have no questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler, do you have any questions of Mr. Kirkland?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

First, let me say that I am sorry for being late. I was at another meeting. But I understand that it is asserted that South African trade union leaders speak for their members when they demand more sanctions.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I'm sorry, sir. Could you speak a little louder, Senator.

Senator PRESSLER. Has there been a referendum or a vote of the trade unions for sanctions? Their leaders say that they want sanctions. If they do, they must do so on the basis of support by their members. It doesn't seem to me that these "leaders have much clout with their membership."

I understand that this summer they were unable to collect enough support for a countrywide strike in July. Is there really evidence that the workers would like to see more sanctions?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Senator, to publicly advocate sanctions in South Africa is a crime. It is a crime.

If an organization or anyone were to put forward that platform and seek to campaign for it, he would be in jail. They tell us this verbally when we meet with them here. They have been telling us this for some time now.

As I said, this statement, the IFCTU position, was formulated in close consultation with the elected leaders of the South African trade union movement. That is convincing enough for us.

With respect to the COSATU day of action that you referred to, that was an action called by COSATU at a time when many of the leaders were in jail and it was not coordinated with the other trade union federations. It was a unilateral call by them. It was a matter of some dispute within COSATU as to its prudence without more

effective communications and organization. It was only a partial and spotty success. It was not a total failure.

On the other hand, the May Day action of 1986 in which all of the different trade union groups joined, that is, COSATU, AZACTU, and CUSA, as well as the unaffiliated, independent black trade unions, of which there are a good many, was almost totally effective.

Senator PRESSLER. I think that this is a good opportunity to ask you questions because you obviously look into the labor conditions there and know a lot more about it than I do.

Yet, I have always been told in the last couple of years that many workers want to migrate to South Africa from other African countries to get a higher standard of living.

If fact, a problem they seem to have is workers coming to South Africa from adjacent countries to have a better wage, a better standard of living. That is what I have been told.

Is that true?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Yes.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, are you complaining as vehemently then about conditions in the places they are coming from?

I guess my question follows that if people want to go to South Africa for a higher standard of living from the immediately adjacent countries, are you equally concerned about the labor conditions in those countries, then?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Yes, and we have an arm, the African-American Labor Center, which is actively engaged in helping to organize trade union movements in those countries where we are permitted to operate. We have a representative in Botswana. We work with the Botswana trade unions. We believe that a strong and free democratic trade union movement is essential everywhere.

We would like to see the elevation of conditions in those countries. I fail to see how the fact that one country is more blessed, more industrialized, more endowed with natural resources than another argues against the basic point, which is that the existence of apartheid and minority government enforced by oppressive measures, is tolerable.

Senator PRESSLER. I am certainly opposed to apartheid. But in terms of the labor conditions, how much better are the labor conditions in South Africa than in some of the neighboring countries?

What is it that causes such a great force of working-class people to want to move to South Africa, whatever color they are?

Mr. KIRKLAND. There are jobs there that do not exist in those other countries.

Senator PRESSLER. Now, if we had sanctions—

Mr. KIRKLAND. South Africa has a great appetite for cheap labor.

Senator PRESSLER. I guess what I am getting at here is if we destroy the economy of South Africa through sanctions, where will the people work?

Mr. KIRKLAND. There will be job loss. There will undoubtedly be restrictions on influx from those countries.

We are forcefully and emphatically assured by democratically elected representatives of the working people of South Africa that they are prepared to endure those consequences insofar as they affect working people for the sake of a brighter future.

Senator PRESSLER. Just in comparing the quality of pay, I am told that the pay available in South Africa is sometimes as much as eight to ten times greater than it is in any of the neighboring countries.

Now, I am not defending South Africa. I am just asking, is that a fact?

Could you compare the quantity, the kind of jobs, the quality of jobs? They are probably bad in both places. But, in comparing the quality of jobs, what is it that a worker gets?

I mean, he gets a job. But he also gets much more pay, I am told. Is that correct?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Pay levels in South Africa are higher, I would say, as a general rule than those in the adjacent states. The exact amounts I think we can provide you.

I have the data that is compiled by the Government statistical agencies. They publish it, and we have, of course, information on scales negotiated. I presume we could get them from those other countries.

But I would argue that that evades the central point that I am trying to make.

Senator PRESSLER. I am not trying to evade anything. I am trying to learn more about South Africa.

I am told that in all of Africa you could make an argument that the South African jobs presently are the best paying.

Would that be a true statement?

Mr. KIRKLAND. In all of Africa?

Senator PRESSLER. [Nods affirmatively.] I don't know if there are any labor statistics that compare that.

Mr. KIRKLAND. I don't know. I don't know.

Senator PRESSLER. Are there any statistics that I could dig out? Where could I go?

Mr. KIRKLAND. Comparisons between countries' wage levels are always a little dicey. But, if you want, I do not dispute at all the proposition that the economic conditions in South Africa and economic opportunities, the opportunities to work down there, for quite some time have been superior to those in adjacent countries.

The other point I would want to add to that is that the relationship between the wages paid to black workers in South Africa and those paid to white workers is, I think, something on the order of ten to one. There is massive economic discrimination against blacks under the system that exists there, enforced by guns and whips.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Mr. Kirkland, we thank you very much for coming to the committee this morning, for your testimony and for your forthcoming answers to all of our questions.

We look forward to additional comments which you or your colleagues may have as we progress with our consideration of legislation.

As the Chair announced at the beginning of the hearing, we hope to do that on Thursday.

At this point in our hearing, I am hopeful that those members of the committee who would wish to participate in a quiet conversation would remain with us and with staff.

Let me just assure the press and all of our observers that we do not plan to take action today, but we will consider legislation and hopefully be better prepared for Thursday.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:53 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

THE SECOND CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS*Tom Lodge*

BETWEEN 16 AND 23 JUNE this year the African National Congress held its second consultative conference in the Zambian copperbelt mining centre of Kabwe (Broken Hill). It was the first meeting of its scale convened by the ANC for nearly two decades but this fact alone does not explain the comment and speculation it generated in the South African press. When, in 1969, the ANC held its first consultative conference in Morogoro in Tanzania it received little public attention in this country. But in the intervening years the ANC has dramatically enhanced its reputation. Its authority as the representative and spokesman for the political aspirations of South Africa's black majority rests on solid foundations. Its widespread internal popularity is repeatedly attested to in opinion polls and social surveys.¹ It has succeeded in constructing a small but nevertheless influential and effective clandestine organisation within the country's borders. Its guerilla army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, continues to maintain the campaign of sabotage that was initiated in the wake of the 1976 Soweto unrest.² Internationally its diplomats and delegates are more and more frequently accorded the status of government representatives. Within the Republic the conviction that the ANC constitutes the only viable alternative and successor to the incumbent administration is one that is beginning to affect not just the political responses of black people but those of whites as well.³ Yet, considerable public confusion and ignorance persist concerning the ANC's previous history, its present character and its future intentions. The purpose of this article is to provide some clarity about the ANC's current leadership and its plans and preoccupations. It is important that the picture of the ANC that is frequently presented by government spokesmen and state ideologues, that of an organisation wholly dedicated to the ruthless and unprincipled pursuit of revolutionary power, an organisation moreover whose programme is a component in the global agenda of the strategy of "international communism," is a depiction that should not be accepted uncritically in any section of South African society. The resolution of South Africa's civil conflict at least partly depends on the capacity for the current beneficiaries of the South African political system to come to terms with, and recognise the validity of, black people's political demands and those organisations that reflect them most closely. The second consultative conference of the ANC represents an important moment not just in the development of an organisation but in the history of this country.

Organising a delegate conference on a scale of the proceedings at Kabwe is a complex operation for the ANC. The logistical problems are formidable. Its external bureaucracy and membership is distributed over twenty countries and quite apart from the business of bringing together representatives from all these centres there is also the difficulty of ensuring that people from the ANC's

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internal South African organisation can attend such a gathering. By mid-1984, though, the need for strategic discussion and revamping of organisation was very pressing. The Nkomati Accord had demonstrated the danger of relying on guerilla operations that were over-dependent on external lines of communication. It is possible that disaffection in the training camps may have drawn attention to organisational shortcomings. With a preponderance of the top leadership of the ANC being veterans of the 1950s there was probably a perception that the National Executive should be reinforced with younger people. Before the conference the ANC was still exclusively African-led; this was growingly at odds with its own internal character and the general tenor of black South African resistance politics. Finally, since the last conference, the ANC had massively expanded its popular following and increased the size several times over of its organised membership. To maintain its internal integrity and renew its sense of direction some kind of open forum for exchange of ideas between the rank and file and the hierarchy was essential.

Preparations for the conference were systematic and extensive. Several months beforehand ANC units were instructed to prepare and submit position papers for discussion and inclusion on the agenda. A list of 40 candidates for the National Executive was drawn up by President General Oliver Tambo. 250 delegates were elected to attend the conference, some of them apparently travelling from South Africa. The location of the proceedings was a well-kept secret as was its date until shortly before the event. Nevertheless, despite the secrecy there was a considerable amount of press speculation, some of it well informed, some of it less so, as to what the main issues of debate would be. Sources close to the ANC predicted that the conference would produce a shift in military strategy but not a break with its previous assumptions and premises, that there would be a fresh consideration of the role of workers in the light of recent trade union developments, and that the deficiencies of the clandestine organisation would be subjected to scrutiny. South African authorities, influenced perhaps by a degree of wishful thinking, suggested that the existing leadership was under fire from younger militants, that there were serious disagreements in strategy between the advocates of guerilla warfare and the proponents of political and diplomatic strategies, and that the calling of the conference was prompted by a sense of crisis within the movement, a crisis generated both by ideological rifts and by the success of South African counter-insurgency.

As yet there have been no public revelations concerning the debates and arguments that actually took place at Kabwe. What seems fairly certain, though, from the decisions that have been announced and publicised is that the underlying mood of the conference reflected a high level of morale amongst its participants and a general feeling of unity over essentials. The resolutions adopted at Kabwe fall into three categories: those that define the movement's political orientation, those that indicate strategic intentions, and those that concern internal organisational matters. In addition to passing resolutions the delegates elected a new National Executive (which included most of the members of the previous one). What follows is an examination of the contents and implications of the

conference's decisions including an assessment of the post-Kabwe ANC leadership. We will look at the political decisions first.

The political resolutions did not include any radical departures from previous policy. The Freedom Charter, adopted by the ANC in 1956, was confirmed in its status as the movement's "ideological lodestar." The working class was formally attributed with the status of the leading social element in the liberation struggle – a slight upgrading of the position accorded to it in the ANC's strategic formulation adopted at the last conference in 1969.⁴ As a corollary to this there was a resolution emphasising the importance of the trade union movement and "the urgent need for trade union unity as the basis for united and sustained industrial action and strikes to bring the government to its knees."⁵ The concept of a political settlement either through a process of negotiation or through a national convention was rejected: victory it was asserted could be the outcome only of the "seizure" of state power. Here the ANC was restating policy; since Morogoro it has advocated the "conquest of power" and the "smashing and breaking up" of the present administration, a process that would appear to preclude the possibility of negotiation over anything but the mechanics of the accession of a people's government (La Guma, pp. 184, 186, 231, 233). Other political resolutions called for unity between all "true liberators," both within and outside the country, a commitment to increase the level of ANC activity in Bantustans, and support for international disinvestment and economic sanctions. The only political decision that involved a break with ANC tradition was the move to admit whites, coloureds and Indians to the "internal" ANC and to positions on the National Executive. "Non-Africans" had been able to join the external movement from 1969 but had been excluded from the Executive. This was the formal position but in reality "non-Africans" have been working "under ANC discipline" in the internal movement for over a decade and have held non-executive positions of responsibility in the external movement since 1969. In dropping its racial barriers to full membership the ANC was formalising what was already becoming a practice and also was responding to the ascendancy of "non-racialism" in the black mass organisations inside South Africa.

The Kabwe conference, then, did not mark a significant shift in the ANC's ideological posture. Since 1969 the ANC has had a formal commitment to socialism – the political report adopted at Morogoro contended that the South African liberation struggle was taking place "within an international context of transition to the socialist system" – but its conception of socialism is hardly doctrinaire. In the analysis of the Freedom Charter that was also presented and adopted in 1969 at Morogoro the interpretation of those clauses of the Charter that touch on economic and social issues implies that a measure of private property would still exist in a post-liberation society, though capitalism would be subject to government restriction:

An ANC government shall restore the wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans to the people as a whole. The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole.

At the moment there are vast monopolies whose existence affects the livelihood of large numbers of our people and whose ownership is in the hands of Europeans only. It is necessary for monopolies which vitally affect the social well-being of our people such as the mines, the sugar and wine industry to be transferred to public ownership so that they can be used to uplift the life of all the people. All other industry and trade which is not monopolistic shall be allowed with controls to assist the well-being of the people.

All restriction on the right of the people to trade, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions shall be ended. . . .

The bulk of the land in our country is in the hands of land barons, absentee landlords, big companies and state capitalist enterprises. The land must be taken away from exclusive European control and from these groupings and divided among the small farmers, peasants and landless of all races who do not exploit the labour of others. Farmers will be prevented from holding land in excess of a given area, fixed in accordance with the concrete situation in each locality. . . . State land shall be used for the benefit of all the people (La Guma, 235f).

Presumably with the confirmation of the Charter as the ANC's programme this interpretation still holds. The assignment at Kabwe to the working class of the leading role in national liberation need not explicitly involve a stronger commitment to socialism. The understanding of the relationship of the working class to national liberation could be one that is understood in principally strategic rather than ideological terms. In other words, the working class can provide the main force in the struggle without its exclusive class interests predominating. Certainly the ANC's commitment to working class concerns falls far short of the measures advocated by its "workerist" critics both inside and outside South Africa.⁶ Similarly the ANC's view of foreign capitalist involvement in South Africa is influenced chiefly by what it sees as strategically desirable rather than any fixed ideological perspective. Hence, though it supports disinvestment and has warned that South African subsidiaries of foreign corporations could become targets for guerilla saboteurs⁷ (as already have South African companies involved in labour disputes), ANC leaders have in the recent past made it clear that they are not opposed in principle to the concept of foreign capitalist investment in the South African economy. In 1981, for example, ANC President Oliver Tambo held discussions in New York with officials from American banks and automobile manufacturers with interests in South Africa. He assured them that after the revolution their companies would be made welcome subject to different rules and conditions from those which today prevailed (*New York Times*, 7 Feb 1982; *Washington Post*, 1 Jan 1985). If one bears in mind the current disenchantment amongst American businessmen with their South African investments and takes into consideration also the crescendo of hostility in the United States to apartheid, it is likely that the ANC will attempt to expand its popular influence in America. If it is successful in doing so, then the ANC's leadership will have a strong motive for remaining fairly pragmatic in its commitment to socialist principles.

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The main source of radical pressure or influence on the ANC leadership does not come either from its eastern bloc allies or, as is often asserted, from its members who are also communists. With the renaissance of popular political culture during the post-Soweto era there has developed a profound and widespread antipathy to capitalism. It is manifest in attacks on black traders, during the recent unrest that have been on a scale sufficient to prompt NAFCOC to set up a commission of enquiry to investigate the reasons for the lack of public standing of township businessmen (*The Star*, 9 Aug 1985; see also editorial in *African Business*, July 1985). It is evident in the anti-capitalist polemic of virtually every black trade union spokesman regardless of his organisational affiliation. It is reflected in the motivation of youthful militants who arrive at ANC recruiting centres in the frontline states and demand to join not the ANC but the South African Communist Party (*The Star*, 7 Jan 1982). That this antipathy exists should surprise no one. As Sam Nolutshungu (1982) has argued, the social basis for the construction of a hegemonic (widely influential) bourgeois ideology does not exist in the black community; property restrictions, political rightlessness, and especially crude forms of co-optation have seen to that. Unlike privileged groups in other societies, members of the black middle classes are unable to persuade the rest of the community that *their* specific class preoccupations are in the general interest as well. In any case their own treatment by South African capital has been on the whole so cavalier that often they themselves are not predisposed to favour bourgeois values and ethics.¹ The argument that the interests of capital and state are intertwined in South Africa is widely accepted; black people understand their oppression not simply in terms of race but as a domination of class as well. South African businessmen will have to distance themselves politically to a much greater degree from government policies than they are prepared to do at present before they are not directly associated with national oppression and social injustice. If in the future the ANC shifts to the left in its social and economic prescriptions this will not be the result of any kind of manipulation of the movement by communists; it will be rather a reflection of the wider political culture of which it is part.

The stated intransigence over the possibility of negotiation may appear to be at odds with some recent statements by ANC leaders. Before 1984 the ANC's attitude was straightforward enough; it was in the business of armed struggle and was not prepared to consider the possibility of a negotiated political settlement. Nelson Mandela, when he said from Pollsmoor prison in August 1985 that the only acceptable purpose of negotiations would be to settle the mechanics of transferring power, was doing no more than reflecting the spirit of the ANC's position since the 1960s (*City Press*, 18 Aug 1985 and *The Star*, 21 Aug 1985). But in the months after Nkomati, a new note of conciliation appeared to some observers to be apparent in public statements by ANC leaders. In July 1984, responding to an undertaking by the South African foreign minister that his government was willing to enter into dialogue with any group that rejected violence, Oliver Tambo, while reaffirming the ANC's commitment to armed struggle, went on to state two conditions that would have to be met before any

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talks between the South African authorities and the ANC could begin. The first of these would be that the ANC would have to be certain that any dialogue would be "serious," directed at "bringing about an end to apartheid" (*The Guardian*, 16 July 1984). Tambo, however, had said previously that talks at this point would be pointless, as "the time was not right" (*The Guardian*, 26 June 1984). Joe Slovo echoed this point in a speech made in Maputo in August: "We do not trust PW Botha's current dialogue offensive." Nevertheless Slovo was prepared to concede that one day dialogue might well take place: "There were conditions under which all states or movements must be prepared to negotiate" (*The Guardian*, 27 Aug 1984). There the matter may have rested; *Sechaba* published a withering editorial that condemned out of hand all the speculation about the possibility of talks ("Talks about talks," Sept 1984). Then in April 1985 the *Washington Post* published an interview with Tambo in which the ANC president indicated his organisation's willingness to consider constitutional negotiations without mentioning the preconditions that had characterised his previous statements on the subject. The omission was swiftly rectified in a repudiation of the interpretation placed on the interview by the South African press but this notwithstanding there appeared to be a genuine wish to project a "moderate and flexible" image. As the journalist Glenn Frankel put it: "He also indicated his group might be willing to discuss and negotiate specific mechanisms to protect white rights" (*The Star*, 25 Apr 1985). Such a prospect seems a far cry from "the seizure of state power." What was happening?

It does seem likely that the ANC was being encouraged by some of its allies, notably the Mozambican and Zambian governments, to soften its stance so as to win more influential sources of support in western countries.⁹ With the sanctions debate in Washington there was added inducement to believe that such support might be forthcoming in the near future. Another factor may have been the growing chorus of advocacy for negotiation in South Africa, its members by early 1985 including not just every black leader of stature, but community councillors, Afrikaans student leaders and university SRCs, members of parliament and editors and journalists in both the English and Afrikaans press (see note 3). The swelling support for the United Democratic Front with its open-ended exhortations for a national convention may have also helped prompt a degree of ANC equivocation over the issue. But to concede the possibility of negotiations taking place and speculate about the conditions under which they might do so in the context of an informal conversation with a journalist is one thing; to define a policy on negotiations in a conference is quite another. Nothing that Tambo has said suggests that there are deep divisions of principle within the leadership over the question, but it does seem likely that there are differences over the public posture the organisation should adopt, whether it should strive for an impression of militant intransigence or of tempered conciliation. The Kabwe conference, dominated by the young men and women from Umkhonto we Sizwe, evidently favoured the former option. Whatever the inclinations of the ANC leaders, their overriding preoccupation is to maintain the unity and morale of their movement and no amount of external counsel or influence can change that. It is not as if, at

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this stage, the prospect of meaningful negotiations is a real one for the ANC.

The strategic resolutions do indicate a degree of rethinking in several areas of the ANC's strategic and tactical formulations. The decision that has received most publicity was the rescinding of the embargo on "soft" targets for guerilla action. Contrary to the impression fostered by the South African authorities and their academic supporters (see for example Campbell 1983) the ANC has never employed a policy of indiscriminate terrorism. In the eight years of urban guerilla warfare since the Soweto uprising its military cadres have on the whole attacked targets in such a way as to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.¹⁰ There have been deviations from this rule – the 1983 Pretoria car bomb blast would be an obvious case in point – but nevertheless the ANC has consistently refrained from bombing places in which large numbers of civilians can be expected to congregate: restaurants, cinemas, sports grounds, and so forth. In other words the ANC has not made it a strategic aim to inflict civilian casualties, whatever their race or social background. This distinguishes it from several insurgent nationalist movements and also, incidentally, places it in a morally more attractive light than the planners of the strategic bombing offensive of Germany during the Second World War. The reasons for this restraint are doubtless partly expedient; as Thabo Mbeki pointed out at the beginning of 1985:

It would be a very easy thing to do. After all, if we can attack Koeberg there is nothing to stop us from placing a bomb in a cinema of 300 white people . . . (but) with a white population of almost 5 million, it makes political commonsense to win over as many of them as possible, and not drive them into the arms of Botha (*Washington Post*, 1 Jan 1985).

But this is not the whole story. As we shall see a large part of the ANC leadership belongs to the school of nationalist politicians that matured during the era of non-violent mass opposition during the 1950s, an era in which African political responses were conditioned by a moral as well as a practical aversion to violence (See for examples Luthuli, Meer and Gerhart 1978: 42f.). Many members of this generation whilst prepared to use violence in the belief that no viable political alternative exists do not revel in its consequences: Nelson Mandela's reservations about the Pretoria car bomb incident are an instance of this (*The Mail on Sunday*, 20 Jan 1985, *International Herald Tribune*, 28 Jan 1985). When the ANC signed the Geneva protocol in 1981 issues of principle were as much involved as considerations of self-interest. Despite this, though, the line of restraint has not been an easy one to uphold: the ANC is under some pressure in certain African states to increase the scope of violence (according to Johnny Makhatini quoted by Dennis Herbstein in *The Observer*, 30 June 1985) and both within and outside the organisation amongst young black South Africans the humanitarian beliefs held by the older generation seem to have less sway.¹¹ During the last year or so the Umkhonto campaign has been noticeably shifting in character: more attacks in working hours in busier public places and the range of targets broadened to include corporation headquarters buildings. From 1981 the ANC leadership was ready to condone attacks in which civilians were accidentally killed or hurt (*The Times*, 13 and 14 Apr 1981) and was occurring more and more

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often. There were limits to what could be endorsed as the inevitable consequence of war: the perpetrators of a carbomb that exploded in July 1984 in a Durban industrial estate and killed five people were angrily reprimanded in a statement by Oliver Tambo who said the guerillas had not taken adequate precautions to avoid civilian casualties (*The Guardian*, 11 Aug 1984). The ANC up to Kabwe has disavowed responsibility for the grenade attacks on "collaborationist" politicians and their families that have been a prominent feature of the post-September 1984 township unrest.¹²

After Kabwe, though, the ANC will not maintain the distinction between the previously acceptable "hard" targets (government offices, military and police facilities, strategic economic installations, etc) and the hitherto prohibited "soft" civilian targets. For, it contends, in the South African context the line between the two is often blurred – farmers, for example, often belong to a rural civil defence system and are sometimes enrolled in a system of military radio communications. Labour relations inevitably have a political dimension so why should the private sector be exempt from ANC attacks? The implications of this change are not yet clear. Since the conference there have been no major ANC attacks (up to the time of writing). ANC spokesmen have discounted suggestions that they have a "hit list" of white political notables or that in future they intend to make a point of killing white civilians. "We will confront the armed police and the soldiers and anyone else identified with the police or soldiers but we will not go on to a football field and explode a bomb to kill players or in a cinema" (*Africa News*, 15 July 1985, pp. 5f.). Nevertheless, the temptation in future to do so could be substantial. As a well-informed Zimbabwean newspaper article commented: "Strikes at 'soft targets' could seriously destabilise the white sense of security, at the same time as mobilising across the spectrum of black opinion a far more aggressive assault on apartheid" (*The Sunday Mail* (Harare), 30 June 1985). And though the argument in favour of the "soft" target motion was proposed through an Umkhonto position paper (*Foreign Report*, 4 July 1985, p. 5) one should not make the mistake of assuming that it was accepted against the inclinations of the elders on the National Executive. The assassinations of ANC officials and other people associated with the movement, the SADF raids on what the ANC insists were non-combatant exile communities in Maseru, Matola and Gaborone, and the hundreds of deaths attributable to police action in the townships since September 1984 have all contributed to hardening attitudes at all levels in the organisation. The degree of bitterness is very intense. After Kabwe, an ANC official defending the new policy argued: "Children were among those killed by police and soldiers in the unrest. Are children hard targets? Definitely not" (*City Press*, 30 June 1985). War is always a brutal business and violence is difficult to regulate, control, or limit. In the past the ANC has attempted to do just this but the logic of the situation makes it increasingly difficult to go on doing so.

Apart from the tactical question of the degree of violence, the conference considered the broader question of military strategy. Until recently the ANC's military thinking reflected fairly conventional concepts of guerilla warfare in which, despite injunctions against militarism and the insistence on the inter-

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connectedness of military and political struggles, the projected final scenario of armed struggle was in terms of large scale and technically sophisticated military confrontation. But recent events seem to suggest a different future course. First of all, South Africa's capacity to bludgeon her neighbours into effective if sullen acquiescence with her counter-insurgency measures means that advancing the guerilla struggle significantly towards a more conventional form of warfare seems for the time being a fairly remote prospect.¹³ Second, the ANC's re-entry into the internal arena of South African politics has taken place simultaneously with (and has helped to stimulate) a revival of black political organisation and an assertive political consciousness. There is now a vast potential popular constituency for the ANC that cannot be expected to wait passively on the sidelines while the highly trained specialists from Umkhonto get on with the job of fighting a liberation war. Yet to equip and train a mass movement up to the standard of the graduates of the ANC's camps is impossible at the moment. Third, economic recession, political divisions within the white community, and the upsurge of black communal revolt make it imperative that the ANC should implement a more all-embracing strategy if it is not to lose the chance of exploiting a unique set of opportunities. Accordingly, at Kabwe the delegates resolved in favour of "People's War," a concept that had already for some time been under discussion in ANC and South African Communist Party journals.¹⁴ This essentially comprises the broadening-out of the base of guerilla operations with the recruitment of an army of "part-time" guerillas who would operate within their normal home areas, who would be provided with basic training through short courses in the use of simple weaponry and explosive devices, and who would concentrate their activity at this stage on attacking the representatives of apartheid political institutions and the forces of law and order within their communities. This would achieve three objectives: it would lessen the ANC's dependence on the flow of logistical support and manpower across South Africa's frontiers; it would deepen the popular roots of its struggle and broaden the basis of its disciplined following; and it would make a very significant erosion in the capacity of the South African state to govern black communities effectively. The move to a generalised popular insurrection has, of course, already begun independently of the ANC or any other political organisation; some townships are at this moment in the state of ungovernability that the ANC aspires to make universal. What the ANC hopes to do is to place itself in the vanguard of this movement. The conference recognised after some fairly self-critical discussion that for the organisation to lead effectively much more effort would need to be devoted to building up the at present embryonic internal organisational structures.

In its people's war concept the ANC may be influenced by a realistic perception of the limits of what is possible. The Mozambicans since Nkomati have been arguing that an essentially military solution was not on the South African historical agenda and that the ANC should devote more energy to political mobilisation (JHP Serfontein in *The Sunday Star*, 17 Feb 1985; *Africa Confidential*, 26:11 (22 May 1985), p. 2). It may be that this advice influenced some of the participants in the Kabwe discussion. But people's war and its

advocacy may stem from a different course of thinking. In at least two press interviews ANC sources have cited the Iranian revolution as an historical situation analogous to contemporary South Africa (Barrell (1985: 11) and *The Guardian Weekly*, 11 Aug 1985, p. 7). In Iran a government was forcibly supplanted without the presence of a revolutionary army. The parallel is not so far-fetched; in particular, South African revolutionaries can point to the demoralisation of a significant section of the security apparatus, the black police, and the apparent inability of the administration in its economic policies to meet the most basic material requirements of even the urban black population. The ANC leadership is too experienced to place its faith in the inevitability of a sudden collapse of the South African state but the expansion of its internal structures that will be the inevitable corollary of people's war will help to ensure that in the event of such a collapse the ANC will not be relegated to the oblivion of the Iranian Tudeh. It should also be pointed out that as the main targets for people's war are in residential areas the economy could emerge in the aftermath of an ANC victory relatively unscathed. Indeed, as the ANC foresees that victory as being immediately preceded by massive industrial stoppages, it is unlikely that guerilla violence will be directed at significantly curtailing industrial production.

In the next phase of its struggle then, the ANC's priorities will be organisational rather than military. "Soft targets" notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the tempo of armed struggle will be raised significantly. ANC activity will probably be less conspicuously evident as the task of transforming its massive informal following into a disciplined adherence gets under way.

The final area of decision-making revolved around internal administrative matters. The Nkomati Accord and the implications it had for the future deployment of guerilla trainees may have been the root cause of outbreaks of discontent that have been reported to have occurred at ANC training camps (*The Star*, 17 May 1984; *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 June 1985). The ANC leaders have denied the existence of serious breakdowns in internal discipline and morale but several of the Kabwe decisions seem to testify to a wish to overcome the gulf that separates the experience and situation of the guerilla trainees and of the more senior people in the ANC hierarchy. In future, all ANC members in exile will undergo military training regardless of which arm of the organisation they are ultimately destined to work in. All ANC members are now subject to a strict and austere code of conduct that regulates their sexual, social and drinking habits. A special grievance procedure was established at Kabwe through which a junior-ranking ANC member can now complain about the behaviour of a senior without having to bring his allegations to a body on which the senior was represented. The problem of isolation of leadership from rank and file was also tackled through making the practice of calling consultative conferences a regular five-yearly event. On these occasions the positions of leading officials and the executive would be up for election.

It is possible to read into these rulings the symptoms of a considerable amount of disaffection within the ANC. But even if this were the case (and my belief is that it is not) the main point of these changes lies not in what may have motivated

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them but what their likely effects might be. If they succeed in their purpose the ANC's leadership will in future be more responsive than at present to the mood and perception of its following and hence less susceptible than ever to external influences. The more internally democratic the ANC becomes – and the measures laid down at Kabwe were an important step in that direction – the less likely it is that the leadership will be deflected from its course by any outside initiated process of lobbying or negotiation that goes over the heads of the ordinary membership¹¹.

Having stated this it is also true that understanding the nature of the organisation's leadership is important in any attempt to interpret the character of the organisation. Leaders can influence their followers; they are not mere delegates of their wishes. The ANC's leadership provides us with some indication of the changing social background of the movement and the nature of its aims and aspirations. The concluding section of this article will therefore be devoted to a consideration of the men and women who will head the organisation in the next five years.

The supreme policy-making body in the ANC is the National Executive Committee (NEC). Before Kabwe it had 22 members. The consultative conference expanded its size to 30 which allowed for the re-election of 19 people from the pre-conference executive. Two former NEC members failed to gain re-election and one did not stand. Eleven new members were elected. The 30 successful candidates were chosen by the delegates from a list of 40. How this list was selected is not publicly known. Here we will discuss the senior office holders, the re-elected members, the new members, and the men who lost or gave up their NEC positions.

The three most important ANC offices are those of president, secretary-general and treasurer-general. The three previous incumbents were confirmed in their offices at Kabwe. The ANC's president, Oliver Tambo, is probably the best known ANC leader apart from Nelson Mandela. Tambo was born in 1917, the son of a Transkeian farmer. He left his birthplace, Bizana, to attend the prestigious St Peter's school in Johannesburg in the early thirties, matriculating in 1938. From St Peter's he proceeded to the University College of Fort Hare to take a BSc in 1941 and a teaching diploma in 1943. For the next four years he taught at St Peter's, influencing a whole generation of younger men who were to be politically influential in the subsequent decade. In 1943-4 he helped found the ANC Youth League, a militant nationalist grouping that aimed to push the then conservative ANC leadership towards a more self-determinist ideological standpoint and more aggressive strategies of mass action. Like other Youth Leaguers of the time, Tambo had reservations about the role of communists who in his circle were then believed to be a distracting and indeed moderating influence on the course of African nationalist politics. In 1948, he began legal studies and in 1952 he opened an attorney's practice with Nelson Mandela. There was not much time, though, to make the new legal firm prosper. On the ANC NEC from 1949 Tambo was one of the main architects of the series of popular campaigns of

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non-violent mass action during the 1950s. He became secretary-general in 1955 and deputy president in 1958. On 28 March 1960, three days before the ANC's banning during the Sharpeville crisis, Tambo left the country to build up the organisation's resources in exile. He was an astute choice for this role: hardworking, diplomatic, morally scrupulous, and ideologically a man of consensus rather than extremities. His earlier distrust of communists had by now disappeared largely as a result of the experiences he had in working with them during the 1950s, but his feelings concerning the Communist Party appear to be shaped more by his regard for its members as individuals rather than admiration for the Marxist premises of their politics. Tambo commands considerable respect both within and outside the movement. His political style is low key, he does not cultivate a charismatic image, or indulge in high flown rhetoric. He gives an impression of austerity without making a particular virtue of it. There is no cult of personality in the ANC and Oliver Tambo is not the man to lend himself to such an exercise; nevertheless, the success the ANC has had in maintaining its unity and purpose in 25 years of exile is attributable in no small part to his personal qualities.

Alfred Nzo, the secretary-general, is a similarly modest individual. Like Tambo in his sixties, he was educated at the Healdtown Institute and Fort Hare, qualifying as a Health Inspector. He worked and lived in Alexandra during the 1950s and joined the ANC only in 1957. That year he sprang into national prominence as the chairman of the committee that led a boycott movement which originated in a protest against bus fare rises in Alexandra. By 1958 he was on the ANC's Transvaal executive and was subjected to his first banning order the following year. Two years' house arrest in Moroka township preceded 238 days of detention in solitary confinement between 1963 and 1964. He left South Africa shortly afterwards and was elected secretary-general at Morogoro in 1969. Like Tambo at the ideological centre of the movement, he is comparably unassuming. Less well known than Tambo in western countries, he plays a conspicuous diplomatic role in ANC delegations to third world events and communist countries.

Nzo's colleague, Thomas Nkobi, the treasurer-general, was born in Johannesburg in 1922. He matriculated at the Bantu High School in Newclare and attended the first year of the BA course at Roma College in what was then Basutoland. He worked as a laboratory assistant and lived in Alexandra. He joined the ANC earlier than Nzo but like him rose to high office as a result of his role in the 1957 bus boycott. That year he became the ANC's national organising secretary. Born a Roman Catholic, the son of an Alexandra businessman, he was politically inspired by the veteran communist leaders JB Marks and Moses Kotane (the latter also lived for a spell in Alexandra). It is possible that he may have joined the clandestine SACP during the emergency in 1960 for Moses Kotane's biographer mentions an unnamed member of the Alexandra boycott committee who worked closely with Kotane (the then general secretary of the Party) and joined the SACP in 1960 (Bunting, 1975: 235). Placed under house arrest in 1963 he fled the country in April that year. In 1968 he was appointed deputy treasurer of the exile movement and increasingly took over the duties of

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treasurer-general from Moses Kotane, by then a very sick man. In 1973 he inherited Kotane's office and has held it ever since.

The remaining re-elected NEC members can be split into three groups: the working class politicians of the pre-1960 period, the soldiers, and the exile administrators and diplomats. The first group comprises a fairly coherent body of people whose early organisational experience was gained through the trade union movement and/or the Communist Party. They include: Steven Dhlamini, born in 1913, textile worker and Durban trade unionist, on the Natal executive of the ANC at the time of his first banning in 1953, chairman of the Durban committee of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955, organising secretary of the Natal ANC in 1956, involved in building a plantation workers' union in 1962, detained for 150 days in 1963, convicted for involvement with the ANC in 1964, the following six years on Robben Island, elected *in absentia* president of SACTU in 1967, released in 1971 and confined to a rural area, left South Africa in 1976 to assume office in SACTU; John Gaetsewe, currently SACTU general secretary and in the 1950s the Johannesburg-based leader of the African Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, in exile from mid-1960s after a prison term and house arrest, outside South Africa mainly engaged in international trade union solidarity work; Moses Mabhide, member of the ANC NEC since 1969 and successor to Moses Kotane as SACP general secretary, an important Natal trade unionist during the 1950s who worked closely with Chief Albert Luthuli, the ANC president at that time, in exile since 1961 as the first SACTU external representative, more recently, in the early 1980s, ANC representative in Swaziland; John Nkadimeng, born in Sekhukuniland, the northern Transvaal, educated up to Standard IV, domestic service in Germiston between 1945 and 1947 and then a worker in a hat factory and a tobacco works, in 1951 elected a shop steward of the Tobacco Workers' Union and joined the ANC, from 1955 a full-time functionary for SACTU, left South Africa after a 90-day detention in 1963, took over the SACTU secretaryship in 1983 and in the same year appointed as chairman of the ANC's political committee; Dan Thloome, trade unionist and Communist Party member since the mid-1930s, by 1941 vice-president of the Transvaal Confederation of Non European Trade Unions, editor of the Party's theoretical journal, *Liberation*, in the 1950s, secretary-bookkeeper of the ANC in 1945 and chairman of its Orlando branch, helped plan the 1952 Defiance Campaign, member of the SACP Central Committee at least from 1961, went into exile in 1964, and from the mid-1970s has deputised for Nzo and Nkobi in their ANC offices.

Fewer details are publicly available on the two other groups of on the whole younger people who have risen to office mainly through the military and political structures of the external organisation. Two men can be placed in the soldier category, Chris Hani and Joe Modise. Chris Hani, in his mid-40s, was recruited into Umkhonto in the early 1960s and participated in the ill-fated joint ANC-ZAPU Zimbabwe campaign in 1967. He managed to evade the Rhodesian army by escaping over the Botswana border but spent a year in a Botswana prison before returning to Lusaka. His and other veterans' criticisms of the ANC's

"stalemate position" in 1969 helped to persuade the leadership to call the Morogoro conference. In the 1970s as a political commissar of Umkhonto we Sizwe, he was in the post-1976 period active for a time in Lesotho where he on several occasions narrowly escaped assassination attempts. He was a principal target in the SADF's 1982 Maseru raid and left Lesotho shortly thereafter. Joe Modise is Umkhonto's commander-in-chief and from 1983 chairman of the ANC's military committee. Aged 52, he is old enough to have had some experience of political activity during the 1950s. Then he lived in Sophiatown, worked as a lorry driver, was active in the Congress Youth League's efforts to resist the Western Areas removals, and helped to organise a clothing workers' union. In 1956 he was among the 156 people detained and later put on trial for high treason.

Biographical details on many of the bureaucrats are even more sparse; in some cases we have to be content with just their names and their most recent ANC offices: Simon Makana, immediately before the conference the ANC's administrative secretary; Andrew Makgothi, director of education; Johany Makhatini, chief representative, United Nations representative, head of the international department, recruited into Umkhonto we Sizwe during the first Umkhonto campaign (1961-4) and leader of the first group of Natal guerillas who left the country for military training, reputedly a man with strong nationalist inclinations and, his early military background notwithstanding, predisposed towards a conciliatory position with regard to the question of negotiations; Thabo Mbeki, son of the well-known eastern Cape activist and Umkhonto we Sizwe leader Govan Mbeki, now serving a life sentence on Robben Island, a member of the African Students' Association in the early 1960s, received university training in economics at an American university, joined the ANC NEC in the mid-1970s, offices include political secretary to Tambo and director of information and publicity; the late Florence Mophosho, a prominent member of the ANC Women's League during the 1950s and active in the Women's Section of the exile movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, died in Harare on 9 August 1985; Joe Nhlanhla, another administrative secretary; Mzwai Piliso, South African representative in 1963 at the All-African Peoples' Solidarity Organisation in Cairo, member of the external ANC from the mid-1960s, author of various pamphlets on African economic problems, apparently a special aide to Tambo in the 1980s but before then an administrator of ANC facilities in Angola; Gertrude Shope, head of the Women's Section, Lusaka; Jacob Zuma, graduate of Robben Island and, before the Nkomati Accord, representative of the ANC in Maputo.

The freshly elected NEC members can be classified similarly. Representing the old guard from the 1950s are Ruth Mompati, Reg September and Joe Slovo. Ruth Mompati (nee Matseoane) was an important women's organiser during the 1950s holding office both in the ANC Women's League and in the Federation of South African Women. She also worked in the Tambo and Mandela legal firm. She was banned in 1962. Her subsequent career is difficult to trace but she was chosen as London representative in 1980. She is believed to have strong nationalist sentiments. Reg September, whom Ruth Mompati succeeded as

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London representative, was born in 1923 near Port Elizabeth into a working-class coloured family. In 1938 he joined the left-wing National Liberation League. He worked in a shoe factory during the Second World War and became active as a trade unionist. In 1951 he helped to found and served as secretary to the Franchise Action Council and in this capacity organised a very successful general strike of coloured workers in protest against the withdrawal of the coloured common roll vote. The years 1951 to 1953 he spent abroad, mainly in England, and on returning he helped to initiate the Coloured People's Organisation, an affiliate of the Congress Alliance. On trial for treason from 1956 he was jailed in 1961 for his role in organising the general stayaway of that year. He went into exile in 1963, first to Swaziland, then to Dar-es-Salaam and then to London where he made an important contribution to the building of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Appointed a member of the ANC's Revolutionary Council in 1969 he has been close to leadership since that time. From 1980 he has worked in the Lusaka headquarters. Joe Slovo, next to Tambo, is in South Africa probably the best known of the exile leaders. He was born in Lithuania in 1926 but his parents emigrated to South Africa while he was still a boy. The family was poor with the father working as a truck driver. He served in the Western Desert during the war and on returning to Johannesburg, despite having left school before matriculation, managed to graduate as the best Witwatersrand LIB of his year's intake. He had joined the Communist Party in about 1940 and by 1946 was a branch secretary. In 1949 he married Ruth First, one of the most important South African intellectuals of her generation, who was killed by a parcel bomb in Maputo in 1982. In 1955 Slovo helped to draft the Freedom Charter though a restriction order prevented him from attending its public presentation at the Congress of the People '66. A member of the illegal SACP from its reconstitution in 1963 he was also one of the founders of Umkhonto we Sizwe. He left South Africa one month before the arrests of his fellow members of the National High Command at Rivonia. In exile his chief importance has been as a formulator of strategy, helping to draft the ANC's strategic document of 1969 and being centrally involved in the planning and mounting of the second Umkhonto campaign from 1977. In that year he moved to Maputo which remained his base until 1984. His formal position is that of chief of staff of Umkhonto and he has served on the ANC's revolutionary council from 1969 and its successor committees from their inception in 1983. He is the ANC's foremost revolutionary theorist and military thinker. Slovo could also fit into the soldier category in which belong "Mac" Maharaj and Cassius Make. Sathyandranath Maharaj is now in his mid-fifties. As a young man he was a member of the second Umkhonto High Command which was formed after the 1963 Rivonia arrests and which with considerable courage and resourcefulness kept the sabotage campaign going for another year. With his comrades he was convicted on 58 counts of sabotage and as a consequence served 12 years on Robben Island. At his and other trials of the time police agents and state witnesses alleged that he was a member of the SACP's Central Committee. He left South Africa shortly after his release from prison and became a senior functionary in Umkhonto we Sizwe. Cassius Make is less well

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known. He joined the ANC's external organisation during the 1960s, served in the late 1970s on the Revolutionary Council and is a high-ranking Umkhonto officer.

The new men from the exile bureaucracy are mainly recruits of the 1960s, some with advanced academic qualifications. Pallo Jordan, head of the ANC's research department, a colleague of Ruth First who was with her when she was killed, is a holder of a London PhD and author of several historical and biographical articles in *Sechaba*. To judge from his writing Jordan's political inclinations are close to Oliver Tambo's. Francis Meli is also a historian but in his case his PhD was earned through a dissertation on the Comintern submitted to the University of Leipzig. Meli is the editor of *Sechaba* and head of the external information department. Another person with East German experience is Anthony Mongale, former representative, East Berlin. The other new members of the NEC are Aziz Pannad, active in the ANC's London office from the mid-1970s, Dr Sizakele Sigxashe, recently a director of information, and, finally, James Stuart, a member of Oliver Tambo's personal secretariat who has held various offices in the external bureaucracies of both SACTU and the ANC since 1971.

The former NEC members who were not re-elected were Joe Jele, one of the 1950s Alexandra group of activists, in exile from 1964 and for a time head of the international department, Andrew Masondo, national political commissar and responsible for internal disciplinary matters, and John Moushahi, active in Transvaal trade unions during the 1940s, on the Transvaal ANC executive from 1952 until his ban the following year and reportedly a member of the SACP during the 1950s.¹⁷

A few brief comments will have to suffice to draw out the main themes of these very cryptic biographical notes. The ANC's leadership remains ideologically eclectic though differences in political outlook do not result in the formation of factions or splits in the executive. About half the executive are members of the SACP; this was the situation before Kabwe. Not too much should be made of this: cross-cutting the lines of ideological affinity are the different shared experiences of the three generations present on the executive, the pioneers of working class organisation of the 1930s and 1940s, the populist mass leaders of the 1950s, and the revolutionary technocrats of the 1960s and 1970s. In any case the gulf between communists and nationalists is not great: men like Tambo are social nationalists and the South African Communist Party has a long tradition of tempering its socialist principles with the non-working class considerations of national unity. Essentially the ANC is a movement of pragmatists, not ideologues, with a heritage of political knowledge and experience that spans five decades. The ANC is the oldest national political organisation in South Africa and its leadership represents some of the most important and authentic traditions in the history of South African political life.

The picture this survey presents is not one that will be very reassuring or comforting to the readers of this journal who have interests to defend in the present social, economic and political arrangements that prevail in South Africa.

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The ANC is an organisation that is strongly committed to the alteration of those arrangements. This commitment though, stems not from the logic of an externally-derived Marxist revolutionary conspiracy as is so often asserted by the apologists for the present order. It comes rather from a popular political tradition of which the ANC is a central component. The ANC's radicalism is a reflection of the times and the society that have produced it. It is an indigenous force and an inescapable part of the political reality of this country.

NOTES

1. For poll evidence see Hanf *et al.*, *The Star*, 23 Sept 1981 and *The Economist Commission*, vol 1 (1982: 101).
2. The most comprehensive analysis of this campaign is Davis (1980); see also Lodge (1983/4) and Kana (1983/4).
3. See for example the calls by the students' representative councils of the Rand Afrikaans University and the University of Stellenbosch for unconditional negotiations with the ANC (*The Star*, 3 May 1983). Also relevant in this context is the HSRC survey released in December 1984, which showed 44% of its white respondents favouring government contact with the ANC (*Rand Daily Mail*, 22 Dec 1984). In the same month Piet Muller, deputy editor of *Beeld*, argued the case for talks with the ANC with officials in Lusaka (*Beeld*, 12 Dec 1984). In August 1985 Alex Boraine of the Progressive Federal Party added his voice to the support for a negotiated settlement with the ANC (*The Star*, 22 Aug 1985).
4. In 1969 the ANC's strategic proposals referred to the "doubly oppressed and doubly exploited working class" as "a distinct and reinforcing layer of our liberation and socialism." See La Guma (1972: 203).
5. As cited in the report on the 1985 conference in *Africa Confidential*, 26: 14 (3 July 1985), p. 1.
6. For an exiled "ultra left" view of the ANC see various articles in *Inqaba ya Basebenzi* (Journal of the Marxist Workers' Tendency of the ANC, BM Box 1719, London, WC1N 3XX). For the standpoint of "workerist" groups inside South Africa see Abrahams, and Anon. For debate on the ANC's socialist content see Patton and Mbeki.
7. See statements by ANC officials reported in *Zimbabwe Herald*, 29 Mar 1985 and *The Observer*, 31 Mar 1985.
8. Instructive in this regard was the decision by the South African Associated Newspapers management to close down the *Rand Daily Mail* despite (because of?) its success in attracting a black middle class readership.
9. For suggestions that this may have been happening see especially articles by JHP Serfontein in *The Sunday Star*, 3 Feb 1985 and 17 Feb 1985; see also *The Guardian*, 26 June 1984.
10. I have argued this in detail elsewhere. See Lodge (1983/4) and my contributions to *South African Research Services*, Lodge (1983 and 1984).
11. Demonstration of this in the wide support there appears to be among younger political activists for the brutal killings during the recent war of those suspected of being informers and police agents. Within the ANC pressure from the lower echelons of the organisation for a revision of the restrictions on guerrilla activity has been building up for some years. For a useful discussion of ANC leadership antipathy to terrorism see Adam and Uys.
12. Craig Williamson, the South African Police intelligence expert, has argued that the "suicide squads" that claim responsibility for such attacks are semi-autonomous units which though nominally independent are equipped and instructed by ANC personnel (*Financial Mail*, 28 June 1985). The Kabwe conference, according to Denis Herbertson "endorsed the already widespread killing of black policemen, councillors, and 'puppets' of the white regime" (*Observer*, 30 June 1985). Howard Barrell, writing on the basis of information gleaned from ANC sources, suggests that in future the activities of suicide squads "would certainly fit into the kind of tactics the ANC is promoting" (1985: 13).
13. Joe Slovo conceded in an interview in the *Guardian Weekly* (10 Feb 1985) that "We're not going to destroy the regime with sabotage blows even if we managed to double or triple the scale of activities."
14. Chris Hani and Mac Maharaj, "A Peoples' Army Fighting a Peoples' War," *Sechaba*, Nov 1984; Comrade Mzala, "Has the time come for the arming of the masses?" *The African Communist*, no 86, 1981; Khumalo Mqwa, "Further contribution on the arming of the masses," *The African Communist*, no 89, 1982.
15. The foregoing discussion of the Kabwe conference is based on information derived from the following reports: Jim Cason and Mike Fleischman, "Tasbo issues call to arms," *Africa News*, 15 July 1985; "ANC conference," *African Research Bulletin* (London), 15 July 1985; *West Africa* (London), 29 July 1985; "The ANC's secret decisions," *Foreign Report*, 4 July 1985; Denis Herbertson, "ANC chooses whites for hit list," *The Observer*, 30 June 1985; "Soft targets: ANC congress decides" and "Major shift in ANC home policy," *City Press*, 30 June 1985; Howard Barrell, "ANC delegates reinforce unity for liberation," *Sunday Mail*, 30 June 1985; Howard Barrell, "All for the front," *Work in Progress*, no 38, 1985; Howard Barrell, "No sign of any mood for talking," *The Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), 5-11 July 1985; "South Africa—*carus belli*," *Africa Confidential*, 26: 14 (3 July 1985).

16. Joe Slovo is the first ANC leader to take credit publicly for co-authorship of the Charter: see Glenn Frankel, "In exile 22 years: militant battles South Africa," *International Herald Tribune*, 16 July 1985.
17. To list in detail the sources for the biographical data would take up too much space. The journalism cited above includes some references to the backgrounds and careers of NEC members. Otherwise I have used the following material: Karis and Carter microfilm collection, South African Research Archives Project, Reels 9A, 11A, 17A, 13A and 14A, *Ikwezi* (Nottingham, GB), Nov 1975, Mar 1976 and Apr 1977, *Sekhaba*, various issues; *African Communist*, various issues; *Africa Confidential*, various issues; "Who are the experts leading the struggle?" *The Star*, 7 Jan 1982; Bartholomew Hlapane, "Testimony before the US Senate Sub-Committee on Security and Terrorism," 25 Mar 1982 (radio); Craig Williamson, evidence-in-chief in *State vs Barbara Hogan*, Rand Supreme Court, Johannesburg, September 1982, trial no 63/82 (extract from transcript); Brian Bunting (1975); Luckhardt and Wall; Ludi and Grobbelaar; and Walker. Note: Some of these sources are based on or consist of police or state witness evidence at political trials. In the past such testimony has been demonstrably unreliable. In this article I have not depended upon information culled from such evidence unless it can be corroborated from other material.

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(From The New York Times, June 16, 1986)

Sanctions vs. Apartheid

By Desmond M. Tutu

A clear message resounds in recent surveys in South Africa in which more than 70 percent of blacks supported sanctions against the Government. Blacks are saying: "We are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering."

Our people have shown they mean business by their use of consumer boycotts. Last year, organizations representing more than 12 million South Africans called for sanctions and economic pressure. These are not insignificant actions or irresponsible bodies or individuals.

I must ask, To whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen or to the perpetrators of apartheid and those who benefit from it?

I would be more impressed with those who made no bones about the reason they remain in South Africa and said, honestly, "We are concerned for our profits," instead of the saloney that the businesses are there for our benefit. We don't want you there. Please do us a favor: get out and come back when we have a democratic and just South Africa.

It is true that many foreign corporations in South Africa have intro-

duced improvements for their black staff. They now have a better chance of promotion. They get better salaries. But these improvements have come about largely through the pressures of the divestment campaign. American companies, especially, have begun to speak out more forthrightly against apartheid than has been their wont, and they would be the first to admit that they got a considerable jog to their consciences from the divestment campaign.

There has been progress, but we do not want apartheid ameliorated or improved. We do not want apartheid made comfortable. We want it dismantled.

You hear people say sanctions don't work. That may be so. But if they don't work, why oppose them so vehemently? If they don't work, why did Margaret Thatcher apply them to Argentina during the Falkland war? Why did the United States apply them to Poland and to Nicaragua? Why was President Reagan so annoyed that his European allies did not want to impose sanctions against Libya? If sanctions are so ineffective, why does the United States still maintain a blockade of Cuba? Yet we have all this wonderful sophistry when it comes to South Africa.

I am unaware of anything that has changed in South Africa without pressure. Changes in the sports policy were due to pressure from the sports boycott and not because there had been a change of heart on the part of white sports administrators.

We hear some say that sanctions will destroy the South Africa economy and leave us with a financial mo-

ness. My response is that the ball is surely in the South African Government's court. Its decisions about the future of the country will determine whether sanctions should be invoked or not. I certainly do not want to destroy a land I love passionately. But if the South African Government remains intransigent and obstinate, then sanctions or no sanctions the economy will be destroyed in the wake of the violence, bloodshed and chaos that will ensue if a full-scale civil war breaks out.

There is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid, but it is the last nonviolent option left, and it is a risk with a chance. President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement, and similar efforts to persuade white South Africans who support apartheid to change, have failed dismally. Let's try another strategy.

There are those who are not ashamed to argue that if they pull out others will come in to exploit black South Africa. The moral turpitude of that argument is quite breathtaking. We are not asking people to make economic or political decisions. We are asking for a moral decision.

There is no room for neutrality. When you say you are neutral in a situation of injustice and oppression, you have decided to support the unjust status quo. Are you on the side of injustice? Are you on the side of oppression or liberation? Are you on the side of death or of life? Are you on the side of goodness or of evil? □

Desmond M. Tutu, the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize winner, is Anglican Archbishop-elect of Cape Town, South Africa. This article was adapted from his recent commencement address at Hunter College, in New York City.

John M. Lemmon
Managing Editor

Africa policy at crossroads

U.S. RELATIONS with African nations will be on the line in July, when the Senate is expected to decide the fate of the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1986 (S.B. 2570).

Although the bill applies only to South Africa, whether or not it passes will be seen as a sign of America's commitment to democracy and human rights south of the Sahara. The companion bill that passed the House of Representatives on June 18 requires a total embargo on trade with South Africa (except for medicine and strategic metals) 180 days after its enactment.

**Coretta
Scott King**

S.B. 2570, sponsored by Sens. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., and Lowell Weicker, R-Conn., is the strongest anti-apartheid legislation now before the Senate. Another bill (S.B. 2498) would prohibit only new U.S. investment in South Africa. Supporters of both bills expect an uphill struggle in the more conservative Senate. "This is a crucial test for the movement against apartheid," says Rep. Walter Fauntroy, D-Wash., D.C., a leader of the Free South Africa Movement. "We're calling on all Americans who are concerned about freedom, human rights and self-determination for the South African people to urge their senators to vote for strong anti-apartheid legislation."

"It's going to take an all-out lobbying effort to pass this bill," agrees Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., author of the House bill. "For all of us who want to help put an end to apartheid, now is the time to contact our senators in support of S.B. 2570."

Some opponents of economic sanctions point to the failure of the U.S. grain embargo and the Olympics boycott to encourage Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet there is abundant evidence that economic sanctions help. Zimbabwean Cabinet ministers, for example, recently told Sir Shridath Ramphal,

secretary general of the British Commonwealth, that "sanctions were enormously important" in their struggle for self-determination. As Rep. William Gray III, D-Penn., asks, "If they don't work, why does the United States have sanctions against 20 other countries?"

Ironically, one of the most compelling arguments in favor of economic sanctions against South Africa has come from the apartheid regime itself. In the words of former Prime Minister John Vorster, "Each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of our continued existence."

The majority of black South Africans want stronger U.S. economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. Despite the publicity given to Zulu chief M. Gatsha Buthelezi and his followers' opposition to sanctions, approximately 73 percent of black South Africans support some form of withdrawal by foreign businesses, according to a survey by the Institute for Black Research in Durban, South Africa.

Utilizing a variety of non-violent tactics, including voluntary mass arrests and stockholders' campaigns, anti-apartheid groups have been remarkably successful in encouraging U.S. corporations to withdraw from South Africa. In 1985, 38 companies withdrew from South Africa compared with only seven U.S. firms in 1984. At least a dozen companies are considering similar action or have already pulled out in 1986.

According to the New York-based American Committee on Africa, 19 states and more than 50 cities and counties have passed divestment legislation. Some 46 colleges and universities have divested since 1977, 32 since the student protests of April 1985. Many anti-apartheid groups are supporting an international boycott of the Royal Dutch Shell Corp., which supplies fuel to the apartheid regime's military and police.

Some 280 U.S. corporations remain in South Africa, taking the position that their withdrawal would further hurt the victims of apartheid. But as Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu has said, "Foreign investors must not kid themselves. They fatten on black misery, cheap labor and the destruction of black family life."

The movement against apartheid will continue to grow no matter how the Senate votes on S.B. 2570. If the Senate passes strong economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, however, it will bring much-needed credibility to our often-stated ideals of freedom, democracy and human rights for the black majority of South Africa.

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97TH CONGRESS }
2d Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

SOVIET, EAST GERMAN AND CUBAN IN-
VOLVEMENT IN FOMENTING TERROR-
ISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

REPORT
OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SECURITY AND TERRORISM
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION



NOVEMBER 1982

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(II)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C., September 17, 1982.

HON. STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism has completed its inquiry into Soviet, East German, and Cuban involvement in fomenting terrorism in southern Africa. The record of the hearings, which lasted 5 days, details the scope of the role in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and Cuba in instigating acts of terrorism, as well as in recruiting, supplying, training, and directing terrorist cadre.

The record, which is very extensive, also includes an addendum of documents and photographs, which in my view will provide a much needed balance to the information now on the public record regarding the South West African People's Organization and the African National Congress. It explains the extent to which the Soviet Union and its proxies are involved with these so-called "national liberation movements."

This report, which I am submitting, highlights not only aspects of the testimony, but also documents, with excerpts from the current literature, the longstanding Soviet connections with and commitment to these organizations.

Moreover, the information is particularly instructive since SWAPO is presently being touted as the sole legitimate political force in Namibia. Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Iran are glaring reminders of our failure to fully comprehend and appreciate the motives and interrelationships of those who sought political power under the guise of national liberation. These situations also serve as graphic examples of the terrible price which others have paid for our previous mistakes.

I feel that a review and analysis of the material which has been compiled will be of substantial assistance to those who desire to have a fuller understanding of the part that the Soviet Union and its proxy states play in international terrorism and national liberation movements such as SWAPO and the ANC.

Sincerely,

JEREMIAH DENTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

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CHAIRMAN'S REPORT: SOVIET, EAST GERMAN AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

In an important policy address to the American Legion in Honolulu on August 29, 1981, Assistant Secretary of State (for African Affairs) Chester Crocker described southern Africa as a "key region" requiring a carefully considered and sophisticated policy in order to advance U.S. interests. Dr. Crocker advanced three reasons for this judgment.

First. U.S. economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60 percent of the sub-Saharan totals, is located there. Our southern African trade totals over \$6 billion. This concentration of our interests reflects southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies—especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70 percent of its industrial and 60 percent of its mining output, 80 percent of the steel and 85 percent of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies like ours, including: The platinum group (86 percent of world reserves), manganese (53 percent), vanadium (64 percent), chromium (95 percent), and cobalt (52 percent) as well as a dominant share of world gold and diamond output and internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper, and other minerals. Many of these minerals are vital to Western defense and high technology industries

Second. A second reality is that southern Africa is an increasingly contested area in global politics. The worldwide significance of the region derives from its potential—unless nations of the area can find a basis to resolve outstanding conflicts and coexist—to become a cockpit of mounting East-West tension. Despite the ending of the drawn-out struggle in Rhodesia and the successful transition to independent Zimbabwe, there remains a combination of local and external pressures that could lead to expanded conflict and polarization. Since Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the U.S.S.R. and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling. Six years after Angola's independence, substantial Cuban combat forces plus Soviet advisers remain there, as participants in a still unresolved and tragic civil war.

This external factor inevitably shapes the calculations of Angola's neighbors. Warsaw Pact countries have arms agreements with four nations of the area and provide the bulk of external military support to guerilla groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. Faced with large scale foreign intervention, the pressure of African guerilla groups, and strains in its relations with its traditional Western partners, South Africa has significantly expanded its defense potential in recent years. The republic, through a sustained self-sufficiency drive, is now an important regional military power. It has clearly signaled its determination to resist guerilla encroachments and strike at countries giving sanctuary.

Let us make no mistake. This is an explosive combination. The potential damage to Western interests is enhanced by southern Africa's geopolitical importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering the region's security and countering the expansion of Soviet influence. We intend to do so by building the confidence necessary for equitable

and durable solutions to conflicts and by encouraging the emergence and survival of genuine democratic systems and productive economies. We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence. If the peoples of southern Africa are to have the chance to build their own futures, it is essential that military force not become established as the arbiter of relations between states or the means of effecting needed political change. In this respect, southern Africa could become a crucial arena for defining the rules of international conduct in the decade ahead.

Third. The third reality is that southern Africa is a highly complex arena which must be understood on its own regional merits if we are to succeed in our efforts. There are powerful linkages—transport systems, labor migration, electric power grids, flows of capital and expertise, active and vital trade ties—that bind together the states of southern Africa. Interdependence is reinforced by the presence in the region of six landlocked states. Economic pragmatism is strengthened by the many nearby examples of negative growth rates and falling living standards. But there are also deep-rooted sources of conflict within the region itself. The political basis for regional cooperation is strikingly absent. The racial and ethnic pluralism of these societies—and the raw emotions generated by colonialism and white minority rule—make it difficult for them to come to terms with themselves and their neighbors.

Almost 1 year earlier, in September 1980, Alexander Haig, in his capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer of the United Technologies Corporation, had appeared before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the House of Representatives. In his testimony, General Haig said:

The United States is inordinately and increasingly dependent on foreign sources of supply for many of the raw materials critical to our defense and our economy . . .

Should future trends, especially in Southern Africa, result in alignment with Moscow of this critical resource area, then the USSR will control as much as 90 percent of several key minerals for which no substitutes have been developed, and the loss of which could bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the free world.

As one assesses the step up of Soviet proxy activity in the third world—in Angola, Ethiopia, Southern Yemen, North Yemen, Southeast Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, and the December 1979, unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan by regular Soviet forces—then one can only conclude that the era of the resource war has arrived. (Emphasis added)

It was with these considerations in mind that the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism commenced an investigation of the role of the Soviet Union, directly and through its surrogates in Cuba and East Germany, in fomenting and promoting terrorism in southern Africa.

At the first hearing in April 1981, entitled "Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support," when the subcommittee undertook its initial examination of international terrorism and, at every hearing thereafter, there was recurring evidence that the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Cuba actively and often successfully seek, under the overall control of the Politburo in Moscow, to utilize, infiltrate, and manipulate so-called "national liberation movements" around the world. We heard repeated references to the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and elsewhere.

In hearings entitled "Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism" and "Terrorism: The Role of Moscow and Its Subcontractors" held in June 1981 on the use of terrorism as a political instrument by Moscow and its subcontractors, additional information was developed on the extent of the Soviet Union's commitment to the use of terrorism and armed revolution to achieve its goal of Communist world domination.

Shortly before the southern Africa hearings, in February and March 1982, the subcommittee concluded 4 days of hearings on Cuba and its worldwide involvement in terrorist activities. These hearings underscored the involvement of the Soviet Union in southern Africa and in Latin America, as well as Cuba's able execution of its role as Moscow's surrogate.

Because of the economic and strategic importance of southern Africa to the United States and the free world, we concluded that the subcommittee should turn its attention to the Soviet, Cuban, and East German involvement in the terrorist activities of the so-called "national liberation movements" in southern Africa. In reaching this conclusion, account was taken of the fact that many journalists and other opinion leaders throughout the world are frequently reluctant to admit or even discuss the extent of Communist involvement in, and control of southern African "national liberation movements." But motivated by the conviction that African blacks, as well as whites, have suffered, are presently suffering, will continue to suffer if Communist movements expand or triumph in that region, and mindful of the impact on American interests of such a development, the subcommittee proceeded with the hearings.

Preparation for the hearings commenced with a study by the subcommittee staff on the origins and development of the major "national liberation movements" in southern Africa and on Soviet doctrine and ideological theory pertaining to such movements. Much of the material uncovered is contained in the next three sections of this report entitled "The ANC," "SWAPO," and "Soviet Ideological Theory."

On the basis of this preliminary study, it was decided to focus the subcommittee's further inquiry primarily on two organizations, the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). It was further decided that members of the subcommittee staff should visit southern Africa in January 1982 for discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel, South African and Namibian security officials, academics and, if possible, members or former members of the ANC and SWAPO.

On the staff's return from southern Africa it was clear that a great quantity of evidence was indeed available to demonstrate the validity of the allegations that the Soviet Union had successfully penetrated and, in large measure, taken over the control of the ANC and SWAPO. A series of five hearings was therefore scheduled for March 22, 24, 25, 29, and 31, 1982, to enable the subcommittee to hear testimony from the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; a Sovietologist who has made a particular study of Soviet goals and strategies in Africa; four former members of the ANC, one of whom served on the National Executive Committee of the ANC at the same time he was a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party; and four former members of SWAPO, including two of its founders, Mr. Andreas Shipanga and Advocate J. Kozonguizi.

The subcommittee also extended invitations to the presidents of SWAPO and the ANC to testify. Mr. Nujoma of SWAPO did not respond at all and the head of the ANC Observer Missions at the United Nations in New York simply advised the chairman of the sub-

committee that the invitation had been relayed to ANC headquarters for a decision.

A former member of the Mozambique Air Force, Lt. Adriano Bomba, who had decided to defect to South Africa in 1981 as a result of his disillusionment over the impact of the Marxist-Leninist policies applied by the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, was also invited to testify before the subcommittee. It was felt that the experiences of someone who had witnessed the transition of FRELIMO from a Soviet-sponsored "national liberation movement" to a formally constituted Marxist-Leninist party would convey a perspective of some importance. This proved to be the case.

THE ANC

The African National Congress of South Africa was founded in Bloemfontein in the then Union of Southern Africa on January 8, 1912. Roland Stanbridge, a researcher at the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala, Sweden, describes its creation as follows:

When Britain handed political power in South Africa over to the privileged white minority in 1910, Africans throughout the country were faced with the need to unite to protect their rights. A prominent Zulu lawyer, Dr. Pixley ka Izaka Seme, declared in 1922: "The demon of racialism, the aberrations of Xhosa-Fingo feuds, the animosity that exists between the Zulu and the Tongas, between the Basuto and every other native, must be buried and forgotten . . . We are one people." Other overseas-trained professional men took up the call, and on January 8, 1912, the founding conference of the ANC (at first called the Native National Congress) opened in Bloemfontein. Its purpose, as set forth in Seme's opening address, was to "find ways and means of forming one national union for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges."¹

Jordan K. Ngubane has commented as follows about the political goals of the founders of the ANC:

After lengthy and careful deliberation, the delegates agreed to unite their peoples for the purpose of projecting them into the future as a new politico-cultural community. They were no longer to be narrowly Zulu or Xosa or Satu; they were going to be the African people. Their unity was designed to extend the area of liberty; to give to citizenship the same meaning on both sides of the color line, and not to drive the Indian, colored, or white man into the sea. Thirdly, the delegates regarded the violation of human rights by the Union Government's race policy as a matter that concerned humanity as a whole. They rejected the contention that it was a domestic South African matter.²

However politically provocative the goals of the ANC may have appeared in the context of the colonial system in South Africa in 1912, there is little doubt that the people of the United States would have no hesitation in identifying with these objectives today.

Stanbridge observes that in the aftermath of several decades of largely unsuccessful petitioning of successive Union governments by the ANC in support of (black) African rights:

By the end of World War II, closer cooperation began to develop between the forces opposed to the White government. In 1944-45 there was a widespread ANC-CP anti-pass campaign which did much to renew widespread support for the ANC. Close fraternal relations developed between the ANC and CP (South African Communist Party) and today the two organizations continue to work

¹ "Contemporary African Political Organizations and Movements," Roland Stanbridge, in "The Apartheid Regime," ed. Robert N. Price and Carl G. Rosberg.

² "An African Explains Apartheid," Jordan K. Ngubane, Praeger, New York.

together intimately. In May 1945, when the Allied victory over Nazi Germany was celebrated, the biggest gathering ever seen in Johannesburg met under the combined auspices of the ANC, the CP, and the trade unions.

After the electoral victory of the National Party of South Africa in 1948, the Government commenced the implementation of the policy of apartheid or separation of races. Standbridge notes:

During this period, increasing closer links were established between the trade unions, the ANC, and the CP. In 1950 a mass rally was held in Durban under the auspices of the ANC, the SAIC, the CP, and the African People's Organization (an organization of Colored people later replaced by the South African Colored People's Organization—SACPO). This was the first time all these organizations had come together to voice their opposition to the racial policies of the government and the bannings of Black leaders.

The South African Communist Party, which had come into existence in July 1921 as a result of white members of the Industrial Socialist League and the International Socialist League joining forces, was declared a prohibited organization by the South African Government in the Internal Security Act of 1950. On June 24, 1950, the Communist Party dissolved itself and core members went underground to continue its activities.

Some years earlier, a group of young ANC nationalists had created a youth league. Stanbridge states:

In 1943 a group of young nationalist-minded intellectuals formed a Youth League (ANCYL) in the ANC. They propounded a policy of fighting for African independence, freedom from domination by other national groups, and the establishment of an African nation. An important dimension of the Youth League outlook was the insistence that the ANC should cease merely making representations to a stubborn government and should engage in more militant action. It rejected the language of supplication of the ANC leadership. The Constitution of the ANCYL declared its aims to be: To arouse and encourage national consciousness and unity among African youth and to assist, support and reinforce the African National people. Though the ANC had not managed to regain its initial mass following, the Youth League soon attracted increasingly greater support.

In a chapter entitled "African Nationalism Sabotaged," Mr. Ngunjane explains:

As soon as the (Second World) war was over, the (Youth) League intensified its pressure for a definite stand against race oppression. Although the resistance movement of 1951 was launched in time, the long debates which preceded this demonstration are perhaps more interesting, for the Youth Leaguers regarded the campaign primarily as a tactical move to train the African masses in the use of peaceful collective action. Some of them selected this weapon for reasons of principle, but others said that expediency had decided the issue for them. At first, the Communists dismissed the idea of a nonviolent demonstration; but when it became clear that African opinion supported the resistance campaign, the line changed. They were heart and soul for a Gandhian campaign. In the meantime, they had worked hard behind the scenes to create a coordinating committee representing all the organizations behind the campaign. The acceptance of equal representation on it by the Johannesburg Youth Leaguers, who were coming increasingly under the influence of the Communist leader, Dr. Yussuf Dadoo, imposed severe strains inside the League. After the campaign, however, Communist pressure on Youth League unity was intensified. Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, and other Youth Leaguers visited Iron Curtain countries—with disastrous effects on Youth League unity. The consequent tensions led finally to the capture of the League by the Communists. And that was its end.

After the resistance movement, Communist policy stressed the need for action against race oppression rather than subversion of state authority. The idea was to stage dramatic stunts designed to administer continuous and indecisive shocks to the economy of the land in order to keep it in a state of chronic malaise. Anti-pass campaigns, boycotts, and mass demonstrations ensued. One of the most

famous and best organized of the latter was the secret trip of 20,000 women to Pretoria, without the knowledge of the police, to protest against race oppression. They demanded an interview with the Prime Minister, J. G. Strijdom, who found it convenient to remain securely behind barred and guarded doors. In all such protests, the idea was not to shock the government into making concessions—no Communist would be so naive—but to impair the health of the country's economy.

These demonstrations were all said to have been organized by the Congress Movement. People who sat in the inner councils of this alliance stated privately that the ANC tended to accept instructions rather than to participate decisively in the formulation of policies. Dr. Willson Conco, who was for a long time Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown gathering, in 1955, which produced the Freedom Charter; but, on his return, he said he had seen the document for the first time at the conference. And Luthuli himself had not known who had drafted the charter. The coordinating committee of the alliance was, as a matter of fact, not the real originator of policy. The bosses of the underground Communist Party did the planning and made policy decisions. They approached men like Luthuli and other non-Communist leaders merely, in actual practice, to acquaint them with what had already been decided. One example will illustrate this point. Just before he went to the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, Moses Kotane—the former Secretary-General of the Communist Party—traveled from Johannesburg to Groutville to inform Luthuli that he too was attending the conference. The latter, a key member of the ANC, was in no position to approve or disapprove; Kotane had come merely to inform him.

This remote control of the ANC was facilitated by the bans on Luthuli. The government had forbidden him to move outside the boundaries of his magisterial district. His head office was in distant Johannesburg. The Communists had successfully resisted pressure to transfer the head office to Durban, which was only about forty-eight miles from where Luthuli lived. Johannesburg did not keep him as well informed on developments as they should have done * * *.

This was not just a piece of bungling. The withholding of vital information from Luthuli was part of the plan to destroy, whenever necessary, any African leader who was not completely under the control of the Communists. And there was an important complement to this plan of subtle destruction. The South African Congress of Trade Unions was one of the members of the Congress Movement. Unlike the other four allies, it was mixed racially, although the Africans were, of course, in the majority. African members of SACTU were encouraged to join the ANC and vice versa: Moser Mabhida was the Communist-sponsored chief of SACTU, and Luthuli led the ANC. Under this arrangement, the African member was deliberately given a dual loyalty and leadership as a precaution against Luthuli's defecting one day. If he were to do that, Mabhida would assert himself as SACTU leader against Luthuli. Since Mabhida was always with the workers, he stood a better chance of pulling a very substantial section of them in any showdown with Luthuli. And in any crisis not involving Luthuli, he could easily be upheld as the leader of the Africans.

It was all part of a complicated plan to reduce Luthuli to the position of an impotent prisoner of the Communists. Locked up as he virtually was in Groutville, he was not free to make any impact on outside opinion. In the meantime, the Communist press was taking advantage of every conceivable opportunity to boost Mabhida. Therefore, the type of leadership the Youth League had tried to establish was being subtly undermined and African nationalism sabotaged.

The treason trial started shortly after Sisulu had returned from Moscow and Peking. The trip to Bucharest, Moscow and Peking by prominent ANC leaders had been clever moves to commit the organization by implication. Luthuli might argue that he and his movement were not Communist; but if his right-hand man could go to Iron Curtain capitals without his knowledge, the world would ask Luthuli who was the real boss of the ANC. If he said, as he did, that he did not know who had paid for these costly trips—his treasurer was saying publicly that the ANC was in the red financially—then it would be clear he was no longer boss. In the event of a showdown, he would not have enough world support to embarrass the Communists.

The government felt it was time to strike at the leadership of the Congress Movement. With characteristic maladroitness, it locked up the Communists and non-Communist leaders of the Movement, together with a few anti-Communists outside of the Congress. In evidence presented during the trial, it became increasingly clear that Luthuli did not have a real hand in formulating policy

for the Congress Movement; therefore, the charge against him and some of his more immediate supporters was dropped. After nearly five years, the government case collapsed, and the accused were once again free men. In short, the trips to Iron Curtain capitals had forced the government to show its hand, for it was going to act ruthlessly against all who challenged or opposed apartheid, regardless of whether or not they were Communists. And the same rule applied to the bannings.

In 1958, the African nationalist faction in the ANC, unwilling to tolerate manipulation by the South African Communist Party any longer, broke away and founded the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This militant—and anti-Communist—movement's credo was "• • • government of the Africans by the Africans with everybody who owes his only loyalty to Africa and is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an African."

After a series of demonstrations by the PAC and clashes with the police culminating in the events at Sharpsville and Langa on March 21, 1960, in which 69 Africans were killed and 178 wounded, and the state of emergency proclaimed by the South African Governor-General after a countrywide strike had been called by the ANC on March 26, 1960, the South African Parliament passed the Unlawful Organizations Act on April 8, 1960, banning both the ANC and the PAC. These organizations thereafter created separate terrorist and guerrilla wings, Umkhonto We Sizwe ("the Spear of the Nation") and Poqo ("Pure"—implying a purely Africa—that is, non-Communist—character) and commenced campaigns of sabotage and terrorism which led the South African Government to adopt increasingly harsh security measures in an effort to stamp out the violence.

As nothing which the subcommittee staff unearthed before the hearings suggested infiltration of the PAC by the Soviet Union—although there is some evidence of support by The People's Republic of China—no further inquiry was made into the current activities of that organization. Recent publicized developments, particularly in 1975 and 1976, however, suggested that the ANC was still dominated by the South African Communist Party. Stanbridge states:

In 1969 the ANC held an important conference at Morogoro (Tanzania), where it was decided to set up a Revolutionary Council charged with mobilizing and accelerating the struggle within South Africa. Another major decision was to expand the ANC by drawing into it all South African revolutionary elements irrespective of their racial origin. This decision, which is still effective, caused serious divisions within the organization. These came to a head in 1975, when an ANC leader, Ambrose Makiwane, charged that "The trouble the African people have at present is that our strategy and tactics are in the hands of, and dominated by, a small clique of non-Africans." He blamed this on "the disastrous Morogoro Consultative Conference which opened ANC membership to non-Africans." Makiwane and seven others were expelled from the ANC. These expellees then made public their disagreements with the ANC leadership in an extensive memorandum released in London on December 11, 1975. They complained that there was an absence of democratic consultation within the organization, that the traditional ANC policies and ideology had been diluted, and that the SACP, whose leaders were White, had effective control of the ANC.

SWAPO

The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was created in June 1960. Its origins, however, go back to the Ovambo People's Congress founded in Cape Town among Ovambo workers—and some few Hereros—in 1957. Among those most prominent in its

creation were Herman Toivo, Andreas Shipanga, Solomon Mifinawe, Emil Appolus and Jariretundo Kozonguizi. Duignan and Gann's comment:

It derived its main support from the Ovambo and from educated people—teachers, nurses, students, even ministers of religion. SWAPO professed to unite all ethnic communities into a single Namibian nation. An estimated 90 percent of its membership derived from the Ovambo people; some of the leaders, however, were Herero. Only a handful of whites have been admitted to membership, and these were subjected to stringent tests.

Another author, Dr. Jeffrey B. Gayner⁴ of the Heritage Foundation, noted further:

In 1959 Toivo changed the name of the organization to the Ovambo People's Organization and was joined at that time by Sam Nujoma and Mburumba Kerina (who is half Herero and half Ovambo). They received assistance from the Liberal Party and Communist Party in South Africa. With the rise of personal, philosophical, and tribal differences that so frequently have plagued SWAPO and Namibia, the Herero broke off from the organization in 1959 to form the South West African National Union (SWANU) in Windhoek. In order to confront the appearance of the narrowing of the ethnic base of the party, the Ovambo People's Organization became the South West Africa People's Organization or SWAPO. But the broader name, intended to attract territory-wide base of support, never effectively changed the Ovambo structure of the party; but it undoubtedly assisted the organization, in later obtaining international recognition, as being representative of all people in Namibia. This assisted Kerina who since 1956 had attempted to argue on behalf of the people of Namibia before the United Nations. In the early years of SWAPO a form of collegial rule developed in the organization as Toivo remained in charge in Africa, Kerina in New York, and Shipanga, Nujoma and others operating in important but subordinate roles.

During this formative period, the group advocated nonviolence, but by 1962 the decision had apparently been made to begin a campaign of guerrilla warfare and sabotage in Namibia. Training facilities for SWAPO guerrillas were made available by the Soviet Union, China, Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. Of the initial leaders only Shipanga apparently embraced Marxism, but soon Soviet support for SWAPO acquired strong ideological tones among the members. Initial guerrilla activities began in Namibia in 1965, and, following the dismissal of the Namibian case before the International Court of Justice in July 1966, SWAPO decided to step up its campaign. In 1968 Toivo took personal leadership of the ill-fated guerrilla campaign in Namibia. The South African authorities easily overpowered this initial effort and captured Toivo who was convicted and sentenced to prison on Robben Island near Cape Town where he remains today.

Following the arrest of Toivo, Kerina had Sam Nujoma appointed as the first President of SWAPO; Toivo had been chairman of the group and some still recognize him as the real leader. By the time leadership passed to Nujoma, division increasingly characterized SWAPO with both external and internal splits developing * * *.

According to Duignan and Gann:

SWAPO was not a single organization. It had the external wing which carried on the "war of national liberation," and the internal wing which involved itself in peaceful political activities. "SWAPO Internal" was less radical than the exile organization—to survive, organize, and hold meetings it had to be. A substantial part of SWAPO's internal strength derived from church members, workers, and intellectuals who looked to radical social reform, and sometimes to a "theology of liberation". Other less sophisticated adherents proclaimed their allegiance to the party because they saw it as an anti-white body, and because a SWAPO label seems to indicate opposition to the status quo. "SWAPO Internal"

³ "South West Africa-Namibia," Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, American African Affairs Association Inc., 1978.

⁴ "Namibia: The Road to Self-Government," Jeffrey B. Gayner, Council on American Affairs, 1979.

was by no means united. It contained at least three factions—the Orambo group in the north, a southern faction made up of moderates, and a younger radical group—the Youth League—which called for a militant revolutionary movement to take charge of Namibia.

"SWAPO External" was an equally divided body. At the time of writing,⁴ its headquarters were in Lusaka, with additional offices in Luanda, New York, London, Zamalek-Cairo, Hydra (Algiers), and Dakar. "SWAPO External" was led by men who had left Namibia in the early 1960's; they clearly were away too long to know what was happening inside their country. A split between the external and internal wings seemed obvious although it has been averted so far by the control exerted over the purse strings by the external group. The latter was recognized worldwide for its diplomatic and military struggles. Both wings of SWAPO refused to participate in the Turnhalle conference, and to date they declined to participate in a new plan advocated by the West. But there were obvious disagreements between those who had to live under a South Africa-dominated Namibia and those who, from the outside, carried on a guerrilla war. "SWAPO Internal," for example had belonged to the Namibia National Convention (NNC), but "SWAPO External" would not join the NNC, claiming it alone could speak for Namibia. Similarly, "SWAPO External" continued to oppose cooperation with South Africa in implementing the West's initiative, yet "SWAPO Internal" could not be happy with this intransigence. It could mean that Namibia would become independent without SWAPO.

Other difficulties faced "SWAPO External." A number of the exiles, disillusioned by the party's leadership abroad, returned to Namibia. These included such men as Jackson Kambode, formerly secretary of SWAPO's trade union organization, Silas Shikongo, a guerrilla leader, and above all, Mburumba Kerina, a cofounder of SWAPO. Other exiles broke with the party's official leadership. This group included men loyal to Andreas Z. Shipanga, the exile interned in Tanzania at the time of writing. The harsh treatment meted out to Shipanga and his adherents reflected the bitter rivalry between contending factions. It also cast grave doubt on the commitment to due process of law and to humane treatment of prisoners professed by SWAPO and by its foreign supporters.

Dr. Gayner had written further on this point:

The growing rift in the guerrilla wing of SWAPO finally erupted in open conflict in March 1976 when many of the younger activist members, under the leadership of Andreas Shipanga, met in southern Zambia and itemized a list of grievances against the Nujoma hierarchy. They charged his leadership with nepotism, corruption, waste, inefficiency and, in general, a lack of principled devotion to the cause of Namibian independence. In order to press their points, they demanded that a new party congress of SWAPO be held in which the entire organization could discuss and eventually vote on the merits of their criticisms and ultimately decide the direction SWAPO would take in the future. Nujoma rejected their proposed challenge to his integrity and authority. This precipitated an attempted march by Shipanga and nearly 1,000 supporters upon the headquarters of Nujoma in Lusaka. However, Nujoma prevailed upon President Kaunda of Zambia to intervene in his behalf and the Zambian army surrounded and disarmed the protesters, forcing them into a prison camp at Boroma. Under the guidance of Nujoma, Zambian authorities continued to arrest additional dissidents in SWAPO and similarly confined them to prison, allegedly granting "protective custody for their own safety."

Mr. Shipanga and 18 other SWAPO dissidents were eventually released by Tanzania in May 1978. The subcommittee has been unable to develop any information about the fate of the other dissidents arrested at the same time. In his testimony, Mr. Shipanga stated that 2,000 SWAPO members were arrested in April 1976 in Zambia. Other than the 600 who were released in April 1977 and the 13 who were released in May 1978, among them Shipanga, he does not know the fate of the remainder, who he last heard had been taken to Angola.

Duignan and Gann have written the following on SWAPO's political ideology:

⁴ 1976.

Politically and ideologically, SWAPO did not describe itself as a Marxist-Leninist party but rather—like the MPLA in Angola and Frelimo in Mozambique—as a “popular movement.” Its constitution called for the creation of a national economy on the principles of “scientific socialism” with considerable concessions to the so-called “national bourgeoisie” and, on paper, a commitment to an “independent foreign policy.” But whereas the MPLA leaders are well-educated and familiar in Marxist circles in London, Paris and Moscow, the SWAPO leaders are poorly schooled and unsophisticated. Depending on the character of its audience, the party spoke with differing voices. One program corresponded to the policy adopted by all other Soviet-supported Marxist movements in Africa and advanced a “national democratic revolution, to be achieved in alliance with the national bourgeoisie, as a stepping stone on the road to socialism.” SWAPO’s external wing was not ideologically “pure” in the orthodox Marxist-Leninist sense, but in 1977 Nujoma quite falsely accused Israel, West Germany, and Chile of maintaining “mercenaries” in Namibia with aid from the U.S.A. The party vowed to end “capitalist relations based on the exploitations of man.” It saw struggle in Namibia as part of a wider confrontation involving the whole of Southern African and, ultimately, the world at large. In tune with the ‘United Front’ policy followed by the pro-Soviet parties in Africa, SWAPO was also anxious to conciliate “progressive” forces in the West by means of concealing its true objectives. The pro-Soviet “African Communist” commented:

“SWAPO is faced with a strategic problem similar to that facing the Zimbabwean liberation movement: to resist the ideological and financial pressure from the West, while exploiting to the full the Western powers’ desire to accommodate to some degree, and for their own reactionary motives, the force for change in Southern Africa. And both these tasks have to be fulfilled while at the same time advancing the armed struggle. . . . the only path to liberation.”

Gaynor notes a significant change:

In July 1976, SWAPO revised its constitution and adopted a revealing program for the future of Namibia:

“To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry, and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and the building of a classless non-exploitive society based on scientific socialism ideals and principles.”

SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL THEORY

One of the standard texts dealing with the application of Marxist-Leninist theory to the international environment is “The World Communist Movement: An Outline of Strategy and Tactics,”⁶ edited by V. V. Zagladin.

In chapters 2 (The Unity and Components of the World Revolutionary Process) and 7 (The Struggle to Build Up an Anti-Imperialist National Democratic Front in Asia and Africa) of this seminal work of Communist theory, the role of the national liberation movements in the “anti-imperialist struggle” is carefully explained. The language is so clear and specific that the dispute in Western nations about the question of Soviet exploitation and manipulation of these movements can only be explained as a triumph of Soviet propaganda aided and abetted by tragic self-delusion on the part of many opinion leaders in the West.

On pages 74 and 75 we find the following statements:

“The social revolution,” Lenin stressed, “can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national-liberation movement in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.”⁷ At the present stage, the variety of forms

⁶ “The World Communist Movement: An Outline of Strategy and Tactics,” general ed., V. V. Zagladin, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1st Imp. (1973).

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 23, p. 60.

of revolutionary movements is of necessity growing in connection with the expansion of the revolution's social basis, and the involvement of new countries and peoples in the revolution.

The movements that go to make up the revolutionary process differ in the social composition of their participants, and in the aims pursued. In each country, such movements are marked by definite national features but, despite the variety of revolutionary movements, they are all linked together directly or indirectly, their community consisting, first and foremost, in their standing opposed to imperialism in one way or another. Moreover, today, when the objective prerequisites exist all over the world for the outmoded exploitative system to yield place to a new system, the struggle of all the revolutionary forces ultimately acquires an objectively anti-capitalist direction. Socialist revolutions, anti-imperialist revolutions for national liberation, people's democratic revolutions, mass peasant movements, the struggle of the masses for the overthrow of fascist and other tyrannical regimes—all these are merging in a single stream that is washing away and destroying capitalism. This gives an inner integrity to the world revolutionary process, despite all the latter's variety, and, as Lenin put it, makes it possible to "regard the international revolutions as one process The world-wide unity of the revolutionary process is manifested primarily in the interlinks and interaction between the three fundamental revolutionary forces of our times: the peoples that are building socialism and communism; the working class in the developed capitalist countries; and the national-liberation movement of the oppressed peoples and of the peoples of the developing countries."

On pages 103 to 105 (still in chapter 2) under the heading "The Place of the National Liberation Movement in the World Revolutionary Process," we find:

Nothing is more erroneous than to assert that Marxism-Leninism underestimates the tremendous role of national-liberation revolutions. It is the Marxists-Leninists who have given the sole correct assessment of the historical place of the national-liberation movement. The disintegration of the colonial empires and the rapid growth of the national-liberation struggle have further aggravated the crisis of the imperialist system as a whole. The national-liberation movement, which is sapping imperialism and forcing it to divert considerable forces to the struggle against the colonial and dependent peoples, is an inherent part of the world revolutionary process.

At the same time, it would be wrong to believe, as the Left- and Right-wing revisionists do, that the areas of the national-liberation movement are a kind of junction of the contradictions in the present-day world. The main contradiction of world development is linked with the main content of our times—the struggle for socialism. Characterizing the historical place of the first socialist state in the destinies of the world revolutionary liberation movement, Lenin said in 1920, "In the present world situation following the imperialist war, reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet Russia. Unless we bear that in mind, we shall not be able to pose a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world. The Communist Parties, in civilized and backward countries alike, can pose and solve political problems correctly only if they make this postulate their starting-point."

World developments have repeatedly confirmed that the main contradiction of the times can be fully resolved in a struggle between the two opposing systems—socialism and capitalism, a struggle that is the highest manifestation of the contradictions between labor and capital . . .

Socialism's role in the development of the national-liberation movement was stressed by Lenin. The "revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism,"¹ he said. This behest is of even greater importance today when socialism has grown into a mighty world system. The world-wide upsurge of the national-liberation movement and its emergence as an independent and active

¹ V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, vol. 31, p. 241.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 30, p. 151.

force were a direct outcome of the radical change in the alignment of world forces brought about by the growth of world socialism. The influence of the world socialist system and the working-class struggle in the capitalist countries is also reflected in the social content of the national-liberation movement.

Since the attainment of political independence by most of the former colonies, national-liberation revolutions have entered a stage of development in which their further successes depend, to an increasing extent, on the consolidation of their alliance with the other decisive forces of the world revolution process and also on the stronger positions of the working class and all democratic elements at home.

The same line of reasoning continues on page 109:

The further consolidation of the alliance between the patriotic forces of the national-liberation movement and the socialist countries and the international working class is a major condition for the completion of national-liberation revolutions.

The prospects of development of the world revolutionary process depend on the cohesion of all revolutionary forces. "Three mighty forces of our time—the world socialist system, the international working class and the national-liberation movement—are coming together in the struggle against imperialism," says the concluding Document adopted at the International Meeting in 1969. "The present phase is characterized by growing possibilities for a further advance of the revolutionary and progressive forces. At the same time, the dangers brought about by imperialism, by its policy of aggression, are growing. Imperialism, whose general crisis is deepening, continues to oppress many peoples and remains a constant threat to peace and social progress."

The situation today calls imperatively for united action by the Communist and Workers' Parties, by all anti-imperialist forces, for an ever broader offensive against imperialism and the forces of reaction and war, by making full use of the ever new opportunities provided by the times.

The unity of these revolutionary forces has a sound basis. Each of these forces is tackling its own tasks, but they have a common enemy—imperialism. They have common aims—the struggle for the interests of the working people, for peace, democracy and freedom. All this calls for the efforts of the world socialist system, the working-class and the national-liberation movement to be united for a joint attack on imperialism. All the objective conditions exist to make that unity a reality.

The essential similarity of the "road to socialism" in different societies is postulated in chapter 3 of the same work, at page 125:

"Experience shows," Leonid Brezhnev said, "that the road of different countries to socialism is marked by such major common milestones as the socialist revolution in one form or another, including the smashing and replacement of the state machine of the exploiters; the establishment of one or another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with other strata of the working people, and the abolition of the exploiting classes; the socialization of the means of production and the consolidation of socialist relations of production and other social relations in town and countryside; the bringing of cultural values within the reach of the masses of working people, i.e. the cultural revolution in Lenin's meaning of the word."

Leonid Brezhnev went on to describe the main features of socialism as already built up, namely, rule by the working people, with the working class in the vanguard and the Marxist-Leninist party guiding the development of society; society's ownership of the means of production and the planned growth of the national economy on that basis, at a high technological level and in the interests of the people's welfare; implementation of the principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work;" education of the people in the people in the spirit of the ideology of scientific communism and of friendship with the fraternal socialist nations and the working people of the whole world; a foreign policy based on the principles of proletarian socialist internationalism.

In chapter 7, we find on page 282 a section entitled "Features of the National Liberation Movement at its Present Stage."

The struggle of the national and social liberation forces against imperialist domination and for economic independence remains the main content of the na-

¹ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, p. 11.

² L. I. Brezhnev, "Following Lenin's Course," p. 291.

tional-liberation movement in the 1970's. At the same time a number of Asian and African countries are going through a multiform process of changes in social relations, during which the national-liberation struggle is developing into a struggle against relations of both feudal and capitalist exploitation.

Two trends are emerging in the progressive advancement of the Asian and African countries. A change in favor of democracy and socialism in the world alignment of class forces has helped enrich the content of national-liberation revolutions. The national-democratic and revolutionary forces that are fighting against imperialist exploitation also come out against the capitalist relations of exploitation, which become an obstacle to social progress.

On pages 285 and 286 the theme is developed further.

Historical experience has shown that programs of socio-economic reforms can be achieved only through a consistent anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. Success along this road will be made possible by radical changes in the alignment of class forces in favor of progress and democracy and by stronger positions of the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Parties.

Representatives of revolutionary democracy have come to power in more and more countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Somalia, Tanzania, the People's Republic of Congo, Guinea and Burma.¹² These countries are carrying out profound social reforms in the interests of the people and greater national independence. Though they do not yet predominate among the newly free states, their emergence and development have been of great significance, because they have shown other countries prospects of advancement along the road of social progress. The successful development of the socialist-oriented countries provides an example and incentive for a fresh upsurge in the liberation struggle everywhere.

Thus, qualitatively new progressive changes that may become irreversible are taking place in the Asian and African national-liberation movements. In characterizing the features of the national-liberation revolution at the present stage, Leonid Brezhnev said at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties: "The socialist orientation of a number of young states of Africa and Asia is an important achievement of the revolutionary forces and a heavy defeat for imperialism. These countries have scored their first successes in carrying through deep-going social and economic reforms, thereby providing fresh practical confirmation of the Leninist conclusion that in our epoch the peoples who win liberation from colonial oppression can advance along the path of social progress by by-passing capitalism. One of the most important conditions which make such development possible is cooperation between the progressive young states and the socialist countries."¹³

The Soviet doctrine of the national-democratic revolution, which is to be followed by the socialist revolution, is well known. Each of the former SWAPO and ANC members who testified before the subcommittee had been taught it. The interim phase, known as the phase of noncapitalistic development, is cogently explained in chapter 7 at page 289:

In such a situation the question of relations between the revolutionary democrats and the Marxist-Leninist parties acquires a decisive significance. The interests of the struggle call for sincere cooperation and genuine unification of all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces.

To sum up, non-capitalist development presupposes the following:

The possibility for economically backward countries to achieve socialism by by-passing the capitalist stage;

The possibility of such countries advancing toward socialism, with reliance on the proletarian and non-proletarian masses;

The ability of the revolutionary leadership to vigorously and consistently implement both anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist measures, which will inevitably bring it closer to scientific socialism;

The elevation of the working masses, above all the working class, to leading positions in all spheres of public life;

Close and comprehensive cooperation with the socialist countries;

A consistent policy of struggle against imperialism in all spheres (economic, political, diplomatic, ideological, and so on).

¹² The book was published in 1973. The list would have omitted Egypt and Somalia had it been published now but added Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia among the African states.

¹³ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, p. 152.

Thus, the non-capitalist road is a specific and historically transitional stage in the development of the countries with a backward and multiform economy, a stage at which the tasks of the national-democratic revolution are accomplished in such a way that political, economic and cultural conditions are created for the construction of socialism to be launched.

Finally, at page 293, we are afforded an explicit account of Communist expectations of the national-liberation movements and of the governments of the newly free nations which they have helped bring to power:

Communists have a differentiated approach to socialist concepts widespread in Asia and Africa, this depending on what interests such concepts express and whose class interests they serve. They make a class assessment of any particular doctrine with due account of the practical activities of groups that are in power and of the essence and aims of the socio-economic measures such groups implement. Communists expose those who falsely asseverate that they want to build a "socialist society," while ignoring the long due need of completing the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. Communists uphold and try to develop the sound and democratic principles contained in some socialist doctrines. Marxist-Leninists realize that hundreds of millions of people have only recently entered political life and are not yet prepared to adopt the ideas of scientific socialism.

Help from socialist countries to the newly free nations of Asia and Africa has been most useful in spreading the truth about socialism. This friendly, disinterested and sincere aid and the experience of the working people are the best arguments in favor of scientific socialism.

The remainder of this instructive chapter discusses the means of creating and maintaining a united national-democratic and anti-imperialist front consisting of workers, peasants, and the national bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the Communist Party.

Not surprisingly, the South African Communist Party has consistently adopted a position with regard to the relationship of national liberation movements to the Soviet Bloc which is entirely consistent with the foregoing theory. In "African Communist," the official journal of the South African Communist Party, No. 80 October 1, 1980, the text of an important resolution, adopted by the party in November 1979, is printed under the heading, "The World Communist Movement":

We who are part of the liberation movement of South Africa must never fail to appreciate and insist that solidarity is a *two-way* process, that the aid and support which the socialist countries give so generously and at the expense of their own material gains, to freedom fighters everywhere, can only be reciprocated by *unswerving identification* with the socialist community in the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism (*italics added*).

The presidents of both SWAPO and the ANC have repeatedly acknowledged the importance of Soviet support to their organizations. High officials of SWAPO and the ANC were among the speakers at the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1981. In his address to the congress, SWAPO President Nujoma described Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev as a devoted staunch fighter for peace, détente, freedom and the peoples rights and human dignity of all the world's people. Nujoma then directly acknowledged Soviet assistance to SWAPO by saying that without the support of the Soviet Union, SWAPO would not have been able to achieve those results that they have achieved today. "We address ourselves to the Soviet Union which is giving comprehensive support to the people of Namibia."

Oliver Tambo has consistently disclosed a like appreciation of the relationship between the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the African National Congress.

In an article published in the ANC magazine "Sechaba" (January 1981), Tambo expressed full support for a conference held in East Berlin on October 1980, to consider the principles of scientific socialism. Tambo went on to emphasize the need for strengthening the unity of the three revolutionary elements of the revolutionary world process. He identified these, to no one's surprise, as the existing socialist states, the international working class movement, and the national liberation movements. Tambo continued by noting that the unity of these three revolutionary elements was a vital precondition for the final victory over all forces of imperialism, colonialism, racism, zionism, and exploitation of man by man.

A report published after a conference on "International Mobilization Against Apartheid and for the Liberation of Southern Africa", held in May 1981, contained reports from the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria on the support that these countries provide to liberation movements in southern Africa. The East Germany statement is of particular interest:

The people and the government of the German Democratic Republic stand firmly by the side of the people of South Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements, ANC and SWAPO . . . Consistent support for those peoples . . . and for the liberated countries . . . represents an inalienable principle of socialist foreign policy. That support is reflected in the German Democratic Republic's close relations with the nationally liberated states of Africa and the national liberation movements ANC and SWAPO.

During previous hearings held by the subcommittee, we have examined the relationships between the Soviet Union and terrorist organizations around the world. It is of interest in this context that Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, speaking at an International Conference on Solidarity with the struggle of the Namibian People, sponsored by the World Peace Council and held in Paris, in September 1980, made the following statement about the relationship between his movement and other terrorist movements.

Speaking as the leader of a liberation movement, I would like to assure our comrades in arms in the liberation struggles, Polisario, Fretelin, and the PLO, the fighters in the Canary Islands, that by definition their struggle is ours. Every victory they win advances our cause against the forces of imperialism and racism. We fight in our countries to advance their struggles. As far as the PLO is concerned, our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military, and economic alliance that has developed between racism and zionism.

Soviet theoretician Alexei Kozlov,¹⁴ writing in the Soviet weekly journal "New Times," No. 20 (1981), makes the same point from a different perspective:

Solidarity with the liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a permanent area of the collective actions of the Communist parties. In the late 1960's and the first half of the 1970's the fraternal parties participated in the truly worldwide campaigns of solidarity with the peoples of Indo-China, as well as Angola, Mozambique and other former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Today the fraternal parties give every support to the patriotic forces of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran, the Arab peoples fighting

¹⁴ "With Confident Stride: The International Communist Movement Today," Alexei Kozlov, "New Times," 20-61.

against Israeli aggression, the liberation movement in the south of Africa, the fighters against tyrannical regimes in Latin American countries.

Even closer ties bind the Communist movement with a new major political force of the modern world—the revolutionary-democratic parties. They function in dozens of developing countries and hold power in Angola, Mozambique, the People's Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and some others. The revolutionary democrats are guided in their activities by the doctrine of scientific socialism, by the organizational and political principles of the building of vanguard parties of the working people, and advocate a socialist road of development for their countries, and alliance with the world socialism and the international Communist movement.

A sense of pragmatic opportunism on the part of the Soviet leadership supplements the Leninist vision of an epochal, universal, social revolution combining the uprising of a revolutionary proletariat in the industrialized nations and a series of "democratic and revolutionary movements" elsewhere. Soviet historian Yakov Etinger,¹³ writing in the "New Times," No. 39 (1981), comments as follows on the advantages which accrue to the Soviet Union as a result of the acquisition of power by "national liberation movements" supported by the Soviets:

An important feature of the foreign policy of these countries is their strategic alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist states on an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist basis. In some cases their relations have been formalized in treaties of friendship and cooperation. In Africa such treaties with the Soviet Union have been concluded in Angola, Congo, Mozambique and Ethiopia. The economic, scientific, technical, political and if necessary, military aid of socialist countries strengthens the alliance between them and the socialist oriented countries and between their ruling Communist and revolutionary-democratic parties within the framework of the world revolutionary movement. "Many sided mutually advantageous cooperation with the countries of the socialist community acquires special significance for us," Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola and Chairman of the MPLA-Workers' Party, said at the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communists. "This cooperation accords with the will of our parties and our peoples and becomes even more dynamic."

Another feature of the foreign policy of the socialist-oriented countries is the growing role of internationalist principles in it as evidenced in particular by the stand taken by many of them on the "Kampuchean" and "Afghan" questions, by their solidarity with Angola which has been savagely attacked by racist South Africa, and by their support of the Namibian guerrillas.

The foreign policy of the socialist-oriented countries is characterized also by militant anti-imperialism and anti-racism in the world arena, in the United Nations in particular, and by support of the initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for peace and international security.

Dr. Etinger further elucidates the Soviet Union's interest in African nations:

The 18th summit meeting of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Nairobi in June 1981 demonstrated once again the increasing role of the newly free African countries in world affairs. "The emergence of these countries on the International scene has infused a fresh and sound spirit into world politics," Leonid Brezhnev noted. "A good exponent of their views and aspirations is the Organization of African Unity which has proclaimed unity of the African countries on an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial basis as its lofty goal. Africa today plays a considerable and indisputable part in world affairs. Its voice resounds ever more confidently in the solution of major present day problems."

The efforts of most African countries to achieve stable peace and international security and to preserve and extend detente, their anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-racist stand, and the expansion of friendly and equitable political and economic ties with socialist countries have earned them much prestige in the international community.

¹³ "Weighty Role," Yakov Etinger, "New Times", 39-81.

The progressive role of most African countries is reflected in their constructive approach to the ways and methods of solving many complicated world issues. For instance, with the active support of African countries, the 32nd UN General Assembly adopted a Soviet-sponsored declaration on the extension and strengthening of international detente.

The African countries made up almost a third of the U.N. membership. They are represented in the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and many other interstate political and economic organizations of newly-free countries.

Africa plays an especially important part in the non-aligned movement which has today 93 full-fledged members. The continent is represented in this movement by 50 countries and one national liberation movement (The South West Africa People's Organization).

Those unfamiliar with the Soviet interpretation of the concept "non-alignment" will find Dr. Etinger's discussion of that term most useful.

Since non-alignment is an expression of the independent foreign policy course favoring profound internal social and economic changes, there can evidently be no contradiction between socialist orientation and non-alignment. The government delegations of Angola and Mozambique stressed in a communique on their talks in September 1978 that the desire of their countries "to build socialist society on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism fully accords with the ideals of the non-aligned movements."

The socialist-oriented countries of Africa resolutely come out against the concept of the "equidistant" position of the newly-free states from world socialism and imperialism which is advocated by some circles in the non-aligned movement.

The need for African countries to continue their anti-imperialist policy and maintain their unity in spite of all internal differences and contradictions has become especially important now when U.S. imperialism is trying on the pretext of combatting "international terrorism" to launch an offensive against the national liberation forces in Africa and other regions of the Third World and to push the newly-free countries out of their anti-imperialist positions.

These attempts are being vigorously repelled. For instance, the anti-imperialist trend of the non-aligned movement was reaffirmed on the whole at the non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting held in Delhi in February of this year. The OAU's Nairobi summit was also marked by the growth of anti-imperialist trends in Africa and by solidarity with the national liberation movements in the struggle against the South African racists and their Western backers.

As one of the witnesses who testified before the subcommittee, Sovietologist Dr. Peter Vanneman, noted succinctly:

The USSR is striving to enhance its influence in southern Africa not merely to affect events there but to influence events throughout the continent and the world. Its purpose is not merely to dominate the southern African region, but to utilize its influence there to enhance its influence elsewhere.

In other words, Soviet activities in the southern African region reflect that regime's concern with fashioning policies for areas far from its periphery which will maximize its global influence. As a global superpower, the USSR must devise policies for farflung areas which will augment its influence in areas of its vital interests throughout the world. The problem is to exploit local conflict to expand global, continental and regional influence.

Dr. Vanneman also pointed out that:

The intensity of the continuing long range interest of the USSR in southern Africa is indicated by the creation of three relatively new governmental structures organized specifically to deal with that area of the world. There is a special section of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Science that deals with "liberation questions," and the largest section of INU, a department of the KGB (Soviet intelligence) dealing with propaganda, is the one for southern Africa. Finally, one of the three sections of the Soviet foreign ministry dealing with Africa focuses exclusively on southern Africa.

This development is entirely understandable in light of Leninist theory with respect to the role of the national liberation movements in the world revolutionary struggle and in light of geopolitical impor-

tance of southern Africa to the industrial health and security of the countries of the NATO alliance.

EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE HEARINGS

The following witnesses testified at the 5 days of hearings:

March 22: Hon. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State; Dr. Peter Vanneman, associate professor of political science, University of Arkansas.

March 24: Miss Nokonono D. Kave, former Black Consciousness Movement organizer and ANC member.

March 25: Mr. Ephraim Mfalapitsa, former ANC member; Mr. Jeffrey Bosigo, former ANC member; Mr. Bartholomew Hlapane, former member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and of the Central Committee of the S.A. Communist Party.

March 29: Mr. Dickson Namolo, former SWAPO/PLAN member; Mr. Emanuel Hashiko, former SWAPO/PLAN member.

March 31: Advocate Jariretundo Kozonguizi, official of the Council of Ministers of SWA/Namibia and founding members of SWAPO; Lt. Andriano Bomba, former fighter pilot in the Mozambique Air Force; Mr. Andreas Shipanga (president of SWAPO-Democrats and founding member of SWAPO).

The hearing elicited testimony which is at once shocking and familiar. It is familiar to those who have experience of the attempts, all too often successful, of Moscow and its agents to infiltrate and manipulate the so-called national liberation movements in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It is shocking to all who prize liberty, democratic values, and human rights.

As Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York has remarked, the Communists have succeeded in appropriating the language of liberty. They cloak totalitarianism in the rhetoric of democracy. They conceal their expansionist goals with praiseworthy labels like "liberation" and "freedom." Who in U.S. society, unfamiliar with the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism, would not identify with a "struggle to liberate oppressed peoples from imperialist domination . . . a struggle for freedom?" The true irony is that the Soviets, whose tyranny over their own citizens has been so graphically documented by writers like Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, and whose brutality toward those in other societies who seek freedom was demonstrated in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Afghanistan in 1979, and in Poland in 1981, nonetheless are allowed to represent themselves as the bearers of the flag of freedom in the developing world.

Some well-intentioned persons argue that the failure of Western governments to support reformist or radical elements in developing societies that, confronted with social, political, or economic inequity, attempt to achieve their goals by force, drives them into the arms of the Soviets. According to this school of thought, the proper course for the United States is to be supportive of these radical elements and their general goals in order to preempt Soviet support.

In reality, of course, right and wrong are rarely so clearly differentiated in human society that the choices are obvious or easy.

With admirable clarity, Dr. Henry Kissinger has characterized the

policy dilemma which our policymakers confront, in the second volume of his memoirs, "Years of Upheaval." He writes:

One of the premises of the democratic process is that the loser accepts his defeat and in return is given an opportunity to win on another occasion. It depends on a moderate center whose evolution is almost inevitably thwarted in a developing country when a totalitarian element succeeds in organizing a guerrilla war. This impels the government into acts of repression, starting a vicious circle that traps both government and opponents and destroys whatever moderate center exists—fulfilling the central purpose of the insurgency. Moreover, the victims of terrorist attacks are almost invariably the ablest and most dedicated officials, leaving in place the corrupt.

The American response to this historical phenomenon is usually expressed in the conviction that a government under siege can best maintain itself by accelerating democratic reforms and by expanding its base of support by sharing power. But the fundamental cause of civil war (of which guerrilla war is a special category) is the breakdown of domestic consensus. Compromise, the essence of democratic politics, is its first victim. Civil wars almost without exception end in victory or defeat, never in coalition governments—the favorite American recipe. Concessions are ascribed to the weakness of those holding power, not to their magnanimity and hence, perversely, may accelerate rather than arrest the disintegration of authority. The proper time for reform is before civil wars break out, in order to pre-empt their causes—though this does not always work when the insurrection is inspired, financed, trained and equipped from outside the country.

The dilemma that our policymakers confront is all the more difficult when the Soviet Union, within the strategic framework so clearly described by Soviet theoreticians, and ever on the lookout for what Assistant Secretary Crocker has described as " * * * targets of opportunity * * * to act counter to Western interests * * *" succeeds in securing influence with, or control over, the leadership of radical groups. For example, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick¹⁴ describes SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organization, as:

... one of those coalitions, of which we have seen a good many in our times, which includes some rather heterogeneous elements: some purely nationalist elements and some not very well-defined elements and some Communist elements and some Marxist-Leninist elements that are explicitly oriented toward the Soviet Union and were trained there.

She has also noted:

... (SWAPO) ... does include in its leadership some significant portion of persons tied to the Soviets by training and by predilection. And its principal source of arms is of course the Soviet Union or surrogates thereof and we have seen in our times a good many such coalitions come to power only to have the most well-organized unit, which usually turns out to be the Soviet-oriented, Marxist-Leninist, seize control of the coalition.

The testimony presented by the witnesses during these hearings certainly supports this description. Dr. Crocker indicated in his testimony that the administration estimates SWAPO receives about 90 percent of its military support and 60 percent of its overall support from Communist sources. Advocate Kozonguizi also drew the subcommittee's attention to the scale of the Soviet bloc's commitment to SWAPO, pointing to the large quantities of weapons and military equipment made available in Angola. The younger witnesses, Mr. Namolo and Mr. Hashiko, testified about their training in Angola by Soviet instructors. They also described their indoctrination in the Soviet Union in "socialism and communism," "Leninist teachings" and "political economy."

¹⁴ Ambassador. Jeane Kirkpatrick: Interview—The MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Tuesday, Apr. 21, 1981. (Transcript, p. 8.)

Documents submitted for the record contain evidence of the training of large numbers of SWAPO "cadres" in the Soviet Union, both in military disciplines and, without exception, in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The position of "political commissar" is entrenched at all organizational levels of SWAPO. These men, selected on the basis of their educational attainments and understanding of ideology, are trained at the KOMSOL Party School in the Soviet Union, in the German Democratic Republic and in Cuba. Documents confirming this have been included in the record.

On the basis both of the testimony presented and the documents made available to the subcommittee, the conclusion is inescapable that the Soviets and their Communist allies within SWAPO insure that Marxist-Leninist doctrine is systematically taught to all who are recruited for, or pressed into service in, SWAPO and PLAN (the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, SWAPO's military wing).

As Advocate Kozonguizi pointed out in his testimony, SWAPO has adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. The quotation from the Political Manual ("Namibia: The Struggle for Final Liberation") and from SWAPO's political program show this beyond doubt. Those familiar with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric will easily understand the clear statement of objectives in this passage:

The ideas of socialist orientation, as stated in the revised Political Program of SWAPO, have become our way of life, and we have now to grasp this great truth, that the first step in the revolution currently waged by the Namibian proletariat and the working peasants is to raise the two friendly classes in our society to the position of the ruling class which, at the time, is the first step to winning the battle of a peoples democracy.

Only in this way, shall we Namibian participants in the current liberation struggle (which we are waging on behalf of the general masses of all our people) be able to use the political supremacy of people's power to wrest state power from the colonial bourgeoisie, for the purpose of centralizing all the means of production and distribution in the hands of the worker and peasant masses."

The political manual states on page 50:

Now this proves the truth of what Marx, Engels and Lenin discovered and predicted. Their discoveries are being confirmed by historical development, by the triumphs and advance of socialism and by the rapid decline of capitalism. Marxism-Leninism is therefore proving to be the only theory enabling the oppressed and exploited classes (the proletariat and the peasantry) to carry out their historical mission (i.e., the destruction of the rule of capital and of the system of exploitation of man by man).

Similarly, the relationship between SWAPO's efforts in Namibia and the Soviet Union's international war against "imperialism" is clearly spelled out by SWAPO in a document called, "The True Nature of Imperialism":

We cannot escape the fact that as long as South Africa remains a bulwark of capitalism, the independence of the rest of the subcontinent is going to be continually threatened.

Nor can we escape the fact that, given our understanding of imperialism as a world system, it is not sufficient to break the hold of South Africa over the subcontinent. To open the path to true liberation, we must break imperialism as a world economic system.

The tragedy of this is illuminated by the testimony of Mr. Andreas Shipanga. He was a founder of SWAPO in 1960 and, in 1958, of its

¹¹ Namibia: "The Struggle for Final Liberation." Political Manual of the Namibian Institute of Revolutionary Studies, Office of the SWAPO Organizing Secretary, 1977.

predecessor, the Ovambo People's Organization (OPO). He testified that the movement was not created as a Communist party or as a front for the Communists and that the chief ally of the OPO in its struggle for the rights of the people of Namibia was the Liberal Party of South Africa. He testified that the South African Communist Party was originally hostile to the OPO and to SWAPO. Mr. Shipanga stated that it was only after his arrest and that of his followers in April 1976 that the Political Program was altered to provide for the reconstitution of SWAPO as an organization espousing Marxist-Leninist principles.

There are clear parallels with the history of Communist infiltration of the African National Congress.

The African National Congress was founded in 1912 and, as Mr. Bartholomew Hlapane has made clear to the subcommittee, its aims were:

• • • To achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means.

Mr. Hlapane, who, as a former member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party and of the National Executive of the African National Congress, is singularly well qualified to comment on the relationship between these organizations, in which he served during the years 1955 to 1964, testified that:

• • • No major decision could be taken by the ANC without the concurrence and approval of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party. Most major developments were in fact initiated by the Central Committee.

Mr. Hlapane further testified that:

The Military Wing of the ANC, also known as Umkhonto We Sizwe, was the brainchild of the SACP, and, after the decision to create it had been taken, Joe Slovo and J. B. Marks were sent by the Central Committee of the SACP to Moscow to organize arms and ammunition and to raise funds for Umkhonto We Sizwe.

Joe Slovo is now officially designated as "Deputy Chief" of Umkhonto We Sizwe and is still a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party. After years of residence in London after his departure from South Africa in 1963, he returned to South Africa in 1975 after FRELIMO's accession to power in Mozambique.

Mr. Hlapane also testified that the sole source of funds for Umkhonto We Sizwe during the period that he acted as Treasurer of the SACP was the Communist Party itself.

Mr. Hlapane's personal account of the situation during this period of ANC history is independently confirmed by Mr. Jordan K. Ngubane in "An African Explains Apartheid," chapter 15, which has been included in the record of the hearings and quoted at some length earlier in this report.

To judge from the testimony of the younger ANC witnesses, little has changed. Mr. Mfalapitsa received military and political training in Angola and the German Democratic Republic, and Mr. Bosigo in Angola and the Soviet Union. Miss Kave recounted a horrifying tale of indoctrination and abuse in Zambia, Botswana and the U.S.S.R. Describing lectures in politics he received in Angola (at the Nova Catengue base where Cuban instructors, lecturers and commanders supplemented those of Umkhonto We Sizwe), Mr. Bosigo has said:

Every recruit was required to know the "Freedom Charter" which was adopted by the African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the South African Communist Party in 1955. We received lectures on Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Communist ideology. During all lectures the oppression of the black man in South Africa by the whites was emphasized, and we were told that we must fight for our freedom from the South African government.

Certainly the South African Communist Party, whose Chairman Dr. Yusuf Dadoo is vice president of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, has not changed its position toward the ANC since Mr. Hlapane served on the Central Committee.

In a "Statement by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party on its 60th Anniversary" printed in African Communist No. 86, Third Quarter 1981, the committee declared:

From the days of the ICU to the Council of Non-European Trade Unions to SACTU, our Party has always been amongst those in the forefront. * * * in their battles against the capitalist class and its racist state. When the situation demanded a turn to organized revolutionary violence in the early 60's, our Party together with the ANC helped bring into existence the fighting arm of the Liberation movement—Umkhonto We Sizwe.

Today the SACP is a vital part of the liberation forces headed by the African National Congress. This alliance aims to unite all sections and classes amongst the oppressed and other truly democratic forces for a revolution to destroy white domination. This revolution, whose main content is the national liberation of the African and other black oppressed groups, must put an end to race discrimination in all its forms, restore the land and wealth of our country to the people and guarantee democracy, freedom and equality of rights and opportunities to all.

We believe that the immediate struggle to destroy racist colonialism and to win national freedom is an essential part of the struggle for a future socialist South Africa.

In this struggle the key force has always been, and will continue to be, the black working class in alliance with the masses of the landless rural people. It is this class which finds its most staunch champions in our South African Communist Party.

Further on in the same statement, the committee noted:

South African Communists, whose party 60 years ago was the first to raise the red flag of Marxism-Leninism on our continent, are especially inspired by the newly born states of Mozambique and Angola led by liberation movements which have transformed themselves into Marxist-Leninist vanguards of their working people and are engaged in the continuing revolution to create conditions for the building of socialism in their countries. The specter of socialism and communism, born of people's liberation struggles, now stares at our common enemy right in the face from the borders of Mozambique and Angola. And the enemy trembles at the knees.

... The revolutionary advances in Southern Africa have been won through sacrifice and struggle and with the internationalist support of the socialist world and, more especially, the Soviet Union, the first society ruled by and for workers who captured power in the great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. We are proud that for 60 years our party has been part of the great international brotherhood of workers and Communist Parties which have always stood four-square behind our struggle against racist and capitalist tyranny. The enemy's intensified anti-Communist and anti-Soviet campaign is itself a tribute to the consistent support which our struggle has received, and continues to receive, from the world socialist forces.

Our people will not be taken in by the slander of the racists. They know that wherever oppressed people have been forced to confront the enemy, the A.K. produced by Soviet workers, has become the feared symbol of the fight for freedom. They know too that it is the socialist world which is the biggest obstacle to the maneuvers of the racists and their imperialist allies in their attempts to turn back the clock of history and to destroy the gains of the African revolution.

When Mr. Hlapane was shown a list of the current members of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, he named seven of them whom he knew to be members of the SACP during the time he was a member of the Communist Party.

South African intelligence sources had previously identified 11 persons (including 6 of 7 identified by Mr. Hlapane), out of 22 currently serving on the National Executive Committee of the ANC, as members of the SACP. The seventh person identified as a Communist Party member by Mr. Hlapane, Thabo Mbeki, now chief of the political department of the ANC, had not previously been identified as a Communist by the South Africans. Miss Kave, however, independently confirmed to the subcommittee staff that she too knew Thabo Mbeki to be a member of the SACP. The following list of the members of the ANC National Executive Committee indicating membership of the SACP, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, Umkhonto We Sizwe, and the (Communist fronts) World Peace Council and Afro-African Peoples Solidarity Organization, was provided to the subcommittee staff by South African intelligence sources.

ANC / NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (NEC)

	POSITION IN NEC	SACP	SACTU	UMKHONTO WE SIZWE	WPC	AFPSO
1.	Oliver TAMBO	○		●	●	
2.	Yusuf Dadoo	●		●	●	●
3.	Alfred NZO	●		●	●	●
4.	Gus TLOME	●				
5.	Thomas MBEKI					
6.	Joe KOSTER	○		●		
7.	Joe SLOVO	●		●		
8.	David JOLI	●			●	
9.	Siemac SIKHACHE	○		●		
10.	Roginald SEPTEMBER	●		●		
11.	Thabo MBEKI			●		
12.	James MAMETJA	●	●	●		
13.	Stephen BLANCHI	●	●			
14.	Harold MALLA	●	●			
15.	John KRAMPHUIS	●	●			
16.	Henry MAMOTYI	○		●		
17.	Samuel DIPA	○		●		
18.	Robert MANCE			●		
19.	Andrew MASCHOD	○		●		
20.	Reinhold PELTIG	●			●	●
21.	Leonard DOLINGA	○		●		
22.	Vicor Sijpe MALAN					

Neither Mr. Hlapane nor South African intelligence have named Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC, as a member of the South African Communist Party and Mr. Hlapane has, in fact, said that as far as he knew, Mr. Tambo was not a Communist. The subcommittee has acquired no firm information that shows Mr. Tambo to be a Communist, although he serves, with Alfred NZO and Yusuf Dadoo, on

the presidential committee of the World Peace Council. The speech which he gave on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the SACP illustrates, however, as do his remarks on many other occasions,¹⁸ that even those in the ANC who are not members of the Communist Party believe it necessary and appropriate to advance Moscow's line.

Comrade Chairman, Your Excellencies and Comrades, let me commence by thanking you, Comrade Chairman, and the SACP for inviting the African National Congress to be a party to this occasion and in particular for the opportunity of sharing a platform with the Communist Party of Great Britain, represented here by the General Secretary Gordon McLennan and with the Communist Party of Ireland, represented by Comrade Michael O'Riordan.

These are our allies; they are part of the international movement of solidarity which gives us strength and confidence in the certainty of our victory. These parties, together with other communist and workers parties around the world, are parties which we can always appeal to for solidarity in the conviction that they will respond.

It is a great pleasure for us, a great honor to participate with them on an occasion of great significance in our struggle in South Africa.

This speech was published in "African Communist," No. 87, fourth quarter 1981, and in "Sechaba," the official organ of the ANC, September 1981.

In his speech to the International Preparatory Committee of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on September 23 through 27, 1980, Mr. Tambo said:

Vietnam confirmed that the international balance of power had shifted irrevocably in favor of the forces of national independence and social progress, whatever reverses these forces might suffer here and there. Vietnam proved to the forces of reaction that the socialist community of nations, the rest of progressive mankind, and the world anti-imperialist movement, had sufficient political will and strength to resist and defeat the most desperate machinations of these forces of reaction. The rout of the U.S. forces in Vietnam represented also the collapse of the policy of nuclear blackmail followed by the United States since Hiroshima.

This speech, printed in "Sechaba," January 1981, has also been included in the record.

We may well sympathize with the original goal of these two movements, SWAPO and the ANC, to achieve democratic political rights and expanded freedoms for the black peoples of Namibia and South Africa. We cannot, however, delude ourselves that their purpose now is the achievement of those praiseworthy objectives. They have, to judge from the testimony the subcommittee has received and from the statements and actions of their leaders, been deeply infiltrated by those who seek to advance the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union. They thus work to the obvious detriment of the peoples of the southern African region, not to their advantage. Mr. Bomba has testified eloquently about the collapse of Mozambique and the regimentation of its society since FRELIMO's accession to power. The State Department has presented the same judgment to Congress in several hearings.

V. Naumov,¹⁹ writing in "New Times," No. 26 (1980), perhaps inadvertently, provides some insight into the reasons for this decline.

The Third FRELIMO Congress held in February 1977 decided to turn FRELIMO into a vanguard party uniting the most class-conscious and active workers, peasants and intellectuals.

¹⁸ Cf. Tambo's remarks in the article in Sechaba (January 1981), cited on p. 15 of this chairman's report and the text of the "Concluding Document," adopted at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1986 (p. 11), cited on p. 12 of the chairman's report.

¹⁹ "Looking Confidently Ahead," V. Naumov, New Times, 26-80.

The FRELIMO programme (of the Revolution), a copy of which was presented to me in the museum, states: "The party will lead the Mozambican people along the road to further revolutionary-democratic transformations, total elimination of the exploitation of man by man and creation of conditions for laying the political, material and ideological foundations of socialism in the People's Republic of Mozambique." It went on to say that the party would be guided on this road by scientific socialism and would "promote ties with the world revolutionary movement, particularly with the Marxist-Leninist parties of socialist countries, which are the closest allies of FRELIMO...."

Implementation of the young republic's economic plans is hampered by the counter-revolutionary forces which have not laid down their arms. They resort to sabotage, putting economically important enterprises and communication facilities out of commission. If only temporarily, assault FRELIMO activists, and sow panic and doubt among the population.

The republican armed forces are waging successful operations against bandit gangs in Sofala, Manica, and Tete provinces. They are assisted by people's militia units and vigilance groups made up of volunteers. The total number of these active defenders of the revolution now exceeds 150,000.

The year 1979 was proclaimed a "year of consolidation of revolutionary gains." Steps were taken to enhance the role played by FRELIMO in the country's social and political affairs, and a number of organizational measures were carried out in the economic field. The Fifth Plenary Meeting of the FRELIMO Central Committee and the Fourth Session of the People's Assembly, both held in June last year, adopted a two-year economic development plan providing, among other things, for the introduction of the principles of scientific socialist planning, and for measures to strengthen the public sector and make it more effective * * *.

Addressing a mass meeting in Maputo on March 19 this year, President Samora Machel, FRELIMO Chairman, summed up the results of the first stage of the "political and organizational offensive" and outlined a programme of action for the near future. He admitted that there had been leftist excesses in economic management, which found expression in premature nationalization of small private enterprises, and urged re-examination of the attitude towards private capital and rectification of mistakes. A ration card system will be introduced to ensure uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs and other necessities. The so-called people's shops, which failed to justify the hopes placed in them, are being turned over to co-operative societies and private businessmen. All these measures may be regarded as the introduction of a new economy policy.

Western propaganda and the South African press interpreted this as a departure from the revolutionary line and socialist orientation. But President Machel declared at a press conference that it was not a question of switching to another path of development, but of speeding up the demolition of the system inherited from colonialism, launching an offensive against bureaucratism, mismanagement and incompetence, and ousting reactionary elements from the state machinery. Refuting claims that there existed African, Asian and Latin American brands of socialism, the President stressed that there was but one Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory by whose basic principles Frelimo would continue to be guided * * *.

Strengthening its ties of friendship and co-operation with the socialist community, Mozambique has concluded a series of agreements with the German Democratic Republic, Cuba and other socialist countries. Soviet-Mozambican relations are developing successfully under the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, signed in March 1977. The Soviet Union is helping Mozambique to train specialists and solve its public health and education problems. An agreement has been concluded on delivery to Mozambique of lorries, cars, tractors and farm machines.

Ties between the CPSU and Frelimo are expanding. The CPSU Central Committee has presented FRELIMO with ten vans equipped to serve as mobile community centers which are of much help in propaganda work among the masses. Most of the books in the National Party School on problems of scientific socialism, political economy, international revolutionary movement and other subjects are Portuguese-language works published in the Soviet Union.

The five years of Mozambique's independent development have been years of important progressive transformations laying the foundation for a society of social justice. Overcoming the difficulties on its way, this African country is building a new life and looks confidently ahead.

In Angola, which borders on Namibia, between 15,000 and 20,000 Cuban combat troops keep the MPLA government in power despite a continuing civil war waged by the UNITA movement led by Jonas Savimbi. L. Skuratov,²⁰ writing in the Soviet weekly journal "New Times," reported as follows on the Congress of the MPLA workers Party in 1980:

The first (special) congress of the MPLA Workers Party ended in Luanda on December 23. It took place three years after the first congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The period between the two forums has seen signal changes in the political, social and economic life of the country.

The main change in the political field has been the democratization of government. The building of genuinely democratic bodies of government was proclaimed one of the goals of the liberation struggle. Elections to the people's assemblies in the provinces and then to the People's Assembly (Parliament) of Angola were held this year.

In the social and economic fields mention should be made primarily of the establishment of state control over the key branches of the economy. This led to the creation of the public sector, now predominant in industry.

All these changes have been effected under the leadership of the MPLA Workers Party, the revolutionary vanguard of the Angolan people. Founded in 1977 on the basis of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which had led the people's armed struggle against colonial rule, this Party ensures sound guidance of the revolutionary process. The continuity of the revolutionary traditions is confirmed by the fact that 48 percent of the congress delegates were veterans of the armed and underground struggle against the Portuguese colonialists * * *.

Drawing on the experience of the past three years, the congress adopted a realistic five-year plan of economic and social development aimed at raising living standards and achieving two important political tasks: to consolidate the economic independence of Angola and to make its advance towards socialism irreversible.

The foreign policy of Angola, which actively works for peace and detente, against imperialism and racism, and for the complete liberation of Africa from foreign domination, has won worldwide recognition. Eduardo dos Santos pointed out in his report that Angola would continue to fight jointly with the socialist community for peace, independence, justice and social progress.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the MPLA Workers Party, the peoples of the two countries, have long been bound by ties of fraternal solidarity and friendship. In its message to the first (special) congress, the CPSU Central Committee noted the extensive and constructive work being done by the MPLA Workers Party and its Central Committee to consolidate the revolutionary gains and fulfill the program for laying the foundations of socialism in Angola.

It is, of course, in Angola that SWAPO's military wing, PLAN [Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia] is concentrated in greatest force. Mr. Hashiko has testified to the fact that PLAN cadres are integrated into FAPLA [MPLA military] units in the struggles against UNITA. PLAN's terrorist operations in Namibia are also launched from bases inside Angola.

Mr. Kozonguizi has testified about the gruesome effect of SWAPO terrorism on the civilian population in northern Namibia. On the basis of their own experiences, both Mr. Namolo and Mr. Hashiko have testified about incidents such as the execution of a headman and the abduction by force of high school students by SWAPO cadres. Documents made available to the subcommittee confirm that such incidents are routine.

In 1981, for example, 64 Namibian civilians were killed and 150 more were injured in explosions following on the detonation of land-mines laid by SWAPO forces. PLAN cadres killed 94 civilians, includ-

²⁰ "Orientation on Socialism," L. Skuratov, "New Times," 52-80.

ing 11 local chiefs, a member of the Ovambo legislative assembly and 4 deputy chiefs. Four chiefs, their wives and a school principal, were abducted and 58 incidents of sabotage involving damage to telephone lines, pipelines, bridges and water ditches, were reported. One set of documents submitted to the subcommittee by Mr. Kozonguizi suggests strongly that the president of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma, telephoned from New York on August 8, 1977, to the SWAPO office in Luanda, Angola, and gave instructions that a group of Namibian politicians visiting northern Namibia should be murdered by SWAPO terrorists. Two of this group were in fact murdered shortly thereafter and the subcommittee is in possession of documents drawn up by PLAN commanders reporting on the successful execution of their missions and a message of congratulations to PLAN cadres from Dimo Hamaambo, the Commander of PLAN. As these documents suggest a conspiracy to murder initiated in New York, they have been handed over to the Attorney General of the United States.

The ANC has not yet undertaken terrorist activity on this scale, and most incidents of sabotage have been directed at installations rather than at persons. Mr. Mfalapitsa has testified, however, about plans to assassinate President Mangope of Bophuthatswana, the Tswana homeland in southern Africa. He also testified that Joe Modise, the chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe, proposed a second phase of sabotage in which mines would be laid on farm roads near the Botswana border, presumably with the same horrifying consequences we have seen in Namibia. Farmhouses, single vehicles, and small police stations would be also attacked. Umkhonto We Sizwe has already claimed credit for bombing an urban shopping center and automobile showrooms, and for attacks on small police stations manned by South African blacks.

Many of the witnesses who testified before the subcommittee fear for their lives because of their "defection" from the ANC or SWAPO, and because of their testimony before the subcommittee. On the basis of the evidence presented, those fears seem justified: His former colleagues attempted to kill Mr. Bosigo when he left ANC; a death notice bearing Mr. Mfalapitsa's name and photograph has been circulated by the ANC; Miss Kave has testified to witnessing brutal murders of dissidents; Mr. Mfalapitsa participated in one disciplinary killing and was present at a meeting where another was planned; Mr. Hashiko was told that one could only resign from SWAPO "*** in a military way," that is, by being killed. As those who have knowledge and experience of other, similar movements know, the justice meted out is often summary and violent.

The witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee were protected while in Washington by the dedicated personnel of the U.S. Marshal Service. The subcommittee wishes to record its appreciation of the outstanding services of the U.S. Marshal Service and of the U.S. Capitol Police during this series of hearings.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of these hearings was not to debate U.S. policy toward southern Africa. This subcommittee is not a part of the Committee on Foreign Relations and has no mandate in that regard. Our purpose has been to determine, through the testimony of witnesses and the

evaluation of documents, the extent to which the Soviet Union has successfully influenced, penetrated, or come to control the African National Congress, the South West African Peoples Organization, and other national liberation movements in southern Africa, such as FRELIMO. Our purpose has been to examine more closely the Soviet ties with terrorism in southern Africa.

The evidence received by the subcommittee is deeply disturbing. It suggests strongly that the original purposes of the ANC and SWAPO have been subverted, and that the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them. The demonstrated activities of these organizations, moreover, cannot easily be reconciled with the goal of liberation or the promotion of freedom. The evidence has thus served to illustrate once again the Soviet Union's support for terrorism under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation. It is past time to bring these facts to the attention of our policymakers, the American people, and the world at large.

In his testimony, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker said that the Department of State would pay close attention to the information which the subcommittee developed during these hearings. We appreciate that commitment and recommend that the other executive departments and congressional committees responsible for the formulation and oversight of our foreign policy both in this important region and elsewhere should join the State Department to study carefully the record of these hearings (two volumes) and this report.

During 1980, after the fall of the Shah of Iran, Dr. Henry Kissinger made the following remarks in a speech delivered in Washington:

It is true that American foreign policy must be grounded in the humane values of our people and of our democratic traditions. We would neither be effective nor faithful to ourselves if we sought to defend every *status quo* in an age of upheavals . . . (but) . . . Iran should teach us that humane values are not necessarily served by the overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy conducted in the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by making the world safe for anti-American radicalism.

Those in our society who, blinded by the success of the Soviet Union and its Communist allies in appropriating and distorting the language of liberty, have misguidedly embraced these Soviet-sponsored terrorist organizations, SWAPO and the ANC, have a particular need to study this report and to reflect on Dr. Kissinger's advice. The findings of the subcommittee appear particularly relevant at a time when SWAPO and the ANC are being touted as the sole legitimate political forces and representatives of the people in Namibia and South Africa, respectively. Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Iran are glaring and tragic reminders of our failure to fully comprehend and appreciate the motives, ideologies and interrelationships of those who sought political power under the guise of national liberation. These situations also serve as graphic examples of the terrible price which others have paid for our previous mistakes.

The subcommittee, mindful of its own responsibilities in this regard, intends to conduct an investigation of the support apparatus established in the United States to provide assistance to these, and other, terrorist organizations which act internationally in opposition to U.S. national security interests, and to explore means of curtailing such support.

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ADL BULLETIN

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The African National Congress A Closer Look

by Nathan Perlmutter
and David Evanier

Discussion of the political scene in South Africa properly begins with the self-evident stipulation that apartheid is racist and dehumanizing.

If you are a black citizen of South Africa, you cannot vote in national elections; you must generally use separate public facilities; you are not allowed to own real estate in 87 percent of your own country; you are told with whom you may socialize, and where you can look for a job. If the government wants to resettle you, it can do so at any time for any reason.

The "homelands" resettlement drive has forced half of South Africa's blacks into overcrowded, unproductive segregated *Bantustans*, areas with no industrial base that are so overpopulated hardly any viable agricultural land remains. Drinking water is unsafe and sanitation deplorable. Since the *Bantustans*

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Oliver Tambo, African National Congress president

are little more than detention camps, many Africans migrate to urban centers as "illegals" subject to arrest. Forty percent of black children are estimated to be malnourished and ten percent suffer from *kwashiorkor* (extreme protein deficiency).

In 1984, Pretoria's Constitution granted Parliament chambers to Asian and "colored" communities but not to blacks.

On the positive side, black, colored and Asian trade union membership has grown from 150,000 after legalization in 1979 to 750,000 today and blacks' real income has risen substantially in the last 25 years, higher than in any other African country. The U.S. State Department says that more positive changes have taken place in South Africa in the last five years than in the previous 300.

Hotels, parks and theaters are being integrated, and the pass laws controlling where blacks can live and work were recently revoked. Other reform commitments that are going to be translated into legislation include guaranteeing blacks freehold property rights.

Paul Johnson, British historian and former editor of the *New Statesman*, recently wrote

Continued on page 12

A Closer Look *continued from page 1*

in *Commentary*: "There is... overwhelming evidence that South Africa has been moving away from apartheid... It is quite clear that P. W. Botha... is convinced that apartheid has to go and has been dismantling it almost by stealth to avoid panicking the regime's followers."

Nevertheless, apartheid remains in force today. We, as Jews, with a collective memory of centuries in European ghettos and who have experienced the singular evil of racism, feel a special personal responsibility to insist on its dismantling.

But this is not to suggest closing our eyes to what may emerge once apartheid is gone. Political morality demands that the values that see us abhor apartheid also measure the society that will follow. We must distinguish between those who will work for a humane, democratic, pro-Western South Africa and those who are totalitarian, anti-humane, anti-democratic, anti-Israeli and anti-American.

It is in this context that the African National Congress (ANC), so frequently discussed as an alternative to the Botha Government, merits a close, unsentimental look.

The question can be fairly asked, what has all this to do with Jews?

As a revolutionary national liberation movement oriented toward Moscow, the ANC has long echoed Soviet attempts to undermine the legitimacy of Israel. Moreover, the ANC is a strident supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

—In 1970, the ANC denounced "Israel's aggressive expansionism" as "supported to the hilt by the ruling circles of the U.S. and their allies" and urged "all peace-loving non-aligned states... (to) immediately sever state relations with Israel..."

—An article in the September, 1971, issue of *Sechaba*, the monthly ANC magazine headlined, "Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid—a Paradoxical Triangle," was adapted from a pamphlet with the same title published by the Palestine Research Center, an affiliate of the P.L.O.

—In September, 1980, ANC president Oliver Tambo spoke in Paris at an International Conference on Solidarity with the Struggle of the Namibian People, spon-

sored by the World Peace Council, a Soviet front. He said:

"... I would like to assure our comrades in the liberation struggles... and the P.L.O... that their struggle is ours... our fight is carried on in the knowledge of the degree of intimacy and political, military and economic alliance that has been developed between racism and Zionism."

—At the 60th anniversary meeting of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1981, Tambo stated: "Today, in the anti-imperialist struggle, we have won new allies like the struggling people of Palestine. We have thrown up new enemies of peoples, like those who murder civilians in Beirut."

—In July, 1982, during the Israeli military action against Lebanon-based P.L.O. terrorism, ANC chief United Nations observer Johnstone M. Makatini denounced Israel for its "flagrant and unprovoked aggression against Lebanon" and its "attempted extermination" of the Palestinian people. He referred to Prime Minister Begin's policies as "Zionist Nazism."

—Witnesses who had been associated with the ANC testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in March, 1982, that the ANC cooperated with the P.L.O. and that some members trained in the U.S.S.R. with P.L.O. cadres.

—In 1983, a controversy erupted at the State University of New York at Stony Brook involving Professor Ernest (Fred) Dube, who taught a course on "The Politics of Race." Dube, an ANC representative at the United Nations serving on the ANC's National Educational Council, taught that Zionism is a form of racism and suggested as a term paper theme "Zionism is as much racism as Nazism is racism." Dube spoke at

Johnstone A. Makatini Yasir Arafat



a "Teach in on Palestine" in New York in December, 1983, sponsored by the November 29 Coalition, a pro-P.L.O. organization of radical leftist and Arab-American groups. In an interview published in the July-August 1985 issue of *Palestine Focus*, a publication of the now renamed November 29 Committee for Palestine, Dube said that "what the Zionists did to the Arabs in Palestine was exactly the same that the whites did to us" in South Africa.

—At the ANC National Consultative Conference in June, 1985, Oliver Tambo stated: "In 1973, the Arab armies succeeded to inflict a major defeat on Zionist Israel for the first time in a quarter of a century, forcing U.S. imperialism to seek new measures to protect its client state in the Middle East."

—The ANC, the P.L.O. and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were observers at the second annual United Nations North American Regional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Symposium on the Question of Palestine, in July, 1985, under U.N. auspices in New York. The symposium, held to plan an anti-Israel propaganda campaign in the U.S. and Canada, was replete with anti-Israel and pro-P.L.O. declarations that often straddled the fine line between criticism of Israel and its supporters and outright anti-Semitism.

—The ANC and the November 29 Committee for Palestine cosponsored a meeting in New York in April, 1986, on the subject, "Israel-South Africa: The Apartheid Connection?" Similar meetings have since been held in many other American cities.

The ANC, which seeks to overthrow the South African government, is a "national liberation movement" that, plainly said, is under heavy Communist influence.

—The ANC has been allied with the South

African Communist Party (SACP) for 30 years.

—The ANC is oriented toward the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, who have furnished it with arms, funding, military training and other logistic support.

—Oliver Tambo, who has headed the ANC since 1964 when former president Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment for acts of sabotage, is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC), a leading Soviet-controlled front organization based in Helsinki. Tambo has been a speaker or guest at various forums sponsored by the U.S. Communist Party.

—The ANC is a member of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), described in 1983 by the U.S. State Department as a Soviet-controlled front.

—*Sechaba*, the ANC magazine, is printed in Communist East Germany.

—Moses Mabhida, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, speaking at the SACP 60th anniversary meeting in 1981, said: "Our Party... fully supports the same program of liberation as the African National Congress for the seizure of power and black majority rule."

—In 1982, seven members of the ANC national executive committee were identified in sworn testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism as SACP members. The 30-member national executive committee now has 12 to 15 members said to be affiliated with SACP.

—The ANC supports the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues. Tambo told the June, 1985, ANC National Consultative Conference: "... the democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan had been saved, with the support of the Soviet Union."

—In a message to the same conference, the SACP Central Committee stated:

"... The SACP... pledges to do its utmost to ensure that your decisions are carried into the field of struggle and implemented."

—ANC spokesmen were featured speakers at banquets sponsored by the Communist Party newspaper, *People's World*, held this spring in California.

The fall of South Africa to such a Soviet-oriented and Communist-influenced force

Fidel Castro

Daniel Ortega



would be a severe setback to the United States, whose defense industry relies heavily on South Africa's wealth of strategic minerals. If America's defense industry were handicapped, our allies' security would also be at peril. A recent Commerce Department report noted that South Africa possesses 83.6 percent of the world's chromium; 80.8 percent, platinum; 70.8 percent, manganese; and 47.7 percent, vanadium.

In the event of a Communist-influenced or controlled revolution, South Africa's dependence on income from the export of strategic metals would perhaps result in continued sales to the West. However, if South Africa's strategic metals were controlled by a regime favoring the Soviet Union, American vulnerability to making political concessions to Moscow would increase substantially.

Moreover, should South Africa be controlled by a regime supportive of the Soviet Union, sea lanes and "choke points" around the Cape of Good Hope through the Red Sea, trade routes to the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and from the Persian Gulf would be at risk.

During the last three decades, it has been made painfully clear to the American Jewish community and to all supporters of human rights, that while tyrannies can be overthrown, at times the regimes replacing them may be even worse.

Some examples: In Cuba, the authoritarian Batista was replaced by Castro's Communism; in Iran, the undemocratic Shah's fall brought to power the tyrannical Ayatollah Khomeini; in Nicaragua, the corrupt Somoza's ouster saw the Communist Sandinista regime rise to power. And in Vietnam, the boat people are our times' searing reminder of the spawn of Communism.

As Freedom House has stated, "... South Africa bears the major onus for the bloodshed. Oppressed by the system of apartheid imposed on them by the white minority, the Africans are fighting back in whatever ways possible."

The ANC and the South African Communist Party are not root causes of the upheaval in South Africa. Communists exploit and manipulate economic and political desperation and oppression for



Corazon Aquino

their own purposes. South Africa is a tinder box; the Communists are poised to strike the match.

Yet there is still time for other agents of change to take hold and a number of them exist today in South Africa. Those partisans of democratic alternatives can take heart at the recent outcome in the Philippines, in which a democratic force, Corazon Aquino, emerged triumphant.

One example of assistance to a democratic alternative is the two-month training program in political, economic and social self-sufficiency for leaders from the black township of Soweto taking place at the Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Israel's labor federation, the Histadrut, a staunch opponent of apartheid, runs the Afro-Asian Institute. The training program focuses on unionizing South Africa's black workers, developing black civil infrastructures, organizing black women and teaching social work.

Israel has repeatedly condemned apartheid and has expressed its willingness to join other countries in economic sanctions against South Africa.

The writer Thomas Mann wrote at the conclusion of his epic novel, "The Magic Mountain":

"Out of this universal feast of death, out of this extremity of fever, kindling the rain-washed evening sky to a fiery glow, may it be that Love one day shall mount?"

The same question applies to violence-ridden South Africa. The survival of freedom in South Africa will be possible only if the forces of violence on the far left and of racial violence on the far right are defeated by the democratic forces of moderation. □

The Comrades' Decree: Death by Necklace

People's Court is in session in South Africa. The courtroom may be a Soweto shanty, with tires hanging ominously on the walls. Or it may be just a vacant lot in another of the rolling black townships. The judges are the "comrades," the radical young blacks who increasingly run the townships. A suspect is hauled in. The trial is short, the guilty verdict foreordained. The sentence: death by "necklace." The victim's hands are tied, sometimes with barbed wire. One rubber tire is put around his neck and another around his legs. They are soaked with gasoline and set ablaze. "Yes, it surely is a horrible way to die," says "Killer," a 16-year-old comrade from Diepkloof, a section of Soweto. "But the people we necklace have committed horrible crimes and deserve to die horribly."

Many radical young blacks justify the necklace because it frightens less committed blacks out of cooperating with the apartheid system. By some estimates, necklacings have increased to the rate of one a day over the past year. South African police say they have 145 cases of necklacing on record. Occasionally even progovernment black gangs have done it. Sources in the eastern cape, where this brutal form of execution has been



DAVID C. TURNLEY—GETTY IMAGES/BLACK STAR
"You're going to think twice": Mob law in Duncan Village

most often used, say that at least 207 people have been killed by necklacing. A grim joke is making the rounds in the eastern cape, at the expense of South Africa's United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organization of anti-apartheid groups. Question: what does UDF stand for? Answer: Unroyal, Dumlopp and Firestone.

Screaming for mercy: The purpose of the necklace is not just to kill but to terrorize. Bongani, a 21-year-old comrade, admitted necklacing a 20-year-old found at a rally with a hidden tape recorder. "He


was screaming for mercy and crying that he would never do it again and that he didn't know what he was doing and that he was sorry. We set him on fire," Bongani said.

Victims are necklaced for a range of comrade-perceived sins. Township officials and black policemen have been executed—but so have migrant miners, since mines are pillars of the system, and liquor-store owners, since they operate under government licenses. Killer, one of Bongani's friends, related how he helped to necklace a 62-year-old woman, Mary Skhosana,

who worked in a funeral parlor. Since she sold funeral insurance, he said, she was part of "the system." "We knew she was a police informer," Killer recounted coolly. "We did not need proof. She was pleading for mercy and crying and screaming. She said she'd pay us 7,000 rands [\$3,080] if we let her go. We told her we didn't need her money; we needed her life. Then we put a tire around her legs and another around her neck and shoulders. We forced her to drink petrol. We poured the rest into the tires and onto her and set her alight. But the fire went out. Another tin of petrol was fetched, and it took about an hour."

Little patience: The necklace is brutal but effective. "When you attend a funeral," says Diliza Machoba of the South African Council of Churches, "and you hear these young comrades chanting, 'Long live the necklace,' you're going to think twice about doing anything which will in any way offend the comrades. What we're trying to do, we older leaders, is point out that blind action is no good and that action and reflection must go together." The angry young radicals have little patience with such talk, and their elders will have a hard time persuading them to forgo their most potent weapon.

RICHARD MANNING
in Johannesburg





By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service

What makes the deaths stand out is that all but one of the victims were killed by other blacks, according to the state Bureau for Information. Several of the killings were by

For both the government and its opponents, the question of what is officially called "black-on-black" violence has become a crucial propaganda issue, and the fiery necktie its most potent and troubling symbol.

Each black-on-black death is cited as evidence that blacks are not ready to govern each other, let alone whites, and furthers Pretoria's claim that it is struggling to resist not legitimate black aspirations but a faceless, barbaric mob that would trample western values and wreak havoc on whites if it ever came to power.

The bureau is the only authorized source of news about civil unrest and police activities during the five-week-old state of emergency here. This article was written under terms of the government's

See BLACKS AND Cal. 1

more than 50 dead in May and June, police appeared to give strong support to the conservatives. Similar conflicts have erupted in black "homelands" such as KwaNdebele and Bophuthatwana, where President Lucas Mangope recently exhorted his followers to "protect what you have" from young radicals.

The black-on-black hate lies at the heart of the new state of emergency, which the government says is imposed to restore order and end the rampant intimidation that torments the silent majority in many corners of South Africa's black townships.

the police crackdown and the arrests of at least 4,000 activists, many of them with UDF affiliations, have had the opposite effect by taking off the streets those who can impose a measure of order on younger militants.

burg where he has been in hiding from the security police for several weeks, described how youths were enforcing a new rent boycott by going from house to house and

THE WASHINGTON POST

One measure of the intensity of the propaganda war being waged here is that both alleged statements were repeated by the government this week in its effort to characterize black-on-black unrest as the last gasp of desperate militants.

percentage of deaths attributable to black-on-black violence also has risen. Between September 1984 and January 1986, according to South African police, nearly 60 percent of the deaths were blacks killed by security forces. But for the first six months of this year—according to the police and independent

Since the emergency took effect on June 12, the information bureau contends that more than 75 percent of the 157 deaths have been blacks killed by other blacks. Because of the emergency restrictions, it is not possible to verify these figures indepen-

REACT, Press A1

Ultimately, these opponents hold the spontaneous system responsible for creating and capitalizing on divisions within the black community and for a process of brutalization that has transformed many young

"I believe necklacing is heinous and I can't agree with it," said Seth Gotsdiner, a top official of the Jewish Civic Association, which is affiliated with the United Jewish Communities, the country's leading Jewish group.

lators, we shall liberate this country."

(Excerpts from Soviet Active Measures, Hearings before the
Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives
July 13, 14, 1982, Pp. 312 to 329)

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 13, 14, 1982



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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL
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A/CONF. 107/5
May 1967
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA
PARIS, 26-27 MAY 1967

RESOLUTION TAKEN BY MEMBER STATES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
ON APARTHEID

ITEMS OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Original: Russian)
(15) Nov 1967

General measures taken by the Soviet Union in the light of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, would be an essential document for the International Conference.

In accordance with United Nations decisions, efforts are under way in the Soviet Union to mobilize world opinion in the fight to eliminate colonialism, racism and ~~apartheid~~ in southern Africa. Active measures in this direction are being carried out by Soviet social organizations, including the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Soviet Afro-Asian Countries Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Committee of Soviet Women, the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, and the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

INTRODUCTION

The Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa was convened in New York, October 7-11, 1967, by a broad cross-section of political, labor, church, entertainment, sports, civil rights, repression groups and organizations from throughout the United States. Elected officials from Cuba and the elderly in co-sponsorship with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) were invited to address the fight to rid their countries of racial oppression and achieve the right to freedom and independence.

The Conference Program was developed to provide a forum for analysis of the situation in the struggles of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia against the policies of racial oppression and efforts to secure majority rule. The role of the U.S. Government and the people of the United States in advancing their struggles was also studied and evaluated.

At the final Plenary session on October 11, Conference delegates ratified a Program of Action, recommending that regional and national strategies aimed at the total isolation of South Africa; the immediate withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, reinforcement of the mandatory area embargo to render it more effective; to include nuclear collaborations; the adoption and implementation of a mandatory arms embargo; and mandatory sanctions against South Africa, including economic and military aid, the severance of all cultural and sporting links with South Africa; increasing political support and material assistance to the people of Namibia through SWAPO and the people of South Africa through the ANC; increasing political support to the Frontline States in face of mounting attempts by South Africa to destabilize them.

This program had been developed by the Conference delegates at the commissions and workshops. The Conference delegates also ratified the creation of a Conference Continuation Committee which would carry on the responsibility of coordinating and implementing the Program of Action. The Conference was held in New York on work on or before Spring 1967. The Soviet Committee of the Conference was appointed to develop an expanded and representative Continuation Committee.

1. CHANGING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Recognizing that throughout its history the Government of the United States has condoned and supported colonial regimes in Africa, overtly and covertly, and further recognizing that the U.S. policy towards the racist and repressive apartheid regime of South Africa has been quietly supportive despite the overwhelming evidence of the ruthless exploitation of the black majority in Namibia and South Africa as a result of these policies, and

Recognizing that through the election of Ronald Reagan there have been direct efforts to increase the apartheid regime's "ally friends," demonstrating a callous indifference to the legitimate demands for human fundamental rights and freedom of the people of Namibia and South Africa, in open defiance of universal international public and political opinion, and because of the economic, political and military support given to South Africa by the U.S. Government, including efforts to create a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" (SATO), a serious threat to world peace, Pretoria has embarked on a campaign of racial and military aggression against the People's Republic of Angola, as well as the Pretorian States of Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, and

Aware that these policies by the U.S. Government will have grave consequences for the peoples of the world unless the peoples of the United States organize to change U.S. foreign policy,

This Conference calls upon the people of the United States to:

1. Demand that the U.S. State Department cease its efforts to end the South African regime's pariah status which has been endorsed by every international and national body in the world.
2. Initiate national, regional and local legislative campaigns to:
 - (a) enforce total and comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa;
 - (b) demand withdrawal of the Clark Amendment;
 - (c) halt the export of enriched uranium to South Africa;
 - (d) grant full diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of Angola.
3. Demand an end of mercenary recruitment and material support for mercenaries in the United States by:
 - (a) sponsoring national tours of students and workers protesting against the establishment and Angola;
 - (b) investigating mercenary involvement in the South African military and police;
 - (c) urging the House Sub-Committee on Africa to conduct an investigation into the extent of U.S. nationals involvement in mercenary activity in Southern Africa.

4. Inform the people of the United States by symposia, lectures, tours and publications about U.S. support for apartheid, the illegal occupation of Namibia and the destabilization of the Frontline States as a threat to world peace and security.

5. Organize a campaign to condemn the efforts of the Reagan administration to characterize the liberation struggles of Southern Africa as "terrorism" and "terrorism" as "terrorism" rather than the indigenous patriotic movements that they are.
6. Support existing national campaigns to:
 - (a) enforce the arms embargo;
 - (b) enforce the oil embargo;
 - (c) and loans and credits.

II. THE ROLE OF LABOR IN SUPPORT OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Recognizing that the oppression of black workers is the cornerstone of the brutal system of apartheid resulting in the economic and political domination of the white minority by paying semi-slave wages to black workers while maintaining an ever-increasing unemployed surplus labor force in host nations, and

Also being aware that the apartheid regime has made token labor law "reforms" without eliminating the basic oppressive features of apartheid, such as denial of political rights to blacks, reservation of certain skilled jobs for whites only, and the reservation of the freedom of movement and the right of residence of black workers, and further that increasingly in South Africa and Namibia, workers face loss of jobs, "desertion," criminal prosecution and banishment for organizing and striking for playing a pivotal role in the struggle for liberation through their trade unions, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) as the struggle of workers and trade unions in Southern Africa is indivisible from the liberation struggle, and

Further recognizing that 500 United States-based transnational corporations profit directly from operations based upon apartheid labor while there are growing instances of corporations closing plants in the United States and relocating in South Africa in order to take advantage of this system, at the expense of workers in both countries as United States corporations use the imported labor to produce the semi-slave labor, such as coal, to keep down the wages of their employees in this country, and

III. ROLE OF RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STRUGGLE TO LIBERATE SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Rejecting the "Sullivan Principles" myth that "liberal" corporations can improve the position of South African workers at the workplace, while the overall system of political repression, pass laws, and migrant labor remains intact, and

Recognizing that since the Reagan Administration's policy of collaboration with apartheid ignores the position of the international community, most recently affirmed at the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in calling for comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, working people in the United States have a special responsibility--in their own countries and in solidarity with South African workers--to take up and to enforce through their own action the international call for economic sanctions against South Africa.

We, therefore, call upon all international, national, and local trade union bodies in the United States and their members to intensify their support for the struggle of our brothers and sisters in South Africa and Namibia and to join in all efforts to isolate the apartheid regime, by taking the following actions:

1. Adopt as their official position that United States workers should not produce, transport, load on, unload, spend or parts destined for or coming from South Africa, and seek provisions in collective bargaining agreements to implement this position.
2. Remove all trade union accounts and pension or other benefit funds from banks which do business with South Africa; and all trade union-related investments in Africa; and all trade union-related investments in corporations which do business with South Africa.
3. Endorse the call of the recent Nairobi summit meeting of African heads of state for a world trade union conference to adopt a plan of action for enforcing total economic sanctions; and to participate in the conference.
4. Recognize the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the National Union of Namibian Workers (NNUW) as the legitimate representatives of the workers of their respective countries and set up solidarity funds to give material and financial assistance to them.
5. Develop a trade union network to disseminate educational materials and programs in order to inform United States workers about the situation of workers in South Africa and Namibia, and about other aspects of the liberation struggle; promote speaking tours of SACTU and NNUW; organize regional trade union/community conferences to promote solidarity.
6. Refuse to collaborate with apartheid by receiving visiting South African trade union groups which are officially or semi-officially sponsored by the South African government.

Recognizing that the level of suffering and oppression in Southern Africa is a product of a repressive and authoritarian economic system that exploits the peoples of South Africa and Namibia by subjecting them to labor theft of land and marginal wages, and

9. Considering that the South African system of forced labor enables mining, industrial and manufacturing concerns to keep labor costs at a bare minimum while African workers are subjected to restrictions of migratory labor, pass laws, restricted trade unions and the illegality of strikes, and

Given that economic involvement by U.S. business interests plays a central role in maintaining the apartheid system and the racist South African regime and thereby strengthens it as a military power in that region, and

Being aware that the so-called Sullivan Principles are being used to misfocus the efforts of people of good will in the United States who support economic justice and social equality for the people of Southern Africa, and

Further recognizing the interrelationship between unemployment in the United States, runaway shops, the exploitation of labor in Southern Africa and United States investments in Southern Africa,

Religious Institutions and Community Organizations are urged to:

1. Participate in and organize divestment campaigns in state, parastatal and national institutions which hold stock in corporations and financial institutions doing business in Southern Africa.
2. Organize campaigns directed at the State Department by sending statements, letters and telegrams of concern about the South African record to establish new consulates. Further, that these organizations be encouraged to picket those consulates who currently house South African consulates.
3. Recognize the wide influence they have in all communities, and to bring the issue of economic sanctions to local churches and community groups and to work towards the development of community and church committees to address the issue on local grassroots levels.

IV. SUPPORT FOR YOUTH AND STUDENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

4. Organize local, state and national campaigns calling for a complete break with the racist and repressive regime of South Africa by ending all economic, diplomatic, political, military, cultural and sport ties with that country.
5. Develop organizational resolutions in support of the liberation struggles of Southern Africa while recognizing the struggle within the United States against racism, genocide and the impact of the budget cuts.
6. Establish a monument to the people's struggle outside their buildings as a sign of solidarity with the liberation struggles of Southern Africa.
7. Support and develop local, regional and national campaigns to boycott any media activities, particularly television, that advertise or show programs that support the authority of South African regimes, especially the Apartheid Campaign.
8. Integrate into their organizational work activities calling for the total isolation of South Africa by utilizing the following activities as developed by the Bank Campaign and the Pension Fund Investment Campaign.
9. Invite ANC and SWAPO to provide speakers as a national speaking tour to support such local campaigns.
10. Develop and organize a campaign calling for the boycott of products produced by collaboration with or in South Africa in local communities.
11. Organize through Church and Community Institutions a week of solidarity with Southern Africa liberation (e.g. January 8, 1967 - the 70th anniversary of the ANC) and to support national activities at that time which dramatize that solidarity.
12. Support the International Campaign to enforce an oil embargo against South Africa and to endorse the oil embargo campaign of the National Anti-Apartheid Action Campaign or a similar petition campaign aimed at the United States government to force it to support the oil embargo against South Africa.

Recognizing that students and young workers in South Africa and Namibia play a special role in the struggle against Apartheid, and for the liberation of Namibia from colonial rule, and further recognizing that the "Bantu" education to which they are exposed is intended to maintain white supremacy and to foster mental enslavement by training youth for lives ministering to the needs of their white masters and further recognizing that U.S. youth and students are crucial in this campaign in support of South African liberation, it is resolved that youth and students should organize for the following:

1. Broaden the campaign to force universities to divest themselves of covert and overt investments in corporations operating in South Africa.
2. Develop and support campus and workplace based material aid campaigns for youth and students in South Africa and Namibia and the students of the SWAPO Secondary School for youth and students of Southern Africa.
3. Establish ties between youth organizations in the United States and SWAPO and ANC youth movements and to develop and distribute information about these youth movements in the United States.
4. Urge schools and universities, public and private, to establish full scholarships for South African youth refugees and for youth new in South Africa.
5. Provide material and personal support for South African and Namibian students presently studying in the United States.

V. SUPPORT FOR WOMEN OF SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Recognizing that Black women in South Africa and Namibia face a unique burden of oppression and further recognizing that the danger to themselves and their children of material deprivation and the threat of political and personal reprisals against apartheid and for liberation as members and supporters of ANC and SWAPO, and further recognizing that racism profoundly affects the quality of health care, particularly of women and children, it is therefore resolved to:

- This Conference calls on all media workers in the United States to implement the following program:
- Organize women in the United States through their organizations in support of the women of South Africa and Namibia by:
 - condemning all U.S. contacts with South Africa; establishing scholarships for South African and Namibian women at universities and vocational training schools;
 - organizing regional, organizational and local meetings, seminars and seminars to educate the people of the United States on the struggles and conditions of South African and Namibian women;
 - establishing national speaking tours for South African and Namibian women.
 - Organize legislative lobbying activities to urge the United States Congress to bar U.S. drug companies from doing business with South Africa and to support the U.S. drug companies from doing business with South Africa.
 - Establish special relief and aid campaigns focused on the special material and medical needs of women and children refugees in the Frontline States and to support the training of medical technicians for the refugee camps.
 - Condemn the readmission of the Medical Association of South Africa to the World Medical Association with the consent of the American Medical Association and to organize a campaign in support of the expulsion of the Medical Association of South Africa.
- VI. A PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR MEDIA WORKERS
- Recognizing the central role of all who work in different branches of the media in strengthening U.S. support for the liberation struggles of the peoples of Southern Africa by publicizing and implementing all aspects of the Conference Program of Action and further
- Recognizing the failure of traditional U.S. news sources to inform the public accurately or adequately about the apartheid regime, its policies and its role in the oppression of the peoples of Southern Africa and the failure to publicize the support for South Africa provided by the U.S. government, its Western allies and transnational corporations, and
- Endorsing the worldwide campaign recently launched at the International Seminar on Publicity and the Role of Mass Media in the International Mobilization Against Apartheid (Berlin, GDR, August 31 to September 2, 1981),
- Expose the links
 - Investigate and publicize the hidden membership of some U.S. media sources by the South African regime or its surrogates and challenge the legality of such membership;
 - Expose the racist violation of the U.S. resolutions, transactions supplying arms, oil, technology etc., and collaborating in attempts to disarm the liberation movements and stabilize the Frontline States;
 - Publicize the liberation struggles;
 - Stress the illegality of the racist occupation of Namibia, the crime against humanity which is apartheid and the legitimacy of all forms of struggle waged by ANC and SWAPO to eradicate these evils;
 - Provide articles and programs for trade union, religious community, political, student, non-governmental and other media outlets and other workers and other publications concerning the just struggles of SWAPO and ANC;
 - Practical assistance to ANC and SWAPO;
 - Provide facilities and equipment for broadcasting, printing and distributing SWAPO and ANC publicity;
 - Establish a Media Monitoring Task Force to conduct international campaigns against bias in traditional U.S. news sources;
 - Train liberation movement members in media skills.
 - Organizing and Mobilizing
 - Establish a list of media workers involved in anti-apartheid activities and set up committees in media organizations to exchange information with media sources and to coordinate and conduct the struggle to correct the bias of U.S. and Third World publicists and subject to traditional news sources;
 - Formulate a code of ethics for journalists reporting on Southern Africa, protest repression and censorship of reporting in South Africa and Namibia and use collective pressure to change management and editorial policies which support, or claim "neutrality" over, apartheid; all advertisements for the recruitment of mercenaries skilled labor or loans and credits and tourism supporting the apartheid economy;
 - Develop special education packets for elementary, junior high, and high school around the U.S. to counter racist propaganda in our schools.

FORGING ARTISTIC COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Recognizing that since 1970 South Africa has been barred from the Olympics and the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sport without a dissenting vote in 1977.

It is resolved to - call for the following

1. Establish a campaign to condemn that the U.S. government (a) confers with Communist principals and that all forms of racial discrimination in the international sports world, the spirit and letter of the International Declaration Against Apartheid and Sport;
(b) oppose all sports contacts with South Africa until apartheid is eradicated and South Africa ceases to use sport as a political propaganda vehicle;
(c) deny all visas to athletes representing South Africa; (d) actively condemn all sports bodies and organizations having contacts with South Africa, including withdrawing from the U.S. Olympic bodies; (e) exclude from the U.S. national and Olympic teams all athletes who compete against South Africa.
2. Support such groups as the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sports and Society (ACCSES).
3. Develop a system to monitor all impending U.S. sports contacts with South Africa.
4. Organize large scale demonstrations against such contacts.
5. Recruit legal resources to consider constitutional and other legal issues arising from anti-apartheid sports boycotts.
6. Develop sports contacts with Angola, Mozambique and other Frontline states suffering from destabilization supported by the U.S. government.
7. Publicize and support the efforts of the South African Council on Sports (SACOS) to eradicate apartheid and facilitate South Africa in the international sports world.
8. Command and support those U.S. athletes who denounce participation with South African sponsored sporting events.

[illegible]

Taking into consideration the United Nations Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly each year from 1964 demanding that "all participating States, organizations and individuals suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with other organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid."

1. Implement this resolution: All artists are urged to boycott

1. Implement this resolution: All artists are urged to boycott tours to South Africa; and the so-called "home lands."
2. Compile and disseminate nationally all artists' names and other activities which support apartheid, such lists should identify managers, booking agents, financial institutions, and other individuals and organizations and their South African subsidiaries who are responsible for organizing and promoting such tours.
3. Organize boycotts of those artists collaborating with the racist regime, including national and international boycotts of their recordings, other performances, and any products of the entertainment corporations.
4. Establish artists' anti-apartheid coalitions to:
 - (a) disseminate pertinent information within the artist community;
 - (b) develop a declaration in support of artists' boycott of apartheid;
 - (c) demonstrate performances in support of the ANC and SWAPO;
 - (d) encourage artists to incorporate Southern African liberation themes into their creative expressions.
5. Integrate the entertainment industry trade organizations such as actors unions, the Black Music Association of Congress Party Africa, and other officials who recognize the need to step forward and support the anti-apartheid struggle. Encourage American entertainers to form touring South Africa and the so-called "home lands."

II. SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Recognizing that in South Africa one out of every four adults is imprisoned every year for violating such laws as the Urban Policy Act or the racist Pass Laws, and recognizing that in Namibia the lives of the people live under martial law, frequently in concentration camps, style "protected villages," and are subjected to gross and protection against arbitrary arrest, detention and torture, and further that the South African government has provided for SWAPO and the ANC, the entire dispossessed majority population of South Africa must be considered political prisoners, and that those who have been imprisoned for taking up arms or organizing other forms of justified resistance to apartheid and colonialism should be accorded the status of Prisoners of War under the Geneva Conventions, and

Recognizing that the imprisoned African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela and the South West Africa Peoples' Organization leader Sam Nujoma, who symbolize the condition of all prisoners in South Africa and Namibia who struggle against the regime, and

Further recognizing that South African law makes mere membership in the ANC or SWAPO as constituting a crime, and that the spy law in support of the act of any other member regardless of actual knowledge, consent or participation,

It is resolved that:

1. Organize a national and international campaign recognizing the right of all political prisoners in South Africa to be declared and treated as prisoners of war.
2. Support and organize national campaigns to secure the release of Mandela and Nujoma and to improve the conditions under which all South African and Namibian political prisoners suffer.
3. Encourage local, regional and national organizations to demonstrate their support of Mandela and Nujoma by resolutions, declarations and press releases.
4. Support the Free Mandela/Nujoma petition campaign for presentation to the U.S. government and the South African regime.
5. Encourage educational and civic institutions to emulate international initiatives by awarding honorary degrees to Mandela and Nujoma and naming public institutions and places in their honor.
6. Publicize the endless harassment and persecution of the spouses and families of political prisoners, exemplified by the treatment of Winnie Mandela.

7. Develop and promote educational campaigns on the conditions of political prisoners in Namibia and South Africa.

2. FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL AID TO SWAPO AND ANC

Being made aware by the ANC and SWAPO of the urgent needs of the people of South Africa and Namibia who are forced to flee their countries to the refugee camps in the Frontline States, where they are exposed to the risk of South African military forces, and are often abandoned back by the repressive regimes they flee, and

Recognizing that medical supplies are a top priority for meeting the health needs of refugees and that refugees often arrive in the camps without clothing, food, hygiene items, and that there are constant needs for clothing, blankets and tents to provide shelter and temporary quarters for families, schools and hospitals.

Further recognizing that transportation is needed to remote, often mountainous areas, delivering critically needed supplies and personnel over roads in the worst condition, including four-wheel drive vehicles which are diesel powered, to build, equip and maintain hospitals and supplies with which to train people to staff these facilities are required to meet the long-term needs of the people forced to leave Namibia and South Africa.

It is resolved that:

1. Expanded and coordinated campaigns be instituted to fulfill the material and financial needs of refugees.
2. The names and addresses of organizations presently providing material aid, with a description of their programs and priorities of their work, be compiled.
3. A network of communication and coordination be developed among organizations, groups and individuals engaged in material aid projects and that a strategy be developed to broaden participation in material aid projects through grassroots political education.
4. A lobbying campaign be organized for the broader circulation of refugee status by the U.S. High Commissioner for Refugees of people forced to flee Namibia and South Africa.
5. That a national campaign addressed to members of Congress be mounted in support of legislation to provide:
 - (a) material aid to the peoples of Namibia and South Africa;
 - (b) denying resources, including U.S. arms and military intervention forces, to the South African apartheid regime; political asylum for South African and Namibian refugees;
 - (c) providing economic and material support for South African and Namibian political refugees in the United States.

August 19, 1981

To: All Districts
From: Nationalities Department

Enclosed are some additional materials to assist in organising to get more elected delegates from your area for the October 9-11 Conference.

1. A list of additional sponsors. Check to see if there is anyone from your area not yet asked to work on the local organising effort to get delegates to the Conference or to help raise money.
 2. A list of organisations and individuals who attended a Conference on Public Investment and South Africa in June of this year. These are potential supporters of this conference for sanctions. Some may be possible delegates. Note the names from your area.
 3. General Declaration from the Conference that founded the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICCA).
 4. Pamphlet on Apartheid.
- Comradely,
Thomas Dennis
Nationalities Department
Chairman

ND/15-s

To: Club Chairpersons, Section Organisers and State Committee members.
Re: Mobilisation for June 12 Demonstration

Dear Comrades,

The movement against President Reagan's military policies is growing all over the world. Demonstrations are occurring with increasing frequency and getting larger. For the next few months, the focal point for such activity will be the United Nations, which is holding its second session on Disarmament from June 1 to July 9. About 100 international and national organisations have formed a coalition to build a demonstration which will coincide with the Special Session scheduled for June 12 in New York City. It could be the largest peace demonstration in U.S. history.

The party has been an active participant in the coalition. We have been involved in the various planning meetings and several of the march forces. We want to mobilise the entire district to help put on a giant march on June 12. This demonstration is the most important so far because the UN is in New York, our district has a special reputation for stability. Every club should try to get at least one organisation to sponsor a march. We should encourage organisations to send representatives to the march. Our plan is to insure that the composition of the demonstration and sponsoring organisations reflect the national, class and racial composition of working people - Black and Puerto Rican and of source trade union participation. Right now, the coalition is having problems maintaining unity. If we can increase the number of grassroots organisations active in the mobilisation, we will be helping to preserve the fragile unity that exists in this diverse coalition. Organisations wishing to endorse the demonstration should contact:

New York June 12 Disarmament Campaign
135 W. 4th Street
(212) 460-8992

The New York Campaign is also doing some coordination for New York State as a whole, especially in those places where there is no June 12th committee. In NYC we should encourage organisations to send representatives to the city-wide meeting of participating organisations scheduled for March 21 at 241 Thompson St. (near Washington Square Park) at 8PM in Manhattan.

The national office of the June 12th coalition (853 Broadway, Suite 2109, Phone: 460-9900) is ready to provide local organisations with information and literature. This office can be contacted by anyone interested in the demonstration and other activities related to the Special Session.

Another good way for the clubs to get involved in the campaign is through the nuclear freeze campaign. This movement which is spreading across the country, has received endorsements from a number of trade unions and prominent politicians. In addition, in a sense it is already half successful since the Soviet Union has already agreed to a freeze. Circulating freeze literature and collecting signatures on a freeze petition can facilitate the mobilisation of organisations in your community for the June 12 action. For information on the freeze campaign, contact: The New Manhattan Project, 45 Rutherford Place, NYC 10003, Phone: 998-0971.

Some mass organizations in your area may be interested in holding an event for members of the Japanese Delegation attending the Special Session. They will be arriving in New York at the end of May and plan to travel around the country speaking about nuclear war. If arranged now, they will also be able to travel up-state. For more information, contact:

O.S. PEACE COUNCIL
7 East 15th Street, Suite 408
New York, New York 10003
(212) 958-1194

Clubs should begin discussing which comrades can march in a Party/VIA contingent on June 12. We will also need volunteers to distribute the Daily World, Vos del Pueblo and the Young Worker to demonstrators.

Enclosed is some of the initial material on the demonstration and related activities. You will soon receive a club education dealing with June 12. Members of the District Peace and Solidarity Commission and section organizers will be contacting clubs to discuss the demonstration. Any club wishing a speaker or has questions, please contact Bruce Kimmel (928-2527) during day.

Cordially,

Bruce Kimmel, On behalf of the District
Peace and Solidarity Commission

URGENT FLASH ANNOUNCEMENT... URGENT FLASH ANNOUNCEMENT...

There will be a demonstration on Tuesday, March 23rd 5:00 - 8:00 PM to speak out and demonstrate against Reaganism. Reagan will be in NYC to accept an "Humanitarian Award". The demonstration is being sponsored by the Emergency Campaign to Save Human Services, with demands against the budget cuts, the military budget and US policy in El Salvador, against unemployment etc.

More than one group is sponsoring a demonstration at more or less the same place. We encourage all party people and those they influence to:

Demonstration at the NY Hilton
6 - 8 PM
5th Avenue and 34th Street
Emergency Campaign to Save Human Services

I enclose a short video tape of part of the proceedings of the recent funeral at Cradock. It was held for the four United Democratic Front activists whom we believe were killed by the rival organisation AZAPO (Azanian Peoples Organisation.) The UDF claims the South African police killed them. In this tape you will be able to see how the Church is spearheading the Communist attack.

An Anglican Prelate from the United Kingdom officiated at the ceremony together with Dr. Beyers Naude of the South African Council of Churches and Dr. Allen Boesak President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. The Marxist -Leninist Terrorist Organisation the African National Congress was represented as was the South African Communist Party, the Black Sash and the United Democratic Front.

It is a great tragedy that the Anglican Church in this country is so divided. Anglicans are tired of the constant politicising by the leaders. I have included a telex sent out to the media after a meeting where it was decided to send the Bishops and Priests back to their Bibles and their work. It is a fact that the Anglican Church has no money. Bishop Tutu has just asked every Anglican to pay one Rand to help the Church coffers and to pay the priests, some of whom I believe have not been paid for two months.

I apologise for the very poor quality of the tape recording. I also would like to point out that the brutal killing of Miss Maki Skhosana included in this video is not for the eyes of children.

Once again I ask you to please remember our country and peoples in your prayers. Yours faithfully,

IN RESPONSE TO WIDESPREAD AND GROWING DISSATISFACTION AMONG
 ANGLICANS REGARDING THE INROAD OF POLITICS INTO THEIR CHURCH
 LAY PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THE TRANSVAAL MET IN PRETORIA
 LAST NIGHT AND FORMED ANGLICANS CONCERNED FOR TRUTH AND
 SPIRITUALITY - ACTS.

THIS ORGANISATION IS DEDICATED TO THE MAINTAINANCE AND FURTHERANCE
 OF THE GOSPEL AS ENshrINED IN THE HOLY SCRIPTURES AND UNIVERSAL
 CREEDS AND RECEIVED BY THE ANGLICAN CHURCH IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
 PRAYER BOOK.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY ALARMED AT THE RECENT SYNOD DECISION CONCERNING
 CHAPLAINS BELIEVING THAT THESE WILL LEAD TO ANGLICANS IN THE
 ARMED FORCES AND ESPECIALLY NATIONAL SERVICEMEN BEING DEPRIVED
 OF THE MINISTRATIONS OF THEIR CHURCH. WE THEREFORE URGE ALL
 ANGLICANS TO WRITE TO ARCHBISHOP PHILIP RUSSELL, THEIR BISHOPS
 AND LOCAL PRIESTS ASKING THEM TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING IS DONE TO
 INTERFERE WITH THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE CHAPLAINS REALISING
 THAT SYNODS ARE THE MAIN INSTRUMENT THROUGH WHICH CHANGE IS BROUGHT
 INTO THE CHURCH.

WE DEMAND THAT A MORATORIUM BE PLACED
 ERROR

WE DEMAND THAT A MORATORIUM BE PLACED ON ALL SYNODS ESPECIALLY
 THE BISHOPS SYNOD DUE IN NOVEMBER. THE TASK OF THE LAITY IS
 TO SEND THEIR BISHOPS AND PRIESTS BACK TO THEIR BIBLES AND THEIR
 WORK AND TO VOTE THEM THE FINANCE FOR THE HOLDING OF FUTURE
 SYNODS UNTIL THE PRESENT CRISIS IS PASSED. WE STRESS THAT OUR
 PURPOSE IS NOT TO BRING DIVISION IN THE CHURCH BUT TO RETURN
 TO SPIRITUALITY FOR ALL. WE APPEAL TO ALL ANGLICANS PRESENT
 AND PAST WHO SHARE OUR CONCERN TO CONTACT US FOR MORE INFORMATION.
 ADDRESS: ANGLICANS CONCERNED FOR TRUTH AND SPIRITUALITY

CHINESE NEWS

Maki victim of misunderstandings

The family of the young woman who died in the hands of an angry mob in Duduza last week believe she may have been the victim of a tragic misunderstanding.

The 24-year-old woman was accused of "selling out" the three victims of the handgrenade blasts who died a few metres from her home.

But the family of Miss Maki Rencine Shonana said on that day she was working late shift and only arrived home about 11 pm - an hour before the blast incident.

According to the family, rumours of her involvement with the police started immediately after the grenade blasts on June 24.

"Lovable"

The woman's killing, shown on local and international television last Saturday, has made her mother all the more beloved. Her mother said she cannot comprehend how her "lovable" daughter came to be accused of being a police informer.

At the dead woman's home yesterday her family held a religious and political involvement.

Going through the family album her mother, Mrs Daaa Shonana, showed us pictures

'Sell-out' rumours began straight after night of handgrenade blasts

Her family said she had warned her mother to leave Duduza. When she refused she advised her to discuss the threats with political leaders, which she did.

"I will not leave because I know I am innocent. At the same time I am not a coward," Miss Shonana is said to have told her sister at the time.

Most of the political leaders she is supposed to have spoken to are now detained and she could not be contacted by The Star.

Miss Shonana, the third child in a family of five, left school in 1967, when her son Godfrey was born.

She was employed at a local school as a teacher for only a few weeks ago.

Community members have shown support for the family, but "none of the activists" with whom Miss Shonana associated have been to see the family.



Miss Maki Rencine Shonana, the woman killed in Duduza.

Her life centred around church and lively political meetings, her mother said. She did not go to school for the church and I cannot imagine when she found time to meet with the police.

For at least a month before she met with her death, Miss Shonana knew her life was in danger, her eldest sister Poo-



THE KILLING. A crowd gathers.

PROTESTING CLERGYMEN ON PROTESTING STREET

"PREACHING" IN THE SHADOW OF THE SOVIET FLAG.



ALAN BOESAK - PATRON AND LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT AT A RECENT "FUNERAL" IN SOUTH AFRICA. A.N.C. FLAGS AND SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY BANNERS WERE ALSO PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED.



BEYERS NAUDÉ - PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE LEFTWING NATIONAL UNION OF SOUTH STUDENTS (NUSAS) AT THE SAME FUNERAL.

Addendum

SACP directive/discussion document

The Politburo of the South African Communist Party (SACP) is currently (May 1986) circulating a directive discussion document on negotiations to its members in order to promote uniformity on this issue throughout their ranks and to foster a similar approach within the ranks of the ANC. The document originated from an extended Politburo meeting with members of the Central Committee in March 1986 where a decision was taken to provide more systematic theoretical guidelines on certain vital questions/problems which have been highlighted by the current situation in South Africa:

- 1 It is universally acknowledged that our situation is pregnant with the prospects for change. The use of brute force, combined with attempts at reformist diversions designed to avoid real change, are visibly failing. The resistance is not being subdued. Instead, more and more people are being awakened to political life.
- 2 The political statement circulated by the Central Committee after our last plenary session touches on these developments in greater detail and forms part of the background to this discussion document.
- 3 Our liberation front is becoming increasingly accepted as more than an agitational opposition; it is regarded by a large scale of the world and, more importantly, by the majority of our people, as the immediate alternative power to racism and exploitation. The heightened tempo of the conflict and the prospects which are emerging for radical transformation demand continuous attention to our organisational, agitational and mobilising tasks both in the military and political spheres as part of the unfolding revolutionary process. These developments also require reflection on a number of problems relating to the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary transformation which may previously have been in the realm of speculative debate but which have now assumed an immediate significance.
- 4 Party cadres at different levels of the liberation structures have of course participated in the process of elaborating answers to questions which changing reality is increasingly posing. It has obviously become more urgent than ever for the Party as a collective to reflect more deeply than it has managed to do in the recent period on some of the problems raised by the changing situation.

cohesion. Sections of the ruling class in the imperialist countries, which were previously quite ready to underpin the apartheid system, are also beginning to lose faith in its capacity to protect their interests. Sensing the inevitability of change, important sectors of the white power bloc are some imperialist strata are themselves beginning to seek a transformation involving mainly the extension of varying forms of political democracy within the framework of capitalism. Recognition by powerful segments of our ruling class (and some of their imperialist allies) that they can no longer continue ruling in the old way obviously favours the revolutionary forces. It brings to the fore the need to intensify the politico-debilitating terrain of struggle so as to weaken still further the cohesion of the forces ranged against us.

Thus, there are emerging in South Africa what Lenin called (in relation to the February 1917 Russian Revolution) 'dis-similar currents, heterogeneous class interests, contrary political and social stirrings', as objective factors in deepening the enemy crisis, fragmenting its previously monolithic character and therefore objectively strengthening the prospects of a radical breakthrough. On the face of it there appears to be a proliferation of new groupings which consider themselves to be part of the forces for change but which cannot necessarily be embraced as part of what we regard as the revolutionary forces. By far the most important class grouping which falls into this category is what one might call (for want of the better phrase) the 'liberal' bourgeoisie. It is the representatives of the latter and their like-minded imperialist friends which triggered off the current series of talks and dialogue with the ANC. Many issues going to the very root of the politics and economics of an immediate transformation have been a subject of discussion with these forces and of continuous speculation in the international and South African media.

Let us be clear. The 'liberal' bourgeoisie seek transformations of the South African society which go beyond the formal limits of the present regime but which aim to preempt the objectives of the revolutionary forces. Old style apartheid no longer serves their class interests. In addition, external pressures triggered off by an unending people's resistance are taking a terrible toll of their existing and potential economic interests. It is clear that the newly founded political liberalism of a significant section of the bourgeoisie (represented by the signatories to the FCI Business Charter) has, as its primary objective, the saving of capital.

The strategic objectives defined in our programme, Party constitution and other basic documents remain valid. These documents define the main content of our national democratic revolution and describe it as a stage towards the struggle for social emancipation in the epoch of the world transition from capitalism to socialism and within the context of the struggle against imperialism. The dominant role of the working class at this stage of the struggle is stressed.

The Freedom Charter provides broad popular guidelines which describe the main content of the people's power in the immediate aftermath of a victory of the national democratic revolution. It is not a programme for a socialist South Africa but, depending upon the social forces which come to power, it can become the starting point for creating conditions which would lead to a socialist transformation.

Our broad strategy for achieving people's power is to mobilise the masses for a seizure of power through a combination of political action and armed struggle in which partial and general uprisings will play a vital role in the developing stages of the People's War.

Paragraph 5 very briefly summarises and describes the main beacons of our struggle. But the tactical journey towards these beacons must be influenced by the continuously changing and developing situation. And, as we have already emphasised, events of the last twenty months have resulted in a very significant transformation of the balance of class and national forces involved in our struggle.

There has already been an immeasurable strengthening of the revolutionary forces. Organisationally, this expresses itself primarily in the enormous growth in the popularity, reputation and status of the ANC-led liberation alliance. This alliance attracts varying degrees of allegiance and support from the masses organised at local, regional and national level and from the organised working class. Roughly speaking, this sector as a whole encompasses the content of the main revolutionary forces as organised contingents in class terms the core of those contingents are the urban and rural working people in alliance with other classes and strata among the nationally oppressed majority such as the Black petty bourgeoisie whose objective interests will be served by the revolutionary transformations envisaged by the liberation alliance.

In addition the struggle in our country is creating a situation in which the white power bloc is beginning to lose its

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ism implying, by and large, the retention by them of the ownership of all or most of the means of production. Their Business Charter, which in certain respects proclaims the same liberties as the Freedom Charter, understandably includes corporate clauses such as "everyone has the right to own property, alone as well as in association with others . . . and everyone has the right freely to employ labour and to own or manage a business in accordance with the rights and principles set out in this Charter". And, (as we shall see later) the other side of the same coin is the fear of a revolutionary takeover and, therefore, an attempt to avoid majority rule in its true meaning.

In other words, the liberal bourgeoisie seek a February but, understandably, in a way which would prevent it from moving into an October. Their strategy for achieving this objective has been clearly articulated by them.

They seek transformation through negotiation and not the kind of conflict which would culminate in a revolutionary seizure of power. Lenin said of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie that it "does not demand the overthrow of the Tsarist government . . . it is striving to effect as peaceful a deal as possible between the Tsar and the revolutionary people . . . a deal which would give a maximum of power to itself, the bourgeoisie, and a minimum to the revolutionary people . . . the proletariat and the peasantry".

To implement this tactic they, together with their external allies, can be expected to attempt to push the revolutionary forces into negotiation before they are strong enough to impose their basic objectives. The intention is to delude the people's struggles and to force a compromise based on existing power relationships.

A vital element of their strategy is to prevent effective majority rule so as to keep the national forces divided. For example Gavin Reilly, one of the most influential signatories to the Business Charter, casts doubts on the advisability of having a single directly elected Assembly, supports the perpetuation of tribal power centres such as the homelands and states that "an immediate handing over of power on the basis of one man one vote would result in political chaos and economic retreat".

Consistent with the above is the insistence by the Ralliya and the Van Zyl Siabberts that there must be a break by the ANC with the Communist Party and that in any case the ANC must be regarded as only one of the many organisations among the black forces when it comes to a round

table settlement discussion. Van Zyl Siabbert's report-back to Botha about his discussions with the ANC reveals another level of his approach. He described the ANC following among the people as a "myth" and asked for permission to see Barnard (the head of National Intelligence) in order to discuss proposals (with security implications) which he felt could "draw the teeth" of the ANC.

We have devoted space to the problem of the liberal bourgeoisie because it helps to highlight with greater clarity a number of questions related to the character of our revolution. More particularly:

Our situation differs from the situation facing the Russian Bolsheviks in 1905 and in the period prior to February 1917. In our case the white bourgeoisie (including its political liberal segment) is in power: it is the ruling class. Therefore we must resist any confusion between the national democratic revolution (whose content is spelled out in our programme, in the ANC strategy and tactics, etc) and the classical constituents of bourgeois democratic revolutions. The unique and atypical form which South African capitalism has developed (based on colonialism of a special type) has placed on the agenda a struggle for national and political demands which are usually associated with the historic struggle waged by the bourgeoisie at the dawn of capitalism against feudalism. These demands have become known as bourgeois democratic rights.

In any case (in contrast to 1905 and February 1917) no sector of our bourgeoisie (with the exception of the tiny weak black bourgeoisie) supports the struggle for bourgeois democratic rights in their true meaning. As we have seen they remain opposed to the very starting point of bourgeois democratic rights, i.e. majority rule, one man one vote in a united national state. Despite a great deal of rhetoric on questions of democracy their ultimate solutions are always qualified by references to group rights which, in the South African context, implies various forms of protection of the accumulated privileges of the white group.

Our characterisation thus far of the liberal bourgeoisie does not however dispose of the question completely. A serious revolutionary movement always tries to divide the enemy and to broaden the base of opposition to the main enemy. This implies the need for ever-widening varieties of opposition some of which may not be motivated by revolutionary intentions. In this connection we must also bear in mind the danger of the potential growth in the strength of out-and-out Nazi forces such as ANWB, HNP, Treurnicht's CP

Another question which requires special attention is how to harmonise and achieve a correct balance between the imperatives of class alliances and the independent role of the working class and its political vanguard. In the area of mass organisation the answer is less problematic. The emergence of a strong trade union movement which is both independent of and part of the broad alliance of revolutionary forces creates a workers' constituency with enormous potential for acting at the mass level in defence of workers' interests both economically and politically. The trade union movement does not and cannot carry out the functions of the political vanguard of the working class. This is the role of the Party of the working class, which we are. In the alliance headed by the ANC we represent both the short and long term political and social aspirations of the working class. We have always believed that our Party can only carry out its historic mission by ensuring that its vital role in the alliance does not result in a negation of its role as a public independent vanguard of the working class. In this connection we must consider the following.

We continue to face the old problem of party work always being pushed into second place because of the necessary involvement of virtually all our talented personnel in other structures of the liberation alliance. This continues to limit our capacity for the independent spread of working class perspectives in the struggle and hinders the strengthening of the Party organisationally. If no effective steps are taken to deal with this weakness, the Party will not be able to carry out its historic mission.

It is also necessary to reflect on the profile of the Party in the liberation alliance whose public head is correctly the ANC. The question which needs to be addressed is, to what extent has it become accepted as a permanent feature of the alliance that the Party is not a participant as a Party in the activities and relations of the alliance with other forces? This question recently came under consideration in the preparations for the meeting with COSATU. After prior discussion which included an informal canvassing of the views of some of the COSATU delegation it was decided that the Party should not be seen to be having an independent presence in the talks. Without questioning the correctness of the decision on this specific occasion it has become important to open up this problem for reflection and discussion especially in relation to the status and role of the Party in our future serious negotiating processes. It is also necessary to reflect on the extent to which the Party should

(and their vigilante offshoots) and the possibility of an undisguised military dictatorship. Also we must not underestimate the counter revolutionary efforts - against freedom movements orchestrated by the Reagan administration. On the other hand a political re-adjustment in the ruling power block which favours its liberal bourgeoisie wing would undoubtedly create better objective conditions for the continuity struggle by the revolutionary forces to achieve the aims of the national democratic revolution. Tactically, what flows from this?

On the one hand we are justified in helping by all means (including talks) to advance the process of breaking the cohesion and unity of the ruling class and to isolate and weaken its most racist and politically reactionary sector.

On the other hand, without blurring some very important distinctions between liberal bourgeoisie and their more reactionary class brothers,

We must expose their objective of co-opting forces from among the oppressed in order to frustrate the achievements of the main aims of the national democratic revolution.

We must not play into their hands by working out compromises (or being seen to work out compromises) for some hypothetical negotiating table which constitute a retreat from the main aims of the national democratic revolution. Nor must a genuine desire to project a public image of "reasonableness" tempt us to peddle softly on the true nature of the liberation alliance and its revolutionary socio-economic objectives.

At the same time we must not mechanically dig in our heels against any future possibility of negotiation or compromise with other forces. We must remember that virtually all revolutionary struggles in the post war period (Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, etc) reached their final climax at the negotiating table. But the question of negotiation usually arises at a time of a major revolutionary climax involving the transfer of power based on the massive strength of the people's offensive. At such a stage we have to judge what interim compromises are historically justified and take the people with us. The main thrust of our present strategy remains a revolutionary seizure of power. Premature speculation about possible compromises in order to tempt broader forces such as the liberal bourgeoisie on to our side, may serve to blunt the edge of the people's revolutionary militancy.

(like SACTU) develop publicly-expressed independent relationships with selected working class groupings.

Making the formal profile of the Party more visible will not, on its own, give it the capacity to perform its historic mission. In the end, it is the Party's strength on the ground and more especially, its organised presence among the black working class, which counts.

The situation has shot into greater prominence than ever before the question of the character of the interim phase of people's power. We have partly touched upon this in reference to the role and objectives of the liberal bourgeoisie. The series of talks on which the alliance has correctly embarked, demand from us more precise formulations than are contained in the broadly stated objectives of the Freedom Charter. Understandably, there is increasing pressure for answers to questions which relate to the interim phase of people's power. It has clearly become necessary to elaborate more detailed approaches to matters such as the relationship between private and public property in the interim phase. These approaches must be guided by the following general considerations.

On the one hand, as clearly spelt out in our programmatic documents, the immediate attainment of the socialist revolution is not on the agenda. This does not mean that we are putting it off but, to quote Lenin's words, we "are taking the first step towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct path, namely the path of a democratic republic".

On the other hand, liberation implies a massive redistribution of wealth and cannot have much meaning without the undermining of the economic hold over the means of production which is exercised by the existing ruling class and without (at a political level) creating a state form in which the working people are dominant. This implies more than an alteration in voting arrangements. Meaningful exercise of people's power during the interim phase is inconceivable in a situation in which the army, the police force, the state bureaucracy, the communication media etc remain substantially in control of the existing structures. It is only a provisional people's government which can take measures which will ensure the possibilities of a real exercise of democracy.

In conclusion it is necessary to stress that the talks which have taken place have undoubtedly served to enhance the unity of the democratic forces and to weaken the cohesion

of the enemy both at home and abroad. Indeed this area of the politico-military terrain of struggle needs to be pursued with even greater vigour. We must however make sure that the whole membership of the liberation movement and the people generally are kept fully informed about the nature of the talks so as to avoid misunderstanding and distortion of their real nature.

The emphasis of the struggle rests on the rising momentum of the people's offensive which must be intensified with the object of winning people's power. The issue of future negotiations (to be distinguished from the talks) must always be dealt with in a manner which will not serve to divert or defuse this momentum. We must continue to make clear that our "bottom line" for negotiation is the transfer of political power to the majority in one united democratic South Africa.

This objective should however not divert us from creating the broadest possible front of struggle around immediate basic demands such as the release of political prisoners, troops out of townships, dismantling apartheid, legalising the ANC and so on. The winning of these demands may create a better climate for negotiations but cannot in itself be regarded as a bargaining chip for slowing down or suspending the people's offensive.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

July 22, 1986

The Honorable Richard Lugar
 Chairman
 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dick:

Further reductions almost demanded by the Budget Committee will force me to be with my Committee on Armed Services probably most every hour of the remainder of this week. I am sorry for this because I did want to come by your committee and testify against sanctions that are too severe on South Africa.

I have been to South Africa at least six times during my life and each time that I have been there I have complained or maybe that's not the word, I have discussed the subject of apartheid explaining that I was totally against it as were most Americans. Nothing of course has come of those protests or all of the other protests made by different people but now we are turning to sanctions.


I think your committee should very carefully understand that the great bulk of our strategic metals needed for defense come from the country of South Africa. If we had to depend on Russia, one of the few other sources in the world, you can imagine what a stranglehold that country would have on our defense efforts. Not only that, South Africa produces a goodly part of the world's gold. Almost any action she cared to take in retribution against sanctions could be a serious problem for our money.

On top of these rather mercenary things, is the fact that she has been a strong ally of ours in every war we've fought, and she provides us today with some of the best sources of intelligence that I cannot discuss by letter but which I can tell you as former Chairman of the Intelligence Committee are invaluable. I hope that the Foreign Relations Committee does not vote out a strong sanctions bill against South Africa. I'll have to admit though, I don't know what the answer is, but I think the damage that can be done to the United States by these actions will far outweigh any advantages that would come to both black and white people living in South Africa.

The Honorable Richard Lugar
 July 22, 1986
 Page 2

By the way, before I close this letter, why don't we take similar actions against the Soviet Union which has murdered Lord knows how many people or Red China whose total death toll numbers over 50 million? Why is it that we pick only one country which operates against the best instincts of America to penalize? I ask that you make this letter a part of the record because, as I explained at the outset, it's impossible for me to come this week.

With best personal wishes,


 Barry Goldwater

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.
MARYLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 12, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Last year, both the Senate and the House voted favorably on legislation which declared that it is the policy of the United States to promote peaceful change in South Africa through diplomatic means and other measures which would reinforce our firm opposition to apartheid. On September 9, 1985, in Executive Order 12532, you declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the policies of the government of South Africa. The order included a number of measures similar to those approved by both houses of the Congress, such as a ban on bank loans, a ban on the provision of computers to agencies which help implement apartheid and a ban on the import of Krugerrands.

By law, such national emergencies terminate automatically if the President does not publish and transmit to Congress -- within 90 days prior to each anniversary date -- a notice stating that such an emergency is to continue in effect after the anniversary of the original order. The clock on that mandatory 90-day timetable began ticking just a few days ago, on June 9, 1986.

Circumstances in South Africa clearly have worsened in recent weeks. A nationwide state of emergency was declared Thursday, a declaration issued without any concrete steps to encourage dialogue and reconciliation between all South Africans.

I wish to call attention to the necessity of renewing your executive order of 1985. There must be no doubt about the policy of the United States at this critical moment: we are unalterably opposed to apartheid and we will continue to work for its dismantlement and for peaceful change that will bring dignity and freedom to all South Africans.

Sincerely,

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
United States Senator

CM:fh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1986

Dear Senator Helms:

In Secretary Shultz's absence, I am writing to provide the information you requested, during his SFRC appearance on July 23, about the tribal affiliations of the twenty-nine members of the leadership of the African National Congress.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to confirm many details on the ANC leadership, and much of what we know comes from sensitive sources. We do know that, of the ANC Executive's current membership of 29, five are not black South Africans, and thus have no clear cut tribal origin. We have been unable to identify the tribal origin of ten others, owing to mixed tribal parentage or otherwise sketchy information. Of the remaining 14, we know that six are Xhosa, four Zulus, two Sothos, one Tswana, and one Swazi.

I regret the delay in responding to your request, and hope this information is helpful to you.

Sincerely yours,

John C. Whitehead
Acting Secretary

The Honorable
Jesse Helms, Chairman
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY B. GAYNER

These hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee come at a particularly propitious time in the re-examination of United States policy towards South Africa. Already this week both President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz as well as several Senators have presented their views on the situation in South Africa.

One month ago, the United States House of Representatives passed tough new sanctions legislation against South Africa. The approval of the Dellums legislation as a substitute amendment for the pending Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 provided for broad mandatory prohibitions on trade with South Africa and the complete disinvestment of American companies. Undoubtedly the House action was stimulated by the decision of the South African Government on June 12 to institute a country-wide state of emergency in order to quell impending demonstrations commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. Pressure had also mounted with the report a week earlier by the so-called Eminent Persons Group representing the 49 nations of the British Commonwealth. The group urged new sanctions against South Africa after it terminated its discussions on possible negotiations at the time of South African attacks against suspected African National Congress bases in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Moreover, several European countries imposed new levels of sanctions against South Africa, ranging up to a total cessation of trade by Denmark. Just as the sanctions fever seemed to be reaching new heights, reports from South Africa indicated

that the government in Pretoria had begun considering its own retaliatory sanctions against its sanction-touting neighbors.

Only with this new threat from South Africa might the entire debate over sanctions return to a more reasonable discourse on the nature of change in South Africa and the relationship between the fate of South Africa and that of all of sub-saharan Africa.

Sanctions legislation and discussions on South Africa should now move from academic debates over symbolic actions to serious examinations of the potential consequences of ill-considered actions. One may find that South Africa might not be the most vulnerable to Western economic sanctions, but that other African countries may be the most serious victims of sanctions. Moreover, the attempt to find a reasonable accommodation in South Africa, one that benefits everyone, seems to be fading as sanctions and counter-sanctions begin to dominate discussions.

Background of Sanctions

On May 21, 1985, the House of Representatives passed the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, and later the United States Senate passed similar legislation. However, both bills were effectively derailed by a series of sanctions imposed by an executive order issued by President Reagan in September 1985. Efforts to supplement the President's sanctions in the Senate were defeated. But exactly one year after the House action, new legislation was introduced in both the House and Senate, designed to impose even more comprehensive sanctions than those proposed

in the 1985 legislation. Only two weeks after it was introduced, the legislation again came to the floor of the House, whereupon even more radical sanctions were adopted in the form of a substitute amendment prepared by Congressman Dellums to H.R. 4686. These sanctions would be comprehensive in prohibiting U.S. trade and other economic relations with South Africa, and mandating complete disinvestment from South Africa 180 days after the date of enactment. The sanctions would be punitive and permanent because no conditions exist for terminating them. Only later repealing the law itself would end these new sanctions.

The Reagan Administration adamantly opposed any new sanctions, as it had the sanctions legislation passed in 1985. Secretary of State Shultz wrote to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Dante B. Fascell, "We do not believe it should be our purpose to harm the South African economy, nor do we believe that such action will hasten the end of apartheid. In fact I am concerned that such a measure could have the opposite effect, heightening intransigence on both sides at a time when we should be strengthening voices of dialogue and moderation." The Secretary elaborated on these views to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

The Secretary of State was essentially correct in his assessment of the potential impact of sanctions on the situation in South Africa. Thus, rather than new sanctions, we need a new effort to undermine apartheid more broadly from within, both through greater economic interaction with South Africa and

through an attempt to accelerate the speed, scope, and direction of existing reform processes in South Africa.

New Legislative Sanctions in the Senate

While the House legislation provides no means for South Africa to avoid sanctions in six months, the two other principal proposals introduced in the Senate do. In order to avoid the implementation of new sanctions, the legislation requires that certain actions be taken by the South African Government. Both the Kennedy-Weicker (S. 2498) and Kassenbaum (S.2636) bills allow the President of the United States to determine whether such actions have been taken. Under S2498 the Congress must in fact ratify any presidential certification. Therefore the language in any legislation must be clearly defined. The specific conditions that must be met in both bills in order to avoid the imposition of new sanctions are the following:

(1) The President certifies to the Congress that the Government of South Africa-

(A) has freed Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners, and has entered into good faith negotiations with truly representative leaders of the black majority for a new political system; or

(B) has totally dismantled the apartheid system.

Hence the legislation requires that Nelson Mandela be freed from prison whether or not he repudiates violent action to overthrow the South African Government. Furthermore, most proponents of this legislation have made it clear that they

consider members of the African National Congress to be "truly representative leaders of the black majority". The ANC, a majority of whose executive committee are members of the Communist Party of South Africa, also refuses to abandon violence. Similarly, while the legislation refers to dismantling the system of apartheid, it does not explicitly define the word "apartheid." At the same time, however, it seems that abolishing "apartheid" would entail enacting certain political reforms, not just removing the general policies of separate racial development that have been the traditional meaning of the word.

In other words, while the language of the legislation is relatively modest, it appears that those who drafted the legislation have much broader definitions of compliance than does the casual reader. Rather than working effectively with the forces of reform in South Africa, the legislation would only undermine the process of reform by placing unreasonable demands upon an already difficult political process.

Unlike the sanctions imposed by President Reagan on September 9, 1985, the new legislation largely obliterates any distinction between sanctions against the government of South Africa and those against companies operating in South Africa, regardless of how progressive their racial policies may be. The House rejected by 150-268 an amendment proposed by Congressman Burton (R-IN) that would have exempted from the sanctions countries that abide by non-racial Sullivan principles of employment. This would have protected the jobs of 50,000 blacks

working for American firms in South Africa. The Secretary of Commerce, Malcom Baldrige, recently criticised sanctions legislation for "barring new investment" and thereby "branding private investment and the private enterprise system as supporters of apartheid. This is not the message Congress and this country should send to the people of South Africa about an economic system we hope South Africa will sustain after apartheid."

Clearly, the intention of the legislation is to create as much economic disruption as possible in South Africa and to isolate the South African Government. Within South Africa, extremists on both sides support such sanctions - both revolutionaries in South Africa as well as those seeking a restoration of original concepts of apartheid believe their own apocalyptic visions can be promoted by isolating South Africa and increasing hardships for the people there.

Is South Africa Vulnerable?

The increasing attention on violence in South Africa has created the impression that white rule in the country is beginning to break down, and that either the African National Congress or some variant of it will shortly come to power. Similarly, there exists the largely unexamined notion that economic and other sanctions against South Africa by the United States or other Western nations can effectively promote both the end of apartheid and the creation of a just and viable democratic society in South Africa. These two assumptions sustain much of

the present debate over U.S. policy towards South Africa, yet both of them are highly dubious. The South African government recently demonstrated some of the power it can exercise to control the situation in its country, thereby putting to rest theories that it may be very weak and vulnerable. So although some people expected extensive violence to break out on the June 16th Soweto anniversary, the situation throughout South Africa remained relatively calm. Random acts of violence or terrorism can never be fully controlled, as has been the case in Northern Ireland for many years. Instead, acts of terrorism directed at innocent civilians only reveal the relative weakness of violent opponents of any government.

South Africa has the most powerful military and police force on the continent of Africa, and President P. W. Botha recently indicated his willingness to use that power to restore peace and stability to his country and to strike out at the bases in neighboring countries used for subversion against South Africa.

The Regional Importance of South Africa

The relative importance and potential power of South Africa is clear from any examination of data on southern Africa. Of the nine countries in the region of southern Africa, South Africa is not only the most populated but also the dominant economic power. It has been estimated that 75% of the GNP of southern Africa is generated by the economy of South Africa. This is easily understandable when one considers that South African dominates in every area of production and distribution in the

region. Comprising just under 29% of the population of southern Africa, South Africa produces 77% of the electricity, 97% of the coal, 98% of the iron ore, 82% of the chrome, 70% of the corn, 87% of the wheat, 67% of the sugar cane, 80% of the sheep, and 39% of the cattle stock. South Africa also contains 80% of the motor vehicles in the area, 63% of the tarred roads, 84% of the telephones and 60% of the railways and harbors. The data indicate not only the relative wealth of South Africa, but also the nearly complete dependence of neighboring countries on the transportation and communication systems of South Africa. As a result, any serious disruption of the South African economy or any civil disturbances can have profound consequences for many of the more than 80 million people in the region of southern Africa.

In particular, Zimbabwe is extremely vulnerable, as 85% of its trade is either with South Africa or dependent upon its transport routes. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the only alternative transport route that Zimbabwe has is a very tenuous railroad route through Mozambique to Beira which handles 800,000 tons of Zimbabwe products each year. Zimbabwe maintains that route only with the deployment of military forces throughout Mozambique to defend it against attacks by anti-marxist Renamo resistance forces.

If South Africa were subjected to sanctions that denied her access to important commodities from overseas, it is difficult to imagine that the Pretoria government would continue to allow the same products to flow through her country to the neighboring

nations which had demanded that such sanctions be imposed. In short, South Africa could either continue to receive indirectly from "opposing" neighboring countries all the goods she had previously received from the Western world, or she could simply impose her own sanctions, which would close corridors of trade in southern Africa and precipitate a political and economic crisis of unimaginable magnitude. For example, it is estimated that possibly 100,000 people died in a famine in Mozambique three years ago, with transportation routes open. With so many nations in the area surviving on the edge of subsistence, any additional economic dislocations could prove catastrophic and lead to the Ethiopianization of the entire region.

Not only are South Africa's neighbors considerably vulnerable to economic sanctions, but many of them also suffer great potential political instability. Through the establishment of one-party Marxist political and economic systems, three countries in the area, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, have already created a profound dissatisfaction among their own people, which has spawned resistance movements. In fact, over the past three years far more people have been killed in civil wars in these countries than have died in the much more publicized civil disturbances in South Africa. The magnitude of the fighting in all three countries could increase dramatically if South Africa provided even modest levels of military and other support to the resistance movements.

Over the past three years South Africa has provided a

certain amount of critical assistance only to UNITA in Angola; occasional South African forces crossed the border in conjunction with South Africa's war against the SWAPO guerilla movement attacking Namibia from sanctuaries in Angola. More dramatic support by South Africa for UNITA could help turn the tide in that war against the Soviet/Cuban-imposed MPLA regime in Luanda.

South Africa ceased considerable support for Renamo in Mozambique with the signing of the Nkomati Accord in January 1985. The Mozambique regime of Samora Machel agreed to stop providing bases for the ANC in that country if South Africa terminated its support for the anti-marxist Renamo resistance movement. However, as a recent Heritage study demonstrated, since the time of the accord the Renamo resistance movement has simply grown stronger, clearly demonstrating its indigenous support. So if South Africa decided to restore significant support to Renamo, the movement might finally prevail in its war against the beleaguered regime of Samora Machel. Any further strengthening of Renamo could also lead to the elimination of Zimbabwe's transportation route to Beira.¹

Finally, Zimbabwe is not only extremely vulnerable to South African economic pressure, but also risks full-scale civil war if South Africa decides to assist the minority Ndebele people living in southern Zimbabwe. The 1985 human rights report of the U.S.

1. For a detailed study of Mozambique see "The Resistance Can Win in Mozambique," National Security Record No. 92. (The Heritage Foundation, June 1986)

Department of State detailed the massive persecution of these people by the Mugabe regime, which has maintained a nationwide state of emergency since it came to power. The following quotes from the State Department report reveal a situation strikingly similar to that existing in South Africa.

"Political killings increased in 1985: Two main factors are responsible for this trend: government efforts to stamp out dissident activity and the tension that emerged among various political parties."

"Youth Members" of one pro-government political organization "have been responsible for between 150-200 deaths over the past year, according to estimates of knowledgeable authorities."

"Between 300 and 400 civilians...disappeared earlier this year, and there has been no word on the fate of a large majority of them. Twelve of them who later surfaced were in custody of the Central Intelligence Operation."

"Informed sources report that the use of torture is routine in a few government facilities, particularly during interrogation of suspected dissidents and dissident sympathizers." Moreover, "some deaths have occurred" among people in police custody; and one finds "as many as 100 prisoners sharing a large room."

"Approximately 3000 people are believed to have been detained during the past year...At any given time, the number of detainees during 1985 probably average between 800 and 1200."

The situation there is clearly ripe for much more extensive violence if opponents of the Mugabe regime have any viable means of resisting.

The Reform Process in South Africa

Apartheid has traditionally meant a unique system of.

segregation designed by the South African Government to provide for completely separate development of the four identified racial groups in South Africa: whites, blacks, Asians and coloreds. The rigid system, largely legalized through extensive restrictive laws passed since 1948, has been deteriorating in recent years. In January, 1986, in his annual address to the South African Parliament, Prime Minister P.W. Botha said, "South Africa has outgrown apartheid."

Over at least the last seven years the ruling National Party in South Africa has implemented a program of reform that has progressively been eliminating apartheid in South Africa. The government moved from the integration of many hotels, restaurants and some transportation facilities, to lifting the prohibition on mixed marriages and sexual relations between the races. Higher education has been integrated. Prohibitions against multi-racial political parties have been abolished. Blacks and other racial groups have been able to form trade unions, and membership grew dramatically to over five million by 1985. Through a constitutional amendment in 1982, South Africa ended the "whites only" parliament and extended representation to Asians and coloreds, who elect their own members in nationwide elections. The South African government also officially abandoned its "homelands" citizenship policy, and acknowledged that blacks within South Africa would be regarded as citizens of South Africa and no longer assigned citizenship to their "tribal homeland."

The reform process continued to accelerate substantially

over the past several months as the South African Government has taken three key steps that both remove some of the crucial elements of apartheid, and simultaneously provide a mechanism for peacefully resolving the most divisive problem of black political participation in government. These actions, which are particularly important, involve: 1) extending the right of property ownership, 2) repealing the Pass Laws, and 3) creating a National Statutory Council.

An integral part of the system of apartheid that denied basic rights to blacks is the notion that blacks were only "temporary residents" of many urban areas in South Africa. Thus blacks could not own property in such areas. The bill recently introduced in Parliament changes that. As Fred Stiglingh, executive director of the Urban Foundation said:

This Bill is the result of a long and arduous process of research and negotiation to achieve full property ownership rights for Black South Africans.

Similarly, the repeal of the Pass Laws proposed on April 23rd and implemented in June has profound symbolic as well as real significance. As the Pretoria News noted, "No single piece of legislation has done more to ruin race relations here: this was the sharpest sword of apartheid, the point of hatred between black and white." In 1985, for example, 132,000 people were arrested for Pass Law violations. On the same day that legislation was enacted to lift Pass Laws and Influx Control Laws, the government indicated that "no further charges will be pressed in terms of such measures" and that 700 of the offenders

then in jail would be released.

And finally, with a bill to establish a National Statutory Council composed of all races, President P. W. Botha provided a framework for drawing up a new constitutional structure in South Africa. The three points he made go to the heart of remaining grievances: he promised to pursue means that would lead to: 1) elimination of discrimination, 2) equality of all under the law, and 3) the broadening of democracy.

Reforms and Reaction

The fact that reforms have continued over the past two years should indicate that the majority of the ruling National Party are conscientiously trying to work themselves away from an awful legacy, a legacy which they readily admit. While many Congressmen in the U.S. talk about the "apartheid" government in Pretoria, the term does not exist in the official vocabulary of the South African government. Instead, it was precisely due to the abandonment of apartheid that the National Party split in 1982, with the new Conservative Party of South Africa adamantly clinging to the banner of apartheid.

The question, then, is no longer whether South Africa will maintain a system of apartheid, but whether the remnants of apartheid can be dismantled in such a way as to prevent either reaction or revolution. Obviously there is evidence of both tendencies in South Africa today. The creation of the Conservative Party, its gains in recent elections, and now the

emergence of a far right Afrikaner Resistance Movement indicate that a significant part of the white political establishment believes that changes have gone too far and too fast, and that this has led to the disintegration of society, as manifested in the civil disorders.

The African National Congress and Revolution

On the other hand, you have the African National Congress which proudly proclaims its devotion to a revolutionary upheaval and to the establishment of a one-party socialist state. To be sure, some elements of the ANC may be genuine democrats, but the call for a democratic and just South Africa loses its credibility when the movement promotes violence and includes, without apologies, a large number of members of the South African Communist party.

The integral role of communists in the African National Congress has been well known for years. The number of communists on the executive committee has grown to an estimated 18, or a clear majority of the total membership. Most important, the armed wing of the ANC, "the Spear of the Nation," is led by a prominent white communist, Joe Slovo from Lithuania, who joined the communist party in 1940.

Earlier this year, the ANC sent a delegation headed by its Secretary General, Alfred Nzo, to the Soviet Union's XXVII Communist Party Congress. The delegation was accorded the same status as a communist party.

Unfortunately, a dangerous naivete exists in the ANC and among its supporters. On the question of the role of communists in the ANC, its Executive Director Oliver Tambo readily acknowledges, "Yes, we do have some Communists on our executive (Committee), I have never counted how many, but they all owe their primary allegiance to the ANC." But can a communist devoted to a Marxist-Leninist view of the world really owe his primary allegiance to any organization which does not share that view?

Similarly, Bishop Tutu appears unconcerned not just about communists in the ANC, but about the Soviet Union as well. During his trip to the United States earlier this year he bluntly stated, "I am not interested in Soviet expansionism. I am not interested in Communism. I am concerned about what is happening to our people now." This is very curious indeed, given that Bishop Tutu comes to the U.S. to solicit American concern about repression in South Africa, then asserts that he does not care about the repression others suffer throughout the world due to Soviet totalitarianism.

Appearing on U.S. television on February 3, 1986, the Washington representative of the ANC made almost identical comments:

I don't know about slave camps in the Soviet Union. I never bothered myself to find out about slave camps in the Soviet union. I'm not interested. And I'm not interested in what's going on in Libya.

While at times the ANC attempts to score propaganda victories in meetings with Western democrats by seeming

reasonable, nonetheless the broadcasts that it sends into South Africa from its Radio Freedom in marxist Ethiopia promote radicalism and violence. In a broadcast late last year monitored by the BBC, the ANC proclaimed:

The (other) campaign that must continue to escalate is the one of extending the theater of war into white residential areas...we must attack them in their homes and holiday resorts just as we have been attacking black boot-lickers at their homes. This must now happen to their white colleagues.

Even Oliver Tambo, a non-communist, stated in another broadcast:

We cannot and should not allow a situation of relative peace and tranquility to obtain in the white areas of the country while black townships are in flames. We must take the struggle into the white areas of South Africa...

The direct role of the ANC in the most gruesome form of terrorism and intimidation in South Africa was revealed by Winnie Mandela when she proclaimed to a crowd at Munsieville on April 13, 1986, "With our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country." The campaign of terrorism that the ANC has been promoting in the black areas. The proclaimed goal of the ANC is "to make South Africa ungovernable" through violent disorders. The violence of the ANC has been directed against blacks who do not agree with it; this in itself reveals the totalitarian character of the ANC. In another Radio Freedom message, the ANC called upon its supporters "to identify collaborators and enemy agents and deal with them." The brutal assassination of other blacks in South Africa through so-called necklacing has nothing to do with apartheid. Burning or burying

people alive is not a form of free expression or an exercise of basic human rights; instead, it is a brutal denial of the most basic right one has - the right to life. So it should not be surprising when police authorities act to prohibit such action, but then they are often allegedly charged with instigating violence by their intervention in the black townships. It has been estimated that well over 600 blacks have been murdered by rival black groups. Most of those killed have been moderates persecuted by radical ANC supporters who charge them with being collaborators of the South African Government. In fact, anyone who does not agree with the radical program of the ANC may be labeled a traitor.

It is fairly obvious that the African National Congress supports a revolutionary transformation of South African society. Therefore all of its actions, from support for disinvestment, to opposition to broad-based aid for those suffering in the black community, to its ties with terrorism, are actions calculated to cause a deterioration in the situation in South Africa and promote the total unravelling of society into civil war. The presumed hope in this apocalyptic vision is that such a bloodbath will purge the society of evil, and a free and just political order will emerge from the ashes. Neither the history of South Africa nor the history of any other political society supports such visions of the future.

AN EFFECTIVE U.S. POLICY: ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

The complicated, but realistic achievement of durable and meaningful changes in South Africa must come through peaceful accommodations between all groups in the country. An integral aspect of this is the engagement rather than disengagement of the Western world with South Africa. Removal of Western influence precisely at the time of positive changes in South Africa can only hinder such change.

Few deny that foreign investment has been a force for positive change in South Africa or that the greater integration of South Africa into the world community has had a beneficial effect upon traditionally isolated South Africans who grew up with a narrow and unrealistic view of the world. To be sure, increased foreign investment alone will not solve the problems of South Africa; indeed 90 percent of all investment in South Africa is internally generated. But as part of broader program of effective engagement in South Africa, investment can contribute to a solution by establishing racially integrated companies.

To spur change in South Africa, the Reagan Administration should pursue a strategy of "investment leverage."^[2] This means:

- 1) Instead of disinvestment, increased American participation in the South African economy should be encouraged.

2. Stuart M. Butler, "An Investment Strategy to Undermine Apartheid", Heritage Foundation (Backgrounder) No. 427, April 30, 1985.

2) The U.S. government should provide special assistance through American companies to upgrade the educational and management skills of black South Africans and help them form businesses of their own.

3) Assistance should be given to American trade unionists to train black union organizers.

4) Technical assistance and encouragement should be given to speed the recent decision by the South African government to return to the private sector key segments of the nationalized economy, thus taking control from Afrikaner bureaucrats.

In order to foster continued economic interaction with South Africa, the Reagan Administration should carefully review existing policies that are incompatible with this objective. Specifically the Administration should:

1) Counter state and local disinvestment laws. The Justice Department should join in the pending suit which seeks to nullify state and local disinvestment laws as unconstitutional violations of federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce.

2) Rescind restrictions on the sale of Krugerrands. The section of the Executive Order issued in September 1985, banning the sale of Krugerrands in the United States should be rescinded because such sales cannot be considered supporting instruments of apartheid. This represented an unjustifiable restraint on trade

with South Africa that only adversely effects the economy of South Africa, especially the mining industry, which happens to have predominately black employees.

On the other hand, any further disinvestment and a cessation of trade with South Africa will be counterproductive. Existing uncertainty in South Africa, coupled with moves in Congress to require economic disinvestment already have prompted some American firms to withdraw from South Africa. Such withdrawal only enhances the role of South Africans and other foreign firms and they are not as committed to integration as are American companies abiding by the Sullivan principles.

U.S. POLICY AND POLITICAL REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Beyond encouraging

continued and expanded economic interaction with the private sector in South Africa, the United States should indicate its willingness to work closely with the South African government in the implementation of the reforms it has announced:

(1) Education. This would mean that the South African government's efforts to upgrade black education in the country could be supplemented by American advice and assistance in constructing programs designed especially for disadvantaged students. The United States can continue its scholarship program in South Africa and widen it to include blacks wherever they live in the country including those assigned to so-called "homelands", who now suffer discrimination under U.S. programs due to the location of their residence. With the integration of higher education in South Africa more assistance should be given to the education of members of disadvantaged groups in South Africa. The same amount of money used for several hundred South Africans in the United States could provide educations for several times that number in South Africa. Also in recognition of the changes in higher education, the USIA should create a bi-national commission in South Africa to oversee the existing Fulbright exchange program with South Africa and thereby work more closely with the integrated South African universities.

(2) Discrimination. The South African government has indicated its intention of abolishing all forms of discrimination. The United States can provide legal assistance to victims of discrimination in South Africa who attempt, through peaceful judicial challenges, to assert their rights under changes in South African law. Some support for them has already been provided through the Human Rights Fund at AID.

(3) Institution building. The National Endowment for Democracy should become more actively engaged in the process of broadening the infrastructure of representative government beyond the white community in South Africa. While leaving it up to South Africans to decide their political future, NED can provide guidance and support to the institutional supports necessary for any open political society.

(4) Black business. The Chamber of Commerce element of NED (CIPE) should be encouraged to work with black businesses in former white areas of South African cities. The Entrepreneurial Training project of AID should emphasize this in its programs in South Africa. The African Development Foundation should expand its work into South Africa by providing assistance to black entrepreneurs.

(5) Labor Unions. Similarly, American expertise from the U.S. labor movement should broaden its engagement in the process reforms in labor relations in South Africa designed to guarantee nondiscriminatory employment practices.

(6) Political participation. The U.S. government should encourage representative leaders of the non-white communities in South Africa who renounce violence to engage in discussions with the South African government concerning political reform. Specifically the proposals of the South African government for a National Council to discuss serious political reform should be pursued.

Through active support for the professed reform process of South Africa, the United States can either help to guarantee their success or make a definitive critical evaluation of their shortcomings. In short, the reform process should be given a chance to develop as an element of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in South Africa.

More broadly, the United States should forthrightly declare its support for the construction of a political order in South Africa based on a representative form of government which would include all people. At the same time the United States should denounce violence and indicate that it will disassociate itself with any group or individual who promotes violent change in South Africa.

1. African National Congress: The U.S. government should maintain a minimal level of contact with the ANC until they renounce violence and endorse a representative pluralistic society. As the House of Representatives voted 365 to 49 on June 18th, the United States should provide no economic assistance to the ANC until it removes all communists from its executive committee. Terrorism by the ANC should be officially condemned by the U.S. government.

2. Black leadership in South Africa: The United States should work with, and encourage the South African government to work with, all leaders in the black community who advocate peaceful change. For example, the United States should work more closely with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Zulu movement in South Africa. Existing U.S. assistance programs to blacks in South Africa have unfairly given a disproportionate amount of support to more radically oriented factions in the black community. The United States should cease advocating the release of Nelson Mandela until he ceases the advocacy of violent change in South Africa. The United States support efforts to create a multi-racial government in a new Kwa-Natal political consolidation.

CONCLUSION

As an effective reform process proceeds in South Africa and the Government seeks to negotiate changes in the political system to guarantee participation in government by everyone, the United States should promote that process. In order to effectively do this the United States must move beyond the constructive engagement presently being pursued. Constructive engagement became a largely reactive policy which allowed forces of revolutionary change in South Africa to gain prestige and momentum, while those seeking peaceful change in the black community have been largely ignored. Thus those promoting a violent, revolutionary change in South Africa now dominate the attention of Washington. By reacting to the pleas of more radical elements in South Africa we have reached a point where many members of Congress appear determined to replace constructive engagement with destructive disengagement. A dynamic alternative of effective engagement in South Africa is necessary to avoid the potential further polarization into reaction and revolution, both of which would create much greater hardships on the people of

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID HAUCK

Mr. Chairman and other committee members, I am pleased to testify today on the question of adopting sanctions against South Africa.

The Investor Responsibility Research Center was founded in 1972 by institutional investors to provide impartial reporting and analysis on public policy issues involving U.S. corporations. From the beginning, South Africa, and the role and impact of American firms with operations there, has been a major focus of our research. Nearly 300 institutional investors--universities, pension funds, investment management firms, banks and insurance companies--use IRRC's research to assist them in developing and implementing shareholder voting and investment guidelines related to the question of U.S. investment in South Africa. Our funding comes from research fees paid by our institutional investor clients. Except for their purchase of our publications, IRRC receives no funds from American firms with operations in South Africa or from the U.S. government.

I have made seven research trips to South Africa since 1979, spending a total of more than 12 months there. I returned last month from my most recent visit to South Africa.

In the wake of ongoing black resistance to apartheid and increasing state repression in South Africa, the U.S. Senate is being asked to consider various sanctions measures. In my remarks this morning, I will focus on three of the proposed sanctions--no new investment in South Africa by U.S. firms, the complete withdrawal of U.S. companies, and a prohibition on new bank loans to any South African borrower.

No new investment by U.S. parents in South African affiliates

U.S.-based companies are the second largest investors in South Africa after the British. As of the end of May 1986, 266 U.S. firms had direct investments in South Africa. In recent years, the unmistakable trend has been for U.S. companies to pull out of South Africa rather than invest in that country for the first time. Seven companies pulled out in 1984, 39 pulled out in 1985 and, in the first five months of 1986, 15 companies pulled out. (See Appendix 1 of my testimony for a list of the firms pulling out.) To the best of IRRC's knowledge, only two U.S. firms have entered South Africa since the beginning of 1984.

In general, companies that have withdrawn have had sales but not manufacturing operations in South Africa. As a result, they had relatively little invested in South Africa, and their withdrawal has had little impact on the overall value of U.S. investments in that country.

Direct investment in South Africa by U.S. firms has declined only marginally since 1982. Although the U.S. Commerce Department's figures show that U.S. direct investment fell by nearly a billion dollars in the last three years, from \$2.28 billion at the end of 1982 to \$1.35 billion at the end of 1985, it is important to note that the principal cause of this drop was the sharp decline in the value of the South African rand against the dollar. (See Table 1.) As a result, the value of rand-denominated investments in South Africa was much less in dollar terms at the end of 1985 than it had been three years earlier. When one removes the impact of the weakening rand, we find that U.S. direct investment has declined by only \$50 million since 1982. (See line labeled "Direct Investment Cumulative Capital Gains and Losses" in Table 1.)

In order to assess the impact of a ban on new investment by U.S. companies in their South African subsidiaries, it is important to note the extent of such investment in recent years. Again referring to Table 1 and the items labeled "Intercompany Debt Flow" and "Equity Capital Flow," one finds that from 1982 to 1985 there was a net capital flow of \$14 million from the South African subsidiaries to the U.S. parents, rather than the reverse. In 1985, the net capital flow from South African subsidiaries to the U.S. parents came to \$17 million. It is hardly surprising that U.S. firms are taking money out of their South African subsidiaries rather than putting it in, given the degree of political unrest in South Africa and the poor state of its economy, but it underscores the fact that a ban on new U.S. investment is not likely to have an impact on the South African economy. In addition, the South African government is likely to block this flow of capital from South Africa to the United States if sanctions are applied, with the result that the pool of investment capital in South Africa could actually grow somewhat after sanctions.

Withdrawal of U.S. Companies from South Africa

If a ban on new investment would have little direct impact on the South African economy, what about requiring U.S. corporations to sell their South African assets and withdraw, as proposed in S.2570? Once again, one finds that this economic sanction would have little direct impact on the South African economy, despite the fact that U.S. direct investment was worth some \$1.3 billion at the end of 1985.

The reason a total pullout by U.S. companies would do little to harm the South African economy is that Pretoria reintroduced a two-tier foreign exchange system on September 1, 1985. South Africa now has two exchange rates—one for the commercial rand and another for the financial rand. The commercial rand is used for foreign trade dealings, the payment of dividends to foreign owners of stock in South African companies, and tourism. The financial rand rate, is used when a foreigner sells an asset in South Africa and then exchanges the rands he receives from the sale for dollars.

When an American firm sells its assets to a South African company, the rand proceeds from the sale go into a financial rand pool. Non-South Africans wishing to invest in South Africa, either through direct investment or by buying shares of South African companies, buy financial rand from the pool. If the supply of financial rand exceeds demand (more foreign investors are pulling out of South Africa than want to come in), the value of the financial rand will fall until a balance between supply and demand is

reached. If no foreigners wanted to invest in South Africa, the value of the financial rand would fall to zero.

The advantage of the financial rand from Pretoria's standpoint is that a decision by a company to sell its assets and take the proceeds out of the country has no effect on South Africa's capital flow account. Because of the financial rand system, South Africa would experience no net loss of capital even if all U.S. companies pulled out and, as a result, the size of the South African economy would not be reduced. (The disadvantage for South Africa is that the imposition of exchange controls strongly discourages any increase in the value of overall foreign investment--companies worry that once they go into South Africa they may not be able to get their money out. Without new foreign investment, the South African economy performs less well than it otherwise could have.)

This discussion assumes that U.S. firms will obey South Africa's exchange control laws. But, given the fact that the financial rand is already worth nearly 50 percent less than the commercial rand and that the gap between the two exchange rates is likely to widen, companies will be under increasing pressure to find ways to evade the law by getting their assets out through the commercial rand. One relatively easy path would be to sign a licensing agreement giving the South African purchaser of the American assets access to the U.S. parent's manufacturing process and technology. In return, the South African company could be required to pay a fee that covers use of the technology as well as an additional, disguised payment for the assets. Under current South African exchange controls, payments in compliance with licensing agreements are made at the commercial rand rate. Thus, getting the South African purchaser to agree to a licensing agreement with a generous payment schedule is one way a U.S. firm could bring its assets out of the country through the commercial rand rate.

Licensing agreements also are important because, to the extent that the South African economy depends on western technology, such agreements permit South Africa continued access to foreign technology even after foreign firms have pulled out of South Africa. It is interesting to note that at least 15 of the 54 U.S. companies that have pulled out since the beginning of 1985 signed licensing agreements with the companies that purchased their South African assets.

U.S. Bank Loans to South Africa

Both Senator Kassebaum's bill, S.2636, and S.2498 would prohibit new loans by U.S. banks to all public and private sector borrowers in South Africa. By adding private sector borrowers, these bills go beyond President Reagan's Executive Order of September 1985, which effectively banned new loans to the South African government and its agencies.

If passed, this legislation would legally mandate what the U.S. banking community is already doing in response to political and economic developments in South Africa and Pretoria's decision on September 1, 1985, to suspend the repayment of foreign loans owed by South African private sector borrowers.

As Table 2 of my testimony shows, the value of U.S. bank loans to all South African borrowers has dropped steadily since September 1984, a period

marked by increased political unrest in the country. From a high point of \$5.0 billion in September 1984, U.S. banks reduced their South African exposure by more than \$1.5 billion before Pretoria declared a debt moratorium in September 1985. In the three months following Pretoria's declaration of a debt moratorium and President Reagan's Executive Order, U.S. banks reduced the value of their outstanding South African loans by another \$200 million so that the total at the end of 1985 stood at \$3.24 billion.

Even without sanctions legislation, few U.S. banks are likely to lend to the South African private sector as long as the debt moratorium stays in place and South Africa's political unrest continues. Moreover, even before President Reagan's Executive Order, U.S. banks were reducing their loans to the South African public sector.

Some thoughts on what might constitute an effective policy toward South Africa

Now let me anticipate some of your questions. Since IRRC's charter is to be impartial, I cannot recommend a particular course of action. But I can give you some idea of whether the actions contemplated by the bills before you will meet their stated policy objectives.

If the goal of the United States government is to undermine white support for continued racial domination in South Africa and to restore its credibility with black South Africans, there is a package of measures that would meet that goal. The package would include imposing non-economic sanctions targeted at South Africa's whites; prohibiting foreign companies and banks from making new investments and loans in South Africa; increasing the frequency, level and visibility of meetings between leaders of black opposition groups, including the African National Congress, and western political leaders; and developing a multilateral assistance program addressing South Africa's enormous social and economic problems that would be implemented once white domination was ended.

Non-economic sanctions can be devised that would fall most heavily on whites in South Africa, increasing their sense of being cut off from the west. Isolating South Africa's whites from the world community through restrictions on South African Airways landing rights and downgrading diplomatic relations by closing consular offices would help to undermine their self-confidence and cause more of them to question and challenge Pretoria's policies.

As I have attempted to show in my remarks, two of the proposed sanctions against South Africa--no new investment by U.S. companies and no new loans by U.S. banks--would essentially mandate what the U.S. business community is already doing based on its objective assessment of the current risks associated with doing business in South Africa. The legislation would have an impact, however, if the situation should change in South Africa and companies and banks, in the absence of sanctions, would be tempted to increase their investments in that country.

If a goal of the United States and other countries is to maintain any credibility with the majority black opposition leaders in South Africa today, this would constitute an even more important reason for adopting a policy incorporating at least some sort of economic sanctions in the form of no

new investment and no new loans. These sanctions would not exacerbate the difficult economic situation South Africa currently finds itself in largely because of its domestic policies. Thus, they would not worsen the condition of black South Africans, nor would they harm U.S. firms and banks which have already adopted these restrictions. But they would send a signal of support to the black opposition.

Having instituted these economic and non-economic sanctions, the United States, Great Britain and West Germany could then move on the political front to improve contacts and relations with black opposition groups, including the African National Congress. These actions could contribute to a more rapid solution to South Africa's political deadlock by giving such groups greater credibility among whites and by increasing the now perilously low standing of western nations in the eyes of black South Africans. Humanitarian assistance for South African refugee education programs being run by the ANC in the frontline states is an obvious place to begin.

Finally, if the West hopes to persuade white South Africans to dismantle apartheid, scrap white political domination and move into a nonracial future that is filled with unknowns and uncertainty, we must hold out a carrot. To undermine their confidence with sanctions alone would merely cause them to react defensively. What could be added is a multilateral assistance plan that holds out the promise of a better South Africa once white political domination is ended. South Africa faces enormous social and economic problems, conditions that will persist even after blacks gain political rights. If the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and South Africa's other major trading partners could agree on a package of economic and social assistance that would be forthcoming once the political deadlock in South Africa was broken, this would help alleviate whites' fears of relinquishing power, and it could create the social and economic conditions necessary for a politically stable, nonracial, future South Africa.

TABLE 1: U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

(\$U.S. millions)	1982	1983	1984	1985
Direct Investment	\$2,281	\$1,987	\$1,510	\$1,346
Capital Gains and Losses*	-40	-197	-597	-92
Direct Investment minus Cumulative Capital Gains and Losses	2,321	2,224	2,344	2,272
Intercompany Debt Flow (minus numbers indicate flow from the United States)	-32	78	-10	9
Equity Capital Flow (minus numbers indicate flow from the United States)	-39	-2	2	8

* During the period shown in the table, capital gains and losses were nearly entirely due to the reduction in the value of U.S. investments in South Africa because of the rand weakening against the dollar.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

TABLE 2: U.S. BANK LENDING TO SOUTH AFRICA

(\$U.S. millions)	Sept. 1984	Dec. 1984	March 1985	June 1985	Sept. 1985	Dec. 1985
Total loans to all South African borrowers	\$4,978.4	\$4,704.5	\$4,198.5	\$3,923.1	\$3,441.1	\$3,240.5
Loans to the public sector	343.0	353.1	302.2	217.0	180.3	114.1
Loans to South African banks	3,531.4	3,228.6	2,753.3	2,495.6	2,231.3	2,167.6
Other private sector loans	1,103.8	1,122.7	1,142.9	1,210.4	1,029.4	958.6

Source: "Country Exposure Lending Survey," Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

APPENDIX I

U.S. Companies that left South Africa in 1984: (7)

Atlantic Richfield	dissolved
Boeing	"withdrew"
Carson Pirie Scott	?
The Continental Corp.	?
Hay Associates	sold to a British company
Parsons & Whittemore	sold to "private buyers"
Tellus Industries	?

U.S. Companies that left South Africa in 1985: (39)

AMR	closed
Alexander & Alexander	sold to SA company
American Express*	closed
BBDO	sold to local management
Blue Bell	?
Carnation	sold to a Swiss company
Celanese	?
City Investing	liquidated
Computer Sciences Corp.	sold to a South African company
Coscelebre	?
Dana	?
Do-All	closed
Ecolaire	?
Engelhard*	closed
Flow General	closed
John Fluke*	sold to a South African company
General Foods*	sold to a South African company
Henkel	sold to a South African company
Illinois Tool Works	"discontinued"
Koppers	closed
Martin Marietta	sold to a Swiss company
Millipore Corp.	sold to local management
Mohawk Data Sciences	sold to local management
Motorola*	sold to a South African company
National Utility Service	?
Navistar*	sold to a South African company
Oak Industries*	sold to a British company
Opico*	closed
Parsons Corp.	project completed
PepsiCo*	sold to a South African group
Perkin-Elmer	sold to local management
Phibro-Salomon	closed
A.H. Robins	sold to a South African company
Singer	sold to a South African company
Smith International	?
Tidwell Industries*	sold to a South African company
TWA*	closed
West Point Pepperell	sold to local management
John Wiley & Sons*	sold to a South African company

U.S. Companies that have left South Africa in 1986 so far: (16)

Applied Power Inc.	sold to "European interests"
Ashland Oil Inc.	sold to a South African company
Bell & Howell	sold to a South African company
CBS*	sold to a South African company
Cooper Industries	sold to a South African company
Eaton Corp.	sold to a South African company
GE	sold to a South African company
GTE	sold to a South African company
Kidder, Peabody & Co. Inc.	dissolved
MacMillan	sold to ?
Manpower Inc.	sold to a British company
Pennwalt*	sold to ?
Phillips Petroleum Co.	sold to a West German company
W.R. Stamler Corp.*	liquidated
The Stanley Works	sold to local management
VF Corp.	sold to local investors

* asterisk indicates that the company retains a licensing, distribution or franchise agreement with a company in South Africa.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. SILBER

Apartheid is repugnant to anyone with even the slightest sense of justice. For those with the imagination to place themselves in the position of people subjected to its indignities, its abuses, its distortion of family relationships, of friendships, of life at work or in the school, its isolation of the individual from the family of man, the very idea of apartheid produces anguish and outrage. It is a system of organized injustice that daily takes its toll not merely of human dignity but of human life. No decent human being would wish to do anything to support this vicious system of oppression and waste or to perpetuate its existence. Every decent human being will do everything possible to bring it to an end as quickly as possible.

But a morally serious person must ask how it can be ended without causing in the process more suffering and injustice than is endured under the system itself. If I believed that sanctions against South Africa would result in the destruction of apartheid rather than its perpetuation along with death and destitution for millions of blacks, I would lobby vigorously for their immediate adoption.

But I am a philosopher, and as such I believe that philosophy offers a rational guide to action, even in the field of public policy. I suggest that there are philosophical considerations bearing upon American policy towards South Africa that should be considered.

In a highly complex situation any action may have unanticipated and therefore unintended consequences. Some of these consequences may be benign and consistent with one's intentions. But in complex situations some consequences are, unknown and unintended, contrary to one's intention, and may be as wrong or as evil as the conscious intentions were right and good. Situations of great complexity are the breeding ground of tragedy. In a situation fraught with tragic possibilities, one who seizes on a simple solution and acts in ignorance of or indifference to the full range of consequences that follow from that solution may find that his action does not correct the problem but rather leads to even more serious problems. Believing he advocates one goal, the advocate of the simple solution may in fact be working for others which would horrify him if he only he recognized them.

Imagine a child tottering on a windowsill: an observer who does not consider the range of consequences may rush forward, shouting "Watch out!" and by doing so cause the child to lose its balance and fall to the ground. An observer who considers consequences will do whatever he can to ensure the child's safety should it fall--perhaps sending someone outside to try to catch it--before moving to remove it from the sill.

A sound understanding of means and ends and their relation to each other is essential to the examination of any social or political issue. No one should proclaim a solution to a problem without first having examined the complex web of means and ends inherent in it; only then can one with confidence prescribe means that in fact lead to the desired end and avoid others that are worse than the problem he desires to correct.

DIVESTMENT

On the campuses of American universities the call to divest has been popular. But I have not heard a single advocate of divestment explain how divestment would lead to the ending of apartheid. Some students have even forgotten what divestment is supposed to accomplish. One student said, "We will never forget that our goal is divestment." But that is not the goal: the goal is to end apartheid. The cry, "our goal is divestment" illustrates the truth of Emerson's observation, "Marry the means and lose the end."

The first step to wisdom is never to confuse means and ends or allow a preoccupation with the means to obscure the end. Let us agree that our goal is to abolish apartheid. There are a variety of possible means to consider in reaching that goal.

But divestment is not one of them. It is, as Chief Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Helen Suzman, and Alan Paton have said--and as everyone who has traced out the chains of cause and effect knows--either an empty public relations gesture or, if seriously and effectively carried out with the result of disinvestment by American corporations, the means to destroy the economic well-being of black South Africans.

The divestment movement is laced with contradictions and surprises that its advocates ignore. The divestment movement does not call for divestment in all companies doing business with South Africa. If it did, and if its call were heeded, 90% of all the stock issued in the United States would be offered at once for sale. Can anyone doubt that 90% of the companies traded on our stock exchanges sell their products or do other business with South Africa? If it is morally wrong to own stock in such companies and

if we all act according to the demands of the divestment advocates and offer our stock for sale, to whom will we sell it? If it is morally wrong to own the stock, it is morally wrong to buy it. If the advocates of divestment were consistent and convincing, all stock would be offered for sale, but no one would offer to buy it and all trading would cease. The free market would end and those advocating divestment would fail in their objective for there would be no way to divest through sale.

Even if there were a way to divest through sale, it would simply depend upon one individual transferring his moral guilt to another by means of exchanging stock. No one who takes ethics seriously could recommend such a proposal. The divestment strategy, if it were to work, would require divestment without sale, the shredding of all stock certificates, leaving the managers in control of companies without stockholders, free from the restraints of stockholders who vote their shares in support of anti-apartheid resolutions.

But the divestment advocates are not consistent. They do not advocate divestment in all companies doing business with South Africa. Rather, recognizing that a consistent program would be absurd on its face, they urge divestment only in that much smaller number of U. S. companies which, by doing business in South Africa, actually employ black South Africans and contribute to their economic well-being. These companies, frequently in deliberate violation of apartheid laws, have created opportunities for training and for economic advancement for blacks; they have introduced racial integration into the workplace--into assembly lines and cafeterias. The most intense cry is raised against IBM, Ford and General Motors,

companies that have moved significantly toward ending apartheid within their own establishments; companies that pay wages that are the highest available to blacks in South Africa, and vastly higher than those available to blacks anywhere else in Africa. Indeed, the wages paid not only by American companies but the wages paid by South African companies in general are so high that they have attracted to South Africa thousands of black workers from other countries in the region.

By focusing the call for divestment merely on this small subset of United States corporations the divestment movement does not escape the paradoxes I mentioned earlier. If we are obligated to divest in these companies, individuals who do not presently own these stocks would likewise be morally prohibited from buying them. Hence, no exchange in these stocks could be made if buyers and sellers shared the moral views of the divestment movement. If A wishes to sell to B, he must corrupt B in the process of the sale. If B is as morally upright as A, no sale will take place and A must retain his stock as a burning coal in his hand.

The advocates of divestment, by marrying an ill-conceived means, have lost their end, which is to abolish apartheid.

SANCTIONS

The members of the House who voted last month to impose severe economic sanctions on South Africa share with all of us--every single one of us--a moral abhorrence of apartheid and a decent determination to end it. Their intention to end apartheid is not only commendable; it is commonplace. It is a

goal shared not only by virtually all Americans and by all black South Africans; it is a goal shared by perhaps a majority of white South Africans, for even the National Party, which represents the majority of white South Africans, is now committed to ending apartheid.

The question facing us is not whether to end apartheid, but how?

The sanctions proposed, if effective, would have the consequence of severely damaging the economy of South Africa and leave black South Africans without possibilities of employment, less open to moderate means for the ending of apartheid, and in misery so intense and destructive that moderate alternatives would be impossible and their desperate choice would be violence and self-destruction.

In fact, the means we adopt to carry out our desire to abolish apartheid is of critical importance for all who desire to end apartheid without massive bloodshed and suffering. Sharing this objective, we must ask how can we assist in the destruction of apartheid without destroying the institutions--political, judicial, financial, economic and educational--on which fulfilled human existence depends. And how can we end apartheid without releasing forces that will result in the destitution, mutilation or death of millions of black South African citizens whose lives we intend to enhance?

This is the problem, and after a consideration of the difficulties involved in several of the solutions that have been offered, I will offer some proposals of my own.

The move to impose sanctions is freighted with ambiguity. The House bill would embargo all trade with South Africa except for minerals certified by the President as strategic. The decision to impose sanctions that prohibit the exchange of goods which are of no great importance to the economy of the United States while continuing to permit the importation of those strategic minerals on which our economic life and our military defense depend is a policy that, if it is passed, would elevate hypocrisy to the level of national policy.

If, however, we seek to escape from a policy of hypocrisy by putting a total embargo on South African imports, we create an even more serious dilemma for ourselves. By extending our imposition of sanctions to prohibit the importation of strategic minerals no less than non-strategic materials, we would create a monopoly in strategic minerals for the Soviet Union. If we believe that the survival of this nation is consistent with this policy, we shall deserve the fate of those who refuse to consult their own essential interests.

Our defense, and hence our freedom, depends on trade with South Africa in strategic minerals. In our determination to end apartheid--a determination which I share as deeply and as passionately as anyone--we must not move in a moral vacuum, or in an economic, political or strategic vacuum. We must look at the complexity of the situation and make our best effort to trace out the network of consequences following from any policy that is proposed.

There are only two ways to end trade in South African strategic minerals: either all the nations of the free world

must boycott South Africa and purchase their strategic minerals from the Soviet Union, or South Africa must itself embargo all sales of strategic minerals to the free world, which would likewise have the effect of giving the Soviet Union a monopoly on strategic minerals. Either alternative would be disastrous for the United States and the free world. The Soviet Union would control industrial production worldwide. All industrial nations would then depend upon the goodwill of the Soviet Union, and that commodity is in shorter supply than strategic minerals.

If we alone impose the sanctions and no one else does, we will simply unilaterally damage the economy of the United States. The greatest burden for that reduction in our economy will fall on the shoulders of American blacks--still, regrettably, the first group to suffer in a recession. We will watch as other nations of the world reap the economic benefits that follow from our embargo. We have already been through that experience with our grain embargo against the Soviet Union, which did not harm the Soviets but damaged our balance of trade and harmed our farmers, to the great benefit of Canadian, Australian and Argentinian producers of grain.

A HIDDEN AGENDA: THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

I have thus far assumed that the call for sanctions is no more than a proposal to place economic pressure on the government of South Africa. For some advocates of sanctions, however, there is a hidden agenda. For them, behind the calls for sanctions--the call for an embargo and the call for

disinvestment--there is a tacit call for the destruction of the government and the economy of South Africa. Indeed, a few advocates of sanctions do openly acknowledge that their aim is the destruction of the government and economy of South Africa. And these advocates call for the destruction of the government and economy of South Africa out of what they claim is a profound concern for the plight of black South Africans.

Here we must face squarely the nature of an organization that is frequently regarded as a legitimate voice of black South African protest: the African National Congress. There is a widespread misapprehension that the ANC is the South African equivalent of Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference. This is a tragic mistake. In recent decades, the ANC has become the purveyor of a strident Leninism, an ideology it has sought to implement by terrorism and murder--so far, largely against blacks. If anyone doubts the accuracy of this description, they should spend some time reading the BBC's transcripts of the broadcasts of "Radio Freedom," the ANC's Ethiopia-based broadcasting station.*

It should surprise no one that calls for the destruction of the the South African economy are music to the ears of Oliver Tambo, head of the ANC, who has said that he will build a new system on the ruins of the present one. Who but the black South Africans will be the primary victims of this crusade? It is the black South Africans who will suffer the

*A selection of quotations from African National Congress leaders Winnie Mandela, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise and Johnny Makatini, in support of terrorism and the Soviet Union, may be found in an appendix to this testimony.

most if there is an attempt to destroy the government and the economy of South Africa in the mistaken belief that this is a workable means by which to end apartheid. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and the president of Inkatha, the largest black political party in South Africa, has put it very clearly: "For Americans to hurt the growth rate of the South African economy through boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment would demonstrate a callous disregard for ordinary people, suffering terribly under circumstances that they did not create."

Chief Buthelezi is not the only anti-apartheid leader to have made this point. Helen Suzman, the longest-sitting member of Parliament, has been fearless in her fight for racial equality. She rejects the use of harsh economic penalties. "Blacks are getting the idea that external pressure . . . will give them victory just around the corner," she warns. "The risk is that Western powers are inadvertently encouraging blacks to launch violence against whites, and then the government is really going to unleash its terrible power on these kids." Alan Paton, author of Cry, the Beloved Country and founder of the South African Liberal Party, has been called "the conscience of white South Africa." He has perhaps done more to awaken the western world to the inequities of apartheid than anyone else. He, too, opposes sanctions. "The idea of me . . . supporting something that would cost people their jobs--I couldn't do it," he told the Boston Globe in 1985. "I doubt whether you advance any good cause by destroying the economy."

The ANC's willingness to rule in the ruins is typical of its Marxist-Leninist orientation. The idea may sound attractive if the ruins in question are the ruins of apartheid, a detestable system that must and will be brought to ruin. This overlooks the stark reality that the ruins to which the ANC and other extremists look forward will--whatever their intentions--be made up of the graves of millions of blacks, outnumbering those of whites not by ratios of 10 to 1, but perhaps by ratios of 100 to 1. Their rule will be a rule on the ruins of an economy that could no longer support blacks at a level equal to the most miserable levels in Africa, much less the level to which they are supported now while the government and the economic system of South Africa continue to function.

In striking contrast to the concern for a peaceful end to apartheid expressed by moderate South Africans of all races, the ANC explicitly rejects peaceful routes to destroy apartheid. Rather, it calls for a destruction of the entire system through bloody insurrection. The focus of its attack, moreover, has thus far been not on the South African government or on white businesses, but on blacks themselves. Some of these victims are employed by the government as informers or vigilantes, but others, simply blacks engaged in peaceful moves toward ending apartheid, are denounced as "collaborators" and sometimes brutally murdered.

The Soviet Union is doubtless willing to contribute resources to the African National Congress and to others who

would rule in the ruins, for the Soviet Union has demonstrated its ability to move into power vacuums and to establish people's republics that quickly become totalitarian states from which the Soviet Union continues and extends its policy of world domination.

With or without the presence of the Soviet Union, the call to rule in the ruins is a call to take a callous road. It is a call that should repel any decent person. It is a cruel and bloody road--no matter how well paved with good and pious intentions. It is not the road to be taken by the United States of America.

Before demanding that South Africa solve its racial crisis on a schedule measured not in decades or years but in months, we should reflect with profound humility on the tragedy of our own history. By the time Abraham Lincoln came into office in 1861, control of our own national crisis over race had passed into the hands of the extremists, and not even Lincoln, a moderate of extraordinary ability, was able to resolve the crisis without a bloody civil war. There followed a century of only gradually attenuating abuse of blacks. In 1948, a giant step was taken: the integration of the military forces by a courageous and politically unpopular decision of a great President, Harry Truman. In 1954, by a decision of the Supreme Court, we began the still uncompleted business of integrating the schools. It is sobering to reflect that the Boston schools were still segregated in 1972, and despite a Federal Court order requiring their integration, they have not been satisfactorily integrated to this day. Moreover, it was

only between 1964 and 1968, twenty years ago, that the civil rights movement brought about a national consensus to extend participation in the political system of the United States to American blacks.

Surely, given our own history, we are not going to urge in righteous moral indignation the destruction of the government and the economy of South Africa, for that is to endorse and encourage a bloody civil war in which not the whites but the blacks will be the primary victims. Those who advocate sanctions and the removal of all those companies from South Africa that are contributing to the economic well-being of South Africans, companies which are defying the laws of apartheid and encouraging the co-mingling of the races, elevating the standard of living for black South Africans to the point where they begin to acquire economic power from which democratic political power follows--those who advocate this should face up to the consequences of their advocacy. They are, intentionally or not, advocating the imposition of untold misery and death on millions of black South Africans.

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND TERRORISM*

If we will these means, we will a tragic end--the use of blacks as means to the destruction of fellow blacks in a terrible civil war in which the determined white Boers with nothing to lose but their lives and all their property, will not cease fighting until they have killed as many millions of blacks as necessary to perpetuate their regime.

*See Appendix

Even a less apocalyptic route to power for the ANC would spell a disaster for all the people of South Africa. Although the ANC began as a non-violent organization, embracing people of many viewpoints united by their opposition to apartheid, it is now increasingly close to the Soviet Union. The ANC's publications extol the Soviet Union for its "liberation" of Afghanistan. This is a terrible omen of what "liberation" means in the vocabulary of the ANC.

The terrorism of the ANC is advanced and brutal. A favorite method of punishing blacks who disagree with it is the "necklace": a rubber tire soaked in gasoline, placed around the neck of the victim and set alight. The use of these demonic instruments of torture and death has explicitly been approved by Winnie Mandela, whose carefully nurtured image in our media--that of a courageous and non-violent liberal--masks the reality of her support for terrorism against blacks and her steadfast support of the Soviet Union, which she has cited as a political and spiritual model for the ANC. Despite her media image, her support of terrorism and violence is not to be confused with the non-violent work of Coretta Scott King.

To support the ANC, with its program of destruction and tyranny, is not a morally tolerable option for the United States. Neither the program of the ANC nor apartheid can be morally justified.

BETTER ALTERNATIVES

1. Recognition and Support of Moderates

But we are not without morally acceptable choices. First of all, we should recognize with careful discernment those voices in South Africa which can lead South Africans toward a peaceful and just solution and we should strengthen those forces. We should identify the forces that advocate war, destruction and violence in South Africa and we should do all in our power to weaken the influence of those voices. We should recognize in Chief Buthelezi and like-minded South Africans, black and white, the echo of one of his spiritual guides, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whom Chief Buthelezi has cited as relevant to the situation in South Africa.

Martin Luther King said:

When the architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men--yes, black men as well as white men--would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

That is, Dr. King did not advocate destroying the Constitution of the United States. Rather, he wished to see the Constitution extended to all American people. He wished to see the schools open to all American people, white and black. He wished to see the economic resources of this country open to all citizens, white and black. In short, he wanted American society, through all its institutions, to be

open and extended to all American citizens without regard to race, creed, or color.

And this is what Buthelezi advocates in South Africa. He does not call for the destruction of the government of South Africa, but for the coming together of moderates, white and black, to move step by step toward the integration of that society and the extension of its parliamentary system and its excellent judiciary, its splendid medical schools and universities, and its banking and industrial system to all South Africans, black as well as white.

Moral reform must be introduced in the context of realism. It is naive to believe that the white South African minority is going to turn the control of the country over to the black majority until their own safety has been assured. Power is not abandoned lightly or trivially. It is almost never abandoned when its abandonment may be suicidal.

The Afrikaners should not be confused with the colonial administrators who elsewhere in Africa surrendered power at the first signs of serious opposition and went home. The Afrikaners already are home. They command immense military power and they show every sign of being willing to use it. If backed up against the wall, they appear ready to use it ruthlessly. We may wish it were otherwise. We may wish that the average Afrikaner had views on race identical to those of the average educated American. But to mistake the wish for the fact will lead us into terrible errors of judgment. And these will be errors paid for by black South Africans, not Americans.

Like the white extremists, the leadership of the ANC is also ruthless. Johnny Makatini, the ANC representative at the United Nations, recently speculated, "If there were only 4 million of us left after the revolution, that would be better than the present situation." He alludes here with bland indifference of the deaths of 17 million South African blacks.

White South Africans have learned from watching Zimbabwe of the consequences of a minority's transferring power to a formerly oppressed majority. But they recognize that their strength in South Africa is substantially greater than the strength of the white minority in Zimbabwe at the time of the transfer of power there. From a position of relative strength they review the history of Zimbabwe and see that a democracy that flourished among the white minority and provided jobs and a relatively high standard of living for blacks has been replaced by an increasingly tyrannical government that is eliminating its opposition and setting up a one-party state.

At present, the government's repressions have been aimed primarily at Joshua Nkomo and the members of his tribe; the white settlers who remained after independence find their status little changed. But even in this regard, they live in fearful uncertainty, noting that Mr. Mugabe has threatened unilaterally to renounce the protections agreed upon at the Lancaster House Conference for the white minority and has been ruthless in his dealings with Mr. Nkomo and other blacks not of his party or his tribe. Tribalism, after all, is only racism particularized. The Boers may be naive to believe that

they can hold out in a situation in which the Southern Rhodesians surrendered. But we will deny the facts if we doubt their determination to do so.

Nevertheless, the moderates in the government of South Africa have recognized the need to abolish apartheid. In recent years and months the legal basis for apartheid has been reduced. While progress has been severely limited and much too slow, it represents a significant departure from the past policies of the South African government.

Black trade unions have been legalized, the universities have been integrated, laws against interracial marriage abolished, the right to own land has been granted and South African citizenship proposed for some blacks, the pass and influx control laws abolished. The national government has given the vote to Asians and "Coloreds," albeit on separate voting rolls, and in Natal Province Chief Buthelezi is negotiating with white leaders over a plan to merge the provincial government with that of KwaZulu, the "homeland" of which he is Chief Minister. Should this proposal--known as "KwaNatal"--be adopted, blacks and whites will be voting together for a multiracial government. Apartheid would be ended in Natal Province. While many observers believe that this proposal is unlikely to be accepted by the Pretoria government, the KwaNatal discussions would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.

The present leadership of South Africa are not unaware of a rising tide of discontent and the imperative of change. But they must find a means of change that they believe is

consistent with their survival. We can help them in this task.

If the United States wishes to be helpful, we must find a way to develop an understanding and cooperation between the white minority and the black majority on the means to preserve the positive features of the South African government and extend them to all South Africans. To accomplish this will require a developmental process that will institutionalize and guarantee the respect for human rights of both blacks and whites as the government transfers political power to the black majority.

A successful transition requires that the parties be brought together. Last November I proposed that President Reagan convene a Camp David conference at which all South African political, professional and economic leaders would be brought together.

To such a conference would be invited South Africans of all shades of skin and opinion: black extremists such as the leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo; white extremists such as Andries Treurnicht and Eugene Terre Blanche; and the moderates, such as Chief Buthelezi and P. W. Botha. Above all, Nelson Mandela should be freed to take part in the conference. The present active leadership of the ANC is properly called extremist, including Winnie Mandela, who has said, "Together, hand in hand with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country." But as hard-headed an observer as Helen Suzman believes that Mandela himself remains committed to negotiation. Freed from his

prison, he might well move the ANC in the direction of peaceful means to abolish apartheid. If he does not, the controversy over his real position will be quickly resolved.

The extremists may be so firmly committed to their moral and political positions that they refuse to attend or to participate constructively in the development of a workable plan for the peaceful integration of South Africa. If so, they will be isolated and exposed in all their moral and political sterility.

But the moderates of all groups, even in the absence of the extremists, would have a chance to negotiate free from the pressure of the present climate in South Africa. Such a conference might not provide a solution. But it would make clear who is willing to work for the amelioration of conditions in South Africa and who advocates rule in the ruins.

At a Camp David conference, those who were willing to work together for a peaceful abolition of apartheid could formulate the conditions that would have to be met in order to extend participation in the political life of South Africa to all its citizens. For example, the development of guarantees ensuring the rights of the individual, black or white, in the context of a new government elected by a black majority; the design of transitional institutions to extend full educational opportunity to blacks.

Such a conference could determine a realistic timetable for the extension of full participation in all aspects of South African life to the black majority. None of these

issues could be discussed and resolved adequately within the scope of a single Camp David conference, but significant progress could be made in the determination of the agenda for a series of negotiations leading to the end of apartheid.

2. Strengthen the Economy

The success of a peaceful transition from apartheid to a just South Africa depends more than anything else on the strengthening of the South African economy. Any call for sanctions that undermines that economy is a call for extremism and bloodshed rather than moderation and progress.

Moreover, American investment, which has already been an engine of change in South Africa, could do more. Rather than forcing the precipitate exit of American businesses from South Africa, leaving their operations to be snapped up at bargain prices by white South Africans, Europeans, and Japanese, we should be encouraging them to stay and expand. A realistic policy towards American firms in South Africa would be to offer tax credits to any firm which maintains or increases its investment and observes in its South African operations the civil rights laws of the United States. Such a program would provide a positive inducement for the South African government to allow black South Africans to enjoy, under the aegis of American companies, the freedom and dignity of a genuinely multiracial society. This measure, following the lead of the Reverend Leon Sullivan, would in effect extend the requirements of the Sullivan Principles for U. S. companies

that follow them and encourage their adoption in this extended form by those companies that have not yet done so.

3. Direct Support to Extend Racial Integration

The United States could provide further support for the moderates by the appropriation of federal funds, not to the government of South Africa, but to specific individuals and organizations offering racially integrated programs in job training, community development, literacy, and health care delivery, etc.

The people of the United States may be able to help black South Africans by their presence; they cannot help them by their absence.

CONCLUSION

Americans believe that for every problem there is a solution. We are outraged by injustice; we are prompted to act in the face of evil; we are frustrated by the idea that problems may exceed our powers to resolve them. But the crisis in South Africa is not a simple matter, and will not be fully resolved in less than a decade--perhaps not in less than a generation. Even if apartheid were to disappear tomorrow, the ravages of centuries of oppression and indignity cannot be undone at once--as we have learned here at home. Those who demand a speedier solution will only compound the tragedy of the problem. They are more likely to perpetuate apartheid than to end it. We may take moral satisfaction in precipitate action against South Africa, but we will share the

responsibility for the suffering that follows from it.

No one can guarantee that the problems now facing South Africa will be fully and happily solved even if the proposals I have made are implemented. But as a country we will have the satisfaction of knowing that we have not chosen the easy but disastrous course of destroying the moderates and handing victory to the extremists. We will have made a serious and thoughtful contribution to the goal all of us share--the destruction of apartheid--and not to the destruction and suffering of the black community of South Africa.

In the aftermath of the Camp David conference we will know who is still enamored with the romantic notions of revolution, and unaware of the irony of revolutionary passion, an irony Yeats vividly describes in his poem, "The Great Day":

Hurrah for the revolution, and more cannon-shot!
A beggar on horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for the revolution, and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.

The policy of the United States must not be to perpetuate the lash, but to help the South Africans replace what exists today with a government that is better. That calls not for revolution, but for rational moral progress. A South African solution requires our support of the voices of moderation and the rejection of the voices of fanaticism. It calls for us to reject the marriage with means to the destruction of ends. We must dedicate ourselves to the goal of ending apartheid in profound humility and with careful exploration of the alternatives, selecting the decent and humane ones and



avoiding the tragic alternatives already so obviously apparent.

The Congress has rarely faced an issue as loaded with ethical significance as sanctions against South Africa. A vote for sanctions is a vote for the easy way out--to remove the United States from the crisis and to sit back and watch Armageddon in comfort through the miracle of television. For that is the most likely consequence of sanctions. And whether we intend it or not, when we will the means we will the end.

Speaking for myself, I can be deeply moved by the outraged denunciations of iniquity and injustice by prophets and political reformers whenever those who denounce the present ills can point us to that road leading to improvement. But in the tragic complexity of South Africa I have not heard anyone other than moderates offer even the slightest possibility of a solution that could be achieved without the imposition of misery and death on millions of black South Africans. The situation in South Africa is one of awesome complexity and exceedingly high risks. It is not addressed responsibly by inflammatory rhetoric or simplistic proposals.

We are right to be indignant over apartheid, but moral indignation should not be confused with a moral solution. Moral indignation offers only a powerful motive for finding a solution. The solution will be found not in rhetorical fireworks or heavy-handed foreign policy but in calm, thoughtful, deliberate negotiations with moderates. Those who favor gradual change are alone likely to succeed in a situation so fraught with uncertainty and seeded with tragic possibilities.

Appendix: African National Congress Statements

"The Soviet Union is the torchbearer for all our hopes and aspirations. In Soviet Russia, genuine power of the people has been transformed from dreams into reality." -- Winnie Mandela, in an interview with Pravda (quoted in Human Events, May 3, 1986)

"Together, hand in hand with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country. We work in the white man's kitchen, we bring up the white man's children, we could have killed them at any time we wanted to." -- Winnie Mandela, Munsieville, April 13, 1986 (reported by Agence France Presse)

"We express our full solidarity with the Afghanistan Peoples' Democratic Party--We fully understand and support the timely assistance of the Soviet Union." -- Moses Mabhidia, member of ANC executive, 1981 (quoted in Human Events, June 26, 1986)

"Joe Modise, commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, called on the people of South Africa to 'organise themselves into groups, and policemen should be ambushed and their weapons taken; bombs and petrol bombs should be made from locally available materials.' After arming themselves the people should 'identify collaborators and enemy agents and deal with them.'" -- Radio Freedom, June 21, 1986, reported in the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts

"If there were only 4 million of us left after the revolution, that would be better than the present situation." -- Johnny Makatini, ANC delegate to the United Nations (quoted by Richard John Neuhaus, Dispensations, Eerdmans, 1986)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEREK BOK

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to testify about the crisis in South Africa and the steps that we as a nation may take to hasten its end. As you may know, I testified on this subject last year before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs when it seemed that Congress was about to enact sanctions. This possibility faded after the President announced an Executive Order containing some of the sanctions then being considered by the Congress. Since that time, the political situation has improved so little and the violence and suffering have increased so much that it is appropriate to urge Congress once again to explore its options for legislative action.

Before speaking directly to the issues before the Committee, I wish to make clear that my views on the subject of legislative sanctions are my own. I do not speak on behalf of Harvard University. Harvard, like most other universities, refrains from taking institutional positions on federal legislation that does not affect higher education directly. However, my duties have led me to follow the events in South Africa very closely for a number of years, and I have had ample opportunity to develop personal views on the situation there.

A preliminary question that all of us in this country might ask is why we should act at all with respect to the affairs of South Africa. I believe there are at least three reasons.

First, and most important, we have a humanitarian stake in the injustice

and suffering which persist in that nation. South Africa is a particularly flagrant example of racial oppression. There are other nations that discriminate officially on the basis of race, other regimes that resort to violence to maintain themselves in power, other governments that deny basic political rights to majorities of the people. But no country I know combines these elements to the degree practiced by the Afrikaner regime in South Africa. The reforms of recent months have failed to alter the basic structure of the apartheid system. The state continues to deny the political rights of citizenship, to discriminate according to race, and to limit economic opportunity. In view of our own history, we have a particular concern for racial injustice and a special reason for supporting efforts to bring it to an end.

Second, we have an economic stake in South Africa because it is the principal source of certain raw materials that are essential to U.S. industry. It provides 39% of the manganese used in the United States, 44% of the vanadium, 55% of the chromium and 49% of the platinum group, including palladium and rhodium, according to the Commerce Department. In addition, Southern Africa is an important market for U.S. sales and investments. These interests are long-term interests. If we believe, as I do, that apartheid cannot survive, we must be concerned about our relations with the black South Africans who will assume power in that country. Rightly or wrongly, as many observers have pointed out, our government is increasingly perceived at present as an implicit supporter of apartheid. It will continue to be perceived in this light so long as we do not take a more forceful position to help bring about the demise of the apartheid system.

Third, we have a strategic stake in the entire Southern Africa region. Because of that stake, the mounting instability which is likely to follow the failure of efforts to achieve peaceful change should be a matter of grave concern to the United States and other nations. What happens in South Africa, and what we do and do not do to help bring about peaceful change, will affect our relationship to the entire region. Once again, our long-term strategic position is in jeopardy to the extent that the political situation continues to polarize, with blacks increasingly inclined to link us and our economic and political system with the evils of apartheid.

The United States, therefore, has ample reason to do what it can to promote the transition to a humane, democratic society in order to avoid further violence and polarization and to associate ourselves clearly with the legitimate aims of the black majority that will assume power in South Africa. The question at issue is what steps to take.

Last year, when I testified on this subject before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Congress was considering legislation to impose sanctions. This process ended in the aftermath of the President's decision to impose milder measures in his Executive Order 12532 of September 9, 1985. Since then there has been a long series of disheartening events--including the recent imposition of a state of emergency with its thousands of detentions, heavy restrictions on press coverage, and higher weekly death tolls. The attitudes of the South African government are revealed most clearly in the failed attempts of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group to secure the release of Nelson Mandela and bring

about a process of meaningful negotiation. In its final report, the Group concluded that "while the government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future."¹

Looking back over the year, therefore, one can surmise that the sanctions imposed by the 1985 Executive Order may possibly have helped achieve some concessions from the South African government, notably the abolition of the pass law system. At the same time, it is clear that the Order has not led the South African government to halt its policies of repression or to enter into negotiations with black leaders. What flaws can one detect in the Executive Order and what improvements can be made at this point?

To begin with, the Executive Order sent forth an ambiguous message about the strength of United States opposition to apartheid. The measures imposed by the Administration were widely perceived not as an expression of America's strong feelings against apartheid but as a last-ditch effort to avert congressional enactment of much tougher sanctions over a presidential veto. As a result, the psychological value of sanctions was largely lost. Since much of the impact of sanctions lies in conveying a strong message to South Africa and its trading partners, this defect was a serious one.

The Executive Order also fell short of what was needed in several other respects. There was no incentive given for South Africa to move beyond the

status quo, because the Order lacks a provision for tougher sanctions in the future if substantial changes are not made. The ban on bank loans to the South African public sector could prove meaningless if its waiver provision serves as a loophole for funding regular government activities which "benefit" blacks in segregated settings. The provision urging American companies to adhere to Sullivan-type fair labor principles contains no reporting requirements or enforcement penalties; in fact, over 90 U.S. firms are still non-signatories.

In contrast, legislation enacted by Congress and signed by the President would be the best way to send a strong and unequivocal message to the South African government and people expressing the opposition of this nation to apartheid and our determination to take significant measures against it. Such a measure would likewise afford a dramatic illustration of the growing isolation from the rest of the world that will await South Africa until apartheid is fully dismantled. Furthermore, legislative sanctions imposed by the United States may be a catalyst to mobilize the concerted international sanctions that offer the best hope for bringing sufficient economic pressure to induce the South African government to change its policies.

It is true that almost any sanctions will have some adverse effects on black South Africans. Yet sanctions have been urged by a broad spectrum of anti-apartheid leaders and by more than three-quarters of black South Africans, according to polls announced by the London Times and the South African Institute for Black Research.² Leaders of the six neighboring states in Southern Africa have also expressed their support for

international sanctions, despite the risk that such measures entail for the economies of their countries.³ Thus, it cannot credibly be argued that a reluctance to take this step is out of regard for the hardship black South Africans will experience.

Nor can we reject sanctions as an inappropriate interference with the affairs of another country. Sanctions are now in place against the governments of Libya, Nicaragua, and Cuba. They are a recognized and useful part of this nation's foreign policy. The decision to take such steps in those other situations was not deterred by concerns about the effect on the innocent people in those nations who bear no responsibility for the government policies the sanctions are designed to affect. Granted, such measures are and should be used very sparingly and reserved for exceptional situations. For reasons expressed above, however, South Africa represents such a case.

The difficult question remains what kinds of sanctions to impose. As previously mentioned, the sanctions last year were too mild and too ambiguous in the message they conveyed. On the other hand, for several reasons, I cannot conscientiously advocate the complete and immediate disinvestment of all U.S. corporate operations in South Africa.

To begin with, it is not clear that such a drastic action will bring about reform. The Investor Responsibility Research Center's analysis of the likely impact of complete disinvestment is that it would quite possibly increase polarization by strengthening the hand of extreme groups on both sides while having little effect on the South African economy in the short

run.⁴ Moreover, according to one of the polls mentioned previously, a substantial majority of black South Africans seems to oppose complete disinvestment,⁵ and I would be personally reluctant to advocate a measure threatening hardship and unemployment for others without evidence of their clear approval. Finally, I question whether the United States should expend all of its economic and psychological leverage at once, with no further possibility of additional sanctions.

Without proposing a specific legislative vehicle, I would suggest certain criteria to use in fashioning appropriate sanctions.

First, sanctions should transmit the most powerful broad-based expression of national sentiment. Such an expression comes from legislation enacted by both Houses of Congress.

Second, sanctions should be strong enough to avoid any claim that they are merely symbolic, halfhearted or insincere.

Third, to the extent possible, they should exert their principal effects on the Afrikaner regime and avoid harming black South Africans and other innocent bystanders.

Fourth, since experience teaches that sanctions are most effective when used to bring about specific ends, they should be directed toward clear objectives, such as the termination of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, the dismantling of the other features of apartheid, and the start of negotiations with recognized black leaders.

Finally, failure on the part of the South African government to achieve the specified objectives within designated time limits should raise the prospect of more severe sanctions.⁶

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the sense of urgency I believe should guide these deliberations by Congress. To be sure, no one can foresee what precise effects sanctions will have, nor what will transpire if no sanctions are enacted. One must make a judgment based on all the relevant facts, including the views of those one seeks to help and the opinions of those whose knowledge and experience one respects. In this regard, we can hardly do better than take counsel from the recent report of the Eminent Persons Group, headed by Malcolm Fraser, following extensive meetings in South Africa. In speaking of sanctions, the Group declared: "The question. . . is in our view clear. It is not whether such measures will compel change; it is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, defers change. [Are we] to stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral? Or will [we] take concerted action of an effective kind. Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War."⁷

NOTES

1. Report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (Penguin edition, 1986), pp. 132-33.
2. The Sunday Times, August 25, 1985; The London Times, September 10, 1985, p. 5.
3. "Six Black African Nations Back Sanctions," The New York Times, September 17, 1985.
4. David Hauck, Investor Responsibility Research Center, testimony at hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., July 15, 1986.
5. The London Times, September 10, 1985, p. 5.
6. Similar criteria for sanctions were recommended by a group of ninety-five U.S. college and university presidents in a letter to the Senate on July 7, 1986 (copy attached).
7. Report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (Penguin edition, 1986), pp. 140-41.

July 7, 1986

The Honorable Robert Dole
141 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Dole:

We wish to express our deep concern about the situation in South Africa and our support for imposing legislative sanctions on the South African government. We offer our views in our individual capacities and do not purport to speak on behalf of the institutions we serve. But our work has caused us all to give many hours of thought to the injustices of apartheid and to the various ways in which this nation's government and its citizens and private institutions can respond.

Many of us wrote to you in July of last year expressing our belief that legislation directed against the South African government was an effective way to undermine apartheid and hasten its end. Thereafter, as you know, the President issued an Executive Order containing some of the provisions of the legislation which then seemed virtually certain to be enacted by Congress. Since then, however, the crisis in South Africa has worsened so dramatically that we believe that our country must do much more to express a rejection of the apartheid system.

Our conclusions find support in the recent findings of the Commonwealth mission known as the Eminent Persons Group. Their report expresses little hope that the South African government will voluntarily enter into meaningful negotiations that could lead to a peaceful end to apartheid. As they point out, effective concerted action by the international community seems to offer the last opportunity to bring about such negotiations and avert massive bloodshed.

As the Commonwealth report reached the public, the South African government instituted new repressive measures which offend fundamental principles of human rights. Censorship has limited the available information on the effects of the new measures, but press reports indicate that they have failed to stem the violence and the number of deaths. Indeed, during the last three months, the weekly death toll has more than doubled.

Against this backdrop, sanctions legislation offers a critical opportunity for the United States to make a forceful, bipartisan statement against apartheid. We do not attempt to state the precise

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features that should be included in the legislation. We do urge that the measures adopted conform to the following criteria:

1. Sanctions should be sufficiently strong to demonstrate the depth and sincerity of this country's disapproval of apartheid.
2. The primary target of the sanctions should be the source of apartheid: the South African government itself.
3. Sanctions should avoid harming nonwhite South Africans to the extent possible.
4. The legislation should hold forth the prospect of additional measures if certain prescribed forms of progress are not achieved by a specified date.

We speak most effectively as a nation when we speak with one voice through laws enacted by our elected representatives and signed by the President. Legislation will convey more effectively than anything else the breadth and depth of national feeling against apartheid. Such action at this time offers the best prospect of inducing other nations to follow suit, thus placing strong pressure on the South African government to pursue a different course.

If we do not take this step and the violence continues to mount in South Africa, will we be able to say that we did everything possible to forestall further losses of life? Although no one can state with certainty what steps will bring justice and peace to South Africa most quickly, we believe that legislated sanctions offer the best chance we have of encouraging peaceful change and avoiding increased violence and bloodshed.

Sincerely,

David Alexander, President, Pomona College
 Edward J. Bloustein, President, Rutgers University
 Derek Bok, President, Harvard University
 William G. Bowen, President, Princeton University
 John Brademas, President, New York University
 Carroll W. Brewster, President, Hobart and William
 Smith Colleges
 H. Keith H. Brodie, President, Duke University
 William J. Byron, President, Catholic University of
 America
 Colin G. Campbell, President, Wesleyan University
 J. Martin Carovano, President, Hamilton College
 John T. Casteen III, President, University of
 Connecticut
 Alice Chandler, President, State University of New
 York, College at New Paltz

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Martha E. Church, President, Hood College
 Lattie F. Coor, President, University of Vermont
 Henry J. Copeland, President, College of Wooster
 Robert A. Corrigan, Chancellor, University of
 Massachusetts
 William R. Cotter, President, Colby College
 Richard M. Cyert, President, Carnegie-Mellon
 University
 John DiBiaggio, President, Michigan State University
 Robert H. Donaldson, President, Fairleigh Dickinson
 University
 Mary M. Dunn, President, Smith College
 Melvin A. Eggers, President, Syracuse University
 David W. Ellis, President, Lafayette College
 Alice F. Emerson, President, Wheaton College
 James F. English, Jr., President, Trinity College
 William P. Gerberding, President, University of
 Washington
 Melvin D. George, President, St. Olaf College
 Marvin L. Goldberger, President, California
 Institute of Technology
 Hanna H. Gray, President, University of Chicago
 Paul E. Gray, President, Massachusetts Institute of
 Technology
 A. LeRoy Greason, President, Bowdoin College
 Sheldon N. Grebstein, President, State University
 of New York, College at Purchase
 W. Lawrence Gulick, President, St. Lawrence
 University
 Sheldon Hackney, President, University of
 Pennsylvania
 Evelyn E. Handler, President, Brandeis University
 Paul Hardin, President, Drew University
 Bernard W. Harleston, President, City University of
 New York, City College
 Theodore M. Hesburgh, President, University of
 Notre Dame
 Ira Michael Heyman, Chancellor, University of
 California, Berkeley
 Stephen Horn, President, California State
 University, Long Beach
 Edward B. Jakubauskas, State University of New
 York, College at Geneseo
 Eamon M. Kelly, President, Tulane University
 Elizabeth T. Kennan, President, Mount Holyoke
 College
 Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford University
 Nannerl O. Keohane, President, Wellesley College
 William A. Kinnison, President, Wittenberg
 University
 James T. Laney, President, Emory University

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George D. Langdon, Jr., President, Colgate University
 Earl E. Lazerson, President, Southern Illinois University
 Peter W. Likins, President, Lehigh University
 John David Maguire, President, Claremont Graduate School
 Jean Mayer, President, Tufts University
 Ellis E. McCune, President, California State University, Hayward
 Mary P. McPherson, President, Bryn Mawr College
 Paul B. Mohr, Sr., President, Talladega College
 Francis C. Oakley, President, Williams College
 Joseph A. O'Hare, President, Fordham University
 Vincent O'Leary, President, State University of New York
 Paul Olum, President, University of Oregon
 Robert M. O'Neil, President, University of Virginia
 Wesley W. Posvar, President, University of Pittsburgh
 Peter R. Pouncy, President, Amherst College
 Harold Proshansky, President, City University of New York, Graduate School and University Center
 David V. Ragone, President, Case Western Reserve University
 Frank H. T. Rhodes, President, Cornell University
 Olin C. Robison, President, Middlebury College
 George Rupp, President, Rice University
 Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., President, Yale University
 Ruth A. Schmidt, President, Agnes Scott College
 Donna E. Shalala, President, Hunter College
 Harold T. Shapiro, President, University of Michigan
 Robert L. Sinsheimer, Chancellor, University of California, Santa Cruz
 Michael I. Sovern, President, Columbia University
 S. Frederick Starr, President, Oberlin College
 Robert B. Stevens, President, Haverford College
 Jon C. Strauss, Worcester Polytechnic Institute
 Jerome H. Supple, Acting President, State University of New York, College at Plattsburgh
 Howard R. Swearer, President, Brown University
 Richard P. Traina, President, Clark University
 Rolf A. Weil, President, Roosevelt University
 Kenneth J. Weller, President, Central University of Iowa
 Joe B. Wyatt, Chancellor, Vanderbilt University
 Charles E. Young, Chancellor, University of California

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Richard C. Atkinson, Chancellor, University of
California, San Diego
Clifford D. Clark, President, State University of
New York, Binghamton
George A. Drake, President, Grinnell College
Frank S. Falcone, President, Springfield College
David W. Fraser, President, Swarthmore College
Ulric Haynes, Jr., Acting President, State
University of New York, College at Old Westbury
David Lloyd Johnston, President, McGill University
D. Bruce Johnstone, President, State University of
New York, College at Buffalo
David T. McLaughlin, President, Dartmouth College
Percy A. Pierre, President, Prairie View
Agricultural and Mechanical College
Albert Somit, President, Southern Illinois
University
Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., Chancellor, State
University of New York



EDWARD V. REGAN
State Comptroller

STATE OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER
ALBANY
12236

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD V. REGAN

I am the sole trustee of the New York State Common Retirement Fund with assets of \$30 billion, a member of the Board of Trustees of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System with assets of \$19 billion and work closely with the New York City pension systems, with assets of \$25 billion. Combined, the public pension systems in the state are worth \$74 billion.

I and the citizens of New York State abhor the policy of apartheid under which the South African government exercises almost total human control over its population. It must be eliminated.

I ask that you and the President assert your respective roles as the designers and implementers of United States foreign policy and take strong, appropriate action as to South Africa. I will, in any event, take strong independent action to force the issue by convincing our American portfolio corporations to leave South Africa. I will do this with the help of my colleagues who administer other large pension funds in this country.

Before I explain how we accomplish this, I want to discuss a related activity involving public pension funds, which has received some public attention, but as yet has an undemonstrated effect on apartheid.

In New York, my pension systems have been asked by the Governor and many members of the State Legislature to divest -- to sell our assets in those companies that have business in South Africa (the New York City system has announced a plan of limited divestment). Their goal, to express outrage at apartheid, is one I obviously and completely share.

But the selling of stocks and bonds of America's largest corporations, I believe, is the wrong way to accomplish this goal.

Some public pension funds, states and municipalities and a few private institutions are divesting, and others are considering it. On the other hand, the 22,285 private and union pension funds in the nation, with a value of \$783 billion, do not divest for legal interpretations of ERISA place a cloud over such actions.

Of the public funds, the New Jersey pension system is the only large fund similar to ours undergoing complete divestment. In the first four months, when that state sold only \$439 million worth of stock out of a scheduled divestment program that could reach \$5 billion, the State Director of Investments reports it has already cost New Jersey \$4.8 million directly in transaction costs and \$45 million indirectly as increased unfunded liabilities. Fully implementing New York's proposed divestment legislation would cost our taxpayers \$465 to \$840 million, according to a Wilshire Associates study, and \$332 to \$573 million, according to a State Senate Finance Committee study. The retirement security of our 765,000 members and their families could be affected by this loss.

Divestment, as these studies show and certainly as they pertain to large systems, is harmful to taxpayers and pensioners alike.

And it has not been demonstrated that it affects apartheid. The New Jersey experience is instructive. The state's Investment Director recently said: "I have not received a single inquiry about our [divestment] program from any representative of any American company or the South African government..." With the exception of takeover attempts and annual meetings, corporations are not overly concerned with who buys or sells their stocks or why they do so.

Let me now return to describe our goals and activities and their effect on corporate presence in a country that practices apartheid. As a large institutional shareholder we will -- working with others who share the same goal -- continually exercise a moral commitment to force our multi-national corporations to abide by high ethical and social standards.

Here's how we accomplish this.

For the last three years our system has repeatedly demanded that its portfolio corporations subscribe to and fully comply with the Sullivan Principles. We carefully monitor and publicly critique their Sullivan Principles performance and insist that they join organizations fighting to change apartheid.

We have stepped up these activities with personal appearances at the annual meetings of these corporations and repeatedly reminded them that apartheid and the free enterprise system can not co-exist. In the past months we voted our shares for 14 resolutions to require companies to withdraw from that country, and not coincidentally -- as a result of working with other concerned shareholders -- 41 of our portfolio corporations have left since January 1, 1985.

That is what we have done so far without any organized national effort, and here is my plan for the coming year:

- In early August we will begin to file shareholder resolutions with the 121 of our portfolio corporations remaining in South Africa for their 1987 annual meetings, requiring them to "...implement a divestment program by withdrawal from South Africa...unless by the end of May 1987 the system of apartheid is statutorily dismantled...."
- We will undertake an aggressive national campaign, by making personal appeals and attending seminars and conventions, to recruit other large pension systems, foundation and endowment funds to vote with us.

Can this plan work?

Let's take General Motors as an example. As of June 30, 1986, the two state pension systems I am directly involved with (CRF and Teachers) held 4,560,000 shares of General Motors, representing 1.0% of the ownership. Currently we estimate that the California, Michigan, Texas and Ohio pension system holdings total 6,000,000 shares. So, hypothetically, working together, we could vote 2.3% of the General Motors ownership. (GM is but an average situation, i.e., my one system alone votes 1.6% of Goodyear Tire & Rubber and 1.2% of Colgate-Palmolive Company.) Obviously, with an organized six-month campaign, and given the volatility of the issue, particularly if the United States government does not act, we surely can vote through our collective shareholder strength a much higher percentage than that.

At the last General Motors annual meeting, on May 23, 1986, with no campaign, our Fund and other shareholders - representing 9% of the ownership - voted to require General Motors to cease doing business with the government of South Africa. GM announced this action that day.

That, coupled with the pullout by 41 of our portfolio corporations, shows this plan will work.

What will be the effect of this action on our pension systems?

Every company that disinvests from South Africa is one less company we will be under pressure to divest from. And stock prices have long reflected the implications of a company's presence in South Africa. Therefore as companies pull out, our asset value will remain unchanged. So our position of divestment, requiring U.S. corporate withdrawal from South Africa, as it is achieved, not only strikes a demonstrable blow against apartheid but will not cost our taxpayers and pensioners anything -- it keeps our portfolio fully invested, diversified and secure.

Let me conclude where I opened. While the Federal government is debating sanctions and other actions directed to South Africa, states and institutions will in fact exercise those actions -- asserting foreign policy for this nation in a major part of the world.

I recommend that you:

- legislate a timetable and standards for the South African government to dismantle the system of apartheid, and if that is not done alternatively impose sanctions, one of which would be a phased removal of American corporations and investment from that country;

- underscore the federal government's leadership role in setting foreign policy, by incorporating in any legislation a clear statement of "preemption" under time-tested principles of our Constitution which provide that foreign policy must be made by the federal government.

As major shareholders in corporate America we have moral and ethical responsibilities, which we are exercising to the fullest -- especially as they pertain to apartheid. The United States government has major foreign policy responsibilities. We should exercise both our responsibilities forcefully in harmony with one another.

July 24, 1986

RESOLUTION PROPOSED FOR INTRODUCTION BY
THE NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND
AT 1987 SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS OF PORTFOLIO CORPORATIONS
REMAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Whereas, the civil and human rights of the black population in South Africa continue to be denied under apartheid;

Whereas, numerous U. S. corporations subscribing to the Sullivan Principles provide excellent working environments for their employees and lobby the South African government for the elimination of apartheid, nonetheless this abhorrent system persists as the major tenet of that government;

Whereas, since January 1, 1984 at least 52 American companies have terminated operation in South Africa;

Whereas, both Reverend Sullivan and Bishop Tutu have called for the withdrawal of U. S. corporate investment if apartheid is not substantially eliminated during 1987;

Whereas, pension funds, endowment funds and other institutional investors are under legal and social pressure to divest their holdings in companies doing business in South Africa;

Whereas, the result will be financial harm to the beneficiaries of such funds;

Whereas, disinvestment -- the withdrawal of corporations from South Africa -- can result in real pressure for change.

Now, therefore, be it resolved that shareholders request the Board of Directors to establish the following policy:

The corporation shall implement a disinvestment program by withdrawal from South Africa and cessation of relationships with it unless by the end of May 1987 the system of apartheid is statutorily dismantled through

- a. elimination of social segregation, including the Group Areas Act
- b. establishment of equitable national education and health delivery systems
- c. elimination of all elements of influx control
- d. establishment of freehold rights for all South Africans regardless of race; elimination of residential segregation and removals

- e. promotion of franchise rights for all South Africans in an equitable manner
- f. elimination of the banning of people and organizations; strengthening the independence of the judicial system; and the unconditional release of political prisoners and detainees and those previously charged with treason

PROPOSERS STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION

United States corporations should not exist within the framework of apartheid which mandates the denial of basic human and civil rights to the Black majority. The use of violence to quell liberty rather than negotiating peaceful change is contrary to the fundamentals of our democratic society. Although significant strides have been made by U. S. companies toward eliminating apartheid within their South African operations, their efforts to lobby the government of South Africa for statutory dismantling of apartheid have to date only had minimal effect.

As a pension fund, we do not believe selling shares as a statement of our abhorrence of apartheid will have any effect other than to harm present and future pensioners. On the other hand, most corporations have a very modest presence there and the weak economy and prognosis for future civic and social unrest suggest that disinvestment is a wise business policy.

It is time for shareholders to voice their opposition to the discriminatory practices of South Africa and for the corporation to make known through disinvestment, that it cannot coexist with a system of slavery.

Accordingly, we seek the affirmative vote of all shareholders on this resolution.

New York State Common Retirement Fund
Portfolio Corporations
Remaining in South Africa

Abbott Labs	Exxon	Pfizer
Air Products	FMC Corp.	Phelps Dodge
Allied Signal	Ferro Corp.	Phillips Petro
Allis-Chalmers	Firestone	Procter & Gamble
American Brands	Fluor	RJR Nabisco
American Cynamid	Ford Motor	Raytheon
American Home Products	Foster Wheeler	Rexnord
American Int'l Group	Fruehauf	Reynolds & Reynolds
American Std. Inc	General Motors	Rohm & Haas
Baker Internat'l	General Signal	Sara Lee
Baxter Travenol	Gillette	Schering-Plough
Becor Western	Goodyear	Schlumberger
Black & Decker	Hewlett-Packard	SmithKline Beckman
Borden	Honeywell	Sperry Corp
Borg-Warner	Hughes Tool	Square D
Bristol-Myers	IBM	Squibb
Burroughs	IMS Internat'l	Standard Oil
CPC Internat'l	ITT	Sterling Drug
Caterpillar Tractor	Ingersoll-Rand	Tambrands
Champion Spark Plug	Int'l Flavors & Frag	Teledyne Inc
Chase Manhattan	Intergraph Corp.	Tenneco
Chesebrough-Pond's	Internat'l Min & Chem	Texaco
Chevron	Johnson & Johnson	Timken
Cigna	Johnson Controls	U.S. Steel
Citicorp	Joy Manufacturing	UAL
Coca-Cola	Kellogg	USG Corp
Colgate Palmolive	Kimberly-Clark	Union Camp Corp
Combustion Eng.	Libbey Owens Ford	Union Carbide
Control Data	Lubrizol	United Technologies
Corning Glass	Marsh & McLennan	Upjohn Co.
Crown Cork & Seal	McDonnell Douglas	W. R. Grace
Cummins Engine	McGraw-Hill	Warner Communications
Dart & Kraft	Merck & Co	Warner Lambert
Deere & Co.	Minnesota Mining	Westinghouse
Diamond Shamrock	Mobil Oil	Xerox
Dow Chemical	Monsanto	
Dresser Industries	NCNB	
Dun & Bradstreet	NCR	
E. I. duPont	Newmont Mining	
Eastman Kodak	Northrop Corp	
Echlin Manuf.	Ogilvy Group	
Eli Lilly	Owens-Illinois	
Emery Air Freight	Parker Hannifin	

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BISHOP JOHN T. WALKER

MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. MY NAME IS JOHN WALKER. I AM THE EPISCOPAL BISHOP OF WASHINGTON. I AM GRATEFUL THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU AND TO EXPRESS SOME VIEWS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED AS I HAVE WRESTLED WITH THE MORAL, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF OUR COUNTRY'S POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA IN GENERAL AND TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IN PARTICULAR. I COME BEFORE YOU OUT OF MY CONCERN FOR THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA. I ALSO COME AS A CHRISTIAN EXPRESSING CONCERN FOR THE MILLIONS OF FELLOW CHRISTIANS WHO ARE VICTIMS OF THE EVIL SYSTEM OF APARTHEID.

OVER THE PAST TWENTY MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE RHETORIC ABOUT APARTHEID AND ABOUT THE AMERICAN POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WHICH, BY THE WAY, IS NEITHER CONSTRUCTIVE OR ENGAGING. THE FRUSTRATION OF MANY OF OUR PEOPLE, BLACK AND WHITE, IS MADE CLEAR BY THE DEMONSTRATION AND ARRESTS AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY AND BY THE THOUSANDS OF INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE DIVESTED THEMSELVES OF HOLDINGS IN COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA. FURTHER, PRESSURE IS BEING PUT ON THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO LEGISLATE STRONG ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

WHILE WE DEBATE, THE TRAGEDY THAT IS SOUTH AFRICA WORSENS. DAILY WE HEAR IT SAID, WITH REASON, THAT WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME, THAT WE MUST DO SOMETHING; SOMETHING THAT WILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE. THE CRISIS OF SOUTH AFRICA IS NOT SIMPLY A CRISIS OF BLACK AND WHITE. IT IS A HUMAN CRISIS, A FIGHT FOR JUSTICE, FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE SOUL, FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF HUMANITY -- THEIRS AND OURS.

THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID IS AS UNJUST AND AS MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE AS ANY PRACTICED IN THE WORLD. IT IS EVIL IN THE EXTREME AND MUST BE DISMANTLED. SINCE 1948 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A SITUATION THAT NOW BORDERS ON CIVIL WAR. IT HAS STRIPPED MILLIONS OF BLACK PEOPLE OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP. IT HAS INSTITUTED A SERIES OF PASS LAWS THAT HAVE COMPLETELY RESTRICTED THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE. IT HAS MOVED PEOPLE OUT OF THEIR HOMES AND TOWNS (AS WRETCHED AS THESE GENERALLY ARE) TO "HOMELANDS" WHERE IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EKE OUT A LIVING. THUS UNDER WHAT THEY CALL "SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT" A TINY WHITE MINORITY HAS FORCED ITS WILL ON THE MAJORITY WHICH COMPRISES BETTER THAN EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION. THE MAJORITY ARE DENIED THE RIGHT TO VOTE, THE PRIVILEGES OF NORMAL FAMILY LIFE, ACCESS TO A DECENT EDUCATION OR EVEN MINIMAL HEALTH CARE AND DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE A PLACE IN THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE BEYOND THE MOST MENIAL. WHAT BEGAN AS A GROSSLY DISCRIMINATORY SYSTEM HAS NOW BECOME A BRUTAL ONE OF REPRESSION AND SUBJUGATION. SOUTH AFRICA HAS BECOME THE WORST SORT OF TOTALITARIAN STATE IN WHICH BASIC CIVIL AND HUMAN LIBERTIES ARE DENIED, WHERE CALCULATED VIOLENCE AGAINST THE BLACK POPULATION HAS BECOME A ROUTINE PRACTICE.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITS PURPOSE TO ABOLISH APARTHEID AND TO GRANT ALL THE PEOPLE EQUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. AND YET IT IS TRAPPED IN ITS OWN MIND SET; TOO OBSESSED WITH ITS PAST TO THINK BOLDLY OF THE FUTURE; TOO MINDFUL OF PRESERVING THE UNJUST GAINS OF THOSE WHO HAVE THEM RATHER THAN MAKING WHOLE THE

RIGHTS OF THOSE WHO WERE DENIED THEM. AS PRAGMATIC POLITICIANS, THE WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERS TEND TO PRESERVE THE PRESENT WITH MINIMAL CHANGE. INSTEAD WHAT WE NEED ARE VISIONARY LEADERS WHO WILL SHAPE THE PRESENT TO SEEK A BETTER FUTURE.

OUR GOVERNMENT, ALSO CONDEMNS APARTHEID AND SEEKS ITS REMOVAL, AND YET ITS POLICY AND DIALOGUE ARE MORE SOOTHING TO THOSE IN POWER THAN COMFORT TO THOSE WHO ARE DEPRIVED OF IT. ITS ACTIONS ARE SUPERFICIAL AND LACK EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS COMMITMENT TO HELP THE DISENFRANCHISED BLACK POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE ACTIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT SEEM TO RUN COUNTER TO AMERICAN POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, AND EVEN TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

IN 1986, ISRAEL AND EGYPT RECEIVED OVER \$6.1 BILLION IN U.S. FOREIGN AID REPRESENTING OVER 48% OF APPROXIMATELY \$12.3 BILLION TOTAL U.S. FOREIGN AID. THE OTHER BIG RECIPIENTS OF FOREIGN AID WERE: TURKEY, \$739.0 MILLION; PAKISTAN, \$628.5 MILLION; EL SALVADOR, \$435.7 MILLION; GREECE, \$431.9 MILLION; SPAIN, \$396.7 MILLION AND PHILIPPINES, \$240.9 MILLION.

IN CONTRAST, SOUTH AFRICA RECEIVED A PUNY \$20.0 MILLION IN FOREIGN AID WHICH AMOUNTS TO LESS THAN \$0.80 PER BLACK PERSON IN THAT COUNTRY. IF SOUTH AFRICA IS IMPORTANT TO THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND AS A BULWARK OF ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, WE CERTAINLY DON'T SEEM TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. IF THIS IS AN INDICATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO HELP

THE BLACK PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE MAGNITUDE OF OUR LARGESSE IS EXCEEDED ONLY BY OUR PROCLAMATIONS OF GOOD INTENTIONS. EVEN AS SIN MONEY, ITS PUNINESS IS EMBARRASSING IF NOT DEPLORABLE.

THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY HAS CONDEMNED APARTHEID AS EVIL AND MORALLY REPREHENSIBLE. WE MUST ALL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEEK ITS DEMISE. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE CHURCH LEADERS HAVE ALSO CALLED FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. HOWEVER, IN OUR DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING, WE HAVE FAILED TO CONNECT ACTIONS WITH OUTCOME. OUR AGONY OVER THE FLIGHT OF THE BLACK PEOPLE IN SOUTH AFRICA HAS OFTEN TRAPPED US IN TAKING ACTIONS THAT MAY BE MORE PRONOUNCED IN THEIR SYMBOLISM THAN IN THEIR CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES. RATHER THAN CONTROLLING AND SHAPING EVENTS, WE ARE INCREASINGLY BEING SHAPED BY THEM. UNWITTINGLY, WE HAVE ALSO BECOME THE VICTIMS OF THE PRESENT.

THE FOREIGN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE U.S. BASED CORPORATIONS, INSIST ON THEIR RIGHT TO STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA CLAIMING THAT IN THE PROCESS THEY DO MORE GOOD THAN HARM. THEY DECLARE THAT THEY ARE A FORCE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE AND HELP BRING ABOUT IMPROVED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR THE BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN WORKERS BOTH BY THEIR ACTIONS, AND ALSO BY SETTING AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHERS TO FOLLOW. AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR GOOD FAITH EFFORT, THEY POINT TO THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES

THAT CALL FOR ELIMINATION OF ALL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES AT THE PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT AND REQUIRE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO HELP THEIR WORKERS IN THE COMMUNITIES THEY LIVE IN AND ALSO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION TO PRESSURE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO DISMANTLE THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. ALL THIS MAY BE TRUE AND QUITE COMMENDABLE. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION IS NOT WHAT THEY HAVE DONE, BUT WHAT ELSE THEY SHOULD BE DOING IN TERMS OF THEIR CAPACITY FOR ACTION AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE DOING ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE. IN SOUTH AFRICA, AS IN MANY OF THE OTHER POOR COUNTRIES THAT ARE OFTEN CONTROLLED BY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IS INVARIABLY ASSOCIATED WITH DICTATORSHIPS AND CORRUPT REGIMES. IT IS NO WONDER THAT PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND CAPITALISM HAVE COME TO BE VIEWED AS THE TOOLS OF OPPRESSION IN MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES BECAUSE THE POOR HAVE NOT SEEN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AS PLAYING THE ROLE OF PROVIDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS.

WHAT MUST WE DO? WE START BY MAKING TWO ASSERTIONS AS A MATTER OF FAITH AND THEREFORE GIVEN:

1. THAT APARTHEID MUST BE ABOLISHED AND ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY. THAT IS NOT EVEN A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION. WHAT NEEDS TO BE NEGOTIATED IS THE FORM AND SHAPE OF A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PROCESS BY WHICH IT SHOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. THERE IS NO QUESTION NOW THAT APARTHEID WILL BE BROUGHT DOWN.

2. THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE EQUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS WHICH INCLUDES THE NOTION OF ONE PERSON ONE VOTE. HOWEVER, THE ULTIMATE SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE AND OF POWER SHARING MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF THAT SOCIETY WHERE THE RIGHTS OF DIFFERENT MINORITIES MIGHT NEED PROTECTION.

I RECOGNIZE THAT MANY IN THE U.S. WILL DISAGREE WITH ONE OR ANOTHER OF THESE ASSERTIONS BUT I SUBMIT TO YOU THAT WE MUST BEGIN WITH THESE ASSERTIONS. FURTHER, THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN EUROPE TO PUT TEETH INTO THE RHETORIC AGAINST APARTHEID BY INSTITUTING STRONG ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THAT NATION. EVEN AS I SAY THIS I DO NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT SUCH SANCTIONS WILL BRING DOWN THE BOTHA GOVERNMENT. WELL-AIMED SANCTIONS DO, HOWEVER, OFFER A WAY TO PUT THAT GOVERNMENT ON NOTICE THAT IN WHAT WE CALL THE CIVILIZED WORLD, SOME BEHAVIOR IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

WHAT SHOULD THESE SANCTIONS INCLUDE?

1. AN END TO THE AVAILABILITY OF LOANS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT ITS EVIL POLICIES.
2. A RESTRICTION ON NEW INVESTMENTS BY U.S. CORPORATIONS IN THAT COUNTRY.
3. AN END TO LANDING RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN AIRPLANES IN THE U.S., THE ENCOURAGING OF OTHER NATIONS TO DO THE

SAME WITH A DENIAL OF OVERFLIGHTS IN OTHER NATIONS.

4. ANY OTHER RESTRICTIONS LISTED BY THE EMINENT PERSONS' GROUP.

ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE I WOULD WANT OUR GOVERNMENT TO IMMEDIATELY INSTITUTE CONVERSATIONS WITH LEADERS OF THE A.N.C. AND OTHER GROUPS COMMITTED TO THE DESTRUCTION OF APARTHEID. I WOULD WANT OUR GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE ITS FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH AFRICA; SUCH AID TO BE ALLOCATED FOR THE WELL-BEING OF SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK PEOPLE AND DIRECTED TOWARD HOUSING, EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IT SHOULD BE MANAGED WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. INSTEAD IT SHOULD COMBINE ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THE U.S. AND INITIATIVE AND COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE BLACK PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD ALSO MAKE A DECLARATION OF ITS INTENT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THIS AID IN PRE-DETERMINED AMOUNTS IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM AND ALSO IN HELPING THE BLACK POPULATION TOWARD IMPROVING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS.

THE WORLD RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SHOULD USE ALL ITS MORAL AND OTHER RESOURCES TO MOBILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST APARTHEID AND TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME. BUT MORE IMPORTANT, IT MUST BECOME A FORCE OF POSITIVE CHANGE RATHER THAN NEGATIVE EXHORTATIONS. WE MUST SEEK TO INFLUENCE THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, WHO HAVE A STAKE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, TO CREATE A MAJOR AID EFFORT, ALONG THE LINES OF THE MARSHALL PLAN, TO BRING THE CHANCES OF A TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA TO A MORE REALISTIC LEVEL, AND ALSO MAKE THE COST OF SUCH TRANSITION MORE BEARABLE BY THE EXISTING ECONOMIC STRUCTURE SO AS NOT TO DESTROY IT BUT TO HARNESS ITS PRODUCTIVE ENERGIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY MUST GO BEYOND THE MANDATES OF THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES. A FIRST AND EXTREMELY IMPORTANT STEP WOULD SEE THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY MOVING TO PROVIDE, IN SOUTH AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE, EXPERIENCE IN BUSINESS FOR THOSE BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS WHO HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY BEEN DENIED SUCH EXPERIENCES. FURTHER THEY COULD ASSIST IN PROVIDING A WAY TO ACHIEVE INTERN EXPERIENCES IN GOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT. THE AIM IS TO GUARANTEE TO A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT A LARGER NUMBER OF EXPERIENCED PERSONS WHO CAN ASSUME LEADERSHIP OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND TAKE THEIR PLACE IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF A NEW SOCIETY. TO DO LESS WOULD LEAVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND NEW SOCIETY VULNERABLE AS IT SEEKS TO SOLVE THE MASSIVE PROBLEMS OF THAT COUNTRY.

AS A SECOND STEP, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY SHOULD MOVE BOLDLY AND SWIFTLY IN BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS OF APARTHEID THROUGH ACTIONS THAT ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED ITS INTENTION OF REPEALING THE APARTHEID LAWS. ONE WAY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CAN BE FORCED TO ACCELERATE THE RATE OF REPEAL IS FOR THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO TEST THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE LAWS BY BREAKING THEM AND THEREBY CHALLENGING THE GOVERNMENT TO DEFEND THOSE LAWS IN COURTS. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS APPROACH WAS RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF G.M. (SOUTH AFRICA) WHEN HE OFFERED TO DEFRAY THE LEGAL EXPENSES OF ANY OF THE COMPANY'S BLACK EMPLOYEES WHO WERE CAUGHT ON THE BEACHES RESTRICTED FOR THE USE OF WHITE PEOPLE ONLY. OTHER ACTIONS OF THIS TYPE MIGHT INCLUDE:

- BUYING HOUSING IN PRIMARILY WHITE AREAS AND ASSIGNING THEM TO BLACK EMPLOYEES.
- MOVING COMPANY HEADQUARTERS OR REGIONAL OFFICES IN AREAS WHICH ARE WITHIN EASY REACH BY THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO CAN THEN BE PROMOTED TO MORE SUPERVISORY POSITIONS.
- ALLOCATING FRANCHISES AND TERRITORIES IN PRIMARILY WHITE AREAS TO BLACK BUSINESS PERSONS.
- AMERICAN BUSINESS SHOULD ALLOCATE STOCK IN THEIR LOCAL SUBSIDIARIES TO THEIR WORKERS, ESPECIALLY THE BLACK WORKERS,

AS PART OF THEIR OVERALL WAGE SYSTEM. WITH STOCK OWNERSHIP WORKERS WILL DEVELOP AN APPRECIATION OF CAPITALISM, THE NOTION OF RISK AND REWARD, AND ABOVE ALL, THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE.

- APARTHEID TAX. APARTHEID HAS YIELDED SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS TO THE BUSINESSES OPERATING IN SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH LOWER WAGES. THE BUSINESSES MAY HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF THESE BENEFITS, BUT WE ARE ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SIN AS THOSE BENEFITS ARE PASSED TO CONSUMERS IN THE FORM OF LOWER PRICES. BUSINESSES SHOULD IMPOSE ON THEMSELVES AN APARTHEID TAX WHICH SHOULD REFLECT A REASONABLE PROPORTION OF GAINS FROM APARTHEID. THESE FUNDS THEN SHOULD BE EARMARKED FOR CREATING EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN THE ENTERPRISE THAT WOULD BELONG TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE.

AS A PERSON, AS A CHRISTIAN, AS A BISHOP IN A CHURCH WITH CLOSE TIES TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND AS A CITIZEN OF THIS GREAT FREE COUNTRY, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA, BLACK AND WHITE. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. I DO NOT WANT THEM TO HAVE A FUTURE THAT IS MORE MISERABLE THAN THEIR MISERABLE PRESENT. I DO NOT WANT TO SEE EVEN BLOODIER STRIFE THAN WE ARE NOW WITNESSING. I DO NOT WANT TO SEE EVEN GREATER SOCIAL INEQUITIES AND EVEN MORE GRINDING POVERTY THAN MANY ARE EXPERIENCING NOW. THEREFORE, I DO NOT WANT TO SEE THE ECONOMY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA DASHED ON THE ROCKS EVEN OF RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION (AND I BELIEVE OUR PRESENT INDIGNATION IS

RIGHTEOUS). I AM NOT INTERESTED IN PUNISHING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT BUT IN CAUSING IT TO END ITS INHUMAN TREATMENT OF THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE BEFORE THE ULTIMATE VIOLENCE BEGINS.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY POLITICAL SYSTEM ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SOUTH AFRICANS MUST NOT BE DICTATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OR FOR THAT MATTER ANY SINGLE GROUP WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT DENY REPRESENTATION TO THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT IT IS COMMUNIST DOMINATED OR THAT IT ADVOCATED VIOLENCE. BY ONE MEASURE, THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO GOVERN IS ALSO SUSPECT BECAUSE ITS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO SHARE THE SPOILS OF POWER AND IS NOT BASED ON THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED. NOR CAN IT ASK OTHERS TO DISAVOW VIOLENCE WHEN IT MAKES EXTENSIVE USE OF VIOLENCE TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGED POSITION OF A MINORITY OF THE POPULATION AND THAT OF THE ENTRENCHED OLIGARCHY. A LONGER-LASTING AND ENFORCEABLE SYSTEM OF POWER SHARING AND GOVERNANCE MUST COME THROUGH THE VOLUNTARY AND WILLING PARTICIPATION OF ALL GROUPS THAT SPEAK FOR SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION.

I REITERATE. APARTHEID WILL END. THAT END MAY NOT COME IMMEDIATELY. IT MAY NOT COME PEACEFULLY BUT COME IT WILL. WE NEED, THEREFORE, TO DO TWO THINGS. (1) APPLY STRONG SANCTIONS NOT TO DESTROY THE ECONOMY BUT SUFFICIENT TO GIVE A STRONG, CLEAR SIGNAL AND (2) BEGIN NOW TO WORK AS THOUGH WE WERE ALREADY IN THE TIME OF TRANSITION FROM APARTHEID TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. IF THE BOTHA

GOVERNMENT WILL COOPERATE. SANCTIONS WOULD (AS) IMMEDIATELY BE LIFTED. IF THEY WILL NOT COOPERATE, THEN WE SHOULD WORK ENTIRELY WITH THE BLACK LEADERSHIP AND THOSE WHITE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, THE CHURCH AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WHO GENUINELY DESIRE AN END TO THIS EVIL BLIGHT ON THE WESTERN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AND WHO WISH TO SEE JUSTICE ACCOMPLISHED.

MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, THANK YOU FOR HEARING ME. I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER MY WORDS SERIOUSLY AS YOU CONSIDER LEGISLATION RELATED TO UNITED STATES - SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS. AND IF YOU WILL ALLOW THIS BISHOP, GOD BLESS YOU IN YOUR IMPORTANT WORK.

DIOCESE OF WASHINGTON

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JOHN T. WALKER
BISHOP OF WASHINGTONPRESS RELEASE

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL NOON, JULY 24, 1986

BISHOP WALKER URGES WELL-TARGETED SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA; CALLS FOR POST-APARTHEID PROGRAM

Bishop John T. Walker, the Episcopal Bishop of Washington, D.C., will tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today that the United States and its allies must adopt strong, well-targeted economic sanctions against South Africa and that businesses operating in that country must be more aggressive in dismantling the system of apartheid.

Bishop Walker will also urge the business community to "go beyond the mandates of the Sullivan principles" to prepare South African blacks to assume leadership of South Africa's business and government in the post-apartheid era.

The Bishop will propose a specific series of actions South African businesses can take to prepare black South Africans to share power in a new government and society in that country.

An embargoed copy of Bishop Walker's testimony is attached. He will be available for interviews after he testifies before the committee.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. AVERY D. POST

I am Avery D. Post, President of the United Church of Christ, and I appreciate having the opportunity of appearing before you today to testify on one of the great issues of our age. The United Church of Christ, formed in 1957 through the merger of the Congregational Christian Churches and the Evangelical and Reformed Church, has 1.7 million members.

I am also co-chair of the Churches' Emergency Committee on Southern Africa, an inter-denominational group composed of 24 denominations which was created after a World Council of Churches consultation in Harare, Zimbabwe last December with South African Church leaders. I am accompanied today by the Rev. Dr. Audrey C. Smock, who is World Issues Secretary of the United Church Board for World Ministries, and in addition to being an ordained UCC minister she is also a political scientist and an African specialist who has taught African politics at several American and African universities.

The purpose of our being here with you today is to call on the U.S. Senate to enact legislation which would terminate trade between the U.S. and South Africa and prohibit U.S. corporate activity in South Africa. We advocate these measures as the only means to both declare this great nation of ours to be unalterably opposed to and morally outraged at apartheid, and to exert economic leverage on the South African government to introduce a democratic form of government in its land, reforms it has adamantly refused to undertake up to now.

Responding to the desperate pleas of the South African Council of Churches and other South African church leaders, I recently joined with the heads of thirteen other Protestant denominations in urging President Reagan to impose comprehensive economic sanctions of the kind the House passed last month. That is the only action which will declare this nation to be on the moral highroad of justice and democracy, as well as enabling us to exert effective leverage on the South African government.

I am sure that you have heard many facts and figures and much political and economic analysis. I won't review that material with you. I am here as a church leader representing a wide range of American denominations who are in close association with sister churches in South Africa. The mission ties of the United Church of Christ date back 150 years, and we sustain very close relationships with our partner church, the United Congregational Church of Southern Africa. During the current crisis in South Africa, we have maintained daily telephone communication with key church people there, to keep abreast of events and to offer whatever help we can.

Within recent weeks hundreds of parishoners and clergy have been arrested during worship services, and some worshippers have been killed while attending church. Just last Sunday, police invaded a service being conducted by Rev. Alan Boesak, and used teargas during the service to break it up, and they smashed the windshield of Dr. Boesak's car, very nearly causing him serious injury. There have been government-inspired terrorist fire bomb attacks against two churches; missionaries are being expelled from the country; the South African Council

of Churches has been ransacked four times by government agents and several of its staff put in detention without charge. One of my most poignant recollections a few months back is of a pastor in a peaceful demonstration in Cape Town, kneeling in prayer, and then being hit in the face with a gun butt by South African policemen. His glasses were smashed, the glass went into his eyes and blinded him.

Anticipating just this kind of inhuman barbarism, the South African Council of Churches has called on partner churches abroad to find ways to exert international economic pressures to force the government to change. The SACC advocates a range of economic sanctions, including the withdrawal of foreign corporations from South Africa.

American churches have joined together to form the Churches' Emergency Committee on Southern Africa to help give voice to what South Africa church leaders are saying that has bearing on American policy. In a time of severe press censorship and when the advocacy of economic sanctions is a serious felony in South Africa, it is of particular importance that the suppressed voices of South African church people be heard. I want you to hear the voices of church people in South Africa.

- Listen to a United Church of Christ missionary, now resident in Zimbabwe, in a recent letter to us: "With all the discussion of sanctions against South Africa, some of you have asked what we think. Based on the 10 years we spent in South Africa, our opinion is that sanctions are urgently needed. We are convinced that no amount of talk will persuade the white government there to share power, and that the voices of moderate black leaders must be heeded; the overwhelming majority of them say that sanctions are a necessary part of a total strategy to bring about full human rights. Furthermore,

the noble rhetoric of some Western leaders about Blacks suffering from sanctions is not persuasive; most black leaders in South Africa and in the rest of Africa are now convinced that such talk disguises the reality that the West does not want to lose valuable import commodities and trade nor sacrifice profits."

- Listen to Bishop Desmond Tutu, soon to be installed as Anglican Archbishop of South Africa: "A clear message resounds in recent surveys in South Africa in which more than 70 percent of Blacks supported sanctions against the Government. Blacks are saying: 'We are suffering already. To end it, we will support sanctions, even if we have to take on additional suffering'....I must ask, To whom is the international community willing to listen? To the victims and their spokesmen or to the perpetrators of apartheid and those who benefit from it? ...There is no guarantee that sanctions will topple apartheid, but it is the last nonviolent option left, and it is a risk with a chance. President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement, and similar efforts to persuade white South Africans who support apartheid to change, have failed dismally. Let's try another strategy...There is no room for neutrality. When you say you are neutral in a situation of injustice and oppression, you have decided to support the unjust status quo. Are you on the side of injustice? Are you on the side of oppression or liberation? Are you on the side of goodness or of evil?"
- Listen to Bishop Tutu again: "I have no hope of real change from this government unless they are forced. We face a catastrophe in this land and only the action of the international community to apply punitive sanctions against this government to help us establish a new South Africa, non-racial, democratic, participatory and just. This is a non-violent strategy to help us do so."
- Listen to Rev. Dr. Alan Boesak, President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and Senior Vice President of the South African Council of Churches: "We have asked the world to apply economic pressure on South Africa's government. We have said that this is a peaceful way of bringing about those changes that our country so desperately needs. And the very people in the Western World who keep on telling us that we must not react with violence refuse to support us when we ask them to join us in nonviolent efforts to bring about the fall of apartheid. I do not understand that...And I want to say to you, do not be swayed by those people who tell you that we cannot do that because black people in South Africa will suffer first...."

"Let me tell you something else about suffering. There is no easy walk to freedom. Which people in the world fighting for their human dignity, or their freedom, can expect the oppressor to give them that freedom on a silver platter? It doesn't happen. It didn't happen in the United States of America when this country was fighting Britain; it didn't happen elsewhere in the world...And when our children have marched peacefully and been mowed down by South African police and their guns, as if they were dogs. And when you had held your dying child in your arms and you know that there is nothing you can do about it because that murder machine will come into the streets tomorrow again and more will die. When you have gone through that kind of suffering, what are people talking about?"

The South African Government so feared the witness of Dr. Boesak that it has ruthlessly silenced him by charging him with economic subversion for advocating divestment and disinvestment. This in itself provides powerful testimony to both the injustice and the economic vulnerability of the apartheid system.

As a pastor, I hope you will forgive me the recollection of a biblical parallel to the situation in South Africa. When God sent the plagues on Egypt, it was for the purpose of freeing the Israelite slaves - locusts, darkness, hail, boils, flies, maggots and frogs. While these plagues were sent as sanctions against the Egyptians and the Israelites were largely immune, they undoubtedly suffered some fallout. God knew that the Israelites would understand that they must undergo these hardships for the sake of their liberation. God did not tell Moses to coax and cajole Pharaoh and appeal to his sense of fair play and high mindedness. He said, "Let my people go, or I will send plagues upon you." God did not change ambassadors or emissaries. God did not tell Moses to maintain dialogue, even when Pharaoh was deaf to his pleas. When Pharaoh's

obstinence became abundantly clear, God punished Pharoah and had Moses lead the captive Israelites to freedom. God did not worry about corporate profits or about undermining the economy of Egypt. The stakes were too high in terms of human survival and freedom to remain inactive or fretful about the exchange rates for Egyptian currency. God acted decisively for the sake of freedom and justice, and that is what the U.S. Senate is called to do in relation to South Africa.

The opponents of comprehensive sanctions argue that we can't "cut and run," and that we will lose our leverage for change if we depart. But the ineffectiveness of constructive engagement, including the engagement by U.S. corporations, has become abundantly clear to all but the originators of that policy. The leverage arising out of sanctions is that sanctions will be lifted if democracy is introduced and racism deinstitutionalized.

The compelling need for a total trade embargo is underscored by the fact that, according to a recent report in the New York Times, \$282 million worth of military goods dominated U.S. exports to South Africa in 1985. Those goods will be utilized by the South African military and police to undermine the struggle by Blacks in Namibia and South Africa for full political rights.

One can not help but suspect that the underlying motive of those who oppose sanctions is that they are more concerned about the profit margins of U.S. corporate investors in South Africa than they are about the abolition of the system of state slavery that exists in South Africa and from which U.S.

corporations benefit. It is time to renounce the profits of exploitation and oppression that accrue to American corporate investors in South Africa. Rather ironically, the Wall Street Journal reported in an article on July 11 that even though U.S. corporations are usually not prepared to admit it publicly, an increasing number of them secretly hope that comprehensive sanctions will be imposed so that they will have a good excuse for pulling out of that increasingly complicated and unprofitable country.

- Listen to Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli, speaking 24 years ago, "The economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for Africans. We do not doubt that. But it is a method which shortens the day of bloodshed, the suffering to us will be a price we are willing to pay."
- Listen to Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. speaking about the same time: "We ask all men of goodwill to take action against apartheid in the following manner...Don't buy South African products. Don't trade or invest in South Africa."

Let me commend to all of you the report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons. Its message is wise, intelligent, and penetrating. They conclude that while President Botha may claim to be reformist, he considers the most fundamental principles of apartheid to be sacrosanct. That government is not at this moment willing to negotiate fundamental change nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and power. Its programme of reform is not intended to end apartheid but rather to give it a less inhuman face. That report concludes,

"From the point of view of the black leadership, the course now taken by the world community will have the greatest significance. That leadership has already come to the view that diplomatic persuasion has not and will not move the South African Government sufficiently. If it also comes to believe that the world community will never exercise sufficient effective pressure through other measures in support of their cause, they will have only one option remaining: that of ever-increasing violence."

I am reminded of a white South African woman who said, "It is either us on top and them (Blacks) on the bottom, or them on top and us on the bottom, and I intend to do whatever is necessary to assure that whites remain on top, and Botha is our best guarantor of that." That is not a point of view that is altered by the coaxing and cajoling of constructive engagement.

Listen to Rev. Beyers Naude, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches: "It is a sign of hope that despite all the bitterness and the injustice and the suffering, we hear the voice of millions of the oppressed Christians of South Africa saying to the white minority, 'We do not hate you as whites. We hate your system. We hate injustice. We hate what you impose on us. But we are still prepared to offer our hand to you and to say, for God's sake, let us accept one another, in the fellowship of a common humanity'."

I am reminded of a scene some years ago at the train station in Johannesburg. It was very early in the morning and trains were unloading thousands of black workers who had traveled from their miserable hovels in Soweto to face another day as the oppressed servants of their white masters. As a group of black workers left the train they sang Christian hymns, demonstrating that even in this desperate situation, Christian hope survives. Black South Africans look to the U.S. Senate and the President of this country as one of few remaining sources of hope in forcing significant change in South Africa. Please don't let them down.

LET US RISE UP AND WALK TOGETHER

Allan Boesak's Speech at 75th Anniversary Conference of
National Urban League: Washington D.C.
23rd July, 1985

Rev. Howard, Mr. Jacob, Mr. Robinson, my dear brothers and sisters. I thank you very much for this invitation to be with you tonight. I am deeply honored that you have invited me to share with you this joyous occasion of your 75th Anniversary. I congratulate you. I bring you the good wishes from all of South Africa's people. I congratulate you on your record, for your own involvement in the issues of civil rights for so long. I am particularly happy that on this birthday I was honored to be part of you this afternoon as we marched from this hotel to the South African Embassy, thinking all the while that when our people in my country decide that we will march or express publicly our feelings about Apartheid, we go into the streets knowing that many of us may die. It was an encouragement for me which I will take home and share with my people. I am also very honored to share this platform with Randall Robinson. I must let you know that what this man has begun in the Free South Africa movement will be taken up in the annals of history in South Africa. When our own history will be written by our own people one day the name of Randall Robinson will be written with pride. I hope that we will, with the same pride, be able to write of the involvement and the contribution of so many Americans at a time when I think we needed you most.

My brothers and sisters, the struggle for freedom and human dignity and justice in South Africa is not a new one. For three hundred and thirty-three years our people have seen our land robbed, have experienced time after time vicious onslaughts on our human dignity. We have seen our people die. For years we have suffered the horrors of slavery and after that the more subtle but nonetheless real horrors of racial discrimination and systematic oppression. For the last 40 years we have been subjected to a system called Apartheid. Apartheid is more than just racial separation as the American media so often describes it. It is more than just segregation, it is more than signs on trains saying "whites only." It is the most sophisticated system of racial domination, of political oppression and of economic exploitation.

Apartheid is unique in two ways. First, South Africa is the only country in the world where racial discrimination is actually institutionalized, written into the constitution of the country. And the second unique characteristic of Apartheid is that it claims to be a "Christian" policy. So that in my country, in the name of Jesus, Christians have developed this system and maintain it, with ruthlessness. In the name of Jesus, the white Dutch Reformed Church has developed a theology of Apartheid, justifying with the Bible the oppression of our people.

In the name of Jesus, families are being broken up for the sake of economic gain and migrant laborers are not allowed to bring their families with them to what is called "white" South Africa. So that fathers will see their children once a year for three weeks, after they have become strangers to their families. In the name of Jesus we have a homelands policy through which black South Africans can be denationalized at the whim of a minister. Forced removals take place. People are taken to relocation camps where our children die of hunger and our old people die of hopelessness and despair. And so in the name of Jesus, the name of Jesus is being betrayed.

What, over the years, has been the response of black South Africans? In 1912 an organization was formed--called the African National Congress. Our people then tried, time after time, day after day, through petitions, and delegations to plead with successive South African governments, to plead with the British Crown and with the British Government, and to ask for a fair deal for South Africa's black people. For years we have conducted nonviolent campaigns to impress upon the conscience of white South Africa the need for a negotiated settlement. For years we have tried to make white South Africa understand that what we want is not to drive white people into the sea, but that we want a share in the decision making processes of our country, a full and meaningful participation in government, what we want is the recognition that we are people that belong to that land, which is, after all, the land of our birth. In the 1950's the African National Congress was responsible for the defiance campaign. In 1960 there was the campaign against the pass laws, and on March 21, 1960 in a place called Sharpeville, while this demonstration was peacefully taking place, the South African government sent its police, who opened fire. Sixty-nine people died. Most of them were shot in the back, hundreds were wounded. In those days instead of realizing that for South Africa a turning point had arrived in our history, that we had entered a phase where all of South Africa would be asked to look deep into our own hearts and to ask fundamental questions about the future. The South African government did not do that--but responded with violence, with draconian laws like the Suppression of Communism Act. Many of our people, hundreds of them--were then detained. Many of our leaders were rounded up by the police, they were put on trial for treason, many of them were sent to Robben Island like Nelson Mandela, many of them forced into exile, many of them killed. Then in 1976 the schoolchildren of Soweto rose up. Again they did not ask for guns. They did not ask for ammunition, they wanted peacefully, nonviolently to impress upon the hearts of white South Africa that they as the children of South Africa want a future, a life that would be different from the life of their parents. No more apartheid, no more racism, no more hatred, no more violence. And once again, the South African government answered with violence, and with intimidation. Hundreds of children died on the streets of Soweto and elsewhere in South Africa. The same happened in 1980 when the schoolchildren of Cape Town rose up again, in a peaceful fashion, to express their aspirations and their expectations for a better future in the land of their birth. After the government announced in 1982 that it would have a new constitution we formed a non-racial front of organizations called the United Democratic Front. We decided to resist the campaign for a new constitution because we said that the new constitution was racist, it entrenched Apartheid and white minority rule, it is based on the continuation of the homelands policy, surely one of the most objectionable and immoral aspects of all the policies of the South African government. The new constitution excludes willfully almost 80 percent of South Africa's population. We asked our people not to go to the polls. And we were singularly successful. For in spite of the violence of the South African government, and in spite of their intimidation, less than ten percent of the people in the so-called Coloured and Indian communities went to the polls, showing clearly that our communities refuse to be sucked into the system of oppression, refuse to be divided from the rest of the black community; and we said to the South African government: "Do not come to us with your shallow divisions based on ethnicity. We want a South Africa where all of South Africa's children will be recognized, and where all of us will participate in the government of our choice."

But since then the violence has not stopped. Something terrible is happening to my country at this moment. Apartheid with its racism, its exploitation and dehumanization not only still exists, but is now being defended with uncommon

harshness. The church is being persecuted by the government for its obedience to God rather than to human beings and for its decision to stand alongside the poor, and the oppressed, and the downtrodden in our struggle for justice. Unrest and violence is found all over South Africa because the cause of it all, namely the policies of the government, has not been removed. The police and the army have laid siege to our townships, our townships are infested with them. Since August of last year more than ten thousand people have been detained without trial and the toll is rising every day. More than five hundred have been killed, and now we have a state of emergency. Now, under the state of emergency the reign of terror the police and the army have been conducting for months in our country has become legal. People have disappeared. And more will now disappear because the police can do what it wants without accountability. In the last few months, many of our leaders have disappeared. Some of them have been assassinated. Death squads are roaming our streets and they receive protection from the South African government. Systematically many of the young people of our country are being taken "out of circulation," as they say. Little children, like Johannes Pochter of 12 years old, get caught by the police and beaten to death for no reason at all. In all of this my brothers and sisters, we are clear. In the South African government we are confronted truly with the spiritual children of Adolf Hitler. And this is what we have to understand. Not only in South Africa, but also in the United States of America.

We have not given up the struggle even though all of this has been happening. When I hear people say to me here in America, "when I hear about your struggle in South Africa, I know what you are talking about because it's the same as what we went through in the 1960's," with all due respect, that is not true. During the civil rights struggle you had your constitution on your side. During the civil rights struggle at least there were some people in government like President John Kennedy who knew what was right, and who knew what was wrong. During those days there were people even from the white community in the United States who understood the issues and who understood fundamentally what the United States is supposed to be about. In my country none of these are present; in my country the press will not even mention when our people get killed. They are more concerned about sports events than they are about the death of our people in South Africa. We do not have a constitution that gives us any protection, in fact the very denial of our human rights and of our human dignity is enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Never in the 1960's did American blacks have to face the kind of violence that our people have to face day after day. And you do not know what it means to go from funeral to funeral, grave to grave, and sadness to sadness, without knowing when we will see the end of that tunnel.

Since 1960 every nonviolent effort that we have been engaged in: Sharpeville and Soweto, Cape Town, and the anti-constitution demonstrations, have ended in a massacre. The South African government has shown its ruthlessness and its utter determination to cling to power no matter what the cost. What do you do when you have to face a situation when even little children, six years old, like Thabo Sibeko, is killed by the police—as he was last year. Shot by a policeman sitting in a moving police vehicle and he died inside his own house and the police make a bland statement saying that they kill only those who are a threat to the police. What do you do when you have gone through these experiences like we have in 1980? The first boy who was shot in Cape Town was Bernard Fortuin. As he lay bleeding on the street his mother came running and wanted to be with him, was not allowed by the police who hit her with their gun butts and shouted to her the words that reverberated across the country to the shame of South Africa forever, and they told her: "Let the bastard die."

Bernard Fortuin was twelve years old. On March 21st this year the South African police without any provocation shot and killed 43 people in Langa township in Uitenhage. I know that the South African government says that only 21 people were killed. Our people in the townships say 43 are dead.

And I spoke to a mother whose child had been killed by the police. She showed me her nine year old son's T-shirt which was soiled with blood. There were bullet holes on the back of the shirt and on the front there was a picture of a bear with the words: "Please take care of this little bear."

In the meantime South Africa still receives support from western countries and especially from the United States of America. Mr. Reagan can coolly and blandly say that the police had fired on those 43 people because they were going to do violence, although he was not there to see neither the provocation by the police nor the killing of our people. I have a feeling he would not even have cared.

And now a State of Emergency has been declared. What Randall Robinson said is right: it is the bitter harvest of "Constructive Engagement." It is the fruit of American indifference for far too long now. The Administration now even with this State of Emergency, says that it hopes that the South African government under the circumstances will respect the human rights of black people. If the government does not even respect our human rights under normal circumstances, how in the world is it going to respect our human rights in a State of Emergency? I would like to ask the Reagan Administration how many more must die before America acts? How many more people must simply disappear before America will understand that its policy of Constructive Engagement is a refuge for South Africa's government? It creates a climate in which they can do whatever they like and can still get away with it. I must ask the question, what in God's name has happened to America? What has happened to those ideals that are enshrined in your constitution? What has happened to your commitment to equality and to justice and to democracy? Why is it that you are concerned about democracy in the United States of America, but when it comes to Central America and to South Africa, democracy doesn't seem to make any difference to you at all, because you are supporting the very governments who dig the graves for democracy, not only for now but also for the future.

I want, my brothers and sisters, to plead with you for the sake of all that is good and decent in your own heritage, turn your government away from this disastrous policy. Refuse to allow America to continue to be aligned with racist oppression. But again I must say to you, that it doesn't matter what happens now. No force on earth can turn the people of South Africa around anymore. We are determined to have our freedom. Over the years we have seen too much, over the years we have experienced too much, over the years we have seen too many of our people die, we cannot be turned around now. And a hundred Ronald Reagans will not stop us from getting our freedom.

We have asked the world to apply economic pressure on South Africa's government. We have said that this is a peaceful way of bringing about those changes that our country so desperately needs. And the very people, the very people in the western world who keep on telling us that we must not react with violence refuse to support us when we ask them to join us in nonviolent efforts to bring about the fall of Apartheid. I do not understand that. The South African Council of Churches on June 29, 1985 accepted a resolution in which we said the time has now come for the churches to openly and publicly call for economic sanctions, and for similar measures of economic pressure on South Africa, because we believe it is a peaceful way to bring about the

changes that we want. And I want to say to you, do not be swayed by those people who tell you that we cannot do that because black people in South Africa will suffer first. I want to ask the business community in this country who employ that argument, this question: where were you when black people were suffering for 330 years in South Africa? Where were you when we were not allowed to bring our women, our wives, our children to white South Africa so that we can have a decent family life? Where were you, where was your concern when our children could not have a decent education and had to grow up with "Bantu" and "Coloured" and "Indian" education? Where was your concern when we were forced away from lands that we had owned since the time that our forefathers came to that part of Africa, and brought to the concentration camps the South African government euphemistically calls "Relocation Areas?" Where was their concern then? Why aren't they honest, why don't they tell us that their concern is for their profits and not for black people? One reason why South Africa's black people could not tell you before that we want disinvestment and economic pressure is that the South African government has made that treasonable. We could go to jail for ten years if we do that. We could be charged with treason if we do that. The reason why I have decided that I will speak out and say this openly is because I can no longer stand the suffering people needlessly in my country, which is caused by Apartheid. And I would rather see us suffering the little while that it will take to dismantle that evil system than to continue the suffering which would have been over 25 years ago had the world then heeded the calls and the cries of black South Africa.

Let me tell you something else about suffering. There is no easy walk to freedom. Which people in the world fighting for their human dignity, for their freedom, can expect the oppressor to give them that freedom on a silver platter? It doesn't happen. It didn't happen in the United States of America when this country was fighting Britain; it didn't happen anywhere else in the world. Why do people think that we must expect something different in South Africa? But let me tell you something else about suffering. I don't understand why people tell us: "Oh, we cannot do this because you will suffer." I would very much like to decide for myself whether I would like to suffer or not.

And when, my brothers and sisters, you have seen your child die in that wealthiest country on the continent of Africa, where white people enjoy every single privilege that modern western society can offer, and where our mothers have to mix flour with soil to make it more so that their children can have something to eat. And where in the relocation areas out of 800 graves, 515 are the graves of little children. And when our children have marched peacefully and had been mowed down by the South African police and their guns, and their hippos and their bazookas, as if they were dogs. And when you had held your dying child in your arms and you know that there is nothing you can do about it because that murder machine will come into the streets tomorrow again and more will die. When you have gone through that kind of suffering, what are people talking about? Telling us that withdrawal of American money will cause black people suffering.

Many of you have asked me, and the press here continually ask me, but what about you? Aren't you afraid to go home? What will happen to you if you go home? Well, I have stood at the graveside of brave people, marvelous men and women and children who have given their lives for the struggle, because they believe in it. I was at a funeral in South Africa on Saturday and I boarded the plane on Sunday to be back at this meeting to speak to you tonight. But I must ask you, my brothers and sisters, do not be concerned for me. Because in my country much more is at stake than simply the life of one man. Be

concerned for all those nameless little people who have no protection, whose names are not known, who will die tomorrow and no newspaper will even write one single word about them. They are the true brave people who have carried the flag for freedom in South Africa for many, many years without a single word of recognition from the world.

I have had my recognition and you will know when I die. But as I said to my people back home, I will say to you: If I die tomorrow, do not mourn me, and do not come to my funeral and sing freedom songs if while I am alive you were not willing to participate with us in the struggle for freedom and justice.

But I assure you tonight, and I say this from the bottom of my heart because amongst the many things that I am uncertain of in South Africa, amongst the many things that I do not know anything about—I do not know what will happen tomorrow; I do not know what will happen to my family, I do not know what will happen to our people. One thing I know: South Africa's people shall be free! It is something that I have seen, it is something that I have experienced in the determination of young people who are no longer afraid to go out on the streets and face the dogs, and the tear gas, and the guns. I have seen this in the face of our own people who have come alive again because they say to me: "In what you say and in what you do, and in what our young people do, I am strengthened again. I am encouraged again, I have hope again." South Africa's people will be free.

Ours is a certain victory. Our march shall not end. We will walk on until that land will once again be ours. And so I will say to you: Do not allow this moment of history to pass you by. Join us in that struggle now. I have said before and I will say it again: The freedom of black people in the United States is bound up with the freedom of black people in South Africa. So let us rise up, and let us walk together for the sake of a country besieged by racism and oppression, by violence and fear, let us rise up and walk together. For the sake of those who have suffered so much but still refuse to give up hope, let us rise up and walk together. For the sake of those mothers who bury their children before they can live and play like children, let us rise up and walk together. For the sake of children, who even now continue to believe that they do have a future in South Africa, let us rise up and walk together. For the sake of all that is good, and decent, and human in America, let us rise up and walk together. For the sake of all of us children of God learning how to love and how to live, believing in a better and just world, and building that better and just world, let us rise up and walk together, to freedom, and to justice, and to peace. And with God's help we shall get there! God Bless you.

[0582P]

HARARE DECLARATION

We leaders of churches from Western Europe, North America, Australia, South Africa and other parts of Africa, along with representatives of World Council of Churches, World Alliance of Reformed Churches, Lutheran World Federation and all African Conference of Churches, met here in Harare, Zimbabwe, from the 4th to the 6th of December, 1985 on the invitation of the World Council of Churches.

We have come together to seek God's guidance at this time of profound crisis in South Africa, and have committed ourselves to a continuing theological reflection on the will of God for the church. WE AFFIRM THAT THE MOMENT OF TRUTH (KAIROS) IS NOW, BOTH FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. We have heard the cries of anguish of the people of South Africa trapped in the oppressive structures of apartheid. In this moment, of immense potentiality, we agree that the apartheid structure is against God's will, and is morally indefensible. The South African Government has no credibility. We call for:

- an end of the state of emergency,
- the release of Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners,
- the lifting of the ban on all banned movements,
- the return of exiles.

The transfer of power to the majority of the people, based on universal suffrage is the only lasting solution to the present crisis.

We understand and fully support those in South Africa who are calling for the resignation of the Government. We regard this as the most appropriate and least costly process of change and as a contribution towards such a change. As we await a new democratic and representative government in South Africa:

1. We call on the church inside and outside South Africa to continue praying for the people of South Africa and to observe June 16th the Tenth Anniversary of Soweto uprising as World Day of Prayer and Fast to end unjust rule in South Africa.
2. We call on the international community to prevent the extension, the rolling over, or renewal of bank loans to the South African Government, banks, corporations and para-state institutions.
3. We call on the international community to apply immediate and comprehensive sanctions on South Africa.
4. We call on the church inside and outside South Africa to support SA movements working for the liberation of their country.
5. We welcome and support recent developments within the trade union movement for a united front against apartheid.
6. We demand the immediate implementation of the United Nations Resolution 435 on Namibia.

We gathered here, commit ourselves to the implementation of the Harare Declaration as a matter of urgency. We are confident that the liberation of South Africa will be liberation for all the people in the country, black and white.

United States Office, The Reverend Joan B. Campbell, Exec. Director. (212) 870-2522

Mission to South Africa

The Commonwealth Report

Report of the
Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons
appointed under the Nassau Accord
on Southern Africa

Commonwealth Secretariat

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE, PALL MALL, LONDON SW1Y 5HX

CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS

329. Our work in South Africa has been a moving personal experience for every one of us. We arrived in the country on the day of the Soweto riots, and on the day of our final departure from Cape Town we saw a country in upheaval and witnessed great human suffering. Even as we write, the killings continue.

330. Each of us pondered at length the invitation to serve on the Group. It was clear that our task would be immensely difficult. Its success would depend, ultimately, on the good faith of the South African Government and on the co-operation of all significant sections of the South African society. It was only because we were persuaded that, whatever the odds, this was a task worth accepting that we accepted. In the course of our successive visits to South Africa and to the various institutions of the Government, we have seen the scale of the country's antagonisms. There could be little doubt that an alternative to a negotiated solution would be appalling chaos, bloodshed and destruction. We are concerned that the South African Government's rejection, in effect, of our negotiating concept compounded by its armed aggression against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe makes those dangers more imminent and the prospect of negotiations more difficult.

331. With members from diverse national and political backgrounds, we possessed particular advantages. We have been able to draw on the confidence and trust of all the principal black leaders and organisations within the country,

as well as the liberation movements outside. We were able to travel freely throughout South Africa, to visit black townships normally not accessible to outsiders and to talk to a diverse spectrum of opinion including opposition parties, trade unions, church leaders, businessmen, women's groups and civil rights activists. In extensive discussions with the State President and many other Ministers, we also gained valuable insights into the Government's own thinking and future plans. The range of contacts we made, enabling us to understand the complexities of the situation, was probably unique; the frankness and openness of the discussions unlikely to be replicated in the near future. We, therefore, permit ourselves some broader reflection.

332. Our mandate was to foster a process of negotiation across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government. It is our considered view that, despite appearances to the contrary, the South African Government is already prepared to negotiate in its own terms. These terms are based on the principle of majority rule, and are subject to reasonable black expectations and well accepted democratic norms and principles.

333. The objectives of any negotiations, as Commonwealth leaders agreed at Nassau, and at all the non-white people of South Africa as well as increasing numbers of whites demand, would be the dismantling of the apartheid system and the creation of a democratic South Africa. The Government's rejection of the principle of majority rule, its failure to accept the principle of non-raciality, its refusal to negotiate, its unwillingness to be regarded as a partner in negotiations, were all factors which made it clear that there should be a firm and unambiguous commitment by the Government to the negotiating process - as well as specific and meaningful steps taken to that end. It needs to be remembered that apartheid goes beyond institutionalised racial discrimination and economic exploitation; it is primarily a means of keeping ultimate political and economic power in the hands of a small white minority. The Government's unwillingness to dismantle apartheid would inevitably result in the perpetuation of the vast majority as a play for perpetuating white power in a new guise, a willingness to change its form but not abandon its substance.

334. The Government told us categorically that it was prepared to contemplate negotiations with a completely open agenda, where everything would be on the table. However, as we have pointed out elsewhere, in some respects, the open agenda appeared to be circumscribed. Nevertheless, for the purposes of our discussions we gave the South African Government the benefit of the doubt in assuming that it was prepared to negotiate in good faith. The concept of a non-negotiable, for example, the concept of group rights, the number of seats in the parliament, the concept of the "homelands" created in furtherance of that concept would not disappear, but be reinforced with the emergence of an "independent" KwaZulu; the principle of one man one vote in a unitary state was beyond the realm of possibility; the Population Registration Act would continue; and the present Tricameral Constitution which institutionalised racism must be the vehicle for future constitutional reform.

335. From these and other recent developments, we draw the conclusion that while the Government claims to be ready to negotiate, it is in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face. Its quest is power-sharing, but without surrendering overall white control.

336. In regard to the modalities of negotiation, the Government's position was a considerable element of difficulty. The Government is willing to negotiate with "responsible" black leaders, but not with "unresponsible" and "instigating" black leaders. These leaders would be ready to come to the negotiating table to strike a deal. Although we were never told by the Government who these "responsible" leaders might be - indeed, the Government assured us it would not prescribe or limit the people's choice - it could be inferred that prominent among them would be the "homelands" leaders whom the Government repeatedly urged us to see. With the exception of Chief Buthe, the "homelands" leaders have no real political standing or following and would not, in our view, be credible parties in a negotiation to resolve South Africa's deepening crisis. The Government's unwillingness to negotiate with the African National Congress, the only mass-based black liberation movement, and its refusal to accept the principle of majority rule, are factors which make it unlikely that a negotiated solution will be achieved.

They are no longer prepared to tolerate the oppression and exploitation. They can no longer stomach being treated as aliens in their own country. They have confidence not merely in the justice of their cause, but in the inevitability of their victory. Unlike the earlier periods of unrest and Government attempts to stamp out protest, there has been during the last 18 months no outflow of black refugees from South Africa. The growth of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for these convictions. They will, therefore, sustain their struggle, whatever the cost.

346. The campaign against collaborators, and the ruthless elimination of agents of white authority, will continue. More and more black townships will be rendered unmanageable, and the process of creating popular structures of self-government within them will gather momentum. The number of street and area committees will increase and their functions will progressively enlarge.

345. The writ of the Government will be increasingly circumscribed. Inter-black rivalry and violence, partly encouraged and partly encouraged by the Government, will grow, making the task of negotiating a settlement even more difficult. Political upheaval and social unrest will accelerate the flight of capital and professional skills and the economy's downward spiral.

346. Amidst all this gloom the quality of the country's black leaders shines through. Their achievement in bringing about popular and trade union mobilisation in the face of huge odds commands respect. Their tenacity, their genuine sense of mission, and their readiness not only to forget but to forgive - commendable qualities in any leader. The Government continues to shrink from taking the necessary political decisions with a sense of urgency. The options are diminishing by the day.

347. The Government faces difficult choices. Its obduracy and intransigence wrecked the Constitutional Initiative, but the issues themselves will not go away, nor can they be bought off by appeasement. It is not sanctions which will destroy the country but the Government's refusal to negotiate and its failure to engage in fundamental political reform.

348. In our Report we have addressed in turn the five steps which the Minister Accord called on the authorities in Pretoria to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". They, and our conclusions with regard to them, are as follows:

(a) Declare that the system of apartheid will be dismantled in a specific and meaningful action taken to fulfilment of that intent.

We have examined the Government's "programme of reform" and have been forced to conclude that at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid.

(b) Terminate the existing state of emergency.

Although the state of emergency was technically lifted, the substantive powers remain broadly in force under the emergency act of the 1960s which, even now, are being further strengthened in this direction.

337. Negotiations leading to fundamental political change and the end of democratic rule will only be possible if the South African Government is prepared to deal with leaders of the people's choosing rather than with prepared leaders of its own creation. President Botha's recent statements expressing his determination to "break" the ANC bode ill for the country's future. There can be no negotiated settlement in South Africa without the ANC; the breadth of its support is incontestable; and this support is growing. Among the many striking figures whom we met in the course of our work, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo stand out. Their reasonableness, absence of rancour and readiness to find negotiated solutions which, while creating genuine democratic structures would still give the whites a feeling of security and participation, impressed us deeply. If the Government is prepared to talk with men like Mandela and Tambo, then the future of South Africa is bleak indeed.

338. The Government made it clear that it did not regard the ANC as the only other party to negotiations. We agree, but would emphasise that the ANC is a necessary party. The Government itself acknowledges this, if only by blaming the ANC for most of the violence. The open identification with the ANC through banners and songs, in funerals and in churches throughout the country, despite the risks involved, supports the widely-held belief that if an election were held today on the basis of universal franchise the ANC would win it. Whatever the truth of that assertion, we nonetheless consider that the political opinion is not meretricious. Conditions in which free political activity about negotiation and political parties and leaders are able to function effectively and test the extent of their popular support. Tragically, the whole thrust of Government policy has been to thwart such legitimate leadership from emerging and destroy it where it does. Even non-violent organisations like the UDF have been subjected to harassment and persecution.

339. Behind these attitudes lurks a deeper truth. After more than 10 months of persistent unrest, upheaval, and killings unprecedented in the country's history, the Government believes that it can contain the situation indefinitely by use of force. We were repeatedly told by Ministers that the Government had deployed only a fraction of the power at its disposal. Although the Government's confidence may be valid in the short term, but at great human cost, it is plainly misplaced in the longer term. South Africa is predominantly a country of black people. To believe that they can be indefinitely suppressed is an act of self-delusion.

340. By pandering to right-wing anxieties and demands, the Government fortifies them, compounding its own problems and losing whatever initiative it might possess. It is also in danger of falling between two stools. Its promises of reform have created a false security among the white community supporters and contributed to growing white backlash; yet the reforms themselves have made little impact on black attitudes or aspirations - save to confirm the Government's implacable resistance to significant change.

341. While right-wing opposition cannot be ignored, it would be fatal to give it a veto. Indeed, we gained the impression that white opinion as a whole may be ahead of the Government in significant respects, ready to respond positively if given a bold lead.

342. We are left with the impression of a divided Government. Yet even the nine unopposed Ministers whom we met seem to be out of touch with the mood in the black townships, the stifling life of anger and impotence within them, and the extent of black mobilisation and defiance. The Government, the great majority of white South Africans - only some ten per cent of whom, we were told, have ever seen conditions in a township.

(c) Release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned and detained for their opposition to apartheid.

Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison.

(d) Establish political freedom and specifically lift the restrictions placed on the African National Congress and other political parties.

Political freedom is far from being established, if anything, it is being more rigorously curtailed. The ANC and other political parties remain banned.

(e) Initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.

The cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled and there is no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government.

Overall, the concrete and adequate progress looked for in the Matsiwa Accord towards the objectives of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa has not materialised.

139 Indeed, in recent weeks, the Government would appear to have moved continuously away from any realistic negotiating process. It is not just their communications with us which have indicated a hardening of attitude. The same message has been clear in the State President's speech in May, the bombing of white residential areas, the Government's refusal to negotiate with the ANC, the withdrawal of the earlier readiness to accept "suspensions" of violence, the renewed escalation of violence, the seeking of greater security powers for the police and military on top of the massive powers they already have, the renewed determination to suppress public meetings and free speech and to harass black leaders, and not least the more recent raids on Angolan ports.

140 For all the people of South Africa and of the sub-region as a whole, the certain prospect of a further sharper decline into violence and bloodshed with all its attendant human suffering and destruction is a very real one. The implications threaten. The unco-ordinated violence of today could become the not too distant future a major armed conflict spilling well beyond South Africa's borders. In such circumstances the entire economic fabric of the country would indeed be destroyed. Up to now those responsible for the armed resistance in South Africa have shown great regard for innocent lives. Unless the cycle of violence is broken, full-fledged guerrilla warfare as practised in other parts of the world, in which "soft" civilian targets become prime targets in a reign of terror, may come to pass. In the absence of significant moves to break the cycle of violence we see the prospect as inevitable and that in the very foreseeable future.

151. What can be done? What remaining influence does the international community have? What can major states do to help avert an otherwise inevitable disaster? There may be no course available that can guarantee a significantly more peaceful solution. But against the background in which even the most optimistic will be certain that the question of further measures immediately springing to mind is the need for the Heads of Government to have agreed that in the event of adequate progress having been made in South Africa within a period of six months, they would

172 while we are not determining the nature or extent of any measures which might be applied, or their effectiveness, we point to the fact that the Government of South Africa has itself used economic measures against its neighbours and that the measures are patently instruments of its own national policy. We are convinced that the South African Government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against its neighbours. It is our conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum, the descent into violence would be accelerated. In these circumstances, the cost in lives may have to be counted in millions.

153 From the point of view of the black leadership, the course now taken by the world community will have a distinct significance. That leadership has already come to the view that diplomatic pressure has not and will not move the South African Government sufficiently. If the world community believes that the world community will never exercise sufficient effective pressure on the other measures in support of their cause, they will have only one option remaining: that of ever-increasing violence. Once decisions involving greater violence are made on both sides, they carry an inevitability of their own and are difficult, if not impossible, to reverse, except as a result of exhaustion through prolonged conflict.

154. The question in front of Heads of Government is to our view clear. It is not whether such measures will compel change; it is already the case that their absence and the pressure of the world community will compel change. The question is whether they will be feared, defied or spiralled (or will it take concerted action of an effective kind). Such action may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War.

155. We hope this Report will assist the Commonwealth - and the wider international community - in helping all the people of South Africa save themselves from that awesome tragedy.

Nelson Mandela
Nelson Mandela

Amrinder
Amrinder

Anthony Barber

La Molella
John Molella

Obheanyo
Obheanyo (Batswana)

Alia Barrow
Alia Barrow

Susan Singh
Susan Singh

Edward Scott
Edward Scott

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To

THE PRESIDENT
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Via TELEX
 Insert "RCA"

JUNE 12, 1986

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE PAST 18 MONTHS HAVE BEEN A TIME OF SERIOUS AND GROWING ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE
 IN SOUTH AFRICA BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

THE UNRESTRICTED POWERS GRANTED THE MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER, THE BAN ON THE
 RIGHT TO LAWFUL ASSEMBLY FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, AND STATE PRESIDENT P.W. BOTHA'S
 REIMPOSITION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY ARE INGREDIENTS FOR GREATER REPRESSION BY
 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE GREATER RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF THE
 SOUTH AFRICAN MAJORITY. IN THE END, THIS CAN ONLY MEAN AN ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE
 AND BLOODSHED.

TODAY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SEIZED AND OCCUPIED THE OFFICES OF THE SOUTH
 AFRICA COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, CORDONED OFF THOSE FACILITIES, AND CUT OFF ALL OUT-
 SIDE COMMUNICATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO DETAINED ECUMENICAL OFFICERS, BOTH
 WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE FACILITIES. THESE ACTIONS ARE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
 PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS WELL AS OTHER BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE
 DETENTIONS ARE IN PART, THE RESULT OF SOUTH AFRICAN CHRISTIANS REQUESTING THE SOUTH
 AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO COMMEMORATE THE EVENTS
 OF JUNE 16TH AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT "REFRAIN FROM CONFRONTATION AND
 NOT PROVOKE PEOPLE WITH THEIR WEAPONS AND MILITARY MACHINES." WE URGE YOU TO CALL

(OVER)

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ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO GRANT THEIR REQUEST.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST RECENT EVENTS COMPEL THE ENACTMENT OF MANDATORY COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO HALT THE INCREASING FLOW OF BLOOD AND GROWING ANGER AND DESPAIR IN SOUTH AFRICA. IT IS REQUIRED IF THE U.S. IS TO REGAIN CREDIBILITY AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS AND OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICANS AND BEFORE THE WORLD, AS A PEOPLE AND A GOVERNMENT WHO HOLD SACRED THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND JUSTICE UPON WHICH OUR NATION WAS FOUNDED.

WE HOPE AND PRAY THAT YOU WILL ACT IMMEDIATELY AND FORCEFULLY TO SUPPORT THE CALL FOR FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT IS NOW BEING HEARD AROUND THE WORLD.

DR. AVERY POST, PRESIDENT - UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST
 DR. ROBERT NEFF, GENERAL SECRETARY CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN
 REV. JOHN O. HUMBERT, GENERAL MINISTER AND PRESIDENT - CHRISTIAN CHURCH DISCIPLES
 BISHOP JAMES R. CRUMLEY, PRESIDENT - LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA
 DR. THEODORE JENISON, PRESIDENT - NATIONAL BAPTIST CHURCH
 DR. C.J. MALLOY, GENERAL SECRETARY - PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION
 BISHOP PAUL DUFFEY, SECRETARY OF THE COUNCIL OF BISHOPS - UNITED METHODIST CHURCH
 REV. EDWIN MULDER, GENERAL SECRETARY - REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA
 DR. RALPH SHOTWELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR - INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY CHURCH
 FR. LEONARD KISHKOVSHY, ASSISTANT TO CHURCH - ORTHODOX CHURCH IN AMERICA (EMENICA)
 BISHOP CLINTON HOGGARD, BISHOP - AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL ZION
 DR. ROBERT CAMPBELL, GENERAL SECRETARY - AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCH USA
 BISHOP DAVID PREUS, GENERAL PRESIDENT - AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH
 BISHOP EDMOND BROWNING, PRESIDING BISHOP - EPISCOPAL CHURCH
 BISHOP PHILIP COUSIN, PRESIDENT - NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U
 DR. ARIE BROUWER, GENERAL SECRETARY - NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN T

END PAGE OF LETTER TO

SECRETARY OF STATE

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE



THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

RESOLUTION ON DISINVESTMENT

Referred to : South African Council of Churches Executive, Member Churches, Regional Churches, Affiliated Organizations and the International Community.

The National Conference of the South African Council of Churches, being deeply concerned at the violent conflict in which the people of South Africa are now embroiled....

1. Reiterates the statement which the Council has made in the past that foreign investment and loans have been used to support prevailing patterns of power and privilege in South Africa:
2. Recognises that many church leaders and Christian people in South Africa are in favor of (selective) disinvestment and economic sanctions because they believe that the situation is now so serious that economic action must be taken to strengthen political and diplomatic pressures on South Africa to force the South African governments to take seriously the need for fundamental change in South Africa:
3. Is agreed that fundamental change would include the dismantling of apartheid and the democratic involvement of all South Africans in the planning of new political, economic and social structures which would seek to guarantee for all people justice, development, freedom and peace:
4. Welcomes the concern and support of our fellow Christians in other countries who are working to assist us in finding non-violent ways in which fundamental change can be brought about in South Africa:
5. Believes that the pressure in western countries for disinvestment and divestment has been most effective in moving white South Africans into a more serious consideration of the cause of the political conflict of this country:
6. Concludes from the evidence placed before it that foreign investment does not necessarily create new jobs and that the contrary is often the case because new investment is frequently in the form of sophisticated technological equipment:
7. Draws attention to the fact that the churches have for many years tried to address the problem of structural unemployment in black communities and have not been aware of any serious concern being shown by the business sector, foreign or South African, or by government until recent months when economic sanctions have become a legislative probability in the United States:

(over)



THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

4.

8. Confesses that in the churches there has been no proper debate and consideration of the disinvestment question because we have allowed ourselves to be restrained by the severity of laws designed to prevent open discussion of economic sanctions. This has meant that the only arguments being heard in South Africa are those in opposition to disinvestment:

This conference therefore resolves:

- a. To express our belief that disinvestment and similar economic pressures are now called for as a peaceful and effective means of putting pressure on the South Africa government to bring about those fundamental changes this country needs:
- b. To ask our partner churches in other countries to continue with their efforts to identify and promote effective economic pressures to influence the situation in South Africa, towards achieving justice and peace in this country and minimizing the violence of the conflict:
- c. To promote fuller consideration of the issues by placing disinvestment before the Executive Committee of the South African Council of Churches and the Regional Councils, and the Councils of our member churches and organizations with the request that they encourage congregations to study and debate them:
- d. To ask the executive to appoint in consultation with the Director of Justice and Reconciliation a task force to examine the whole question of economic justice as well as issues of economic sanctions, to review and co-ordinate the responses from the churches, and to assist the church leaders by making available to them information and analyses:
- e. To call member churches and individual Christians to withdraw from participation in the economic system that oppresses the poor, by re-investing money and energy in alternative economic systems in existence in our region.

Accepted by National Conference of South African Council of Churches on June 28, 1985

From Mr. Dan Vaughan
Director of Administration
July 1, 1985

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT MORRIS

The prime purpose of an enlightened United States foreign policy should be the protection and advancement of our interests around the world. We also have a moral obligation to aid, within the limits of our power, our brothers and sisters in that world to achieve the fulfillment of their God-endowed spiritual and material potential.

On both scores sanctions, disinvestment and other punitive measures against the people of South Africa fail to measure up to these purposes.

South Africa today is besieged by an insurgency that has been initiated and aided by Moscow and encouraged by forces in the United States. A directive of the Politburo of the South African Communist Party to its revolutionary forces in the country, that surfaced last month, told it all. "Our broad strategy for achieving power is to mobilize the masses for a seizure of power." The directive further urges that the momentum of the "struggle" must be built up by partial and general uprisings until it reaches the climax of "revolutionary struggles in the post war period - Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique".

The emphasis of the "ANC-led" struggle rests on "the rising momentum of the people's offensive". The bottom line is the transfer of power to them. The basic demands in which many here join them - the release of political prisoners, troops out of townships, dismantling apartheid, legalizing the ANC, will create a better climate for this momentum "but cannot be regarded as a bargaining chip for slowing down momentum".

The leader of this insurgency is the African National Congress (ANC) and its leadership more than other successful revolutions represents a saturated Soviet proxy. Its Secretary General, Alfred Nzo, addressed the 27th World Congress in Moscow in March. The head of its military arm perpetrating the violence, is Joe Slovo, a Lithuanian

Comintern agent. Its spokesperson, Winnie Mandela, who receives a supportive press in this country, has pledged fealty to Moscow. The Soviet newspaper Pravda recently interviewed her and quoted her:

"The Soviet Union is the torch bearer for all our hopes and aspirations. We have learned and are continuing to learn resilience and bravery from the Soviet people, who are an example to us in our struggle for freedom, a model of loyalty to international duty. In Soviet Russia, genuine power of the people has been transformed from dreams into reality. The Land of the Soviets is the genuine friend and ally of all people fighting against dark forces of world reaction."

This same Winnie Mandela said of the ghoulish acts of terrorism the ANC is employing to further the momentum (the necklace, a gasoline saturated tire imposed on its victim and ignited) "together, hand in hand with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate the country".

These people are terrorists. Their AK rifles and bombs are supplied by the USSR and while the world is deploring terrorism it is encouraging the ANC in these depredations. From March 1 to June 5 of this year 284 innocent blacks were violently killed by the ANC, 172 of them by the necklaces - more than those killed by Qaddafi and other terrorists combined.

There are other black forces engaged in this unfolding drama. When I was in the country last year the moderate blacks outnumbered the revolutionaries by a 3 to 1 margin, as measured by a poll, taken by a liberal professor at the University of Natal which showed that blacks opposed sanctions by that margin. While that margin is probably reduced by the intimidations and the violence, there is a substantial group of blacks who, while opposing apartheid and wearing it down, are opposed to sanctions and the violence of the ANC. They are led by Chief Buthelezi, the most important black man in the country who heads up the Zulus, the largest of the eleven tribes. He has organized a political organization, Inkatha, and is now trying to work out with

the South African government, a black, power sharing provincial structure in Natal which is called Indaba.

These moderate blacks are working for a democratic, South Africa. They oppose the ANC and its violence. They yearn for further American presence. They recognize that American corporations have uplifted the educational, economic and political standards of the black workers. They abhor the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the political scene. They are joined in this by the black leaders of the surrounding countries, such as Swaziland and Lesotho.

They are also joined by the progressive whites such as Sybil Hotz, former mayor and now councilwoman in Durban with whom I spent some time. She has long been engaged in an organized campaign to uplift the conditions of the black majority in her province. She groans when she contemplates the devastating effects on her programs for the disadvantaged, developmental education, professional and semi professional training that she has been organizing.

This is the basic composition and content of the forces opposing apartheid. My friends there view with consternation the fact that the United States is intervening in South Africa, not on the side of the democratic forces but on the side of the revolutionary forces who want to make the country "ungovernable."

The agitation in this country for invoking sanctions, the demonstrations in front of the South African embassy, organized by the Randall Robinsons, the disinvestment campaigns sparked by campus radicals all orchestrated by media support, have been accelerating the momentum of the ANC-led revolutionary forces in "the struggle". We are thus undercutting friends of democracy and aiding our enemies.

If this insurgency succeeds, encouraged by sanctions, the disaster befalling United States interests will be immeasurable. Moscow recognizes this. Its journal, African Communist, published in East Berlin,

said:

"The balance of forces not merely in southern Africa but in the whole of Africa and indeed the world would be fundamentally altered if the South African revolution were to succeed in its aims and overthrow the Apartheid state".

Indeed this is the case. The strategic minerals in South Africa are indispensable for U.S. industrial and military survival. Between the USSR and South Africa, they control 99% of the world's platinum, 97% of its vanadium, 93% of its manganese and 84% of its chrome. Andrew Andrews, head of our subcommittee on international trade, has said of our denial of access to these "we would have to ground the airforce, close hospitals and restaurants". And of course President Reagan would not have his SDI. Actually we are more dependent on South Africa than South Africa is dependent on us.

Geopolitically, South Africa is the sole effective force in the southern half of Africa with the capacity to blunt the current Soviet drive to control that whole region. Hence the quote in the African Communist: South Africa now holds the Cape of Good Hope, gateway to the Indian Ocean. Its base at Simons Town is the only full western base in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. Soviet control of these could result in a geopolitical disaster.

The Soviet buildup in the Front Line States, principally in Angola and Mozambique, is enormous. Its nuclear submarines operate out of Luanda, Angola's capital. Robert Mugabe has offered to lead a Soviet backed army to attack Pretoria.

Some senators and congressmen support Joas Savimbi's UNITA and other freedom fighters in Africa. They should realize that if sanctions bring down the Pretorian government, Savimbi will fall, RENAMO, the resistance force in Mozambique will be crushed and the democratic government opposing SWAPO in Namibia will be overthrown.

It is argued by proponents of punitive action against South Africa that even if the blacks suffer hardships from the withdrawal of American

presence in the country, it will be worthwhile if apartheid is eliminated. This logic is flawed in that it does not carry to its eventual conclusion. Ending apartheid and substituting ANC rule will plunge blacks (and Indians and whites) into a gulag where the deprivations economically and politically will be far greater.

South Africa is a highly complex society. There are 11 disparate tribes with different languages, superstitions and customs, all hostile to each other. Many of these people live in tribal conditions without any concept of the foundations of a democratic life style. What the advocates of punitive sanctions are demanding is that the United States impose on the people of that country, instant democracy or some idealistic structure of government that could not possibly survive in the turmoil and intrigue of Africa. This goal should not be substituted for a foreign policy that advances the political, economic and military interests of this country. This foreign policy can be pursued while we work to bring democracy to that beleaguered country. But this must be done by working with the democratic forces, the advocates of reform, the moderate blacks and progressive whites who share our aspirations and not with the terrorists and revolutionaries who are working to make the country "ungovernable" to use their words. There are tremendous improvements being made. If you go to the country you will see them. The President has delineated some of them but there are many more.

Robert Morris is Chairman of the National Committee to Restore Internal Security, has been Chief Counsel, Counsel and Advisor to three Senate Committees. He is a retired commander in the U.S. Navy Intelligence and author of books on geopolitics and intelligence.
Tele: 201/892-4186

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN DE MARS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am John De Mars, Special Assistant for Peace Programs and International Relations for the National Education Association. NEA provides this testimony in the hope that you will consider the effects of apartheid on the children of color in the Republic of South Africa.

NEA's 1.8 million members are elementary, secondary, and postsecondary faculty and staff in the United States, and in the Department of Defense schools overseas. NEA is a founding member, and serves on the executive committee, of the 9 million-member World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP). WCOTP consists of 158 national teacher organizations from 102 nations, including the Republic of South Africa. For many years NEA, through WCOTP and its member-affiliates, has worked closely with the African Teachers Association of South Africa (ATASA) to enhance the effectiveness of its leadership and the competency of its members. Recently, NEA and WCOTP have provided support for ATASA's efforts to eliminate the widespread discrimination and violence against, and repression of, South Africa's people of color.

Since 1976, NEA has had specific policies, augmented and reaffirmed many times, condemning South Africa's apartheid system and supporting measures to pressure that government to move toward true political and economic democracy. Based on our policies, we endorsed the recent House-passed disinvestment legislation, and will work for passage of equivalent legislation by the Senate.

While the Reagan Administration pleads that it seeks resolution of the injustices directed toward South Africans of color under South African

government policy, there is little hope that continuation of our government's current policies will bring about the intended effects. It pains many Americans that the United States, the last best hope for democracy, is viewed by many in South Africa and throughout the world as "the last best friend" of the racist regime in Pretoria. We sense a growing American consensus to use every means at our disposal to move the South African government toward immediate elimination of apartheid, a system which South Africans themselves acknowledge is unjust and must be ended.

Since the 1976 uprisings in Soweto, the Black and other children of color in South Africa have borne a disproportionate burden in the struggle against apartheid. Wave after wave of regulation and control measures have been imposed by the government to drive from their minds the belief that they shall ever be politically and economically liberated in their home country. Those who cling to that belief are harassed, intimidated, beaten, arrested, detained, and, in numbers which shock us, tortured and killed. Their mistreatment begins with their education but extends to all aspects of their life.

Education for Black children is neither compulsory nor free. For Whites the opposite is true. Black families are required to pay fees for their children to attend school regardless of their unemployment and lack of income. In some areas 30 percent Black unemployment is not uncommon. What education is available for Black children is education in subservience and tolerance of a segregated and racist society. Up to 60 percent of all Black children leave school by the fifth year.

The education that is provided for Black children is woefully inadequate. Per pupil expenditures for White children are 800 to 1000 percent higher than for Black children. Teacher-pupil ratios for White children run about 1:25, while for Black pupils the ratio is 1:56, and class sizes up to 75 have been reported. We have seen a study which indicates that, to provide universal education to all Black children in South Africa, more than 180,000 classrooms would need to be constructed.

As one might imagine, opportunities for the education and training of Black teachers are also poor. From 70 to 80 percent of all Black teachers have only eight years of schooling followed by two years of teacher training; White teachers all have matric (high school diploma) plus three to four years of teacher training.

Black children realize the unsatisfactory future that inadequate education promises them. The condemnation of "Bantu" education, with its emphasis on education in the Afrikaans language, serves as the center of student unrest.

Despite arguments that much has changed since the early days, a quote from the Interdepartmental Committee on Native Education (1936) is instructive of current official attitudes regarding the purpose of education for Blacks:

"We must give the native an education which will keep him in his place. If the native is to receive any education, he should have as his aim the idea embodied in Dicken's version of the ancient prayer:

Oh, let us love our occupations,
Bless the Squire and his relations,
Live upon our daily rations,
And always know our proper stations."

And even earlier, Rev. W.E.C. Clarke, Transvaal's first inspector of Native Education, affirmed that the interest of White employers in Black schooling was "to teach the native to work:"

"No proposal for a plan of native education would be likely to commend itself to the great majority of the people (i.e., whites) of this country that did not contemplate the ultimate social place of the native as that of an efficient worker . . . the scheme prescribed makes provision, therefore, in the first place, for the combination of manual training with elementary instruction, and, in the second, for the shaping of that elementary instruction so as to equip the native for a more intelligent comprehension of any industrial work that is set before them."

Although changes in the nature of work and technology are widely recognized as necessary for effective and competitive production, Black people in South Africa view present-day education as nothing more than a means of preserving the old order. It is not surprising, then, that Black students have taken to the school yards and streets of South Africa to protest the system of education afforded them. As these students become better informed and recognize their increasing victimization, their protest expands to include the whole system of apartheid. They have now concluded, "Liberation now, Education later."

As students have demonstrated and protested, and the government's determination to end the opposition has stiffened, children have come into harm's way as the police and the military forces move violently to repress student dissent. The Council of South African Students and other student organizations have been banned and their leaders restricted, silenced, arrested, and detained. Students have been killed in demonstrations. In funeral gatherings for those dead, more students have been killed. The cycle of violence against children, and their response to it, escalates.

It is not enough to condemn violence in this crisis. We must also look at its genesis and at the world's response to it. Absent the institutions of apartheid and the United States' tepid response to the crisis, it is unlikely that South African students would find it necessary to sacrifice their education for the dangers of the streets.

A broad segment of the South African Black population has engaged in demonstrations and has felt the wrath of its government. However, in the disturbances of the past year, children have been a major target of government violence. The 1985 annual report of the South Africa project of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, South Africa 1985: Martial Law in the Townships, indicates that, upon the declaration of emergency and thereafter, 36,000 persons, including 500 members of the student organization COSAS were detained. Of all those detained under the state of emergency, 26 percent were children under 16. The government admits to killing 763, while human rights groups put the total at 879. Quoting from the Lawyers' Committee report:

"At least 201 children were killed by the security forces; 11-year-olds were charged with political offenses and denied bail; and children of 16 required psychiatric hospitalization following brutal torture.

"Torture in detention was rampant. There were detailed and consistent reports of detainees being hooded, beaten, given electric shocks, and subjected to death threats. At least 15 people died in police custody or immediately after release during 1985, most of them were younger than 25, including Johannes Spogter who was only thirteen."

We commend to the Chairman and Members of the Committee the 200-page report of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, entitled, "The War Against Children:

South Africa's Youngest Victims," April 1986. Page after page of testimony and documentation substantiates the brief comments provided above. While the report does not include the activities of the South African government of the past two months, it is well known that the focus of that government on children, and upon organized labor, including teachers, continues today.

In the present state of emergency the government has intensified its pattern of indiscriminate arrest and detention. An estimated 3,800 to 8,000 persons have been detained in the past five weeks alone. The Detainees Parents Support Committee has compiled a list of 2,111 names. Among these are 261 students and teachers, 488 community activists, 209 trade unionists, 67 clergy, and 12 journalists. The Progressive Federal Party of South Africa claims a list of 3,867 detained persons. No detainees have been charged, nor have they had access to counsel. And, since identifying detained persons is a crime, it is impossible to obtain an officially verified count.

The Secretary General of the African Teachers Association of South Africa is among those detained. Although he has been located, more than two weeks after his arrest he is still without legal representation despite our best efforts to attend to his legal rights. The government of South Africa has also thus far ignored our requests to meet with our colleague or to discuss his detention with the proper authorities.

Rather than moderate its behavior toward the children, in the past week the government has intensified its pressure upon the students and schools. Increased security personnel now make armed outposts of school yards. School grounds are fenced to control access and egress. All students must be issued

identification badges to be worn during school hours. Students have been required to present themselves to the schools to renew their registration, and authorities are free to refuse readmission. And Black teachers are under surveillance to assure that they follow the government-prescribed syllabus rather than the education content urged by students, Black parents and their supporters, Black teachers and trade unions, and the National Education Crisis Committee.

Prior to the recent state of emergency, an estimated 3 million students, including 1 million Black students, participated in a school stayaway. In the past week reports have reached us that fewer than 45 percent of the children are now attending schools, although reliable nationwide school attendance figures are out of the question due to government regulation of information.

The passions of South African students are aroused and the government's resolve to use force to control student activity remains unabated. The present situation in South Africa threatens to grow from random disorder and unrest to full-scale revolution. A number of your Senate colleagues, and other observers in our country, have forecast a nightmare of death and destruction of unimaginable numbers involving persons of all races. These dire predictions are supported by recent public statements of recognized leaders from the Black community of South Africa.

It is no longer possible to wait for voluntary change by the South African government. It is our hope that immediate action may be in time to prevent the impending slaughter of South African youth. We urge the Senate to join now with the House in adopting severe economic measures against the government of South Africa.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDALL ROBINSON

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity to testify before this Committee.

There is no graver moral-political crisis facing the world today than apartheid. Apartheid holds terrible if obvious dangers for all the people of South Africa. What may be less obvious but perhaps more dangerous is the grave risk it poses to the moral and political fibre and international interests of the U.S. It is therefore in our direct moral, political and security interests to do everything we can to help end this crime against humanity.

Apartheid is no case of mild, unfortunate discrimination. It is a horrendous, on-going political nightmare that has continued for far too long. Under apartheid, the fundamental law of the land requires--demands--that the overwhelming majority of the populace be brutally oppressed solely because they happen to be the wrong color. They can have no political power of any kind. They are stripped of citizenship. Their land has been shamelessly stolen from them. They are herded into overcrowded, unproductive bantustans and pen-like townships. They are brutally exploited, paid starvation wages, and over-taxed. They are given inferior education and what is called health care only for want of a more appropriate description.

The instrument by which the tiny minority manages all of this is unbelievable violence and brutality and pervasive state terrorism. When the victims of apartheid--most of whom are mere children--protest, they are exiled, imprisoned, kidnapped, tortured and murdered.

Tragically, American entities have and continue to support apartheid. American-owned companies supply 40 percent of the oil that apartheid Pretoria uses to oppress the people. They provide the computers that are used not only for keeping tabs on citizens in the fashion of Big Brother, but for nuclear research as well. Our banks advance the loans and

other financial instruments that keep the wheels of the apartheid political economy well oiled. Our corporations have made America the number one trading partner of apartheid. American-owned factories manufacture trucks and other vehicles for the murderous apartheid South African security forces. On countless occasions our government has protected Pretoria from even the verbal criticism of the world by vetoing U.N. Security Council resolutions. We have winked when convincing evidence has indicated that apartheid South Africa was developing nuclear weapons.

What we must do is clear and simple: we must withdraw our support from the perpetrators of apartheid; we must give our help to the victims; we must help end apartheid immediately.

The time to end American support of apartheid is now. Each day that we sit here debating, South Africans are being killed. They are being terrorized and brutalized. They are consequently becoming radicalized. On July 21, 1985, Pretoria imposed a state of emergency and banned journalists from reporting its atrocities. During that state of emergency:

- (a) the daily rate of violent political deaths tripled from 1 plus per day to 4 per day.
- (b) 15 people were killed in detention, the highest since 1977.
- (c) 714 people were killed in the streets during the seven months of the emergency; this compares with 177 in all of 1984.
- (d) the regime detained (i.e. incarcerated incommunicado, without charge or trial) 11,633 persons; in contrast, 1,129 persons had been detained during all of 1984.

After a brief respite in the spring of this year, the Pretoria regime re-imposed on June 17 1986 an even harsher state of emergency under which blanketing censorship has been imposed on the foreign and local media. During 1986, according to Pretoria's own official

sources, the following numbers of black political deaths have occurred:

JAN.	179
FEB.	105
MAR.	171
APR.	153
MAY.	213
JUN.	160

Let us bear in mind as we consider these figures that the Reverend Allan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches has asserted that for every 19 black political deaths that Pretoria acknowledges, the true figure is nearer 300! Moreover, since this second state of emergency was declared, thousands have been incarcerated incommunicado and without charge for the crime of saying apartheid is wrong. It is also now a crime for journalists to even publish the names of those in jail. These figures carry a warning for us: the more we hesitate, the more people die and the more the future rulers of South Africa see us as unfriendly.

The only way to peacefully bring about the end of apartheid is through stringent, comprehensive economic sanctions. Effective sanctions constitute the only chance for averting a racial bloodbath. Bishop Tutu has said it, Cyrus Vance has said it, Malcolm Fraser has said it, Allan Boesak has said it, and I affirm it. The root problem in South Africa is apartheid. It will be eradicated. The choice is either violently through an uprising of the victims or peacefully, with the help of our sanctions. Simply put, effective sanctions are the last chance for peace in South Africa; they are the only alternative to a bloody, racial, civil war.

The US has used economic sanctions before and quite readily. We have applied sanctions against some 34 countries whose behavior we sought to change. Even as we sit here now, we

have in effect sanctions against Nicaragua, Cuba, Afghanistan, Libya and others. We have recently applied even military sanctions against Nicaragua, Libya, and Afghanistan. How can we face ourselves when we argue that an exception should be made for the only country in the world whose constitution mandates racially-based oppression of the majority? To the world we appear to be nothing but hypocritical racists.

Mr. Chairman, the Free South Africa Movement believes strongly that we must impose effective comprehensive sanctions such as are found in S-2570. Stringent economic sanctions are the only kind that work. Here is the lesson that the Economist magazine of London--hardly a neophyte on political economy--gives after reviewing an exhaustive study of economic sanctions throughout history, "Don't increase the economic pressure gradually; pile it on as much as you can at the outset. Sanctions that work . . . [are] sharp shocks. Time allows the target to adjust to its new economic surroundings." To impose anything less than stringent economic sanctions is to strengthen apartheid by inoculating it against peaceful economic pressure.

Mr. Chairman, today, the Senate of the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to begin to redress a grievous wrong to which our nation has long been a party. The President has simply abdicated responsibility on this issue. The Senate now must act in conjunction with the House to formulate a policy on South Africa. We do not have any time left. We must move resolutely to stand firmly on the side of a long oppressed majority. If we do so, we would gain a powerful friend in that part of the world when South Africa becomes free, as it inevitably will. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA

South Africa: Human Rights Violations
Under the State of Emergency

Amnesty International is deeply concerned about the dramatic escalation in human rights violations since South Africa State President Botha announced a nationwide State of Emergency on June 12, 1986. Although Amnesty International has for many years protested the policies of apartheid and earlier this year released the results of its two-year study on the imprisonment of blacks under the pass laws, current situations in that country warrant an even greater demonstration of Amnesty International's position that everything possible must be done to stop the massive violations of human rights and the further loss of human lives in South Africa.

In recent weeks, many hundreds of people have been detained on account of their opposition to the government and its apartheid policies. The government has refused to disclose details of the number and identities of those held, but unofficial estimates suggest that they may total as many as, or in excess of, 3,000 people. Amnesty International is not able to confirm this figure but the organization has received the names and other details of many hundreds of people detained without trial throughout the country. It is clear that large numbers of arrests were carried out not only in the main urban areas but also in small towns--for example, at Carnarvon in the Northern Cape, at Graaff-Reinet in the Cape midlands and at Mahwelereng in the Northern Transvaal--and rural areas.

Nationwide security police raids on the homes of anti-government activists began on June 11, several hours before the emergency took effect and up to 18 hours before it was announced. Those detained were held under Section 50 of the Internal Security Act, which empowers the police to detain people for up to 14 days. However, the detainees were transferred to detention under the state of emergency as soon as it took effect at one minute after midnight early on the morning of June 12. The first wave of arrests continued throughout June 12-13 and the following weekend. Thereafter, detentions have continued although the pace of arrests appears to have slowed. Some officials of political organizations, trade unions and other groups whom the authorities intended to detain apparently evaded arrest and are now in hiding.

The state of emergency appears to have been imposed in an attempt by the government to forestall plans by opponents of apartheid to commemorate the Soweto uprising of June 16, 1976, which resulted in the deaths of several hundred black civilians, including children, who were shot by police. In addition, there were plans by the main black trade union confederations to hold a three-day general strike beginning on June 16, 1986.

Shortly before declaring the emergency, the government had attempted to rush through parliament new security legislation to further strengthen police powers of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial. Two new security bills were approved in the white House of Assembly, though opposed by the opposition Progressive Federal Party, but they were not passed by either the House of Representatives, the parliamentary chamber for so-called "Coloureds" (i.e., mixed race), or the Indian House of Delegates. Faced with this impasse, State President P.W. Botha then referred the security bills, in the form that they were approved by the all-white House of Assembly, to the President's Council, a majority of whose 60 members are whites. Though normally an advisory body, the President's Council is empowered under the Constitution to approve any bill which has been passed by one of the houses of parliament but rejected by others. In effect, therefore, the President's Council, whose members are either nominated by the houses of parliament or appointed by the State President, is empowered in such circumstances to overrule directly the decisions of elected members of parliament. In fact, it was those among the 45 white members of the President's Council who support the government, or opposition parties considered politically to the right of the government, who ensured that the two security bills were approved on June 20 and thus now require only the assent of the State President in order to go into effect. It may be noted that some 25 of the 45 members of the President's Council were directly appointed by State President Botha.

The two new security laws approved by the President's Council are the Public Safety Amendment Act and the Internal Security Amendment Act. The former act amends the Public Safety Act, 1953, to empower the Minister of Law and Order effectively to exercise powers held previously only by the State President. In particular, the Minister of Law and Order is empowered by the amendment to declare any area to be an "unrest area" if, in his opinion, it is subject to public disturbance, disorder or violence, or is threatened with such disturbance, and the ordinary law is not considered sufficient to control the situation. The declaration of an unrest area is valid for three months, but it may thereafter be extended by the Minister of Law and Order with the approval of the State President. The Minister of Law and Order is also empowered to make any regulations "as appear to him to be necessary or expedient" in connection with the situation in an "unrest area." Such regulations, the amendment makes clear, may be similar to regulations which the Minister of Law and Order is currently empowered to make under the state of emergency. These include empowering the police or other security forces to make arbitrary arrests and detain people without trial, to issue orders to the population in an unrest area and to impose penalties for any contravention of such orders. With respect to the use of detention without trial, the Public Safety Amendment Act states only that the Minister of Law and Order is required to notify parliament of the names of detainees held without charge for periods in excess of 30 days. The amendment also states that the Minister of

Law and Order may make different regulations for different "unrest areas" and also for "different classes of persons." It provides that people detained in a particular unrest area may be held at any place in South Africa, whether or not it is within an unrest area.

In an accompanying Memorandum published with the Public Safety Amendment Bill, the government explained that it was introducing this new provision in order that the authorities should be equipped with powers similar to those that they possess under a state of emergency, with the adverse connotations that it seems to have. Under the Public Safety Act, only the State President, who is both head of government and head of state, has the authority to declare a state of emergency. Formally, this will remain the case in the future. However, the introduction of the Public Safety Amendment Act effectively transfers to the Minister of Law and Order the authority to place specific areas under what amounts effectively to a state of emergency. An adverse feature of the amendment is that it denies the courts jurisdiction to challenge either any decision of the Minister of Law and Order to declare an "unrest area" or the regulations issued by the Minister with respect to such an area.

As yet, with a national state of emergency in force, there is clearly little need for the Minister of Law and Order to declare any area an "unrest area." Until such a declaration is made, it is only possible to speculate as to the precise nature of such regulations as the Minister may issue. It is uncertain, therefore, whether such regulations will serve to give the police and other security forces immunity against prosecution for any acts that they may commit in an "unrest area," although the granting of such immunities during the partial state of emergency of 1985 and the current national state of emergency suggests that this would be a very clear possibility. Such immunities, in Amnesty International's view, have contributed to the high level of violence used by the security forces both in dealing with political detainees, many of whom were tortured or assaulted during the 1985 emergency, and in dealing with those not yet in custody who demonstrated their opposition to the government.

The Internal Security Amendment Act amends the Internal Security Act, 1982. It inserts a new section into the 1982 act, Section 50A, which provides for the use of detention without trial for up to 180 days. At present, Section 50 of the Internal Security Act permits the police to hold detainees initially for 48 hours and thereafter for an additional 12 days if such further detention is authorized by a magistrate. This provision will remain in effect, but at times determined by the State President and notified by publication in the Government Gazette, it will be augmented by Section 50A.

Like Section 50, Section 50A empowers any police officer of or above the rank of warrant officer (approximate to sergeant) to

arrest any person without a warrant and without charge if in his opinion this will "contribute to the termination, combatting or prevention of public disturbance, disorder, riot or public violence at any place" within South Africa. Any person so detained may be held initially for 48 hours on the authority of the arresting officer. Thereafter, under Section 50A, a lieutenant-colonel or more senior police officer is empowered to order the further detention without charge or trial of any such person up to a maximum of 180 days. It is provided that the Minister of Law and Order may at any time order the release of such a detainee before the expiry to the 180 day period. It is provided also that a detainee may make written representations to the Minister of Law and Order concerning his detention and that each detainee's case should be reviewed after three months by a specially established Board of Review. This board sits in camera and has discretion to decide whether or not it should hear evidence or written representations from the detainee. After reviewing each case, the board is required to make a recommendation to the Minister of Law and Order as to whether the detainee should continue in detention or be released, but the Minister is not obliged to implement the board's recommendation.

Detainees held for up to 14 days under Section 50 of the Internal Security Act officially have a status similar to that of prisoners awaiting trial. In other words, they have access to legal counsel and may receive visits from their relatives. Section 50A, however, makes no such provision. It gives no indication of the formal status that detainees held under Section 50A will have. Instead, it authorizes the Minister of Justice to make regulations regarding the conditions and treatment of detainees held under Section 50A. Until such regulations are issued, it will not be clear whether Section 50A detainees will be permitted access to legal counsel or contact with their families or, rather, will be detained incommunicado.

It also remains to be seen whether the security police will use Section 50A effectively to hold detainees for periods in excess of the 180 days envisaged by the act by formally releasing detainees once one 180-day period has expired and then immediately re-arresting them under a new detention order. In the 1960s, when security police possessed somewhat similar powers of detention without trial up to 90 days there were cases of this nature in which detainees were held effectively for periods of more than 90 days.

The introduction of the Internal Security Amendment Act to authorize detention without trial up to 180 days may have stemmed from problems that the authorities have encountered in recent months with respect to their use of indefinite preventive detention (Section 28 of the Internal Security Act) and indefinite incommunicado detention for interrogation (under Section 29 of the Act). In March 1986, the Appeal Court effectively undermined the value to the authorities of Section 28 of the Internal Security Act by

ruling that the Minister of Law and Order had failed to give satisfactory reasons, as required by the terms of the act, to justify the detention of certain opponents of the government in late 1984. As a result of the Appeal Court ruling, all Section 28 detainees were released and to date no new detentions have been made under the provision, presumably because the Minister is not prepared to discuss his reasons for ordering detentions.

Section 29 of the Internal Security Act has been the cornerstone of South African security legislation since 1982, when it replaced a similar, earlier provision, Section 6 of the Terrorism Act. It empowers a senior police officer to authorize the detention incommunicado and without charge or trial for an unlimited period of people suspected of political offenses, requiring that such detainees are held in solitary confinement and that their whereabouts are not disclosed, and providing for their interrogation by security police. In late 1985, two cases were brought successfully in the Natal Supreme Court which seriously challenged what has appeared hitherto to be the incontestable powers of the security police to detain whom they would, and to do so without judicial check. In both cases, the courts ruled that the security police had failed to prove that the senior officer authorizing each detention could have had valid reasons to suppose that the detainees in question had committed political offenses or possessed information relevant to their commission. The courts ordered the release of the detainees and they were freed. The state challenged the judgement but on May 22, 1986, the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein upheld the decisions of the Natal Supreme Court. It was on the very same day that the government, presumably forewarned as to the Appeal Court's judgement, laid in the Internal Security Bill before parliament and sought to rush it into law.

There remains an unknown number of people in detention incommunicado under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. In some of these cases, or in future cases, the Natal Supreme Court judgements and the decision of the Appeal Court may mean that the actions of the security police can be effectively challenged in the courts. Now, if this should occur or be threatened, it may be supposed that the security police will be able to make use, instead, of Section 50A of the Internal Security Act in order to detain people for long periods without submitting to any check on their power.

For the present, the two new security laws described above appear superfluous in view of the powers taken by the authorities under the nationwide state of emergency. These powers are set out in a series of Regulations issued by the Minister of Law and Order on June 12, 1986, whereas an accompanying set of Rules made by the Minister of Justice to define the conditions and treatment of detainees held under the emergency were issued on the same day. Both the regulations and the rules are largely analogous to similar provisions issued during the partial state of emergency in force between July 1985 and March 1986, but there are some new features.

In particular, the current regulations make it an offense punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment for any person to write, print, record, possess, disseminate or distribute, display or utter a "subversive statement." The definition of a "subversive statement" is both broad and vague, being "anything which is calculated to have the effect or is likely to have the effect" of promoting the aims of any unlawful organization, inciting people to participate in any unlawful strike, gathering or protest procession, or to support or participate in any boycott. A statement urging people to participate in "acts of civil disobedience" or which may "discredit or undermine the system of compulsory military service" likewise is proscribed as subversive. The definition refers also to statements which lead people to resist or oppose the government or the security forces in connection with the emergency or any other matter relating to public order and the administration of justice. It is now "subversive" to encourage or promote disinvestment or economic sanctions against South Africa, to cause or increase any feelings of hostility within the population or between different categories of people. Any publication which the Minister of Law and Order regards as subversive may be seized and those responsible for its publication can be punished for making a "subversive statement." It is an offense under the regulations for any person, without official authorization, to film or record or publish within or outside South Africa any public disturbance, violence or strike or "any conduct" by a member of the security forces in relation to "the maintenance of the safety of the public or the public order or for the termination of the state of emergency."

Section 3 of the emergency regulations empowers all members of the police and other law enforcement personnel (that is, members of the Railways Police, the Prisons Service and the South African Defense Force), of whatever rank, to arrest any person without a warrant and then detain that person incommunicado for an initial period of 14 days. At the end of this initial two-week period, the Minister of Law and Order may authorize further detention without charge or trial for an unlimited period, and he may do so without notification of any person and without hearing any representations from the detainee or on the detainee's behalf. The Minister may order a detainee's release at any time, but detainees have no access to the courts, which anyway have no jurisdiction to challenge the validity of individual detentions, and there exists no internal review procedure as a check on abuse of power. Detainees are subject to security police interrogation. They may be held at any place in South Africa and no one is entitled to information about them or obtained from them.

As under the previous, partial state of emergency, the police and security forces have been granted immunity in advance from civil or criminal prosecution for any acts committed "in good faith" in connection with their use of emergency powers. Those indemnified in this way also include members of the government, state officials, and any person "acting by direction or with the approval of" any security force personnel, and for ministers or

state officials. In the case of any dispute, the onus of proof is laid on the complainant to prove that any act was not committed "in good faith."

During the July 1985 to March 1986 emergency, Amnesty International received numerous and substantial reports of torture, assaults on and ill-treatment of detainees. The organization brought these to the attention of the South African Government and called publicly for urgent action to be taken to prevent torture, to safeguard detainees against ill-treatment, and to bring to justice those responsible for torture and other abuses of human rights. Several court actions were brought within South Africa by relatives of detainees, church leaders and others which resulted in detailed evidence of torture of detainees being laid before the courts.

One particularly significant case was brought in the Port Elizabeth Supreme Court in 1985 when one of those who gave evidence to the court was a young district surgeon, Dr. Wendy Orr, who had herself examined several hundred detainees held under the emergency in the Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage districts. In her evidence, she testified that many of them complained of torture and assaults, and bore injuries consistent with their allegations. The police denied that any detainees had been tortured or ill-treated by an interim order was granted by the court to the effect that the police should not assault detainees held in the area. Statements by Dr. Orr and others suggested that police and other security personnel had interpreted the immunity against prosecution conferred on them under the regulations as a license to abuse detainees. The presiding judge, however, stated clearly that in his view any such personnel found responsible for acts of torture would not be protected by immunity.

There are some additional features of the immunity provisions contained in the current Regulations compared to those which were in force in 1985. In particular, it is specified that any court in which proceedings have been brought as a result of actions which may have been committed "in good faith" may not continue the proceedings, may make no finding or, if a finding has already been made, shall consider such a finding to be null and void. In other words, the Regulations appear to have been revised in an attempt to eliminate the possibility of any court continuing to hear an action similar to that brought by Dr. Orr to the Port Elizabeth Supreme Court, or at least to eliminate the possibility of any even interim judgement against the authorities being considered valid.

The emergency regulations also confer on the police and other security forces the power to arbitrarily place people under house arrest, close any public or private place, control entry to and departure from particular areas, and to control news or comment relating to their own conduct. These powers may be exercised, the current regulations state expressly, "without furnishing reasons

and without hearing any person." In addition, the commissioner of police and those to whom he delegate authority are empowered to take any other action which they might consider "necessary or expedient" in connection with public order and the state of emergency. This would appear to include the power to impose curfews. All members of the security forces are also authorized to order people, without giving reasons, to leave areas in which they are not normally resident or else be arrested. This last power has been used, among other things, effectively to seal off certain black townships and deny entry to journalists or others who might wish to inquire into the local situation.

The many hundreds of people detained under the emergency regulations since their imposition on June 12 include people of all races. A number of clergymen were among those detained at the outset of the emergency: Bishop Sigisbert Ndwandwe of the Anglican Church was taken from his home at Klerksdorp; Father Smangalisso Mkhathswa, General Secretary of the Southern Africa Catholic Bishops Conference, was detained at his home in Soshanguve township near Pretoria. Many other less prominent clergymen detained are ministers of the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, and the "Coloured" and black Dutch Reformed Churches. Many active lay members of these churches have also been detained in places as far apart as Carnarvon, Middelburg, and East London in Cape Province, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria.

Officials of predominately black trade unions have also been a particular target and at least 200--some sources suggest many more--are known to have been detained under the emergency. They include Sehlolo Dennis Neer, General Secretary of the Motor Assembly and Component Workers Union in Port Elizabeth; James Mndaweni, President of the Council of Unions of South Africa; and Madoda Mabhoza, a South African Allied Workers Union organizer in Grahamstown.

Apart from clergymen and trade unionists, those detained under the emergency include members of political organizations opposed to the government, lawyers, doctors, students and teachers, and local black community leaders throughout the country. Among those held are senior members of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an alliance of many groups of all races formed in 1983, and leaders of the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), the main black consciousness organization. Human rights activists belonging to the Black Sash, an organization of white women opposed to apartheid, and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), a Christian-based organization of young whites opposed to military conscription and the use of troops in black townships, have also been detained. In some areas, virtually all workers at local Advice Offices, set up to advise and assist victims of the recent unrest, were swept up during the first wave of detentions.

What follows is a list of some of those detained since the nationwide state of emergency was introduced on June 12, 1986:

POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY LEADERS

Aubrey Mokena, Chairman of the Release Mandela Committee and a leading member of the United Democratic Front, was detained during the night of June 11-12, initially under Section 50 of the Internal Security Act, and taken to Protea Police Station in Soweto. His lawyers sought to exercise their right to access to detainees held under Section 50 but they were turned away. He is believed to be held now under the emergency regulations. He was previously restricted under a banning order from 1973 to 1983, detained without trial for lengthy periods on at least three occasions, and was one of the Pietermaritzburg treason trialists charged in December 1984 and subsequently acquitted in December 1985 (charges against the four remaining defendants were withdrawn on June 23, 1986).

Vusi Khanyile, leading member of the Soweto Civiv Association and the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), a country-wide organization of civic leaders and parents set up in 1985 with the purpose of resolving the crisis in the schools through negotiation with the authorities.

Hamilton Dlamlenze, member of the NECC

Molatlhegi Lawrence Ntlokoa, a leading member of the Krugersdorp Residents Association from Kagiso Township near Krugersdorp, Western Transvaal. Formerly Transvaal President of the Young Christian Workers, a Catholic Youth Organization, he was detained without trial from September 1977 to January 1978 and again from June to November 1978, when he was held as a potential state witness in a political trial. After he repudiated in court a statement made to the police while in detention, on the grounds that he had been threatened with indefinite detention if he did not sign it, he was released from detention but then restricted under a banning order for five years. Following the expiry of his banning order in July 1983, he was seriously wounded in an attack by unknown assailants.

Members of Kagiso Residents Association,
Krugersdorp, Western Transvaal:

Joseph Makgothlo
Bongani Dhlamini
Hlohlo Dubase
Spike George
Jerry Goveia

Members of Alexandria Action Committee,
Johannesburg:

Jabulani Kunene
Paul Kunene

Sesokeng Civic Association, Vaal Civic
Association Executive Members:

Isaac Rantsatsi
Marokabe Seakgwa

Adam Morapedi, Chairman, Tumahole Civic Association, Parys

Members of Sonteheuwel Civic Association,
Cape Town:

Joseph Aranes
Suleiman Isaacs

Ernest Malgas, aged in mid-50s, Vice-Chairman of the Port
Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO)

Tango Lamani, Executive member of PEBCO and of the Port
Elizabeth Branch of the United Democratic Front (UDF)

Members of the United Committee of Concern
in Wentworth, near Durbin (affiliated with
the UDF):

Eric Applegren
Janet Applegren
Jean Manning

Workers at the Oudtshoorn Advice Office,
Western Cape:

Cheryl Moses
Wendy Prins
Clive Stuurman
Danny Stuurman
Johnny Stuurman
Esther Ingo

Lucy Nenzi, worker at the Paarl Advice Centre, Western Cape and
some 10 other workers at the office

Vusiyiwa Miriam Moleleki, leading member of the Worcester Civic
Association, Western Cape

Workers at the Worcester Advice Office,
Western Cape:

Shepherd Matshoba
Harris Sibeko
Steven Williams
Irvin Kolo
Amos Dyantyi
Nellie Mroxisa
Lulubool Peter
Zingisile Yabo
Neil February

JOURNALISTS

Strinivasa Rajoo Moodley, journalist working for the Natal Witness
and member of the Natal Indian Congress. Formerly Publicity
Director of a leading "black consciousness" organization, the
South African Students Organization (SASO), he was served with a
five-year banning order in 1973. He was detained without trial
from October 1974 to early 1975, when he and 12 other "black
consciousness" leaders were charged with offenses under the
Terrorism Act of 1967. He was convicted in December 1976 of
seeking to bring about a racial confrontation in South Africa,
and served with a five-year prison sentence, the minimum mandatory
sentence under the Terrorism Act. During this period he was
adopted by Amnesty International as a Prisoner of Conscience.

LAWYERS

Attorneys from the firm of Smith, Tabata & Van Heerden in Kingwilliamstown, Eastern Cape, which has been involved in human rights cases:

John Eldred Smith
Trevor Van Heerden

Azhar Cachalia, aged about 30, lawyer, member of the Transvaal Indian Congress and National Treasurer of the United Democratic Front (UDF). Detained in June 1981, he was served with a banning order on his release to restrict his freedom of speech, movement, and association for five years. The order was lifted prematurely in July 1983 at the same time as a number of other banning orders were lifted.

MEMBERS OF WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

Elisabeth Kistner, member of Black Sash in Johannesburg and daughter of Wolfgang Kistner, Director of the Division for Justice and Reconciliation of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and Assistant General Secretary of the SACC.

Sandy Stewart, member of Black Sash and mother of two young children

Noluthando Ngigane, leading member of the United Women's Organization

Gabriele Shapiro, member of the United Women's Organization, Cape Town

CHURCH MINISTERS AND LAY WORKERS

Dr. James Buys, minister of the Dutch Reformed Church Mission (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk) and President of the Southern Cape Council of Churches, detained at his home in Calitzdorp, Cape Province, on June 14 and held at Vanwyksdorp

The Reverend Hendrik Van Wyk, a minister of the Lutheran Church, detained at his home in Riversdale, Cape Province, on June 13

The Reverend Gerald De Klerk, a minister of the Congregational Church, detained at his home in Oudtshoorn, Cape Province, on June 15

Bentley David, youth worker with the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches

Sandy LeBase, employee of the South African Council of Churches in the Transvaal

Employees of the Northern Cape
Council of Churches, Kimberly:

Thekiso Tlhakoane
Jack Nkatio

TEACHERS AND STUDENTS

Khalid Desai, in his 50s, Principal of Alexander Sinton High School, Athlone, Cape Town, was detained at his home on June 16 and is being held at Victor Verster Prison in Paarl. His family has been refused permission to visit him. He was briefly detained during the 1985 State of Emergency following a boycott of classes by pupils at his school.

Nabil Swart, Vice-Principal of Alexander Sinton High School, Athlone, Cape Town, also previously detained during the 1985 emergency, has also been detained.

Lorna Houston, an 18-year-old school student leader, previously detained during the 1985 emergency, from Cape Town

Shanaaz Isaacs, schoolgirl and member of Bonteheuvel Inter-Schools Committee, Cape Town

Mkhambi Mondli, a member of the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM), a "black consciousness" school district organization, in Zamdela, near Sasolburg, Orange Free State Province

Raymond Suttner, law lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, Education Officer for the Transvaal branch of the United Democratic Front (UDF), and former Prisoner of Conscience

Andre Roux, Senior Economics Lecturer at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, Cape Province

Llewellyn McMaster, Chairman of the Students Representative Council (SRC) at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town

Russell MacGregor, Secretary of the SRC at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town

Victor Steyn, student at the University of Cape Town

The following are students at St. Joseph's Scholasticate, Cedara, Pietermaritzburg, detained on June 12 following a meeting they held at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, in protest against the detention of two of their lecturers, Father Theo Kneifel (a German National subsequently deported to the Federal Republic of Germany) and Father Larry Kaufman: Martin Badenhorst
Steven Docherty
Derrick Harris
Alan Henriques

Derrieck Houston
Malcom Jacobs
Gabriel Jama
Edward Khumalo
Clive Malherbe
Paul Mangope
Solomon Mathuloe
Allison Mtole
Trevor Mufweba
Donatus Ndwane
Brendan Proctor
Jan Samson
Boniface Shabangu

Nicholas Mandla Msomi, a former Seminarian at St. Joseph's, currently working with the Association for Rural Advancement in Pietermaritzburg, also attended the meeting and was detained.

BLACK YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

Saulsville/Atteridgeville Youth
Organization, Pretoria:

Mpho Lekgoro
Nathaniel Lekgoro
Titus Mofolo

Thulani Ngwanu, Sobantu Youth Organization, Pietermaritzburg

M. Zuma, Imbali Youth Organization, Pietermaritzburg

END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN

Veronica MacFarlane, 23-year-old computer analyst, member of End Conscription Campaign (ECC), and Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC)

Dominique Souchon, leading member of ECC and human rights activist in Port Elizabeth

Philip Wilkinson, member of ECC and conscientious objector facing prosecution for refusal to serve in the South African Army, detained Port Elizabeth

TRADE UNIONISTS

James Mndaweni, President, Congress of Unions of South Africa (CUSA)

Mahlomola Skhosana, Assistant General Secretary, CUSA

Joyce Sedibe, a CUSA regional organizer

Shadrack Marumo, official of the National Union of Textile Workers at Tumahole, Parys

Themba Duze, Executive member of the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) in Port Elizabeth, former Prisoner of Conscience detained without trial under 1985 State of Emergency and reportedly whipped at the time of his arrest

Sipho Kubheka, official of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

Prakash Naidoo, aged about 21, journalist and full-time worker with COSATU in Pietermaritzburg, Natal

M. Oliphant, COSATU Regional Secretary in Empangeni

J. Vilane, Vice-President of the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) in Empangeni, a COSATU affiliate

M. Mchunu, leading official of MAWU in Empangeni

B. Peterson, MAWU member in Johannesburg

Mike Makuyakhulu, MAWU member from Northern Natal

Blakey Mtshali, MAWU organizer

Solomon Mauna, MAWU official in Pietermaritzburg

Joseph Miya, MAWU official

Nelson Ngwenya, member of MAWU

Botha Modisapodi, MAWU shop steward at the National Bolt Company in Tumahole, Parys

Members of Food and Allied Workers Union:

T. Mkhwanazi
Ron Peterson
Ursula MacDonald
Anne Mentoor

Victoria Motsamai, official of the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) from Alexandra Township, Johannesburg

Vusi Mavusi, official of the CWIU in Johannesburg

Donsie Khumalc, official of the Retail and Allied Workers Union in the Transvaal

Lolo Ditshigo, General Workers Union of South Africa, Transvaal

Ray Lazarus, Organizer of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in Cape Town

Julius Mxamkelu, TGWU member in Port Elizabeth

Gerald Ramsano Dau, aged about 30, member of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) from Atteridgeville, Pretoria. Previously convicted of possession of banned literature in July 1984, he was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, suspended for 5 years

Members of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (CCAWUSA):

Petrus Bekkers
Ben Boikanyo
Kaizer Thibedi
Richard Ncunwali
Steven Patsa
M. Cindi

Members of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU):

Kgoro Dau
Post Molepo
Jacky Masemula

Paul Nkuna, member of SAAWU from Pretoria

Thobile Moses, Chairman, Kingwilliamstown branch of SAAWU

Johannes Phake, regional organizer of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in Orange Free State Province and member of the Detainees Support Committee in Welkom

Paul Nkuna, NUM regional organizer in the Transvaal

Moses Gladile, NUM member from Klerksdorp, Western Transvaal

NUM members from Kimberly, Northern Cape:

Manne Dipico
Victor Bambani
Ezekiel Mngkolo
L. Babuseng
Peter Mathibola

The Reverend Howard Marawu, full-time organizer for the General Workers Union in Cape Town, previously detained without trial under the 1985 State of Emergency from October to December 1985 and then released only under restrictive conditions similar to a banning order which prevented him from continuing his trade union activities. These restrictions fell away when the previous State of Emergency was lifted in March 1986.

As evidenced above, Amnesty International has obtained the names of hundreds of those detained, but these represent only a minority of those held. The enormity of the current crisis for human rights has been demonstrated by actions taken by the authorities in several places to suppress with force church services held by the black and "coloured" communities to remember those who were killed 10 years ago during unrest in Soweto and other areas. In Elsies River, Cape Town, three church ministers and their congregations of more than 200 people were detained en masse on Sunday, June 15, 1986. Police entered the church while the service was in progress, claiming that it was an illegal gathering. Those arrested were taken to a nearby police station, fingerprinted and photographed, whereupon the three ministers and other men were detained under the emergency regulations and sent to Victor Verster Prison at Paarl, some 40 miles away. Children under 10 years of age were released but the women and other young people were detained under the emergency and imprisoned at Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town. At first, the authorities refused to confirm that these arrests had taken place, but subsequently they admitted to them and released most of those detained.

On June 16, a similar incident took place in Graaff-Reinet's black township. Again, all members of a church congregation, this time numbering more than 600 people, were detained en masse by armed police who entered the church while a service was in progress, let off tear gas and damaged church property. Children under 14 years of age and adults over 50 were released, but more than a week later, when news of this incident first became known outside the area, some 530 people were still held incommunicado under the emergency regulations and their whereabouts had not been disclosed. On the same day, there were similar incidents in black townships neighboring East London. In Duncan Village, the local Catholic Church was opened for the day to enable people to privately commemorate the Soweto killings and pray for peace in South Africa. More than 100 people present at the church in mid-morning were arrested and, with the exception of some 50 children among them, who were released later in the day, the remainder were still detained incommunicado 10 days later under the emergency regulations. Some of them were believed to be held at Fleet Street Police Station, one of the two local police stations in which, the Eastern Cape Supreme Court acknowledged in late 1985, detainees held under the partial state of emergency then in force had been tortured, including with electric shocks.

At about the same time that the Catholic church in Duncan Village was raided, police and soldiers employed by the nominally independent Ciskei "homeland" suppressed by force a church service in progress in the nearby Mdantsane township. Unlike Duncan Village, Mdantsane is located within Ciskei, which the South African Government declared independent in late 1981 (though it has not been recognized internationally). This incident did not result in arrests; rather, the members of the congregation were attacked and assaulted with whips. As a result, a 14-year-old boy

was killed and a baby is believed to have suffocated from inhaling tear gas. More than 30 people, most of them women, reportedly required hospital treatment for injuries sustained as a result of the assaults or during the panic among the congregation that ensued. Subsequently, Ciskei administration officials are reported to have claimed that the police and soldiers intervened after the congregation became unruly, but this is denied by those present who maintain that the service was peaceful.

Political detainees held under the emergency regulations have virtually no rights and may be subjected to a variety of punishments for what are termed "disciplinary contraventions." The contraventions, and the general conditions under which emergency detainees are to be held, were defined in a series of "Rules" issued by the Minister of Justice on June 12, 1986. They provided that detainees may be held either in prisons or police cells and required that they should be searched on committal. The Rules stipulate that the detainees should be held incommunicado and are to have no contact with other categories of prisoners. However, provision was made for individual visits to detainees if approved by the Minister of Law and Order or the Commissioner of Police. During such visits, no physical contact between the detainee and visitor is permitted and they must communicate in either English or Afrikaans, the official South African languages, neither of which is the mother tongue of most of those detained, or else have a prison officer act as interpreter. There is no requirement that emergency detainees be visited on a regular basis by magistrates or the specially-appointed inspectors of detainees who are required to visit other political detainees held under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. However, the Rules imply that there may be some inspection of detainees' conditions and they do require that all detainees be medically examined on admission to their place of detention by a district surgeon, a government-employed doctor, who should thereafter visit them "regularly." Provision is also made for ministers of religion to have access to detainees but the police may deny access to specific ministers.

Amnesty International is concerned that detainees held under the emergency are not permitted to communicate with the outside world through correspondence. They may not receive or send out letters, except with the express permission of the officer in charge of their place of imprisonment and the Commissioner of Police. As reading matter, they are permitted only the Bible or another holy book, such as the Koran, or "selected magazines" supplied by prison officials.

Under the current Rules for emergency detainees, certain "disciplinary contraventions" may be committed by detainees, leading to punishments including up to 30 days solitary confinement and corporal punishment. The 20 some contraventions include deliberately replying falsely to a member of the detaining staff, disobeying a "lawful command or order" and being "insolent or disrespectful" towards a police officer or other official.

Detainees are prohibited from communicating with any other detainee or other person when held "at a place where it is not permissible for him to do so" or from leaving their "allocated sleeping or eating place" without permission. A detainee who "sings, whistles, or makes unnecessary noise" or is "a nuisance" is also liable to punishment under the disciplinary code, as is a detainee who "dis-figures or damages" any part of the place in which he is being detained or any other state property. Hunger strikes are included in the list of punishable offenses, as well as any actions found "contrary to good order and discipline" or to cause "discontent, agitation, or insubordination," or to participate in any "conspiracy." Detainees who make complaints may also jeopardize their own situation further if the complaints are regarded by the authorities as "false, frivolous, or malicious." Likewise, detainees who are considered "idle, careless or negligent," or who refuse to clean their place where they are detained, including its sanitary facilities, are liable to punishment.

Punishments under the disciplinary code may be imposed either by a prison officer or the magistrate responsible to the district in which the place of detention is located. In such cases, detainees are not permitted to have present at the hearing or be represented by a lawyer unless this is expressly permitted by either the Minister of Law and Order or the Commissioner of Police. The penalties for disciplinary contraventions include solitary confinement with full diet for up to 30 days; corporal punishment up to a maximum of six strokes with a cane, but only when the victim is a man "apparently under the age of 40 years" and when no other punishment has been imposed for the same offense. Detainees may also be sentenced to imprisonment in solitary confinement for periods of up to 30 days during which they receive what is termed "spare diet" on not less than 18 days, "reduced diet" on six days and the full prison diet on the remaining six days. The maximum single period of solitary confinement permitted is 30 days; however, longer periods of solitary confinement may be imposed for disciplinary contraventions so long as there is a 14-day interval during which the detainee is held under normal conditions between each successive 30-day period of solitary confinement.

In mid-August 1985, Amnesty International asked the South African Government through its embassy in London whether any detainees held under the partial state of emergency imposed on July 21, 1985, had been punished for alleged "disciplinary contraventions" and, if so, whether the Minister or Commissioner of Police had permitted such detainees to be legally represented. Neither the embassy nor the authorities in Pretoria responded to that inquiry.

Amnesty International is greatly concerned that the imposition of the state of emergency in South Africa has led to a substantial escalation in violations of fundamental human rights. Many of those detained under the emergency regulations are prisoners of conscience, imprisoned on account of their non-violent opinions

and activities in opposition to the South African Government and its policy of apartheid. Amnesty International strongly encourages the immediate and unconditional release of such prisoners of conscience. In addition, we ask that all other people detained for political reasons be brought to trial promptly and fairly or else released.

Amnesty International is particularly concerned also that those detained are held under conditions conducive to torture and other abuse. During the partial state of emergency in force from July 1985 to March 1986, the authorities published the names of most of the 8,000 people who were detained. Under the current nationwide state of emergency, however, the authorities have refused to disclose the names of those being held. Indeed, they have made it a crime to name such individuals without official authorization. This control, along with their censorship of the media, means that an accurate count of the numbers held, let alone the identity of those arrested, is difficult to know.

During the previous emergency, many detainees were tortured. The conditions which contributed to this, including particularly the immunity against prosecution given to police and security forces, have again been applied. But this time, if anything, conditions are more severe, given the secrecy surrounding police actions against individuals and the broader terms of the immunity. Amnesty International is gravely concerned that many of those detained under the emergency may be tortured.

The introduction of two new security laws, the Public Safety Amendment Act and the Internal Security Amendment Act, also gives serious cause for concern. The terms of these laws have been specified in such a way that they too seem certain to result in gross and systematic violations of human rights. Amnesty International considers that both laws should be repealed.

Finally, we request the United States Senate, under the terms of the 1984 Joint Resolution Against Torture, to call upon the President of the United States to instruct the Permanent Representative to the United Nations to raise the issue before the United Nations of torture by the police and security forces in South Africa, and to have the Secretary of State instruct the Chief of Missions in Pretoria to gather information about the practice of torture, to express concern about individual cases of alleged or suspected torture, and to protest laws which provide for extended incommunicado detention and restrict access to prisoners by family members, lawyers, and independent medical personnel.

On January 31, 1986, South African State President Botha announced his government's intention to stop the prosecution of individuals for pass law offenses. Amnesty International welcomed that news at the time, considering that we had just released the results of a two-year study of the pass laws and how they have been used to imprison the majority population of South Africa.

The date given by President Botha for the changes to be effective was July 1, 1986.

Whatever hope was generated by Botha's announcement six months ago has been eclipsed by the recent developments in South Africa. As a matter of policy, Amnesty International takes no position on the advisability of governments imposing economic, political, or other sanctions on other governments for human rights violations. We regard such decisions as political matters, and deem it outside our mandate to advise governments on such matters. Since the organization was founded 25 years ago, Amnesty International has consistently revealed and protested human rights abuses in the Republic of South Africa. It is a bleak picture that we must submit to you in this testimony. Aware of the difficulty of ensuring certain change in South Africa, we urge this body to consider the strongest action available to affect the safety and indeed the survival of the majority population in South Africa.

Executive Memorandum

The Heritage Foundation

RUSH

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A SECRET COMMUNIST DOCUMENT REVEALS THE REAL GAME PLAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA

United States policy toward the Republic of South Africa (RSA) has reached a turning point. For five years the Reagan Administration has used private diplomacy and quiet pressure to encourage the Pretoria government to speed the dismantling of apartheid, its institutionalized system of racial segregation. But under heavy pressure from groups in the Congress and the international community, the Administration has begun a high-level review of this policy. Beyond short-term considerations such as whether or not the U.S. should impose harsh economic sanctions on Pretoria, the policy review is considering questions of more significance for the long term, including U.S. policy toward the best-known South African opposition group, the African National Congress (ANC).

Before coming to their conclusions, Administration strategists should study closely a May 1986 secret discussion document of the South African Communist Party Politburo, captured recently by South African authorities. The report discusses at length the attitude of the Communist Party toward the negotiations between the ANC and South African reformist elements. The document not only reveals the close links between the ANC and the communists and the way in which the communists exploit the ANC to manipulate Western opinion, but it also echoes the success that Communist Parties have had in the past in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in fooling the West by hiding behind the respectable front of "genuine" reformist national liberation movements.

The South African communist document begins by noting the increased stature of the so-called "liberation front." The document points out that no longer is the Communist Party-ANC alliance viewed merely as an "agitational opposition"; instead, it is seen increasingly as "the immediate alternative power." Because of this change--and, specifically, the increased visibility of the ANC--the Party has felt it necessary to reassure its membership that it still controls what it calls the revolution in South Africa.

While the ANC's own literature claims as its ultimate goal a "national democratic revolution," the secret communist document rejects this thesis. Instead, the national democratic revolution is described as "a stage towards the struggle for social emancipation in

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the epoch of the world transition from capitalism to socialism and within the context of the struggle against imperialism."

The document discusses the breakdown of consensus among the white ruling elite, noting that "there appears to be a proliferation of new groupings which consider themselves to be part of the forces for change." Then the document cautions that these new groups "cannot necessarily be embraced as part of...the revolutionary forces." The meaning: the Communist Party is willing to use these groups for what they can offer, and then cast them aside. This, of course, is what communist parties have done in a dozen other countries since 1945.

The Politburo study states candidly its view of these liberal South African reformers: "Let us be clear. The 'liberal' bourgeoisie seek transformations of the South African society which go beyond the reform limits of the present regime but which aim to preempt the objectives of the revolutionary forces....They seek transformation through negotiation and not the kind of conflict which would culminate in a revolutionary seizure of power." That is, the liberal reformers seek peaceful, negotiated change. This does not serve the interests of the Communist-ANC liberation front, because it does not allow for the seizure of power by the revolutionaries.

Though it is essential for the liberation front to be seen by the international community as sincere in its desire for peaceful change, this must not divert attention from the the main goal: "Nor must a genuine desire to project a public image of 'reasonableness' tempt us to paddle softly on the true nature of the liberation alliance and its revolutionary socioeconomic objectives....The main thrust of our present strategy remains a revolutionary seizure of power." The talks which so far have taken place between the ANC and reformist elements in South Africa therefore are only tactics in a much broader strategy.

What the Communist Party confidentially has been telling its members is that the only real negotiations the Communist-ANC liberation front is interested in are surrender terms. Before that, there is to be no real negotiation and no real compromise. The Reagan Administration must understand this when reviewing its policy toward the ANC. It may rediscover what it has known to be true all along--that when it comes to negotiation with the ANC, the best negotiation is no negotiation.

William W. Pascoe, III
Policy Analyst

For further information:

"The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1982.

Alan Cowell, "Wild Card in South Africa: Communist Party," The New York Times, June 26, 1986.

The Heritage Foundation **The Backgrounder**

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MOSCOW'S STRATEGY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The crisis in southern Africa once again has captured international attention. Domestic violence in South Africa, anti-communist insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique, a coup in Lesotho, bombings by communist guerrillas in South Africa, diplomatic insults in Zimbabwe, cross-border preemptive strikes by South African forces--all vie for the attention of United States policy makers.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin must be delighted. The Soviet drive for control in southern Africa that began in the early 1960s and reached its peak in the mid-1970s--when communist regimes in Angola and Mozambique signed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR--once again is underway. Although in the early 1980s Moscow backed off, it recently stepped up support for its client regimes in Angola and Mozambique, and for pro-Soviet insurgents in South Africa and South West Africa. Further, Moscow has been moving closer to the governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. And, with a strategy that is the key to the entire region, Moscow long has been working for the destabilization of South Africa.

The stakes for the United States are high. The U.S. defense industry depends on critical strategic minerals imported from southern Africa. Without access to those minerals, the only source for many of them would be the Soviet Union. The Cape of Good Hope shipping route, moreover, is one of the West's vital trade routes: the 25,000 ships

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that navigate it annually carry 90 percent of Western Europe's oil and 70 percent of its strategic minerals.¹ Clearly, the U.S. cannot afford to allow Moscow to pursue its regional goals unchallenged.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

There are two key Soviet goals in southern Africa. The first was stated by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, when he admitted, "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends--the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."² The second Soviet interest in southern Africa, as it is in other peripheral areas of the Third World, is to gain a geostrategic advantage in the region to maximize its global influence.³ Specifically, Soviet aims in southern Africa are:

- o To expand Soviet influence while reducing U.S. and Chinese influence.
- o To establish Soviet control over the "cordon" states--Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South West Africa--to surround South Africa with pro-Soviet nations.
- o To gain access to air and naval facilities in littoral states of southern Africa to enhance Soviet power projection capabilities.
- o To deny Western access to the strategic minerals of South Africa.

Moscow pursues its objectives by arming its clients with military hardware ranging from fighter aircraft and sophisticated air defense systems to heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers. In most cases, Soviet advisers man the equipment and train host nation forces in its use. Depending on the particular government and the strength of its ties to the Soviets, security assistance also may include the provision of security experts to establish a Soviet-style state

1. South Africa, for example, holds 86 percent of the world's platinum group metals reserves, 64 percent of its vanadium, 83 percent of its chrome ore, and 48 percent of its manganese ore. See Adm. Robert J. Hanks, Southern Africa and Western Security (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983), p. 12.

2. Cited in Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p. 23.

3. See Dr. Peter Vanneman, testimony, "The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, March 22, 24, 25, 29, and 31, 1982, Volume 1, pp. 28-49.

security system. In Angola, military assistance even includes Soviet bloc combat forces and command personnel to bolster the regime.

Moscow also uses such political weapons as foreign propaganda, international front organizations, and activities within international and regional organizations.⁴ Through these, the Soviets seek to manipulate public opinion in the target country and in the international community to create the conditions in which favorable outcomes are likely.

SOVIET EXPANSION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 1983-1986

In mid-1983 the Kremlin began escalating its activities in southern Africa. In South Africa and South West Africa (or Namibia) Moscow has been assisting rebels seeking the overthrow of an established pro-Western government. In Angola and Mozambique, Moscow helps the pro-Soviet regimes struggling against anti-communist national liberation movements. And in non-aligned Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Lesotho, Moscow is attempting to increase its influence, both overtly and covertly.

South Africa

The Soviet campaign to destabilize South Africa until recently was a relatively low priority for Kremlin strategists. For decades it has depended on the alliance between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the African National Congress (ANC). The SACP was one of the first communist parties created by Lenin's Comintern. As such, it has always been one of the Third World's most pro-Moscow communist parties. The ANC, on the other hand, originally was founded in 1912 as a nationalist organization dedicated to the creation of a multiracial government in South Africa. It was not until immediately after World War II that the ANC was, for all intents and purposes, co-opted by the SACP.⁵

In 1960, the ANC was outlawed by the South African government. The following year, the organization adopted a strategy of violent revolution and formed a military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe--"Spear of

4. For a fuller discussion of Soviet political warfare techniques, see Richard Shultz, "Recent Regional Patterns," in Uri Ra'anan, et al, Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism: The Witnesses Speak (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 93-124.

5. See, for example, "Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism to the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, November 1982.

the Nation" in the Zulu language. It began to send its militants to Soviet bloc countries for training. At present, there are an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 trained ANC guerrillas.⁶

Since the early 1960s, the ANC's trained guerrillas have been conducting a campaign of terror in South Africa. Its strategy is to "make the country ungovernable" by radicalizing the townships. ANC targets are, for the most part, moderate blacks--especially policemen, city council members, and businessmen--who are deemed "collaborators" with the government. By killing enough of them, the ANC hopes to scare away all moderate blacks from any attempt to work with the government for peaceful change.

One of the key Soviet tactics for political destabilization is formation of a broad opposition front in which communists persuade non-communists to jointly oppose a regime. The front in South Africa was formed in August 1983. Calling itself the United Democratic Front (UDF), it chose as its presidents three well-known ANC supporters: Albertina Sisulu, Oscar Mpetha, and Archie Gumede.⁷

Soviet bloc delegates, meanwhile, are active in regional and international organizations, attempting to isolate the South African government. The immediate goal of this effort is international economic sanctions.

Thus, the Soviet strategy for South Africa seems well on track. On the military side, ANC-led mobs are radicalizing the townships and terrorizing moderate blacks. On the political side, internal agitation is being led by a newly created ANC front organization. And on the diplomatic side, the Kremlin has been successful in pushing for international sanctions against South Africa.

South West Africa

The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) is Moscow's chosen instrument for the destabilization of Namibia. Formed in 1960 to challenge Pretoria's control over South West Africa, SWAPO in 1962

6. The low figure comes from a conversation with Dr. Jan DuPlessis, a South African authority on the ANC, on May 19, 1986; the higher figure is quoted by Dr. Tom Lodge, another South African expert on the ANC, cited in Alan Cowell, "Wild Card in South Africa: Communist Party," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1986.

7. Joseph Lelyveld, "Foes of Apartheid Hold Large Rally," *The New York Times*, August 22, 1983, p. A11. Though the UDF denies that it is a front for the ANC, its leaders have been unable to point to a single instance in which there has not been a convergence of policy views between the ANC and the UDF. Moreover, even the respected British journal *The Economist* refers to the UDF as the "legal wing" of the ANC. *The Economist*, May 10, 1986, p. 11.

adopted a strategy of revolutionary violence. The guerrilla wing, known as the Namibian People's Liberation Army (PLAN), operates in northern Namibia from bases in southern Angola. After the United Nations in 1973 recognized SWAPO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people," Moscow stepped up its support for SWAPO, increasing training for SWAPO cadres and deliveries of military hardware.

Since then, Soviet policy on South West Africa has focused on: 1) supporting SWAPO in its terrorist campaign to destabilize the country; and 2) positioning itself as SWAPO's champion in international organizations.

So far, however, the combined operations of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) and the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) have kept the SWAPO insurgency in check. The installation of the multi-racial Transitional Government of National Unity in Windhoek in June 1985 removed a purported justification for SWAPO violence. SWAPO cadres are now being used more in support of Soviet, Cuban, and Angolan forces operating against UNITA in southeastern Angola than they are in fomenting violence in South West Africa.

Lesotho

The landlocked Kingdom of Lesotho is totally surrounded by South Africa. A pro-Soviet underground communist party was formed there in 1962 and has provided aid for over 20 years to ANC militants on their way into and out of South Africa.

In September 1984 the Soviet campaign to woo Lesotho began in earnest. A delegation representing Lesotho's ruling Basotho National Party, led by the party secretary general and Lesotho foreign minister, Vincent Makhele, visited Moscow for talks with Soviet officials. In May 1985, Moscow named an ambassador for the first time with responsibility for just Lesotho.⁹ The Soviet embassy staff was enlarged, an almost certain indication that the Soviets have expanded KGB operations.¹⁰

Last December, Makhele again visited Moscow. There he signed a cultural and scientific cooperation accord and a technical and

8. Peter Vanneman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Namibia: Some Considerations and Developments," *Strategic Review*, Institute for Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria, November 1985, pp. 13-18.

9. Previously, the Soviet ambassador to Mozambique had doubled as the envoy to Lesotho.

10. Conversations with Western intelligence sources, September 13, October 2, December 18, 1985, and February 26, May 27, 28, and 29, 1986.

economic accord. Only the coup against the government of Chief Lebusa Jonathan in January 1986 prevented the further consolidation of Soviet-Lesotho ties. This was a serious setback for Soviet aims in Lesotho.

Botswana

Because Botswana is one of Africa's few functioning democracies, and hence is relatively stable, the opportunities for Soviet influence are limited. Overt Soviet efforts in Botswana therefore concentrate on state-to-state relations. Moscow, for example, is attempting to increase arms sales to Botswana and last year made generous offers of military aid.¹¹

At the same time, Moscow seems to be expanding its covert operations in Botswana. Just four days after the new Soviet ambassador was posted to Lesotho last year, a new Soviet ambassador was posted to Botswana. The embassy staff then was enlarged. Of the 53 staff members, 28 have been identified as KGB and GRU intelligence officers.¹² Gaborone, the capital, has become such a staging area for ANC guerrillas that South African commandos struck at ANC facilities twice between June 1985 and May 1986.

Zambia

Though most observers believe that Zambia tilts West, it nevertheless is a key to Moscow's strategy for the region. Soviet activity in Zambia consists of a major military assistance program, efforts to transform the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party and support for the ANC, which has its headquarters in Lusaka, the Zambian capital.

From 1979-1983, the Soviet Union delivered \$180 million in arms to Zambia. These arms represented almost 70 percent of Zambia's total arms imports, which included MiG-21 fighter aircraft, tanks, armored personnel carriers, SA-3 missiles, and radar equipment. Some 500

11. For the period 1979-1983, the Soviet Union accounted for fully 50 percent of Botswana's arms imports. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 131. These weapons included, among others, armored personnel carriers and SA-7 missiles. See above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

12. The KGB is the Soviet national intelligence agency; the GRU is Soviet military intelligence. These figures come from the above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

Soviet military personnel are in Zambia, training Zambian Defense Force troops in use and maintenance of the weapons.¹³

Formal Soviet Communist Party-UNIP ties were established in Lusaka in 1981.¹⁴ Since then, Soviet party delegations have visited Lusaka several times to help the UNIP become a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party. Reciprocal trips were made by UNIP delegations to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Zambia has been serving as ANC headquarters since early 1984. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Lusaka houses the largest Soviet embassy staff in the region. Employing 129 officials, including at least 25 KGB and GRU officers with diplomatic cover and another 50 without, the Soviets use Lusaka as the base for covert activities against South Africa. It is here that the military operations of the ANC are conceived and staged, with the help of Soviet military and intelligence personnel.¹⁵

Soviet strategy in Zambia typifies Moscow's short- and long-term considerations. In the short term, Lusaka provides a base for destabilizing South Africa; in the long term, Moscow aims at constructing a Zambian vanguard Marxist-Leninist ruling party, with tight links to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, a Soviet military assistance program ties the current government of Zambia to the Kremlin.

Zimbabwe

Relations between Zimbabwe and the Soviet Union were strained for a few years after the Zimbabwean revolution's victory in 1980. Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, who is leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), had been backed during the insurgency by Beijing, while Moscow supported his principal rival, Joshua Nkomo.

As a self-proclaimed Marxist, however, who made no secret of his desire to create a one-party state in Zimbabwe, Mugabe was clearly a potential ally of Moscow.

The Kremlin push to intensify ties to Zimbabwe began in early 1984. That January, Zimbabwe and the USSR signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement. In February 1985 Zimbabwe sent Oswald Ndanga to Moscow as its first ambassador to the Soviet Union. At the same

13. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, op. cit., p. 132. Other information comes from above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

14. See "CPSU, Zambian Party Sign Plan for Interparty Ties," FBIS-USSR, May 1, 1981, p. J2.

15. See above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

time, Soviet diplomatic presence in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital, jumped from 48 to 62; among them are 18 KGB and GRU officers with diplomatic cover and 4 KGB officers without it.¹⁶

A major breakthrough for Soviet strategy was Mugabe's visit to Moscow last December. There he met with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet President Andrei Gromyko, Communist Party International Department chief Boris Ponomarev, and other top officials. He signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement and a Communist Party-ZANU cooperation agreement. It is widely believed that he discussed arms purchases with Konstantin Katushev, head of the Soviet Union's office which handles Third World arms sales. In fact, Western intelligence experts report that as early as September, Zimbabwe began receiving Soviet heavy weapons with the arrival of 20 T-54 tanks.¹⁷ With the conclusion of an economic and technical cooperation agreement, party-to-party ties, and a military assistance program, the Soviet effort to draw close to Zimbabwe seems to be succeeding.

Mozambique

From 1977 to 1984 Mozambique was one of the twin pillars, along with Angola, undergirding Soviet policy in southern Africa. The communist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), led by Samora Machel, had won control of the country from Portugal in 1975. Less than two years later, Machel signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR that calls for a close political and military relationship. Between 1975 and 1983, the Soviet Union sold Mozambique \$978 million worth of arms, accounting for over 75 percent of Mozambique's total arms imports for the period.¹⁸ In return, it appears, Mozambique gave the Soviets a base of operations for ANC guerrillas operating against South Africa and also port facilities for the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.

Yet Mozambique also gives Moscow problems. In April 1977 a loose coalition of former FRELIMO militants and disaffected Mozambicans formed the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). It began fighting the Machel regime for control of Mozambique.

16. See above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

17. See above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources. See also "Further Reportage on Mugabe Visit to Moscow," in FBIS-USSR December 3, 1985, pp. J1-6, "Further Reportage on Mugabe Visit to Moscow," FBIS-USSR December 4, 1985, pp. J1-7, and "More Reports on Mugabe Visit to Moscow," FBIS-USSR December 5, 1985, pp. J1-8.

18. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985, op. cit., p. 131.

To staunch RENAMO's increasingly threatening activities throughout 1984, the Soviets intensified their military aid to Machel. Between September 1984 and August 1985, 20 T-55 tanks were shipped to Maputo, Mozambique's capital, bringing the total to 174; 85 armored personnel carriers also were shipped, bringing the total to 410. For the first time, heavy BM-24 and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers arrived in Mozambique.

Despite this new aid from Moscow and troops from Zimbabwe, Machel has failed to suppress RENAMO. Since the start of this year, this national liberation movement has turned up its pressure on the Machel regime. This seems to be forcing Moscow to reassess Machel's future prospects and its continued relationship with his government. The future of Soviet-Mozambican ties thus is at a crossroad. The continuing success of RENAMO will play a large part in determining that future.

Angola

Soviet prestige is on the line more in Angola than anywhere else in Africa. It was only the massive Soviet airlift of Cuban troops and Soviet arms that gave the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) control of Luanda in 1975. Since then, the Soviet Union has sold Angola approximately \$4 billion worth of arms, including MiG-23 jets, Mi-24 helicopters, and heavy T-62 tanks. At present, over 40,000 Soviet bloc military and security personnel are in Angola, keeping the MPLA regime in power. These forces include 35,000 Cuban combat troops, 1,500 Soviet military advisers, 3,000 North Korean advisers, and another 1,500 East German security advisers.

From its first day in power, however, the MPLA has been challenged by the freedom fighters of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). When Savimbi began winning important battles in 1983--which since then has given him control of almost half of Angola--the Kremlin upgraded its arms for the MPLA. For the first time, Moscow sent T-62 tanks, Mi-24 helicopter gunships and MiG-23 fighter aircraft to Angola.¹⁹

Moscow-MPLA relations soured briefly in early 1984 when Angola signed the Lusaka Accord with South Africa. The agreement bound South Africa to pull its troops out of southern Angola in exchange for an MPLA promise not to allow the SWAPO insurgents to use Angola as a base for raids into South West Africa. Moscow did not like the deal, and

19. See above-cited conversations with Western intelligence sources.

20. See Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," in *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1985, p. 34.

made its feelings clear to Angola. As a result of these strained relations, MPLA chief Jose Eduardo Dos Santos boycotted the February 1984 funeral of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and he omitted the Soviet Union from his itinerary when he visited Eastern Europe that August.²¹

By early 1985, however, relations seemed to be healed, possibly because of UNITA's military gains--which threatened the very existence of the MPLA regime. Soviet, Cuban, and Angolan consultations were held in Moscow that March. There plans apparently were made for a new offensive against UNITA. Soviet arms continued to flow into Angola, so that by last summer, Angolan government forces boasted a total of almost 500 tanks, over 100 fighter aircraft, and over 70 helicopters.²²

When the MPLA launched its offensive in late July, Soviet involvement was greater than ever. For the first time, Soviet officers took operational control of troops down to the battalion--and possibly even platoon--level. Soviet and Cuban pilots flew the ground support combat missions.²³

The offensive was largely successful in recapturing from UNITA large portions of Angola. But the attack was blunted 120 miles north of Savimbi's bush headquarters at Jamba in late September.²⁴ Since then, new arms have continued to arrive from the Soviet Union, in preparation for an expected offensive later this summer.

A U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

The West, and particularly the United States, must begin to counter the Soviet drive for southern Africa. U.S. policies up to now generally have failed. Angola is still as intransigent as ever regarding whether and when the Cuban troops will withdraw, and the country remains a Soviet client. Mozambique, while eager for Western economic aid, is still aligned with the Soviet Union on every important issue. Zimbabwe has moved closer to the Soviets over the last several years, votes consistently against the U.S. at the United

21. Ibid. p. 36.

22. See William W. Pascoe, III, "Angola Tests the Reagan Doctrine," Heritage Foundation Background No. 470, November 14, 1985, p. 5.

23. Ibid.

24. See Allister Sparks, "Angolan Forces Fall Back from Site of Heavy Battle," The Washington Post, October 9, 1985, p. A1.

Nations, and even publicly insulted the U.S. at this year's Fourth of July party at the U.S. Embassy in Harare. Zambia and Botswana, meanwhile, seem to be moving closer to Moscow. U.S. influence with these nations has decreased, while Soviet influence has increased throughout the region.

What is needed instead is a more creative and direct U.S. policy for the region. In Angola and Mozambique, for example, pro-Western national liberation movements threaten the existence of the communist regimes. Until very recently, U.S. policy precluded aid to these freedom fighters. Even now, only UNITA in Angola receives U.S. assistance--and the aid is purely defensive. Yet U.S. military aid to UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique could be the deciding factor in ensuring their victories. The withdrawal of Mozambique and Angola from the Soviet camp not only would benefit the hard-pressed and suffering citizens of those nations but would send a signal to the Third World that Moscow has nothing to offer developing countries.

In Zimbabwe, Mugabe must be told explicitly that he will receive no U.S. economic assistance until he liberalizes his regime by allowing the creation of opposition political parties, freedom of speech and the press, and by ending state control over large sectors of the economy. He also would have to cut his strategic ties to the Soviet Union.

Zambia and Botswana must be reminded of the cost of close ties to the Kremlin.

In Lesotho, the U.S. should work closely with the new leaders to ensure a stable transition to representative government and an end to close ties to Moscow.

In South West Africa, the U.S. should delay no longer in recognizing the Transitional Government of National Unity, and should work closely with it in its move for independence from South Africa.

As for South Africa, the U.S. must recognize the very serious nature of the Soviet threat. Moscow, not the blacks of South Africa, would be the main victor if the African National Congress and its allies in the South African Communist Party came to power in Pretoria. For the U.S. and the West to isolate South Africa will radicalize the opposition forces in that country and lead to an increase in violence that heightens the chances of a pro-Soviet government coming to power. Rather than isolating Pretoria, Washington must devise a policy that uses the still considerable U.S. leverage to speed up the dismantling of apartheid, which already is underway. The U.S. should insist upon full political, economic, and social rights for all South Africans. At the same time, the U.S. must be aware of those forces in South Africa that serve Soviet ends.

CONCLUSION

The Soviet drive for southern Africa has begun again. Following a dormant period through the early 1980s, the Kremlin has stepped up its activities in this geostrategically vital area. Moscow has been moving on military, political, and diplomatic fronts, employing a wide range of methods--the establishment of correct diplomatic relations, the creation of communist party-to-communist party ties, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, high-level official visits, and the support of revolutionary forces. The prize for Moscow, of course, is the control over the vital strategic minerals of southern Africa, the Cape shipping route, and the clear demonstration to the Third World that the Soviet empire remains capable of expansion.

In South Africa and South West Africa, Soviet support for the revolutionary anti-government forces of ANC and SWAPO enables them to conduct campaigns of destabilization aimed at the overthrow of the established pro-Western governments. In the so-called non-aligned nations of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Botswana the Kremlin seeks to bolster its influence through the myriad network of proper state-to-state relations, while employing covert methods in support of its other regional objectives. In Angola and Mozambique, its two treaty-bound allies in the region, Moscow's planners provide aid to embattled regimes fighting defensive battles against pro-Western freedom fighters.

While the Kremlin correctly has perceived the need to bolster its influence throughout the region by acting in all nations, it clearly has set its priorities. The campaign to destabilize South Africa is at the top of the list. Economic sanctions against Pretoria thus serve Soviet ends.

The Soviet Union is clear in its goals and strategy for southern Africa. It aims to take effective control of the region by supplying allied communist governments and revolutionary forces the weapons and advisers they need to take and maintain power. The U.S. and the West must be just as clear and clever in denying Moscow its goal.

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Policy Analyst

The author wishes to acknowledge valuable research assistance provided by Gerard Alexander in the preparation of this study.

THE PRESIDENT IS RIGHT !

by Howard D. Greyber

(A scientist formerly with the Department of Defense, Howard Greyber is a candidate for the Republican nomination for the United States Senate in Maryland).

Yesterday in an extraordinarily fine closely-reasoned speech, President Reagan listed a whole host of excellent reasons why the Republic of South Africa should not be singled out for punitive sanctions. Chief among these was the emphasis that such actions would not only hurt black people in all of Southern Africa (including black-ruled nations) more than white people but would tend to bring on a terrible civil war with enormous bloodshed. No thinking person can doubt that the highly efficient modern South African Army would win, but at what a cost! Is this a moral end?

Or do the proponents of sanctions propose that, in extremis, American soldiers (or Soviet soldiers) be sent to crush the South African Armed Forces, preparing the way for a ruined, smashed society to be taken over by a ruthless, communistdominated African National Congress where only one-party phony elections would be held and a KGB-guided secret police would persecute and torture dissidents. To take a leaf on outcries about Vietnam, "Hell, No, - my sons will not go!"

All Americans should unite, deeply resenting and deeply deplore the vicious outrageous insulting cracks made against the President of the United States by Mr. Bishop Tutu. They reveal his true attitude i.e. that, as suggested by Chief Buthelezi, head of the largest group of blacks in South Africa, Tutu is merely the front man for the Soviet communist dominated African National Congress (ANC). As an intelligent black leader who helped found the ANC but left it when its communist bent was obvious, Chief Buthelezi wrote eloquently in these very OP-ED pages against American opinion listening only to radicals like Randal Robinson, the ANC and Bishop Tutu. He also made a very strong case against sanctions. Do Senators, caught up in an emotional high, know better, sitting in Washington, than he does in South Africa, 7000 miles away?

The strategic importance of South Africa to the Free World, as a storehouse of minerals vital to Western industry, such as the platinum group of metals used for catalysts, appears to be ignored by otherwise reasonable members of Congress. Also ignored is the fact that the only other commercial sources for many of these vital minerals is the Soviet Union. Can we afford to have the world sources of many vital minerals under the total control of "Imperial Russia"?

The present wave of emotion for strong sanctions against South Africa has been partly orchestrated by the news media. This is seen, for instance, when Mr. Tutu's bitter remarks were given longer time on the national TV news than quotes from the calm reasoned speech by the President of the United States! Therefore let us for a moment consider only "moral" arguments.

In America, after the Supreme Court verdicts in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) and Plessey v. Ferguson (1896), the system of "apartheid", i.e. segregation, was as firmly established as it is in South Africa today. Only one Justice, John Marshall Harlan, dissent

THE PRESIDENT IS RIGHT ! contd.

arguing "Our Constitution is color-blind", a quote used hundreds of times by Martin Luther King and Thurgood Marshall to gain support from white moderates like me. (Of course, Harlan's noble doctrine has been smashed by later black leaders using racist quotas and forced busing, but that is another story).

Should the European countries in the period after 1896 have imposed harsh punitive sanctions against us, against America? Were we so depraved as to deserve this arrogant treatment? Of course not, - and they did not... and with time we evolved, so some eighty years later, blacks actually have many dubious legal race-based advantages o innocent whites for jobs, entry to universities, law and medical schools, etc.

Just as we did not suffer punitive sanctions for our mistakes, and were allowed to evolve and progress peacefully, so should we treat the Republic of South Africa. Just as American whites, for all our faults and mistakes in 1896, were good and decent people, so are the South African white people today. Surely they will evolve and progress to a more fair and just society given the chance. Let us, as President Reagan said, not become their enemy but help them to change gradually.

South African whites came, 250 years ago, to a nearly empty land. As they came north, black tribes were migrating south. A scientific analysis of African soil cannot, after all, prove that only blacks can control and live on this soil! I have met many South African scientists and find them first-rate and intelligent. They have built a First World industrial civilization that supplies and nourishes all of Southern Africa, and also has created an educated, industrious black middle class unequalled in all of Africa.

Is it moral, in accord with arrogant pious omniscient purposes of Washington politicians, to destroy this First World civilization and destroy this black middle class by bringing on a bloody civil war and perhaps transform this troubled but creative society in the Republic of South Africa into a corrupt Third World hopelessly inefficient black dictatorship like Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, etc. under ANC communist control? If this is 'moral', the word has lost its meaning.

Just returned from fighting in a bitter Civil War where he was wounded three times in combat, a young Oliver Wendell Holmes, future Justice of the Supreme Court, shouted at his friend, William James, "To know is not less than to feel!". With all due respect I request our United States Senators to control their feelings, and think carefully about the facts laid out in President Reagan's superb speech. Only a President can execute foreign policy. Ronald Reagan, elected only twenty months ago, by 49 states to one, deserves your support on this vital foreign policy issue.

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Howard S. Feyer

PREPARED STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

The ICFTU delegation currently visiting their trade union colleagues in South Africa today urged the Minister for Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, to give an urgent response to their request to be enabled to meet trade unionists currently held in detention.

From the wide-ranging talks the delegation have already held with trade union colleagues (Council of Unions of South Africa, Congress of South African Trade Unions, Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions and others) and, this morning, with lawyers who act for unions and detainees (including Ishmael Ayob, attorney of Nelson Mandela), the delegation has grown increasingly alarmed about the plight of the detainees. They have heard horrifying reports of brutal beatings and the use of torture and are gravely worried about the impact on detainees' families and the unions' ability to function properly.

ICFTU General Secretary John Vanderveken today said "it is vital that we are allowed access to meet detainees directly--many of whom have been held continuously since June 12th without being seen by family, friends, lawyers or any other independent outsiders. There can be no possible justification for further delay in responding to what is an undeniably reasonable request on trade union and humanitarian grounds."

While clearly concerned about the position of all detainees, the ICFTU has requested access to eight specifically named trade unionists believed to be held in the Johannesburg area.

- Donzie Khumalo is a COSATU representative in Pretoria.
- Alex Mhalatsi, president of Transport and Allied Workers Union. He has been tortured in detention and had to be treated in a hospital, so bad were his injuries.
- James Mndaweni, president of CUSA and executive committee member of Food and Beverage Workers Union, employed at Unilever.
- Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of Metal and Allied Workers Union. Fourth time he has been detained, second time this year. He was badly treated in March this year and his condition now is unknown.
- J. Mohakgwe, shop steward at Siemens.
- Moses Mphahlele, member of Azanian Congress of Trade Unions.
- Sipho Mxolo, organizer of South African Chemical Workers Union, Tembisa.
- Mahlomola Skhosana, assistant general secretary of CUSA. He has been detained in every emergency since 1977 and never charged with anything.

After further meetings with trade union colleagues and others today, the delegation will tomorrow (Sunday) be meeting the Bishop of Johannesburg and Archbishop-elect of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu (Sun Hotel, 9 a.m.) which will be followed by a visit to Soweto when the delegation will meet the wives and families of detainees. The delegation will give a press conference to report on their visit at 3 p.m. tomorrow (Sunday) at the Sun Hotel.

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ICFTU Statement
Sunday, July 20, 1986

The ICFTU delegation came to South Africa to assess the problems facing the South African trade union movement at first hand, and particularly the human and industrial consequences of detentions. To hear trade union views about growing international moves towards effective economic sanctions, to consider what further assistance the ICFTU and its affiliates can render to their colleagues in this country and, above all, to provide a tangible demonstration of solidarity.

The delegation's visit represents no new concern over the problems of South Africa but derives from a relationship of support, friendship and fraternal assistance by the ICFTU and the National Trade Union Centers dating back to the first emergency of independent South African unions and renewed again by the adoption only in April 1985 of the ICFTU's "beating apartheid" program which includes a sanctions policy, calls for an end to emigration, cultural contacts, an end to government collaboration with the South African regime, and the targeting of transnational corporations to step up economic pressure on the apartheid regime. It also supports the fight to end influx control and the oppressive migrant workers system and the strengthening of South Africa's neighbors in supporting the Southern Africa Development Cooperation Conference countries and the fight for Namibian independence.

During the visit, the delegation has been grateful for the cooperation given in meetings with the trade union organizations (Council of Unions of South Africa, Congress of South African Trade Unions, Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions and others), attorneys, employers, and church and community leaders. Despite the brevity of the delegation's stay, they have no doubt that they have received a comprehensive and authoritative account of the grim realities facing the trade union movement within a society presently on a course for cataclysmic disaster with incalculable human consequences that can only be averted by fundamental change.

The plight of detainees was uppermost in the delegation's concern. The horrifying picture painted by the first-hand accounts given to the delegation--in many cases by the released detainees--has proved genuinely shocking.

There is a pattern of unjustified arrest often followed by systematic brutality and torture that amounts to a massive violation of human beings and human rights. The delegation has seen the physical evidence in the scarred bodies of the released detainees to substantiate the harrowing accounts they have received. They have been denied the opportunity to compile further evidence by the refusal of the authorities so far of the request to visit trade unionists currently held in detention. They repeat their call for such facilities and their demand--fully vindicated by the evidence they received--for the unconditional release of detainees.

The peremptory, untrammelled misuse by the state of the system of law has been underlined again by the imposition of the present emergency regulations. Detainees can become non-persons. Families cannot pass information to their attorneys. Attorneys cannot disclose identities to the court. The number of trade union detainees whose names are now known to us stands at 269. Their position is of grave concern. But they represent only a glimmer of a frightening and largely concealed reality.

A system of law in which any concept of natural justice would appear an alien being offers little redress to its oppressed victims. Nevertheless it is a triumph of wit,

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commitment and organization that the struggle goes on in the courts, as elsewhere, to win relief wherever possible.

The detentions have caused great suffering to families and have damaged the operational capacity of unions. Yet it is absolutely clear that the trade union ideal is now firmly embedded in South African life, and it cannot be uprooted despite all adversity. Even in present circumstances, unions have shown a remarkable durability and resilience. Collective, democratic organizations remain an irreplaceable vehicle for the pursuit of the interests of working people--a fact increasingly understood and accepted by South African employers and their organizations. They are the main effective means through which black people have a powerful and continuous say in the decisions which affect them in the working place and in society at large. They are a real protection to black people and the main force for constructive, peaceful change.

In some cases, employers have recognized the role of unions as essential negotiating partners. But it is clear to the delegation that they could and must do much more immediately to exert their undoubted influence on the regime to secure the unconditional release of detainees and to break down the repressive apartheid system.

The world community is now confronted by crucial decisions about effective economic sanctions as a result of the intransigent refusal of the South African regime to contemplate real change. On this issue, the delegation was most anxious to hear the views of workers. The possible implications of effective sanctions for the well-being of ordinary people--so often cited as a justification for inaction or delay--cannot be ignored nor can governments and inter-governmental institutions continue to turn away from the overwhelming evidence--confirmed during the delegation's visit--of a willingness by the victims of apartheid to endure further suffering in the interests of achieving the transformation needed in their society so urgently.

Again and again, the delegation heard an authentic and eloquent plea for hard-hitting action against the South African regime. The casualties of the inhumanity of apartheid have the right to prescribe the remedy, and their message to the world is clear--freedom at all costs and action now.

There is, moreover, increasing evidence made known to the delegation of employer pressure on the regime for change, even to the extent of readiness in some cases to favor sanctions. The time for prevarication in the world community is drawing to a close.

The delegation will now report through the ICFTU and its affiliated organizations. The first task is to inform, to communicate however imperfectly, the obscenities of the apartheid system and the evils now being perpetrated in its name. Working people throughout the world must be galvanized into maximizing the pressure they can exert for irreversible change.

Pressure will be increased for action on sanctions, including a renewed call on the Commonwealth Summit meeting in London in August to unite around a meaningful program of action.

Beyond that, the ICFTU will be devising yet further measures of practical support for and cooperation with South Africa's independent trade union organizations building on their statement "beating apartheid."

No solution to South Africa's problems can be found that excludes the growing influence of the trade union movement as a vital and vigorous force for peaceful change leading to a fully democratic system.

BEATING APARTHEID

(Statement adopted by the ICFTU Executive Board
at a Special Session held in Washington, D.C.;
April 11, 1985)

Introduction

1. The situation in South Africa is at a crisis point. The political and economic foundations of the apartheid regime are under attack as never before. Repression of black leaders is intensifying, the hated influx control measures are being tightened, and clashes between the black community and security forces occur daily. The regime is desperately trying to change the image, although not the reality, of apartheid both in South Africa and abroad. Business leaders in countries with extensive economic links to South Africa are beginning to reassess their ties with apartheid. This is due to the pressure of public opinion in their own countries, to growing doubts about the future return on their investments and increasingly effective opposition to apartheid in South Africa. Yet conservative political leaders have yet to react to these realities. Now is the time to step up the international pressure against apartheid by governmental and further trade union action.

2. The ICFTU and its affiliates are proud to be in the forefront of the campaign against apartheid. We welcome the recent upsurge in international awareness of the evil nature of apartheid which is in part due to the campaigning work of the free trade unions over many years. In the fight against apartheid, the ICFTU's distinctive contribution is the emphasis on assisting the development of a strong independent black trade union movement in South Africa. The key importance of democratic trade union organizations in the freedom struggle is now apparent to all. As was stated in the recently updated ICFTU Program of Action, the growth and strengthening of the independent black trade union movement, is the single most effective measure for the repressed majority in South Africa to gain freedom and justice and to abolish apartheid. This conviction will continue to be at the center of the ICFTU campaign against apartheid. Apartheid is an entrenched system of racial discrimination and economic exploitation which is based on a number of key pieces of legislation, backed up by the administrative powers of the government. Ending apartheid means majority rule in an undivided society.

3. The existence of the South African regime depends on apartheid. It will not end it. Diplomacy has failed to get across the abhorrence felt by people all over the world against the repression of the black majority. The ICFTU is therefore convinced that government must firmly commit themselves to escalating political pressure on and applying sanctions against South Africa. As a matter of urgency all governments and especially those of the main trading and investment partners of South Africa should increase and implement the range of measures so long threatened by the United Nations.

Sanctions

4. Support for a tough sanctions policy is growing as public awareness of the continued repression and injustice suffered by the black majority in South Africa has increased. The threat of economic isolation is a major concern for the apartheid regime, but must be made more credible by specific commitments to effective action by the large industrialized countries.

5. The ICFTU proposes sanctions which should begin with the tightening of the

U.N. arms embargo and proceed further. In cooperation with the U.N., all governments should develop immediate, effective machinery for the implementation and monitoring of an international sanctions policy.

6. Governments should by administration and legislative action build up the following sanctions.

- i. The extension of the arms embargo to include sales by South African subsidiaries of transnational corporations, a tightening of the definition of arms sales to include all types of equipment intended for use by South Africa's military, security and police services, sales of machinery to South African arms-producing companies, the purchase of South African produced arms and the strengthening of international monitoring to ensure compliance by all major industrial countries.
- ii. The ending of investment guarantees, export credits and all trade promotion measures, and steps, product by product, to switch both import and export trade from South Africa.
- iii. Prevention of new investment in South Africa by transnationals.
- iv. The ending of all contracts for the expansion of the South African nuclear energy and oil from coal programs.
- v. The ending of all commercial operations by transnationals in the so-called "homelands or "Bantustans."
- vi. A stop on bank loans to the African State and publicly-owned companies, and new IMF loans.
- vii. Punitive action against the owners of any ships which carry oil to South Africa and against oil companies or oil traders which break or are party to the breaking of the U.N. oil embargo. This will entail intensified national and international monitoring by governments of shipping traffic to South Africa.
- viii. A ban on sale of Krugerrand.
- ix. A ban on purchases of South African coal.
- x. A program of compulsory disinvestment by transnationals operating especially in the armaments, energy, high-technology sectors in South Africa, and including all those companies which have been identified by the independent black trade union movement as being in violation of internationally accepted standards of labor practice.

7. These measures should culminate in the adoption of mandatory U.N. sanctions to enforce the economic isolation of South Africa.

Emigration and cultural contacts

8. Linked to sanctions on trade, investment and other commercial links, governments of the countries of origin of white emigrants to South Africa, should take

immediate steps to warn their citizens of the reality of apartheid. Governments should also take steps to:

- i. Close all official and unofficial South African recruitment offices and tourist promotion offices;
- ii. Ensure that no public employment agencies handle job vacancies in South Africa; and
- iii. Actively discourage the advertising of South African job vacancies;
- iv. Vigorously discourage sports and cultural contacts with South Africa.

9. The ICFTU and its affiliates will also undertake a coordinated information campaign in support of measures to discourage white emigration through trade union action targeted on individual countries in turn (United Kingdom, United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Australia and Belgium) and at multinationals or South African companies which recruit white labor for South Africa.

Government collaboration with the South African regime

10. Special note should be taken on the collaboration between the South African government and other governments. The ICFTU believes that the present racist government of South Africa should be isolated and that visits by exponents of apartheid should never be entertained by any country.

Targeting transnational corporations

11. At the same time as working for governmental action against apartheid, the ICFTU, the International Trade Secretariats and their affiliates will also increase pressure on transnational corporations operating in South Africa and on South African multinationals with operations outside that country. Such transnationals are pivotal to economic relations with South Africa. They are directly affected by changes in South Africa and by efforts outside the country to increase pressure on the regime. Both individually and collectively transnational corporations have a major influence on the future of apartheid and their vulnerability to international trade union pressure should be exploited.

12. The ICFTU firmly believes that measures must be taken to reduce links with South Africa. The ICFTU calls on all transnational corporations operating in South Africa to cooperate fully with the international effort to step up economic pressure on the apartheid regime. In addition, and within the framework of the ICFTU's policy on sanctions and disinvestment, the ICFTU, the International Trade Secretariats and national affiliates will work in consultation with the independent black trade union movement to further their demands vis-a-vis particular companies. These campaigns will be targeted at individual companies, including South African transnational corporations with operations outside that country, and will involve, among others, the following activities:

- i. Approaches to management by unions in a company's home country in support of demands for full collective bargaining rights by independent black trade unions in South African subsidiaries;

- ii. Meetings between representatives from the South African union concerned and their counterparts from the parent company of the South African subsidiary involved in a dispute, in order to put direct pressure on management;
- iii. Working contacts between union representatives in a parent company and in its various subsidiaries inside and outside South Africa in order to pave the way for effective collective bargaining by the independent black trade union movement in South Africa;
- iv. In cases of continued obstruction by management, international campaigns on the transnational corporations concerned involving appropriate solidarity action. Such international campaigns will be initiated in response to the expressed needs of the independent black trade union movement, by the ICFTU, in cooperation with national centers and International Trade Secretariats;
- v. Research into the activities and structure of target companies with a view to identifying the scale and nature of commercial links with South Africa;
- vi. The development of information material on the situation of South African workers in the companies and their unions, with particular reference to their views on the fight against apartheid and the companies policies, for distribution to union members in the target companies;
- vii. Suspension of contracts calls for banks on new investment and disinvestment where companies refuse to work with the independent black trade unions in South Africa.

Influx control and migrant workers

13. The ICFTU reiterates its abhorrence of the apartheid system and particularly singles out the pernicious influx control system which denies South African workers the right to seek work where they wish, to live with their families and to live normal family lives. The fight of the independent trade unions against this obnoxious system should be supported by the international trade union movement by providing assistance aimed at mitigating the immediate problems. Programs of assistance to migrant workers such as those already operating in Botswana and Lesotho should be extended into South Africa in order to strengthen the trade union movement in the Southern African region as a whole.

Strengthening South Africa's neighbors


14. The ICFTU believes that apartheid is at the root of the hegemony pursued by South Africa in the region beginning with Namibia for which the ICFTU calls for compliance with Resolution 435 on Namibia which decided to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the U.N. The ICFTU vigorously condemns the continued destabilization of the region through political, military and economic interference. The ICFTU strongly believes the strengthening of the economic base of the frontline states would also contribute to the dismantling of apartheid. It, therefore, calls on all countries to support effectively measures proposed and being undertaken by the Southern Africa Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) countries to reduce dependence on South Africa. In supporting the SADCC countries, trade unions in industrialized countries should also contribute to the

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strengthening of trade unions in those countries to enable them to play a major role in the SADCC process of development. The unfavourable conditions imposed by international agencies and banks in respect of aid, loans and investment funds negatively affect the economic growth of these countries. The ICFTU calls on the international community to change these policies in order to strengthen the economic position of the countries in the region.

Conclusion

15. The key to change in South Africa lies within the country and will be determined by the black majority. However, international resolutions translated into action can help accelerate progress towards democracy and justice. Escalating economic sanctions, discouraging white immigration, ending government collaboration with the South African regime and targeting campaign activities on specific transnationals offer four specific and practical ways of forcing the message home to the South African government that apartheid must end. These measures will be supported by a wide spectrum of opinion in all countries, including most importantly the independent black trade unions in South Africa. The international free trade union movement strongly urges all governments, and especially those of South Africa's main economic partners, to adopt these proposals and thus clearly inform the apartheid regime of the consequences of continuing its racist policies. The ICFTU reiterates its call for the immediate release of imprisoned black trade union and political leaders, the cessation of repressive measures against the black community, the unbanning of all political organizations and of political activity in order to develop a society based on universal suffrage, full respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and undivided South Africa.



NEWS AFL-CIO



DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION

202/637-5010

July 24, 1986

FOR RELEASE:

NOTE

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, comprising 144 organizations with 80 million members in 92 countries, sent a delegation of union leaders to visit the Republic of South Africa starting July 18. The delegation included John Vanderveken, ICFTU general secretary; Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO; Ernst Breit, chairman, West German Trade Union Federation (DGB); Norman Willis, general secretary of the Trade Unions Congress of Great Britain (TUC); Kaare Sandegren, international director of the Norwegian Labor Federation (LO) representing the Nordic Federation of Trade Unions.

The following statements were issued by the delegation during their visits:

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

DEATHS IN DETENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Prepared Statement of Helena Cook

of the

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

submitted to the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

July 1986

In July 1986 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights published a report--Deaths in Custody: Seven Recent Cases in South Africa--, documenting the cases of seven detainees who died in mysterious circumstances in April and May of this year while in the hands of the South African police.

In the past year, the Lawyers Committee has been investigating and reporting on human rights abuses in South Africa, with a particular focus on the conduct of the security forces in the black townships during the current unrest. I visited South Africa twice in 1985, spending more than two months in that country. A Lawyers Committee representative has been based in South Africa since January of this year. This report on deaths in custody is the third report on South Africa published by the Lawyers Committee in 1986. Mamelodi - South Africa's Response to Peaceful Protest was published in January and in April the Committee released a 150-page report entitled The War Against Children - South Africa's Youngest Victims.

A staggering total of more than 2,000 people have been killed in the conflict and political turmoil that has swept South Africa's black townships since September 1984. Since the government imposed a State of Emergency to "restore law and order" on June 12,¹ the daily death toll has soared to still higher levels. More than 160 people have died in the five weeks since the latest Emergency was declared, with the average daily death toll climbing to its highest level at any time since the unrest broke out.

- 1. A State of Emergency was imposed by the South African government on July 21 last year in 36 magisterial districts in response to the continuing unrest. It remained in effect for seven and one half months before being lifted on March 7, 1986. The renewed State of Emergency declared on June 12, 1986 is currently in force nation-wide and is even harsher in its restrictions.

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The majority of victims -- most of them black -- have been killed by South African security forces in operations in the townships designed to crush the growing opposition to apartheid. These are the victims who fell, with each passing day, before the television cameras that brought South Africa's seething violence into the homes of horrified watchers throughout the world -- until the cameras were forbidden by Pretoria to bear witness any longer.

Other deaths have passed unrecorded by any watchful observer. Inside South Africa's hellish detention centers, abuse has been meted out with such savagery that its victims were dying at the average rate of one per week in the period between April 2 and May 20 of this year.

Since then, South Africa's jails have swelled with over 4,500 new detainees caught in the sweeping net of the government's latest, and most draconian, emergency measures. At the same time, the government has erased the last remaining restraint on its notoriously brutal detention authorities -- that of public scrutiny. It is an offense under the current emergency regulations to publish even the names of detainees without official permission. This, coupled with far-reaching restrictions on the dissemination of information concerning the State of Emergency ensures that police authorities responsible for South Africa's burgeoning jail population can pursue their notoriously brutal course of treatment without fear of public discovery.

Consider, for example, the case of Lucky Kutumela, described in the Lawyers Committee's recent report. He was a 25 year-old journalist and anti-apartheid activist. On April 4, 1986, Kutumela was arrested, along with six other activists, and taken to the Mahwelereng police station. One of the other detainees arrested with Kutumela described his treatment there:

As they dragged [Lucky] out. . . they were hitting his body with sjamboks [metal-tipped whips] and the butt of a shotgun; they were kicking, too. . . . After they took him out we couldn't see him but we could still hear everything, and it was horrifying. We could hear the thuds on his body, his body bumping against the walls and his screams. At first he was just screaming in pain, but later . . . we could hear him pleading for them to stop, that they were going to kill him.

Later that night, the police refused to respond to pleas for medical attention as Kutumela lay dying:

Lucky was writhing in pain. . . . He was moaning, and I think his brain was going funny. . . . We were shouting for help, because Lucky was in serious trouble, but no one came even though we could hear voices nearby. Lucky was now breathing heavily and started saying that he was going to die; he asked us to cover him with water because he was "burning". . . . A few minutes later, he died.

Like Lucky Kutumela, all of the victims described in Deaths in Custody were black, and at least four were detained because of their active opposition to apartheid. In at least five of the cases, there is evidence that the victims were subjected to brutal assaults by police before their deaths, resulting in severe injuries that contributed to or were the direct cause of death.

Far from holding its police accountable for these acts, the South African government has erected an impenetrable shield around their behavior. The government has consistently

refused to acknowledge serious abuses by its security forces, even where -- as in the infamous Steven Biko case -- the evidence has been damning.²

The cases presented in the report by the Lawyers Committee exemplify the government's continuing denial of official responsibility for deaths in detention. Despite clear indications of police abuse in respect of most of these recent deaths, there has been no admission of official wrongdoing in any of the seven cases. Wholly inadequate -- and in some cases ludicrous -- explanations for these fatalities have been proffered. In not one of the cases has a date for an inquest even been set.

The characteristic response of the South African authorities has been to drop a shroud of secrecy around the incidents. In some cases, South African authorities have obstructed efforts by relatives of the deceased or their representatives to view the victim's remains, to be present at post-mortems and to have access to information about the circumstances and cause of death. In at least two of the cases, pressure has been brought to bear on the family by the police to compel them to concur in the official version of events. In some of the cases relatives of the victims have been pressured to bury the body immediately.

Under the current Emergency, the government's practice of obfuscation with respect to its treatment of detainees has hardened into policy. The police are refusing to divulge the names and even the number of emergency detainees. In most cases, they will not confirm where detainees are being held. Even when challenged in Parliament recently, the Minister of Law and Order refused to give any information about detainees, on the grounds that such disclosure was not in the public interest.

Nor do any meaningful external restraints operate to mitigate the harshness of the South African police. Independent official investigations into police conduct are rare, and there is no indication that complaints of abuse are seriously investigated internally by the police force. The courts' power to examine police conduct or inquire into the validity of security detentions is severely limited in view of the vast discretionary powers conferred on the police and the Minister of Law and Order by permanent security legislation. Under the State of Emergency, the role of the courts is restricted still further by a broad indemnity from legal proceedings accorded with respect to all actions of the security forces taken "in good faith." As a result, prosecutions of the security forces for alleged misconduct are practically unknown.³

Above all, vast police powers of detention without trial stand as an open invitation to abuse of detainees. South Africa's permanent security legislation contains severe provisions for lengthy detention without charge. In particular, provisions of the Internal Security Act (ISA) authorizing detention for purposes of interrogation,⁴ or as a preventive measure⁵ and then to hold such persons indefinitely in solitary confinement without access to counsel or relatives, furnish a license for abuse.

2. Steven Biko, the well-known Black Consciousness leader, died in 1977 after being transported 700 miles in a police van while semi-conscious and suffering from severe head and other injuries. Police alleged that he hit his head against a wall during a scuffle which apparently necessitated his being subdued by the entire interrogation team.

3. In 1984, a member of the security police was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the shooting, at point blank range, of detainee Paris Malatji during the latter's interrogation. This was the first successful prosecution of a security policeman for an incident carried out in the line of duty. The case is now on appeal.

4. ISA, section 29.

5. *Id.*, sections 28 and 50A.

That such abuse takes place on a massive scale in South Africa's police and prison cells has been well documented.⁶ The severe beating of detainees with fists, boots, sjamboks,⁷ batons and heavy objects and other physical assaults are commonplace. Various forms of torture, including the use of electric shock, suffocation and the infamous "helicopter"⁸ are routine methods of interrogation. Nor is the problem confined to political prisoners. By all accounts, post-arrest treatment is often brutal, no matter the status or age of the prisoner concerned.

In a detailed study published in 1985 by the University of Cape Town's Institute of Criminology,⁹ 83% of the ex-detainees interviewed reported that they were tortured in custody. The South African courts have also acknowledged the use of torture. In 1985, several interim injunctions were granted enjoining the police from further assault and abuse of detainees.¹⁰ Since the current wave of unrest began in September 1984, 22 people have died in detention, a startling average of about one such death each month. Three of the victims in 1985 were children; one them, Johannes Spogter, was only 13 years old.¹¹

Unexplained deaths of persons in police custody in South Africa, particularly of those arrested and detained without charge under the harsh provisions of the internal security laws, have been documented since detention without trial was permanently enacted into the legislation in the early 1960s.¹² According to the Detainees Parents' Support Committee (DPSC), a human rights group which monitors such issues, the seven deaths chronicled in Deaths in Custody brought the total number of such deaths in detention since 1963 to at least 81.¹³

If South Africa's existing security laws confer a license for such abuse, the recently imposed security measures solicit similar violations on a still more massive scale. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Emergency authorize detention for up to 14 days when any member of the security forces believes it "necessary" to preserve public order.¹⁴ Emergency detention can then be extended by the Minister of Law and Order, without notice to the detainee or a hearing, for the duration of the Emergency.

Just as during the first State of Emergency, when nearly 8,00 people were detained, detentions have sharply increased since the June 12 Emergency declaration. At least 1,200 people seized on the first day of the renewed Emergency. Human rights monitoring groups estimate that there are now at least 4,500 persons in detention, and the number is climbing

6. The systematic physical and psychological abuse of detainees has been documented by groups such as Amnesty International, the Detainees Parents' Support Committee and Black Sash. The Lawyers Committee has also gathered considerable evidence of such abuses in its own interviews in South Africa with ex-detainees, doctors and others over the past year.

7. A sjambok is a heavy hide or plastic whip, often with a metal tip.

8. The victim is suspended over a pole with hands and feet handcuffed often for prolonged periods of time while being beaten and interrogated.

9. A Study of Detention and Torture in South Africa: Preliminary Report, D. Foster and D. Sandler, 1985.

10. The best known of these cases was an application brought by a district surgeon, Dr. Wendy Orr, and 43 others in Port Elizabeth in September 1985. More than 200 pages of affidavit evidence was laid before the court detailing horrifying police abuse of detainees. The court order enjoined the police from further assault and abuse of all present and future detainees in Port Elizabeth's police and prison cells.

11. See The War Against Children: South Africa's Youngest Victims, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, April 1986.

12. For a comprehensive analysis of the deaths in detention that have taken place between 1963 and 1983, see Deaths in Detention and South Africa's Security Laws, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, September 1983.

13. Detainees Parents' Support Committee Report, April 1986.

14. Emergency Regulation, Section 3.

daily. Of those whose identity and political affiliations are known, the majority are community and political activist linked to the largest opposition umbrella group -- the United Democratic Front. A significant number are trade unionists, students and teachers.

Little news of their treatment has managed to seep through the government's tightening web of silence. What little information has emerged confirms apprehensions born of past experience. An international delegation of labor leaders that visited South Africa in July reported as they left that they had compiled evidence of "systematic brutality and torture" of trade unionists and others who have been detained. Based on interviews with and photographs of 10 union officials who had been assaulted while detained, the delegation's leaders described physical abuse that included "lashings leaving bloody lacerations" and application of electric shocks.¹⁵

Despite the South African government's much-vaunted claim to be moving on a course of progressive reform, it has recently institutionalized, by legislative amendments to the Public Safety Act and the Internal Security Act signed into law on June 29 over the opposition of the new Indian and Colored Houses of Parliament, the potential for the executive to impose a permanent State of Emergency, buttressed by a new and sweeping power of detention without charge. Thus, the special and extraordinary powers, previously only available when a formal State of Emergency was in place, are now incorporated into the ordinary law of the land.

Of particular relevance to the subject of our report on recent deaths in detention are the amendments to the Internal Security Act, which have introduced a new and broader power of preventive detention, exercisable by the police rather than the Minister of Law and Order without a warrant of arrest. Such detention can be prolonged for up to six months. No reasons need be given for the detention, thus removing practically any possibility of judicial review.

As the South African government continues to parrot the rhetoric of reform, it has redoubled its assault against blacks who dare to demand fundamental political rights. In the process, it is fortifying some of the most pernicious institutions born of apartheid, institutions that sow division and violence and encourage official lawlessness. Such measures can only encourage further abuses and are, therefore, likely to contribute to an over-all worsening of the human rights situation and to more cases of assaults, torture and ultimately death inside South Africa's police and prison cells.

A brief summary of the seven deaths in custody described in the Lawyers Committee Report is set out below. The report is based on interviews conducted in South Africa by the Lawyers Committee in April and May, 1986 with family members of the deceased, fellow detainees, doctors, attorneys representing the family and others, as well as from official police statements about the cases and, where possible, official documentation such as medical reports.

* * * *

The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is a public interest law center based in New York. Since 1978 the Committee has worked to promote compliance with internationally recognized human rights law and legal principles. In the past year, the Lawyers Committee has sent human rights delegations to more than a dozen countries world-wide, including South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, Israel, the Philippines, Poland, Cambodia, Liberia, Cuba, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.

15. Robert Boorstin, "Tear Gas Used on Churchgoers in South Africa," The New York Times, July 21, 1986.

**DEATHS IN CUSTODY:
SEVEN RECENT CASES IN SOUTH AFRICA**

1) Joel Phoshoko, age 28, of Mabopane, Bophuthatswana

Date of arrest: April 2, 1986
Date of death: April 2, 1986

Joel Phoshoko died only hours after presenting himself at the Pretoria Central Police Station in connection with the investigation of a house-breaking incident. Joel's wife, who saw his body, has stated that the corpse bore evidence of serious injuries consistent with severe assault. The state pathologist's report, which found the cause of death to be internal bleeding between the brain and the skull, support these allegations.

2) Lucky Kutumela, age 25, of Mahwelereng, Lebowa

Date of arrest: April 4, 1986
Date of death: April 5, 1986

Lucky Kutumela was arrested with four other members of AZAPO, a black opposition group, on the evening of April 4. According to one of those arrested with him, Lucky was the first to be taken away by the police and brutally assaulted. The sounds of blows and Lucky's screams were clearly audible. A number of the other detainees were also severely assaulted, and four of them, including Lucky, were then left in a cell overnight.

Despite Lucky's critical condition, he was denied medical treatment and died during the night. An independent doctor who was present at the post-mortem found injuries on the body consistent with the account of Lucky's fellow detainees and has determined the cause of death to be a brain haemorrhage. No official explanation of the death has been given and no date has yet been established for the inquest.

3) Peter Nchabeleng, age 59, of Apel, Lebowa

Date of arrest: April 10, 1986
Date of death: April 11, 1986

A veteran anti-apartheid activist and UDF leader, Peter Nchabeleng, was arrested at his home early on the morning of April 10. His wife was informed the next day that he had died in custody of a heart attack but her efforts to view the body were obstructed for more than a week. When she was permitted access to the body, she saw blood in Peter's eyes and visible marks that suggested he had been beaten to death. The family's lawyer has also said that there is evidence to support this contention. No date has been set for the inquest.

4) Eric Ngomane, age 22, of Mahushu, KaNgwane

Date of arrest: March 20, 1986
Date of death: April 11, 1986

Eric Ngomane, who only recently became involved in political activities, was arrested on March 20, ostensibly on a charge of arson. His mother was not permitted to visit him at any time during his detention and the family was not informed of Eric's death for several days after it occurred.

The police allege that Eric was taken out of detention so that he could identify other suspects, and was shot while trying to escape. According to witnesses who viewed the body, however, Eric apparently was shot at point-blank range. Almost no details of the shooting have been released by the police. A shooting of a young man believed to be Eric Ngomane did take place in Mahushu on April 11, but not, apparently, during an escape attempt. No date for the inquest has yet been announced.

5) Johannes Mashego, age 26, of Tumahole, Parys

Date of arrest: April 18, 1986

Date of death: April 19, 1986

Johannes Mashego was arrested on the evening of April 18, apparently in connection with a house-breaking incident. The next day police informed his family that he was dead but would not allow them to view the body until the following day. Detainees who were held in the same cell as Johannes have said he appeared to be in good health when arrested. Family members who viewed the body have said that it bore evidence of assault, and they believe that severe beating was the cause of Johannes' death.

Police claim that Johannes collapsed during questioning after complaining of nausea and that he died of a heart attack. The family's lawyer was not permitted to be present at the post-mortem and, as a result, no independent physician was present either. No inquest has yet been scheduled.

6) Ayanti Silika, age 23, of Crossroads, Cape Town

Date of arrest: May 7, 1986

Date of death: May 12, 1986

Ayanti Silika, a member of the Cape Youth Congress and the Release Mandela Campaign, was arrested on May 7 in connection with the shooting of a South African policeman. Police claim that when he was taken out for further investigation in Crossroads, he attempted to escape and was fatally shot.

Community spokespersons in the Cape suspect that Ayanti's arrest and his death were in response to his political activism in the community, and have identified inconsistencies in the police account of the shooting.

7) Goolam Bismilla, age 19, of Mohadin, Potchefstroom

Date of arrest: May 20, 1986

Date of death: May 20, 1986

Goolam Bismilla was arrested at work in connection with house-breaking charges. His father was summoned to the police station in the evening and went there, believing he could visit his son or escort him home. Instead, he was told that Goolam was dead. His father claims that his son was in perfect health when he left for work. The police have stated that, during their investigation, Goolam "made a snorting sound and dropped dead." Another person detained at the Potchefstroom police station has told Goolam's father that he heard the boy screaming.

COUNCIL OF UNIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF UNIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA

ASSOCIATION OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF SOUTH AFRICA (ASSOCOM)

COUNCIL OF UNIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA (CUSA)-----
SOUTH AFRICAN FEDERATED CHAMBER OF INDUSTRIES (FCI)

STATEMENT RECORDING SOME AREAS OF JOINT CONCERN AND JOINT

CONVICTION ARISING FROM A MEETING BETWEEN TWO EMPLOYER

ORGANISATIONS (FCI, ASSOCOM) AND THE TRADE UNION FEDERATION (CUSA)

1. THE ORGANISATIONS PARTY TO THIS MEMORANDUM BELIEVE CONFLICTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATION, DISCUSSION AND COMPROMISE. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ESSENCES OF SOUND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO SOUTH AFRICA'S LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEMS. THIS JOINT MEMORANDUM IS AN INDICATION BOTH OF THE GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AS WELL AS AN INDICATION OF THE STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO OVERCOME IT.
2. WE RE-AFFIRM OUR BELIEF IN HUMAN AND TRADE UNION FREEDOMS. THE EMERGENCY PROCLAIMED ON 12 JUNE 1986 AND SUBSEQUENT EMERGENCY REGULATIONS CURTAIL THESE INDIVIDUAL UNION AND EMPLOYER FREEDOMS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS FUNDAMENTALLY HAMPER THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS. THE DETENTION OF UNION REPRESENTATIVES AND COMMUNITY LEADERS CREATES A LEADERSHIP VACUUM IN OUR SOCIETY WHICH DOES NOT BUILD THE TRUST SO ESSENTIAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND SOUND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIP.
4. THE DETENTION OF TRADE UNION LEADERS AND THEIR MEMBERS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS CREATES A CLIMATE FOR ESCALATING TENSION WHICH IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE GRAVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS FACING OUR COUNTRY.

5. FREEDOMS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE BASICALLY INDIVISIBLE. WHEN THESE FREEDOMS ARE THREATENED IN ANY WAY, ALL FREEDOMS IN OUR SOCIETY ARE THREATENED.
6. WE THEREFORE URGE THAT ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE, FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, CEASE AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, THEREFORE, BE BROUGHT TO AN URGENT END.
7. WE REAFFIRM OUR BELIEF IN A UNITED, NON-RACIAL AND DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, WHEREIN THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF ALL CITIZENS ARE PROTECTED.
8. SOUTH AFRICA'S CURRENT CRISIS CAN ULTIMATELY ONLY BE RESOLVED BY INVOLVING ALL LEADERS IN FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY PARTICIPATING IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICA. THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF A FORMULA CAN BE FOUND FOR ALL LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE PRESENTLY IN PRISON, TO PARTICIPATE IN A DEMOCRATIC, NON-VIOLENT POLITICAL PROCESS.
9. THE PARTIES TO THIS MEMORANDUM PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO UNDERTAKE EVERY AVENUE OF PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC ACTION TO SUSTAIN SOUND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS.

ENDS++++

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